Cold War History Research Center Budapest Hungarian Documents on the Iraq-Iran War 1980-1988 Edited by Csaba Békés

### DOCUMENT

# Report to the HSWP Political Committee on the visit of the special envoy of Saddam Hussein in Hungary. (October 13, 1980.)

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Top Secret! Prepared in 7 copies Copy number: <u>1.</u> <u>Attachment</u>: rough translation of written message

#### REPORT

#### for the Political Committee

on Naem Hamid Haddad, Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister, Saddam Hussein's special envoy's visit to Budapest.

The Iraqi party requested on October 7, 1980 that Naem Hamid Haddad carrying Saddam Hussein's message to Comrade Pál Losonczi [Chairman of the Presidential Council] be recieved. (Our embassy reported that the Iraqi president sent special envoys to 27 countries. Naem Hamis Haddad, Deputy Prime Minister, the President of the Iraqi National Assembly was sent to the European Socialist countries /Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Poland).

Comrade Pál Losonczi met the Iraqi special envoy on 10 October, who delivered President Saddam Hussein's written message. Based on the wording of the message it is likely that that the same message was sent to each country.

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translated by Levente Gajdócsi; with the support of the Cold War International History Project, Washington

The message stresses that their aim is to consult with and exchange opinion with the friendly countries over the conflict with Iran, and stresses that the Iraqi leadership intends to enhance the cooperation with the countries friendly to Iraq in the future. It reviews the events preceding to armed conflict and stresses Iraq's readiness for a negotiated settlement.

Naem Hamid added the following to the message.

President Saddam Hussein received him before the departure and informed him that he would meet with friends in Hungary who would understand him. Saddam Hussein sends his kind regards to Comrades János Kádár and Pál Losonczi.

[...]

The Iraqi leadership thoroughly considered the impacts of the war, primarily the dangers of the involvement of the United States. The Iraqi leadership is convinced that the Americans' involvement was coordinated with the Iranian leadership. The aim of holding back the American hostages in Iran is that the Fleet of the United States is already in the area with the aim to "defend friends". It is characteristic of the American behavior that when Hammadi, Iraqi Foreign Minister's made a remark on the delivery of US war material to Iran, Secretary of State Muskie responded that the United States sold weapons and parts to Iran worth of only 50 Million \$. There are American military advisors still staying in Iran.

Iraq is determined to prevent the United States from being involved in the region's affairs; the security of the Arab Gulf and Indian Ocean is the concern of the peoples living there.

Iraq accepted the mediation attempts not from the position of weakness, but from the position of power and even more, it was ready to order an unilateral cease-fire. She accepted the Security Council's call, too.

[...]

Iran's real aims concerning the continuation of the conflict are not known [to Iraq]. The Iraqi leadership can imagine that the Iranian religious leaders' aim is the complete weakening of

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both the Iraqi and Iranian Armies so that, having achieved this, the "Islamic Army" come on stage in order to spread the Islamic Revolution.

In order to prevent the aims of the United States, they consult with their friends, the Socialist countries in the first place. The Iraqi leadership thinks that more pressure needs to be put on the Iranian regime in order to enforce a negotiated settlement on them.

They expect help from their Hungarian friends as well. They ask that we speed up the delivery of military and economic goods necessary for war. They especially ask that we make the Iranian party participate in the peaceful settlement. Iraq is ready to accept the multinational organizations' resolutions calling for a cease-fire and talks and is ready to listen to and review its friends' views and advice.

Comrade Losonczi explained that our friends in Iraq might be right in many issues pertaining to the preceding events, but now what is important is not to consider it, but to do everything possible so that the international tension do not increase, prevent the imperialist circles from [executing] their intentions aimed at intervention.

 $[\ldots]$ 

Our main concern is the danger of the continuation and the escalation of the conflict, thus providing potential for an open intervention by the imperialist forces. Consequently our common aim is the settlement of the conflict and the prevention of the involvement of the imperialist circles. We have to work on it jointly.

## [...]

Comrade Losonczi stressed that according to friendly relations between our countries, we want to meet all our contractual obligations. Due to the war, the execution of our undertakings is not untroubled. The relevant economic and trade organs are working on meeting our previous undertakings, both in the delivery of the special items and the food and other items. We try to speed up certain deliveries, such as meat, canned food, bus parts and machines. We are reviewing the additional request by the Iraqi party.

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Those specialists, who are forced to discontinue their activity, are ready to return as soon as the conditions enable them to do so. We are ready to participate in the restoration of war damages. We wish not to have any problems in our friendly cooperation due to the events.

We have friendly relations with Iraq, also based on the basic principle that we have common aims in the fight against imperialism. We have respected Iraq's anti-imperialist policy, its positive role in the non-aligned movement's anti-imperialist wing and the results of development of the Iraqi economy.

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A member of Naem Haddad's attendance had separate negotiations with Technika Foreign Trade Company [the Hungarian Foreign Trade company for military materials].

Budapest, 13 October, 1980

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