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Report of the Hungarian Embassy in Pyongyang to the foreign minister 9 September 1970

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EXTREMELY CONFIDENTIAL!

MEMORANDUM I.

Pyongyang, September 9, 1970.

/Unintelligible word/

On September 3 there was a meeting for the mission leaders of friendly embassies at the Soviet embassy. The Soviet ambassador gave information on the visit of a party and government delegation to DPRK headed by Deputy Foreign Minister Malik and Comrade Nazurov. Comrade Mim Il Sung received Comrade Malik on August 9 and Comrade Nazurov on August /for a short protocol meeting/ and on August 18. Comrade Malik discussed with him some issues concerning the fall session of UN; he did not have any other task to perform. Comrade Nazurov gave detailed information to Comrade Kim Il Sung on the internal development of the Soviet Union, some issues regarding the new five-year plan, and the negotiations conducted with the Western German government and Nasser. In regard to Cambodia he stressed position of the Soviet Union on this issue which was coordinated with the Vietnamese comrades /Comrade Kim Il Sung was surprised to hear that/. He briefly touched upon some issues of the Asian collective security system. The most important conclusions drawn from these two visits were jointly summarized by the Soviet ambassador, for several identical conclusions could be drawn from both. According to the Soviet ambassador Kim Il Sung said the following at these meetings:

- 1. Recently there have been no significant qualitative changes in the Korean situation. Tension continues to exist. When asked about the press that was writing about the possibility of a war breaking out any minute, he said "words will be words", and then reiterated his earlier remark. The situation was tense at the time of the known provocations, but there is no such danger now he said though the situation is still tense. The press will continue to write the way they always do.
- 2. On the unification of the two countries: there is no change whatsoever in their policy, and they do not count on unification in the near future. The policy of the party on this issue remains the same as it was before. South Korea has its own allies too, and we also have our own allies.
- 3. On the revolutionary party fighting for unification: the establishment of the party shows that there are some forces in South Korea that wish to promote democratic development and unification. This party has its own program. Its program includes the peaceful reunification of the country too.

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- 4. On the unified front of 5 countries /China, Korea, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia/: Imperialist forces have become active in Asia and have actively demonstrated their close relationship with one another. The idea of a unified front of these five countries had to be set against these endeavors. This idea does not have a concrete organization, a concrete action plan, and there is no elaborated tactical plan either.
- 5. On Japan: Comrade Kim Il Sung talked quite a lot on Japanese imperialism several times. He especially stressed the following: the militarization of Japan is already underway and is a real danger to the neighboring countries. Increased vigilance is needed against Japanese imperialism and it has to be revealed in a more effective way. The five countries do not have a concrete action plan in this matter.
- 6. On the Japanese CP: they have good relations with the Japanese CP, but there are significant differences of opinion too. The Japanese CP sees the militarization of Japan differently from the Korean Worker's Party. The leaders of the Japanese CP bring up rather childish arguments against the militarization of Japan, saying that there is no such thing, and it is not possible at all, for it is forbidden by the constitution. The Japanese socialists devote much more attention to this issue than the communists. This is an opportunist mistake of the Japanese CP.
- 7. On China: DPRK should appear as a strong country in the eyes of the enemy. Therefore, it needs allies. Such allies can only be China, the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. This is why DPRK intends to strengthen its relations with China. Their relations contributed to the easing of tension in the region. He also mentioned several well-known arguments for the need to improve relations with China /economic relations, etc./. He stressed several times that DPRK was resolute in its policy of maintaining, improving and developing relations with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, independent of whether the Chinese like it or not /!/. We have he said some differences of opinion with the Chinese on some important issues. These are:
 - a. in domestic policy: contradictions among the people, the people's communes, the policy of big jumps, let every flower flourish, issues of the cultural revolution. /In regard to the latter he stated that they did not agree with it on principle and it does not suit Korea./ But we consider these issues to be internal affairs and we do not wish to interfere with them.
 - b. In foreign policy: they do not agree with the position of China regarding the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. DPRK sees the Soviet Union as a great, friendly nation that build communism. They do not agree with the Chinese view that the support provided by the Soviet Union for anti-imperialist forces is nothing but deception and fraud. In their view the Soviet support for anti-imperialist forces is genuine and very important. They do not agree with the Chinese evaluation of the role of the Soviet Union and the socialist countries in anti-imperialist fight. /They told this things to Chu En Lai too!/ His answer to it was this: "This is your problem, we are also thinking about improving our relations with the Soviet Union."

These are the most important issues on which I can report concerning the two visits. According to the Soviet ambassador comrades Malik and Nazurov on the whole left DPRK with very good impressions.

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