

Students on the Cold War



*New Findings and
Interpretations*

EDITED BY

Csaba Békés and Melinda Kalmár

COLD WAR HISTORY RESEARCH CENTER
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**New Findings and
Interpretations**

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Foreword

The Cold War History Research Center was established in December 1998, as the first scholarly institution founded as a non-profit organization in East Central Europe. The Center is specialized in historical research in the Cold War era, focusing on the former Soviet Bloc. From the outset the Center has been contributing to the flourishing of the "new Cold War history" aimed at transforming the previous one-sided approach based primarily on Western sources, finally into a really international discipline through the systematic exploration of the once top secret documents found in the archives in the former Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc countries. The Center's English language website (www.coldwar.hu), providing a great number of articles, documents, chronologies, bibliographies and finding aids is the only such institution in the former Soviet Bloc and now it is an indispensable resource for international scholars and students interested in the history of the Cold War, Communism, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Bloc. Since 2009 the Center has been affiliated with the Institute of International Studies at Corvinus University of Budapest, and beginning in 2017, also with the Centre for Social Sciences, at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.

The Center works together with researchers and various international cooperating partners from all over the World, among others, the Cold War International History Project at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington DC, the Parallel History Project on Cooperative Security (formerly: on NATO and the Warsaw Pact), the National Security Archive, Washington DC, the Ludwig Boltzmann Institute for Research on War Consequences, Graz and the European Institute, Columbia University, New York.

One of the Center's main projects has been the creation of an extensive English language online Cold War history chronology on East-Central Europe: The Chronology of the Soviet Bloc, 1945–1991. Parts 1, 2 and 3 covering the period 1945–1980 were already available earlier, while Part 4 and 5 up to 1991 were published in December,

2017. All this was made possible by the (unpaid) internship project of the Center which was started in 2009. So far the internationally renowned research activity of the Center has attracted more than 180 interns from Western and Eastern Europe – mostly in the framework of the Erasmus program–, the United States, China, Ukraine, Turkey, Greece; altogether from 33 countries. In 2017 the Center also became an official internship partner of Oxford University.

Since 2010, the Center has also organized an annual two-day English language international student conference on the history of the Cold War, with the participation of BA, MA and PhD students. This volume publishes 29 papers selected from the 144 presentations from 14 countries of the first seven conferences between 2010 and 2016. Our Center proudly presents these excellent research results by motivated students and young would be scholars.

Csaba BÉKÉS

Founding director

Cold War History Research Center

Chapter 1: Explaining the Cold War, debates and representations

Cold War or not? The Institute of World Economy and Politics and the Soviet foreign policy (1943 – 1948)

Andrea BORELLI

Introduction

The literature available on the Institute of World Economy and Politics has reconstructed its role within the Soviet State.¹ During my studies, I have recreated relations between Stalin's power system and the Institute through the analysis of its members especially in times of cooperation between the Soviet Union and Western democracies in which pro-Western positions emerged in Soviet Union.²

The article is based on various original sources available in the Russian language:

- The Journal of the Institute "Economy and World Politics", published from 1926 to 1947.
- A vast array of documents conserved at the Archives of the Russian Academy of the Science in Moscow (Archivy Rossiskoi Akademi Nauk: ARAN) and at the Russian State Archive of the social-political history (Rossijskij Gosudarsvennyj Archiv Social'no- politiceskoj Istorii: RGASPI).

Furthermore, this paper is of significance because these documents are not yet available to the international scientific community.

The research is based on the methodological guidelines suggested by Anna Di Biagio. She reconstructed the archival sources and the Soviet newspapers learning the crucial role of Bolshevik political culture in the development of Soviet foreign policy at the late 1920s. Moreover, the works of Silvio Pons regarding the relationship between ideology

¹ G. Duda, *Jenő Varga und die Geschichte des Instituts für Weltwirtschaft und Weltpolitik in Moskau 1921-1970. Zu den Möglichkeiten und Grenzen wissenschaftlicher Auslandsanalyse in der Sowjetunion*, Akademie Verlag, Berlin, 1994; O. Eran, *Mezhdunarodniki an assessment of professional expertise in the making of Soviet foreign policy*, Turtle Dove Press, Tel Aviv, 1979.

² A. Borelli, *Ideologia e Realpolitik. L'Istituto di economia e politica mondiale e la politica estera sovietica*, Aracne, Roma.

and *Realpolitik* during the Stalin era have been central for my research.³ In regards to the years of 1928 to 1948, I have shared the thesis on the "specificity" of Stalinism⁴ and the idea that Stalin's regime represented a driving force for the modernization of Russia.⁵

In the last three years, I looked in greater depth at those cultural norms and values, a contradictory but effective mix of nationalism and socialist internationalism, which characterized the Stalinist leadership.⁶ Furthermore, during my work, the study of the Soviet political culture and the relationship between the intellectual world and the leadership in the Soviet Union has been useful.

My hypothesis is that this relationship has determined, in the past as well as today, the Kremlin's choice between a policy of cooperation or isolation toward the Western countries. For those reasons, the history of the Institute of World Economy and Politics helps to show that the Soviet political culture combined with the perception of external threats played a decisive role in the elaboration and legitimization of the foreign policy of the Kremlin. Here new elements are included: soviet political culture and perception of external threats.

The *miroviki*⁷ and Eugene Varga

The Institute of World Economy and Politics was born as a center for studies of international relations to help the Kremlin in 1924.⁸ The first Director of the Institute was Fyodor Rothstein. Rothstein was a member of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, Narkomindel, and was the head of a bureau that studied international relations. With his colleagues at this bureau, he was appointed as director of the Institute

³ S. Pons, *Stalin e la guerra inevitabile 1936-1941*, Einaudi, Torino, 1995 [Stalin and the inevitable War].

⁴ S. Fitzpatrick, (ed.), *Stalinism: New Directions*. Routledge, New York, 2000.

⁵ S. Kotkin, *Magnetic Mountain Stalinism as a Civilization*, University of California Press, Los Angeles, 1997.

⁶ D. Brandenberger, *National Bolshevism: Stalinist Mass Culture and the Formation of Modern Russian National Identity, 1931-1956*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2002; D.L. Hoffmann, *Stalinist Values: The Cultural Norms of Soviet Modernity, 1917-1941*, Cornell University Press, 2003.

⁷ Miroviki stands for *globalists* in English. Originally it's written in Russian as мировики

⁸ Institut Mirovogo Chozjaistva i Mirovoj Politiki", in 'Izvestija', 19 December 1924

in 1924. Several members of the Institute were important members of the Party also, such as Preobraženskij, Radek, and Rakovskij.

During the early years, the Institute had two different functions: studying capitalist countries and international relations in general. Additionally, it was also controlled by the Trotskyist faction. For example, Trotsky wrote the first article published by the Institute's journal. During the Stalinist power consolidation, after the defeat of the opposition in the party, the function and role of the Institute changed.

At the end of 1927, Eugene Varga was named Director of the Institute and members close to Trotsky were expelled.⁹ In the 1930s, the Institute played a crucial role in the ideological justification of foreign policy and in collecting information about the capitalist world. The fate of the Institute was linked to Varga.¹⁰ For example, during the *Great Terror*, his personal relationship with Stalin allowed the survival of the Institute. Stalin intervened directly to protect Varga and his colleagues and allowed the spread of the *miroviki's* non-dogmatic interpretation of the world political and economic system with the goal of justifying his choices in foreign policy.

Most of the works on Varga tend to describe him either as a loyal advisor of Stalin or as a non-dogmatic thinker. Regarding the first interpretation, Varga was never accused of treason, but between 1947 and 1948 he was persecuted because he was Jewish. Regarding the second trend, Varga was considered as a non-dogmatic thinker because he showed also, his opposition to the Stalin's foreign policy. This article will aim to go beyond these two views, framing Varga's contributions in the wider debate about the formation of the Soviet foreign policy during Stalin's regime.

Eugene Varga grew up and studied in Budapest, where he was born in 1879 in a Jewish family. Influenced in his youth by the Marxist ideology, he joined the Social-Democratic Party in 1906 and then the Hungarian Communist Party. During the short-lived Hungarian Soviet Republic, the political regime established in 1919, he became

⁹ Aran, Fond 354, Opis 1, Delo 22.

¹⁰ A. Di Biagio, "L'Urss e l'Occidente nell'analisi di E.S. Varga", in A. Masoero e A. Venturi (a cura di), *Il pensiero sociale russo. Modelli stranieri e contesto nazionale*, Milano, Franco Angeli, 2000.

Minister of Finance, a position that forced him to find protection in Moscow, amidst a period of repression that followed the collapse of the republic. At this point, his career took off. He worked for the Comintern thanks to Lenin's support, becoming first the head of the Information Bureau and a member of the *plenum* of the IKKI (the Executive Committee of the Third Communist International). The Information Bureau was re-named as "Bureau Varga", demonstrating the prestige achieved by the economist during the 1920s.¹¹ However, the most important achievement for Varga's career came with the Institute of World Economy and Politics. Here, Varga found a proper environment to discuss his thesis with a team of highly specialized colleagues.

In 1931, Rothstein and many of his colleagues were expelled and the Institute, led by Varga, lost its connection with the Narkomindel. The Institute's members became the *miroviki* ("globalists" in English), a group of scholars highly specialized in the study of capitalist economy, politics and ideological propaganda. In 1936, the Institute entered the Academy of Sciences of the Soviet Union, which was established that same year.¹² The *miroviki* and Varga shared a multicultural background, the knowledge of various foreign languages, and an open-minded attitude towards capitalist dynamics. During Stalin's regime, they represented an important part of the Russian intellectual world quite different from the nineteenth-century *intelligentsia*.

The *miroviki* were not just strongly influenced by the political regime, as occurred in the past, but also they played an organic role in the new state. Indeed, they were researchers and bureaucrats at the same time. As researchers, they could access to a vast range of rare sources about the capitalist world such as foreign academic publications and international press. As bureaucrats, they were required to provide all this information to state institutions and to the Communist Party to support their activities. This status as both scholars and members of the Soviet bureaucratic pyramid made them less independent than most Western intellectuals. For this reasons, they cannot be considered an independent political group in the traditional sense, and they could not criticize or directly influence the foreign policy of the regime. However, their work

¹¹ RGASPI, F. 504, Op. 1, D. 1.

¹² Aran, F. 1993, Op. 1, D. 1.

must not be underestimated. In several ways, they contributed to a deeper and non-dogmatic understanding of the development of capitalism and over the international relations. During the 1930s, the Institute organized a three-year course about these topics. Many graduates worked at the Institute or at other Soviet academies and state institutions. The *miroviki* were the first official think tank on international relations in the Soviet Union.

In contrast to most of the Soviet political elite, Varga and the *miroviki* maintained a more positive attitude towards Western Europe during the Stalin era, shared by the pre-revolutionary *intelligentsia*, and consequently, with the rise of the Cold War, they faced the consequences of these sympathies.

When Stalin consolidated his dictatorship in 1927 and 1928, the catastrophic interpretation became the official one. Consequently, during the first half of the 1930s, scholars of the capitalist world, under the pressure of Stalin's regime, adopted a more dogmatic view of international relations. However, in 1934, with the rise of "collective security" campaign and Popular Fronts against Fascism, Varga and his colleagues could again advocate pro-Western positions. In these ways, they legitimized collaboration between the Soviet Union and "bourgeois democracies" against Hitler's Germany.

After the agreement with Nazi Germany, the Institute reworked the previous analysis and played a propagandist role against the Western democracies, but this situation changed with the outbreak of the Great Patriotic War, when Varga and his colleagues proposed again a pro-Western position.

These pro-Western opinions were not only a response to the new international situation, but also the natural development of the positions that the *miroviki* had already proposed during their career. They were convinced that the integration of the USSR into the Post-War international system would be the natural and better choice for the Kremlin.

From the Second World War to Cold War

In 1946, Varga published his most famous work, *Changes in the Economy of Capitalism as a result of the Second World War*, a collection of essays from the journal of the Institute.¹³ The analysis was based on the concrete observation of the ongoing economic changes that occurred during the War in the global scenario. According to Varga, the analogies between Soviet and Western models were progressively growing. In particular, the emerging role of the state in the capitalist economies looked like the crucial element shared between the two systems.

This trend would entail three main changes. First, it would facilitate the transformation of the capitalist economic model into a socialist one. This would be linked to the rise of new forms of collaboration between social-democratic parties and the communists, inspired by the French and Spanish "popular fronts". Second, the USSR would be integrated into the new world system, contributing, for example, to the creation of a new international organization for global security.

Third, the Eastern European countries, which were now under the influence of Moscow, would develop democratic socialist systems, which he defined as "democracies of a new type". This transition would reflect also the national peculiarities and respect political pluralism without being forced into the Soviet model.

Varga and his colleague's analysis implied a peaceful evolution of capitalism, which contradicted Lenin's notion of the "inevitability of the war" under capitalism. The *miroviki* suggested that not just peaceful coexistence would be possible, but also the cooperation and integration between socialist and capitalist states.

In 1946, it was remarkable that those ideas were not censored, and it suggests the persistence of some cultural openness and pluralism in the post-war Soviet *intelligentsia* and establishment about the future of international relations. 1946 was a chaotic year for the Soviet relationship with Western countries which was marked by "insecurity" across the entire decision-making process in foreign policy. Between 1943 and 1947, no

¹³ E.S. Varga, *Izmeniia v ekonomike kapitalizma v itoge vtoroy mirovoy voyny*, Gosudartvennoe izdatel'stvo politicheskoy literatury, Moskva, 1946

dogmatic project oriented Stalin's foreign policy and even a possible collaboration with the Western countries was seriously considered by the regime. It is in this context that the non-dogmatic positions of *miroviki* can be framed. Those theories could circulate because in 1946, they could still provide an ideological basis for possible cooperation between West and Soviet Union.

This kind of relationship between the Institute and Stalin implied that *miroviki* analysis began to be inconvenient as soon as the international and domestic situation changed at the beginning of the Cold War.

In 1947 and 1948, Varga and his colleagues were accused of being “reformists” and “anti-Marxist”. A public discussion of Varga’s book was organized for 7, 14 and 21 May 1947.¹⁴ Konstantin Ostrovitianov, a dogmatic soviet economist, criticized Varga and his colleagues for asserting that the struggle between socialist and capitalist countries had been halted during the Second World War. In other words, the Institute was an anti-Soviet centre of capitalist propaganda.

In his reply, Varga defended himself and the *miroviki* from the accusation of being reformist, declaring, “I regret very much if the comrades who have expressed criticism here are of the opinion that I have insufficiently recognised my mistakes. There is nothing to do about it. It would be dishonest if I were to admit this or that accusation while inwardly not admitting it”. This meeting reflected the confusion and confrontation within the Soviet Union in the first months of 1947.

In 1947, the Marshall Plan and the foundation of Cominform changed the international situation. At the end of the year, the Institute was closed. Varga asked in vain for Stalin's help, but this did not change the destiny of the institute. Nevertheless, Stalin may have reserved preferential treatment to Varga due to his reputation. While most of the *miroviki* were deported to the Siberian Gulag, Varga was not arrested and he was allowed to work and live in Moscow. Fifty members of Varga’s former institute were

¹⁴ Diskussija po knige E.S. Varga ‘Izmenenija v ekonomike kapitalizma v itoge vtoroj mirovoj vojny’, in *Mirovaja Chozjajstva i Mirovye Politiki*, N° 11, 1947.

dismissed and some were arrested. The Institute of World Economy and Politics was closed and re-organized under the umbrella of the new Institute of Economy.¹⁵ There were no reasons to justify the work of the *miroviki* and to tolerate further ideological pluralism. As shown by the statements from meetings held in October of 1948 in the new institute, the works of Varga and his colleagues continued to be debated and harshly criticized by central authorities.¹⁶ At the conference, Varga argued that the new imperialist war against Soviet Union was “highly improbable”. This point of view was incompatible with the Cold War and the participants of the meeting, including his former colleagues, attacked Varga. Furthermore, during the discussion, the *miroviki* rejected their own analysis and admitted to being “reformist” and anti-Marxist.

At last, Varga repented publicly on 15 March 1949, when he published a letter to the editor in *Pravda*¹⁷. Varga argued that he had been the “first scientist in the Soviet Union to oppose the Marshall Plan publicly” and that he wasn’t a “pro-Western scholar” because “today, in the present historical circumstances, that would mean being a counter-revolutionary, an Anti-Soviet traitor to the working class”. The Cold War had begun.

Three major changes that occurred at both national and international level can explain these decisions towards Varga and the work of the Institute:

- 1) the new order established by the Marshall Plan in 1947;
- 2) the spread of a shared anti-Western attitude in the Soviet Union after the Second World War;
- 3) the transformation of Stalin’s power.

The introduction of the Marshall Plan changed the state of international affairs. Stalin re-adopted a more dogmatic interpretation of relations between the USSR and the Western countries, based on the idea that no collaboration could persist to justify the

¹⁵ “Ob Institute ekonomiki i Institute mirovogo chozjajstva i mirovoj politiki”, in *Akademija Nauk v rešenijach Politbjuro CK RKP(b)-VKP(b)-KPSS 1922-1991*, Sost. V. D. Esakov, Moskva, Rosspen, 2000, p. 361

¹⁶ «Voprosy Ekonomičeskie», N° 8, 1948.

¹⁷ ‘Pravda’, 15 March, 1949.

rise of the new bipolar order.¹⁸ It must also be added that during the Second World War, the propaganda of the regime promoted feelings of patriotism, the need for national unity and Soviet superiority. The Soviet identity became more and more flattered by Russian nationalism. For example, let's think about Zhdanov's propaganda, approved by the dictator and orchestrated in 1946 against some segments of the *intelligentsia* accused of admiring Western countries during the Second World War. As known, Zhdanov combined anti-cosmopolitan and anti-Semitic feelings.¹⁹

Finally, in the second half of the 1940s, Stalin began to manage his power in even more paranoid and authoritarian ways than in the past. He eliminated most of his closest allies such as Molotov, Mikoian and Vorošilov. In this context, Varga's point of view was naturally no longer necessary to the regime.²⁰

Conclusion

To sum up, the experience of Varga and the Institute of World Economy and Politics provides fresh insights to the debate about the role of ideology in Soviet political strategies and the origin of the Cold War. The ideology played a crucial role at the beginning of the Cold War, but it was not monolithic. The experience of Institute clearly shows that intellectual efforts to facilitate the cooperation with the Western countries existed in the 1940s, though the repression against Varga and his colleagues showed why pro-Western position remained marginal and couldn't halt the advent of Cold War. While in the 1930s and 1940s Stalin was interested in the *miroviki's* nondogmatic analysis, he later condemned them when his strategic goals changed. This article argues that the *miroviki* were persecuted in 1947 and 1948 because they were Jews as well as

¹⁸ S.D. Parrish and Narinskij, M.M. "The turn toward confrontation: the soviet reaction to the Marshall Plan, 1947: two reports", *Cold War International History Project Working Paper* N° 9; G. Roberts, "Moscow and the Marshall Plan: Politics, Ideology and the Onset of the Cold War", 1947, in *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol.46, N° 8, 1994.

¹⁹ Mezhdunarodnyj fond demokratiia Rossiia XX Vek (ed.), *Stalin i kosmopolitizm 1945-1953 dokumenty*, ROOSPEN, Moskva, 2005; N. Klementsov, *Stalinist Science*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1997; B. Tromly, *Making the Soviet Intelligentsia: Universities and Intellectual Life under Stalin and Khrushchev*, Cambridge University Press, 2013.

²⁰ Y. Gorlizki, "Ordinary Stalinism: The Council of Ministers and the Soviet Neo-patrimonial State, 1946-1953", in *Journal of Modern History* 74, N° 4, 2002, pp. 699-736; O.V. Khlevniuk, *Master of the House: Stalin and His Inner Circle*, Yale University Press, 2009; J. Arch Getty, *Practicing Stalinism Bolsheviks, Boyars, and the Persistence of Tradition*, Yale University Press, 2013.

reformist thinkers. In these years, the regime began a propaganda campaign against the Jewish people accused of being pro-Western and of having anti-patriotic feelings. The end of the Institute shows the transformation of the USSR and mentality of the establishment during Stalinism. At the end of the war, after twenty years of Stalin's regime, the nation was dominated by nationalistic feelings. However, part of Soviet *intelligentsia* (especially the *miroviki* and the diplomats) rejected those feelings and proposed a collaborative foreign policy with the European countries.

In this context, 1948 represents the turning point. At this time, Stalin condemned every interpretation of international relations that could weaken the balance of the bipolar order and the superiority of the Soviet system. In other words, part of the Soviet political culture justified the collaboration with Western countries, but Stalin was unfit to oversee that dialogue. The members of the Institute participated in the peculiar struggle of modern Russian history: the dialectical struggle in the Russian *intelligentsia* and establishment between anti-European/isolationist and pro-European/integrationist positions.

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The Logic of Force: Henry Kissinger's PhD dissertation about the sense of insecurity and the origins of the Cold War

Sara RODA

Introduction

In early 1954, Henry Kissinger, student in the Department of Government at Harvard University, completed his PhD dissertation on the European path from Napoleonic revolutionary chaos to the international order created at the Vienna Congress. The title of his thesis was *Peace, Legitimacy, and the Equilibrium (A Study of the Statesmanship of Castlereagh and Metternich)*, later published under the title *A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace 1812-1822*.²¹ There is a gossip that tells that when Kissinger chose this topic, his colleagues from the Department of Government were quite surprised and suggested him moving to the History Department.²² I would like to note that history was at that time considered out of fashion. In the post-war era, students and professors at most of the American Universities were mainly concerned with international relations, particularly between the Soviet Union and the United States. That is why historical work focused on 19th century European policy seemed out-of-date. Despite this suggestion, Kissinger did not relent. Later, when he was already a well-known politician, he even admitted in an interview for *The New York Times* that: "I think of myself as a historian more than as a statesman."²³

However, to think that the future diplomat and Secretary of State would be content just with analyzing Napoleon's and Metternich's political moves is mistaken. Rather, *A World Restored* is an analysis of the relations between two main powers on the

²¹ H. Kissinger, *A World Restored, Castlereagh, Metternich and the Restoration of Peace 1812-1822*, London 1957 (also: Boston 1957, New York 1964). In this essay all the quotations will be taken from the London edition.

²² W. Isaacson, *Kissinger. A Biography*, London – Boston 1992, p. 74.

²³ *Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for the New York Times*, "Department of State Bulletin", Vol. 71, N° 1846, November 11, 1974, p. 629.

international arena. For his theory, Kissinger chose historical background but I think that the general rules illustrated by the 19th century examples could be applied to many other political situations.

Kissinger's dissertation had one more aim: to present the European method of diplomacy in the US. Certainly of great importance for Kissinger's views was his origin. Due to his German roots, he understood the mentality and the European way of conducting foreign policy. He shaped his views based on European philosophy: "His conservatism is more Hegelian than Burkean, more German than Anglo-Saxon, and more European than American."²⁴ Such an understanding of political theory and the history was missing in the American tradition. For Americans, the freedom of nations was the overriding principle. Since Wilson's political philosophy expressed by the League of Nations did not work on the European political stage, the Americans did not tolerate anything connected with the European way of foreign policy that minimized the development of nations and is based on the disagreement between countries. They did not understand the rules of the European policymaking, because they looked at it through the prism of America's own isolated, privileged position:²⁵ "We never had to face the problem of security until the end of the Second World War, so we could afford to be very idealistic and insist on the pure implementation of our maxims."²⁶

In 1969, Kissinger as President Nixon's national security advisor wrote, "in the years ahead, the most profound challenge to American policy will be philosophical: to develop some concept of order in a world which is bipolar militarily but multipolar politically. But the philosophical deepening will not come easily to those brought up in the American tradition of foreign policy."²⁷ Understanding *A World Restored* is possible only by realizing why Kissinger dealt with the analysis of the Congress of Vienna and

²⁴ B. Mazlish, *Kissinger. The European Mind in American Policy*, New York 1976, p. 155. Kissinger refers to Burke also in *A World Restored*, p. 192-195; H. A. Kissinger, "The Conservative Dilemma: Reflections on the Political Thought of Metternich", *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 48, N° 4 (December 1954), pp. 1017-1030, p. 1018-1019.

²⁵ M. Howard, "The World According to Henry. From Metternich to Me", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 73, N° 3 (May - June 1994), pp. 132-140, pp. 132, 138-140.

²⁶ *Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for the New York Times*, "Department of State Bulletin", Vol. 71, N° 1846, November 11, 1974, p. 630.

²⁷ H. A. Kissinger, *American Foreign Policy: Three essays*, New York 1969, p. 79.

the politicians who built the so-called “Metternich system.” The way Kissinger wrote his text indicated that his purpose was not to provide the reader with specific events taking place in Europe in the period 1812-1822. Strictly historical data was marginalized in favor of philosophical arguments about the nature of international relations and historical events as examples. Kissinger was also not overly interested in the biographies of Lord Castlereagh and Metternich.

He presented a fairly detailed picture of these politicians due to his individualistic view of the history, but more important for him were the problems these politicians confronted. Furthermore, he chose after the post-Napoleonic period because he believed it reflected his own times. Kissinger himself explained that he decided to deal with post-revolutionary Europe because it was “a decade which throws these problems into sharp relief: the conclusion and the aftermath of the wars of the French Revolution. Few periods illustrate so well the dilemma posed by the appearance of a revolutionary power, the tendency of terms to change their meaning and of even the most familiar relationships to alter their significance.”²⁸

In 1957 Kissinger published another book,²⁹ *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*,³⁰ which quickly became a bestseller. At first glance, it seems that contrary to *A World Restored*, the topic of *Nuclear Weapons* was more fitting to modern trends. However, both books presented certain contemporary ideas. Stephen Graubard³¹ wrote in the biography of Henry Kissinger that “few who read *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* were at all aware of Kissinger’s other interests; not many who read that book thought it necessary to look also at *A World Restored*. Had they done so, they would have noticed at once the extent to which Kissinger made use in the nuclear weapons volume of insights drawn from his early-nineteen-century researches. [...] Some of the most important concepts in *Nuclear Weapons* derived from the prolonged, almost leisurely

²⁸ H. A. Kissinger, *A World Restored*, p. 3.

²⁹ *A World Restored* was published the same year, but few months later than *Nuclear Weapons*; see: S. R. Graubard, *Kissinger. Portrait of a Mind*, New York, 1973, p. 13.

³⁰ *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, New York, 1957.

³¹ Stephen R. Graubard was born in 1924. He got PhD degree at Harvard University. He was a colleague of Henry Kissinger since their studies at Harvard University. Also, they conducted together the Harvard International Seminar in its inaugural year. Graubard was professor of history at Brown University in Providence.

study that Kissinger had made of diplomacy and politics in the Napoleonic era.”³² A few years earlier, in 1946, American *charge d'affaires* in Moscow George F. Kennan wrote the most famous diplomatic telegram to Harry Truman. His message from February 22, 1946 became known as the “Long Telegram.” After Second World War, the direction of Soviet policy was not clear for the U.S.

First sign of the direction was provided by Stalin in his speech, made on February 9, 1946. He announced the policy based on the concept of permanent and inevitable conflict of interests between capitalism and communism. Also he threatened conflict with any opponent of the communist system. Stalin’s speech explicitly determines the path of Soviet post-war policy.³³

Kennan was asked to write an interpretive analysis of Soviet Union policy, its motives and expectations of the Soviet behavior after implementation of their policy³⁴. That’s why Kennan wrote this over 5,500-words long telegram. His text was not only an in-depth analysis of Soviet policy, but also a presentation on the historical background and motives of Soviet government actions, information about Russian society and communist ideology. Moreover, it contained suggestions for the U.S. on how they should respond to inflexible and aggressive Stalin’s policy. The “Long Telegram” shaped American foreign policy in the post-war period. Kennan became known as a “father” of the strategy of containment.³⁵ A modified version of ‘Long Telegram’ was published in 1947 in *Foreign Affairs*, under the title “The Sources of Soviet Conduct.”³⁶ For political reasons, the author was hidden under the letter “X.”

³² S. R. Graubard, op. cit., p. 13.

³³ A. Bógdał-Brzezińska, *Ewolucja doktryny i koncepcji polityki zagranicznej Stanów Zjednoczonych u progu zimnej wojny*, in *Historia. Stosunki międzynarodowe. Amerykanistyka. Księga Jubileuszowa na 65-lecie Profesora Wiesława Dobrzyckiego*, ed. S. Bieleń, Warszawa 2001, pp. 73-121.

³⁴ *The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State*, in: United States Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946*, Vol. VI: *Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union (1946)*, p. 696, note 44. [University of Wisconsin Digital Collection: <http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS>]

³⁵ J. L. Gaddis, *Strategie powstrzymywania. Analiza polityki bezpieczeństwa narodowego Stanów Zjednoczonych w okresie zimnej wojny [Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War]*, trans. Piotr Ostaszewski, Warszawa, 2007, p. 43-80.

³⁶ X [G. F. Kennan], *The Sources of Soviet Conduct*, “Foreign Affairs”, Vol. 25 (1947), №. 4, pp. 566-582.

In my essay, I will present a partial analysis of Kissinger's *A World Restored*. First of all, I will focus on his theory on the world powers and rivalry among them as shown in Napoleonic France. Next, I will briefly discuss the basic features of the Soviet Union demonstrated in Kennan's 'Long Telegram.' Finally, I will compare these two texts and propose that Kissinger took certain basic ideas for his book from Kennan's telegram. I believe that actually he was writing about the features of Soviet Union through the example of France ruled by Napoleon.

A world restored

The period of the French Revolution and Napoleonic era changed the European continent so drastically that a return to the old order was impossible. Politicians that gathered in Vienna seemed aware of this. They knew also that Europe was tired of wars and revolutions, which was why a return to a peaceful existence was the only way of conducting international policy. At this moment Europe was ready for the first time in history to create an international order based on a balance of power.³⁷ Therefore, the main role of the Congress was the pursuit of the *Iustum Equilibrium* and legitimacy, as well as the fight against any manifestation of power. *Iustum Equilibrium* means to stabilize the international arena with the balance of power, and its main proponent was the United Kingdom. Legitimacy means regarding the internal order and lawful validation of the monarch's power. Supporters of this principle were Talleyrand and Metternich. These two concepts are key for understanding the Congress of Vienna and Kissinger's analysis in *A World Restored*.

Kissinger based the history of Napoleonic era on the contrasts. He presented a bipolar vision of the international relations between European powers. Every basic element of this world has its opposition. The first and basic pair of oppositions in his conception is the opposition between two international orders, "legitimate" and "revolutionary". These two forces define the nature of international relations. There can be "legitimate" power and "revolutionary" power. Legitimate power accepts the frameworks of the

³⁷ H. A. Kissinger, *Dyplomacja [Diplomacy]*, trans. S. Głąbiński, G. Woźniak, I. Zych, Warszawa, 1996, s. 81.

international order, while the revolutionary state opposes the international system: “Whenever there exists a power which considers the international order or the manner of legitimizing it oppressive, relations between it and other powers will be revolutionary. In such cases, it was not the adjustment differences within a given system which will be at issue, but the system itself.”³⁸ Every state can belong only one or the other and were thus “very distinct categories.”³⁹

Kissinger based his theory of legitimacy on the philosophy of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), echoing his question of what can make authority legitimate?⁴⁰ The Enlightenment philosopher developed the theory of ‘The Social Contract’ in regards to the legitimacy of power. The theory states a group gives up its freedom for universal sovereignty resulting in a single ‘social body’ with each member as an integral part. This “social body” creates a certain framework which becomes the general law.⁴¹ Kissinger generalized this theory, replacing the unit with the state and society with the international community. The rules that define international order became general framework accepted by the individual states.⁴² If power undermines this international order, it was defined by Kissinger as revolutionary.

According to Kissinger, France in the Napoleonic era was a revolutionary power. He wrote: “There have been societies, such as United States or Britain, in the nineteenth century, which have been basically conservative. [...] There have been others, such as France over a century, where all issues have been basically revolutionary”.⁴³ In the book *A World Restored*, Kissinger built the opposition of Napoleonic France and two kinds of legitimate powers, conservative and continental Austria and isolationist, insular Great Britain. I will not write about these powers because they need separate analysis. However, it’s very interesting that even between two legitimate powers, Kissinger saw them in opposition, for different reasons, but still contrasting with each other. I emphasize further that Kissinger based all his concepts on duality and contrasts. Below,

³⁸ H. Kissinger, *A World Restored*, p. 2.

³⁹ S. R. Graubard, *op. cit.*, p. 17.


⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 3.

⁴¹ J. J. Rousseau, *Umowa społeczna [The Social Contract]*, trans. A. Peretiatkiewicz, Kęty 2002.

⁴² H. A. Kissinger, *A World Restored*, p. 4.

⁴³ Ibid., p. 192.

I present the diagram of the basic concept of the book *A World Restored*. Black arrows show the point of inevitable conflict.



Back to my main topic, Napoleon's problem was not fighting, but stabilizing the external and internal field. After 1807, he already defeated Austria and Prussia and entered the alliance with Russia. There was no more serious opponent to fight. Now he had to create stability and maintain his power, which is when his problems started. Kissinger wrote: "For now, the incommensurability between Napoleon's material and moral base was apparent, the intermediary powers had been eliminated, the time of unlimited victories gained by limited wars was over. Victory henceforth would depend on domestic strength, and Napoleon, having failed to establish a principle of obligation to maintain his conquest, would find his power sapped by the constant need for the application of force."⁴⁴

There are two possibilities in building the internal structure. It can be based on loyalty or on duty. Stable order builds its internal structure on duty, which is followed by a notion of responsibility. It is not connected with the individual, current ruler but with the individual sense of responsibility for the state. On the contrary, loyalty is typical

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 16.

with revolutionary power. This loyalty is to an individual or group of individuals. People are united in absolute obedience to the ruler. The ruler is strong, unless somebody undermines his authority. In the structure based on loyalty, it is not important that power is right or wrong or its rules are good or bad for the state, but its power. In this system, transferring power from one individual to another is a mortal danger to the stability of the state.⁴⁵ Internal order built on a sense of duty leads citizens to accept principles for the good of society. In this case, transfer of power from one person to another, within the same model, does not threaten the stability of the state. However, the ruler, whose power is based on loyalty feels insecure. In consequence, this insecurity is followed by “the constant need for the application of force.” Napoleon established his power based on loyalty, and thus with the first defeat, he could lose everything. Therefore, in order to maintain his power, he always referred to the possibility of force. Napoleon is an example of a ruler who believed that power based on loyalty could survive even with the help of force, but as Kissinger said, “force may conquer the world but it could not legitimize itself.”⁴⁶

The second problem of the revolutionary power is the coexistence with other states. This is also connected with the legitimization of the power. For Napoleon, the only justification of his rules was force. It was the reason why he could not admit that his power was limited. If he admitted this, it would mean that somebody was stronger in some aspect. For revolutionary power, showing the limits is the beginning of its collapse. Kissinger wrote in *A World Restored*, “for Napoleon, everything depended on exhibiting his continuing omnipotence; for Metternich, on demonstrating the limitations of French power.”⁴⁷ However, every power that wants to have peaceful relations with other countries has to find its place in the international system within framework of this structure. Negotiations are part of the process of “finding own place”, which is why the art of diplomacy and negotiations are necessary for every state. But negotiation requires every state to admit its own limits. For revolutionary power, this again results in the sense of insecurity, and in consequence, the use of force. “A man who has been used to command finds it almost impossible to learn to negotiate, because negotiation is an

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 192.

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 17.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 43.

admission of finite power.”⁴⁸ If revolutionary power cannot use diplomacy as a tool for external contacts, the only tool that persists is force. “A ruler legitimized by charisma or by force cannot easily accept the fact that henceforth he must seek his safety in self-limitation, that events are no longer subject to his will, that peace depends not on his strength but on his recognition of the power of others.”⁴⁹ Acceptance of this self-limitation does not fit into the revolutionary rulers vision of the world as he knows that it would lead to the recognition of other powers in a certain area. Hence, a situation in which there is a natural threat to the revolutionary power would arise, which creates a sense of insecurity and again of the necessity of using force.

The main features of a revolutionary power and legitimate power is presented in the table, showing also the oppositions marked by Kissinger in *A World Restored*:

Revolutionary power	Legitimate power
Does not accept the framework of the international order.	Accepts the framework of the international order.
Undermines the system itself.	It just needs matching individual differences within the system.
Looking for a way to legitimize itself	It becomes legitimate by social acceptance, or at least the major powers.
It creates a situation in which one country feels absolutely safe and others fully insecure. There is therefore a risk of continuous revolution in the dissatisfied countries.	It creates a situation where no country feels completely safe, but there is not one that would be absolutely in danger. None of the members of the international structure is unhappy enough to lead to a social explosion.
Nothing can satisfy it besides complete elimination of the enemy.	It achieves relative satisfaction through balance.
It considers itself to be all-powerful and not limited. War is the only means of communication.	Conflicts are possible, but they have their limits. War is conducted in the name of preserving existing structures.
The only form of communication with other countries are power, war or arms race.	The main form of communication with other countries is diplomacy.
It is based on loyalty to the ruler.	It is based on the duty and respect to the established structures.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 63.

As we can see, according to Kissinger's concept, revolutionary power has problems in both building internal order and in forging stable relations with other countries. In both cases, Napoleon came to the same point, a sense of insecurity, to a revolutionary state is resolved force. Kissinger explains that the basic motive of using force is almost in any case insecurity. It should be noted that the motives of the revolutionary power do not have to be negative:


To be sure, the motivation of the revolutionary power may well be defensive; it may well be sincere in its protestations of feeling threatened. But the distinguishing feature of a revolutionary power is not that it feels threatened, such feeling is inherent in the nature of international relations based on sovereign states, but that nothing can reassure it. Only absolute security, the neutralization of the opponent, is considered a sufficient guarantee, and thus the desire of one power for absolute security means absolute insecurity for all the others.⁵⁰

That is why revolutionary power will always use force as a remedy of all problems and at the same time every problem will be based on and cause the sense of insecurity. The only satisfaction for the revolutionary power would be total security, which is excluded in the international order based on balance of the forces. Full security of one country would mean the absolute danger to others. According to this philosophy, revolutionary government seeks to completely eliminate the enemy, because only this can ensure its security. Kissinger stated that legitimate powers cannot apply the tools of diplomacy as methods of contacting the revolutionary power. In this situation, diplomacy is replaced by war or an armaments race⁵¹ and some tools of diplomacy merely have supporting positions.

Before the final part of my essay, I would like to summarize this section by a diagram, presented below. It is a chain of causation of the logic of the revolutionary power. As is visible, every action leads to the sense of insecurity.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 2

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 3.



Long Telegram: The sources of soviet conduct

Kennan points out in his telegram a few main features of the Soviet Union. First, he summarized the main points of Soviet ideology. This is based on antagonism to everything connected with the 'capitalist world.' The Soviets were building an internal order based on this antagonism by demonstrating to society an enemy could justify the need for a dictatorship. Also, it helps mobilize all forces in one direction, in this case led by the Communist Party.⁵² It combined concepts of offense and defense. The Soviet Union was also opposed to the logic of reason, which was replaced by the logic of force. They did not want to help create the international order but instead wanted to defeat the enemies as the only method of defense, which therefore generates a constant feeling of insecurity.⁵³

The author of the telegram also raised the issue of the stability of power in the USSR, which was not yet validated. This issue is connected with the transfer of power from

⁵² X [G. F. Kennan], *The Sources of Soviet Conduct*, p. 570.

⁵³ Ibid., p. 557.

one person to another. Kennan wrote that it had not been fully tested.⁵⁴ This problem was also raised by Kissinger in *A World Restored*. If there was a change in the object of the loyalty, than it was not sure that this new person would be accepted. This loyalty of the Soviet society was based on the fact that nobody tried to officially undermine the authority of the government. As Kennan wrote, there was no objective truth in the Soviet Union, it was created by Party, because they represented the embodiment of the “ultimate wisdom” and the logic of history.⁵⁵ If anybody tried to undermine the authority, he would be defeated by force.

Kennan also wrote about the problem in the external relations of the Soviet Union in that “at the bottom of the Kremlin’s neurotic view of world affairs is traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity.”⁵⁶ Kennan sought the motivation of the Soviets in this sense of insecurity. In his article, he wrote, “easily persuaded of their own doctrinaire *rightness*, they insisted on the submission or destruction of all competing power.”⁵⁷ When comparing with Kissinger’s concept of of insecurity and neutralization of the opponents, it seems almost the same.

The last aspect, which I would like to present is the first part of the summary in Kennan’s ‘Long Telegram.’ He wrote that the Soviet Union was “impervious to logic of reason, and it is highly sensitive to the logic of force.”⁵⁸ Kennan often brings up this primacy of the logic of force. In any case, the U.S. should have supposed that the Soviets would use force. Again it was very similar to Kissinger theory. Force is a final result of every action. It was best for anyone who had contact with the revolutionary power to assume that the force would be used. Similarly, it was best to assume that the Soviet Union was able to use the force in any case.

⁵⁴ G. F. Kennan, *Telegraphic Message from Moscow of February 22, 1946*, in: G. F. Kennan, *Memoirs 1925-1950*, Boston-Toronto 1957, p. 558.

⁵⁵ X [G. F. Kennan], *op. cit.*, p. 573.

⁵⁶ G. F. Kennan, *op. cit.*, p. 549.

⁵⁷ X [G. F. Kennan], *op. cit.*, p. 568.

⁵⁸ G. F. Kennan, *op. cit.*, p. 557.

Conclusion

Henry Kissinger presented in his work as a well-defined vision of the world. We get a picture of a bipolar world, in which one force is trying to eliminate the other, creating a constant struggle. Kissinger clearly favored the legitimate authority. Moreover, his vision of the nineteenth-century France is quite often compared to the Soviet Union in the early Cold War period.⁵⁹ We can suppose that the aim of Kissinger was to present that resemblance. However, while reading *A World Restored*, it seemed that the author made a comparison of the two superpowers in the reverse order. First he established the idea and then proved it through history.

In my essay, I wanted to demonstrate similarities between Kissinger's concept and Kennan's analysis. It seems to me that Kissinger based his PhD thesis on Kennan's ideas. He just presented it in a historical background and developed his ideas. Aside from obvious similarities such as the sense of insecurity, logic of force, loyalty in internal structure, central position of the authority, there is also one more argument for my thesis.

Kissinger did not use any source about France under Napoleon's rules. In his bibliography, we can find many books about Metternich and Castlereagh, but none about Napoleon. The author of *A World Restored* declined reading the literature on the Vienna Congress, opting to read Metternich's memoirs instead. Finally, as he began to write his work, he read some basic literature about the Congress, but these books did not make a good impression on him.⁶⁰ He most criticized⁶¹ the two historians who devoted their life to researching the "Dancing Congress", Charles Webster (1886-1961)⁶² and Harold Nicolson (1886-1968).⁶³ In *A World Restored*, Kissinger rarely used the references to the literature and when he did, he did so only to give specific historical data, which is strange, especially in a PhD dissertation. For me, it means his concept of

⁵⁹ Zob. S. R. Graubard, *Kissinger*, p. 18; G. J. Klein Blumink *Kissingerian Realism in International Politics. Political Theory, Philosophy and Practice*, Leiden, 2000, p. 82; B. Mazlish, *Kissinger, The European Mind in American Policy*, New York, 1976, pp. 172-183.

⁶⁰ T. J. Noer, "Henry Kissinger's Philosophy of History", *Modern Age*, Vol. 19, Spring, 1975, pp. 180-189, p. 181.

⁶¹ H. A. Kissinger, *A World Restored*, p. 342.

⁶² Ch. Webster, *The Congress of Vienna*, London, 1934.

⁶³ H. Nicolson, *The Congress of Vienna. A Study in Allied Unity: 1812-1822*, London, 1946.

Napoleon's rules were based on different, contemporary ideas. While reading *A World Restored*, it appears that Kissinger had a theoretical thesis and tried to prove it on the historical example, using this data that fit the concept, without developing superfluous details. As Stephen Graubard noted, "Kissinger's major resource was his intelligence."⁶⁴

It is clear that Kissinger did not want to be an expert on the Vienna Congress, but was trying to learn from the nineteenth-century statesmen who lived in the revolutionary period and who tried to, in their own way, build an international order from the ashes of the old, conservative, eighteenth-century world destroyed by the French Revolution and Napoleon. For Kissinger, *A World Restored* is a form of dialogue with himself conducted in order to understand contemporary politics through the lens of history.⁶⁵

It is worth mentioning that Kissinger referred to the Kennan's "Long Telegram" in 1994 in his article on the containment strategy.⁶⁶ However, he did not mention in the article his approach during his studies at university. Therefore, the question remains open whether Kissinger's vision stemmed only from the study of the Congress of Vienna or the study of the nineteenth-century combined with the knowledge of the concepts of Kennan.

Kissinger's world was in almost every aspect bipolar, and thus it was intimately linked to the post-war period. The cause of all problems is the sense of insecurity. It is characteristic of revolutionary power and thus makes international relations unstable. The only remedy is stabilization achieved by the balance of powers and coexistence of legitimated powers. The Soviet Union in early post-war times exactly suited the theoretical concept created by Kissinger. In both diagrams presented in this essay, we could classify the Soviet Union as a revolutionary power since from an American point of view, it was a revolutionary power.

⁶⁴ S. R. Graubard, *Kissinger*, p. 16.

⁶⁵ Stephen Graubard uses the expression that Kissinger was 'writing for himself': Ibid., pp. 13-17.

⁶⁶ H. A. Kissinger, "Reflections on Containment", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 73, N° 3 (May-June 1994), pp. 113-130.

It would be also interesting to compare Kissinger's concept with modern American and European diplomacy. In a world that has become a global village, there cannot exist a state that plays the role of a lonely island, and in this global village, a revolutionary power is even more dangerous. Therefore, the question arises, which elements of the Kissinger's concept have survived in contemporary U.S. and European foreign policy?

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Cold War Representations in U. S. Museums

Julia DANYLOW

The Cold War was a basic condition of life for nations all around the globe from 1946 until 1990. Scarcely anyone ever thought it possible to overcome the ideological rift between East and West, originating from the different political positions on post-war reconstruction in Europe.

When looking at historical museums, there seem to be different approaches to the topic of Cold War History; contrasting views from American, European and Asian nations exist, depending on their respective historical involvement and their coming to terms with the past. In this article I will analyze four different U.S. American institutions – some being government funded, others products of public-private partnerships or completely privately funded. Each institution represents one of the four characteristic aspects of historical culture – the academic, the aesthetical, the political and the economic dimensions. The German historian Jörn Rüsen developed the prototype of this classification in 1994.⁶⁷ My leading question is whether Cold War history in the described museums follows an American master narrative or allows for broader international perspectives. In concluding this paper, I will discuss some challenges of Cold War representation in museums in general.

Museums as an expression of historical culture

The British cultural anthropologist Carol McDonald specifies museums as the “key cultural *loci* of our times”⁶⁸. They are symbols and sites for exemplifying and

⁶⁷ Jörn Rüsen, Was ist Geschichtskultur? Überlegungen zu einer neuen Art, über Geschichte nachzudenken, in: Klaus Füssmann et al, *Historische Faszination. Geschichtskultur heute* (Köln, 1994) 5f.

⁶⁸ Sharon Macdonald, Gordon Fyfe, *Theorizing Museums. Representing Identity and diversity in a changing world* (Cambridge 2006) p. 2.

illustrating social relations, identity and difference, knowledge and power, theory and representation of national and international culture.⁶⁹ The task of historical museums is to provide orientation for their visitors in time and space. Historical narratives are constructed and deconstructed to vividly picture times long gone. That is to say that exhibitions themselves create certain narratives of the past.

In my analysis the exhibitions are evaluated as sources, regarding their way of dealing with Cold War history and of their date of origin. Which events and objects are shown? Are there mainly original objects, or rather replicas? Is the presentation a standard cabinet display or a scenic experience for the visitors? What is the curatorial intention behind the exhibitions?

Museums and exhibitions representing Cold War history have different purposes. Some are intended for the improvement of historical knowledge, others engage their visitors emotionally. At the same time, public history projects depend on economic preconditions as well as political decisions. These four aspects, the academic, the aesthetic, the political and the economic dimension are to be found in every exhibition – but their weighting differs. The following four case studies will explain this idea.

The academic dimension of historical culture – The Space Race Gallery at National Air and Space Museum (NASM)

Part of the Smithsonian Institution, the *National Air and Space Museum (NASM)*⁷⁰ on the *National Mall* in Washington D.C. is a government-funded museum. Within the scope of its permanent exhibition, the *NASM* focuses on a specific aspect of the Cold War – the history of the *Space Race* between the U.S. and the USSR. In the mid-1990s the exhibition team developed a narrative called "From Competition to Cooperation", comparing the American space program to the Soviet one.⁷¹ For them, it was a close fight over presenting the *Enola Gay* debacle. The idea to display the fuselage of the

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ See *The National Air and Space Museum*, Washington D.C., USA, URL: <http://airandspace.si.edu> (09/15/13).

⁷¹ Interview with Michael J. Neufeld, Curator, 09/26/11.

Enola Gay aircraft, which dropped the atomic bomb on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, provoked a major controversy between historians and veteran groups.⁷² In the end, it did not prove possible to consolidate the perceptions and beliefs of war participants with the post-war research evidence gathered by professional historians. The exhibition was cancelled.

The *Space Race* exhibition delivers a well-balanced display of American and Soviet space artifacts to illustrate the race to the moon and the effects of this technological competition on the military confrontation. The aesthetics of the exhibition are not fashionable. Bulky cabinets, poor lighting and uniformity of explanatory texts refer to the early 1980s. But on the content level, *Space Race* is not outdated at all. In particular, the chapter on the *Military origins of the Space Race and the former Nazi-German V-2* weapon, in addition to the NASM internal discussion about its presentation, serve as an example of successful transgression of historical-political boundaries. The presentation of the *V-2* in the *NASM* proceeded in two stages. At first the rocket was entitled “captured German V-2 missile as a prominent and persistent symbol of Space Age”.⁷³ But the retaliatory weapon was intended by the Third Reich's leaders to demoralize the civilian population of the enemy.⁷⁴ This rocket is therefore an object with at least two levels of memory. Repainting the originally camouflaged *V-2* in black and white, to present it as a space artifact, was thereby erasing [also camouflaging] its Nazi past.

Moreover, it was supplemented with further large objects (a *Viking*, a large liquid-fueled rocket and a *WAC Corporal*, the first American sounding record), which strengthened the purely technological nature of the presentation. A new director and a little luck concerning the budget made an update of the *V-2* representation in the *Space Race gallery* possible.⁷⁵ Using new research results, visitors are now informed as to how the weapon fell into the hands of the United States and about its role as the technological

⁷² Richard H. Kohn, “History at Risk. The Case of the *Enola Gay*”, in: Edward T. Linienthal, Tom Engelhardt, *History Wars. The Enola Gay and other Battles for the American Past* (New York 1996) 140-170.

⁷³ Interview with Michael J. Neufeld, Curator, 09/26/11.

⁷⁴ David H. DeVorkin and Michael J. Neufeld, “Space Artifact or Nazi weapon? Displaying the Smithsonian’s V-2 missile, 1976-2011”, in: *Endeavour* (2011), 1.

⁷⁵ Interview with Paul Cerruzzi, Curator, 09/26/11.

beginning of the American space program. In addition to this, American businessman Ross Perot⁷⁶ donated some objects reflecting the Russian perspective. The *V-2* presentation, in its new form, features a great starting point for the topic of the *Space Race*. That is why *Space Race* is a good example for a scientific-based understanding of historical culture.

The aesthetical dimension of historical culture – The Price of Freedom. Americans at War at the National Museum of American History (NMAH)

The National Museum of American History (NMAH)⁷⁷ in Washington D.C. sees its task to survey the major themes of American history and culture to the public.⁷⁸ One of its permanent exhibitions is *The Price of Freedom. Americans at War (POF)*. *POF* spans the time from the War of Independence to the present. It was built within three years, thanks to an \$80 million donation by real-estate developer Kenneth E. Behring.⁷⁹ This type of funding is not possible for public museums in Germany.

The Cold War has its own section in *POF* covering the period from 1945 to 1989, but focuses mainly on the Korean and Vietnam Wars. These parts are presented with dramaturgical and scenographic elements. Illuminated images of war printed on canvas, enhanced by music and sounds of war, show up in a seven-minute loop to catch the visitors emotionally right from the beginning of the exhibition. The music is reminiscent of dramatized films like *Saving Private Ryan*.⁸⁰ As a continuous subtheme, *POF* operates with “War in media” – an important topic referring to the Vietnam War as *The Television War*.⁸¹ The curators rebuilt a typical American living room of the 1970s. One wall is covered with a pyramid of old TV sets playing a compilation of U.S. media

⁷⁶ Gerald Posner, *Citizen Perot. His Life and Times* (New York, 1996).

⁷⁷ See *The National Museum of American History*, Washington D.C., USA, URL: <http://americanhistory.si.edu> (09/15/13).

⁷⁸ See Mission Statement of NMAH, URL: <http://americanhistory.si.edu/about/mission> (09/15/13).

⁷⁹ See Smithsonian Institution Announces Biggest Single Donation in its 154-year history, URL: <http://americanhistory.si.edu/press/releases/smithsonian-institution-announces-biggest-single-donation-its-154-year-history> (09/15/13).

⁸⁰ *Saving Private Ryan* is a Hollywood movie by Steven Spielberg from 1998, dealing with the Allied Invasion of Normandy on June 6th 1944. The soundtrack was composed by multiple Academy Award Winner John Williams.

⁸¹ See Michael Mandelbaum, *The Television War*, in: *Daedalus* (111/44) 1982, 157-169.

coverage on the Vietnam War. The living room leads directly into a larger room that contextualizes both the Vietnam War and the Cold War in general. There is a scenographic presentation of the largest object in the collection of the *NMAH* – a Bell-Huey helicopter.⁸² The helicopter is presented in a shaded room; loudspeakers deliver the sound of rotors. Exhibition designers transformed the surrounding area with grass and sands into a Vietnamese paddy field. Two display dummies dressed as American soldiers are lying in front of the helicopter on the ground – one holding the other one, who is wounded, in his arms. The door of the helicopter is open, showing a large TV screen. Visitors can select film clips with interview sequences of veterans. This kind of scenic and emotional presentation has a disconcerting effect on European visitors.

Drama is definitely in the foreground throughout the Vietnam part of *POF*. Only visitors with background knowledge and the power of endurance will discover contrasting views behind this emotionally loaded presentation. Covered behind the helicopter are two display cases where the typical equipment of American soldiers and Vietnamese Vietcong are presented. The comparison of an original Ho Chi Minh Trail-wood bike and American military equipment conveys that the Cold War was a real war, not merely a TV-event, with real victims and veterans on both sides. Unfortunately, there is no reference to international media coverage and reactions on the conflict. Concerning the international dimension, there is one mandatory element, a segment of the Berlin Wall, but with no elaboration on the European dimension of the Cold War. A multifaceted global Cold War, as stated by the historian Odd Arne Westad in 2007,⁸³ is not visible in *POF*.

The political dimension of historical culture – The John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum

The *John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum*⁸⁴ in Boston, MA is one of thirteen *Presidential Libraries* in the U.S. and is administrated by the *National Archives*

⁸² Interview with Dick Daso, Curator, 09/29/11.

⁸³ Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War. Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times*, Cambridge, 2007.

⁸⁴ *John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum*, Boston/Massachusetts, USA, URL: <http://www.jfklibrary.org> (09/15/13).

and Records Administration. The associated museums are sponsored and maintained by both presidential families and private donors. The *Presidential Libraries* represent a particular form of a public-private partnership, and such a model of funding exemplifies one crucial difficulty, as stated by *Presidential Library* expert Benjamin Hufbauer, “Important historical material is often repressed when it is unflattering”.⁸⁵ Only through the passing of time does the influence of the president, his family and his supporters weaken, which is a basic requirement for a more balanced view.⁸⁶ This step is yet to be completed in the case of John F. Kennedy, and is discussed in the following.

The concept behind the exhibition is that John F. Kennedy himself tells the story of his life. Movies and sound files from the *Audiovisual Collections*⁸⁷ of the *Kennedy Library* are used to illustrate his political decisions. The visitor is to re-experience Kennedy’s extraordinary career, the challenges he faced and his political decisions. His role as a decision maker concerning the *Bay of Pigs* disaster and his handling of the *Cuban Missile Crisis*, however, are presented from his perspective only – not as a whole from different perspectives. Furthermore, some negative but all too human aspects of his life, including illnesses and his womanizing, are not mentioned at all.

The museum building created by the Chinese-American architect I.M. Pei,⁸⁸ a white structure with many windows, promises openness and transparency for which visitors of the exhibition search in vain. The ethical guidelines of the *National Council on Public History* postulate that historians owe society the historical truth, insofar as it can be determined from the available sources.⁸⁹ Following the argument of Benjamin Hufbauer, the *Kennedy Library* exhibition does not always meet this standard in the

⁸⁵ Benjamin Hufbauer, *Spotlights and Shadows: Presidents and their Administrations in Presidential Museum Exhibits*, in: *The Public Historian*, 28/4 (2006), 118.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ See *Audiovisual Collections*, <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Research/About-Our-Collections/Audiovisual-collections.aspx> (09/15/13).

⁸⁸ Ieoh Ming Pei is characterized as the master of modern architecture. He built other cultural institutions like the pyramid of the *Louvre* in Paris, the *National Gallery of Art* in Washington D.C. and the modern wing of the *Germany Historical Museum* in Berlin.

⁸⁹ See *National Council on Public History*, *Bylaws and Ethics*, URL: <http://ncph.org/cms/about/bylaws-and-ethics/> (09/15/13).

historical interpretation it presents to the public.⁹⁰ The *Harry S. Truman Presidential Library*, however, seems to be a positive example for a more critical approach. “The diverse voices in this exhibition also acknowledge an important truth: History never speaks with one voice. It is always under debate – a manuscript that is continually being revised, and is never complete.”⁹¹ In contrast to the *Kennedy Library*, the *Truman Library* curators succeeded in avoiding a pure hagiographic representation. Thereby the constructive character of historiography becomes visible.

The economical dimension of historical culture – The International Spy Museum

Open to the public since 2002, the *International Spy Museum*⁹² is a private museum and part of the *Malrite Company*⁹³ based in Cleveland, Ohio. Its founder is the media mogul *Milton Maltz*.⁹⁴ After having served as a Navy soldier in Korea, he worked for the *National Security Agency* for some years. He held on to his fascination for espionage, even after retiring to civil life. The brand name *International Spy Museum* was tested in public by an advertising agency before the museum was in business.⁹⁵ *Spy Museum* was the term with the highest attractiveness for potential visitors. This procedure demonstrates other possible motives behind a museum besides the sole desire to transfer knowledge about history and espionage, namely as in this case making money. Besides the museum, the *Malrite Company* owns the *Spycafe* and three other restaurants throughout Washington DC. The company employs about five hundred people, however only eight of them are working in the *Exhibition and Programs Department* of the museum.⁹⁶

Conceptually the *Spy Museum* consists of two parts – the *School of Spies* and the exhibition space *The Secret History of History*. While the *School of Spies* is an

⁹⁰ Benjamin Hufbauer, Spotlights and Shadows: Presidents and their Administrations in Presidential Museum Exhibits, in: *The Public Historian*, 28/4 (2006), p. 124.

⁹¹ Ibid., p. 126.

⁹² See *International Spy Museum*, URL: <http://www.spymuseum.org> (15/09/13).

⁹³ See *About the Malrite Company*,

http://www.jfkmontreal.com/john_lennon/cache/mmaltz/spymuseum.pdf (09/15/13).

⁹⁴ See *Milton and Tamar Maltz biography*, URL: <http://www.maltzmuseum.org/about/board-of-trustees/milton-tamar-maltz-bio/> (09/15/13).

⁹⁵ Interview with Mark Stout, Curator, 09/26/11.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

interactive museum, the latter deals with the history of intelligence and espionage, beginning with the Trojan horse. The geographical focus clearly lies on the United States; some excursions are made to the British, Soviet and East German intelligence institutions.

The section on Cold War history starts with an animated wall about espionage and the construction of the atomic bomb. A narration explains the connections between the parties. At the end of the story, there is a countdown to an audiovisual detonation of the atomic bomb. The floor vibrates and the lights dim. The rest of the area is limited, interestingly enough, to the city of Berlin as a center of the bloc confrontation. Alongside the following stairs are warning signs and propaganda posters for nuclear war. The *Berlin Wall* has its place, as well as a black *Trabant* that was used to smuggle refugees across the inner German border. Even a non-scale reconstruction of the spy tunnel of Rudow, the original version of which is shown in the *Allied Museum* in Berlin, can be passed through by the visitor.

With their scenographic presentation, the makers of the *Spy Museum* take advantage of the childlike curiosity that arouses even adults when confronted with the topic of espionage. Historian Robert Hanyok criticizes:

“If anything, this museum is about atmosphere, the physical and emotional environment to espionage. After paying admission, visitors are told repeatedly things are not what they seem. They are asked to join in on the game and memorialize an alias and expect to be questioned about it later.”⁹⁷

Having become a part and a product of popular culture – already during the Cold War itself (just think of the James Bond movies and John Le Carré’s spy novels) – the topic of espionage works as an amazing catalyst for interest in Cold War history. The hype about espionage reflects the grade of public interest. Current political developments, such as those in Korea, show the actual importance that the Cold War can claim approximately one generation after the Soviet orbit has collapsed.

⁹⁷ Robert Hanyok, “International Spy Museum”, in: *The Public Historian*, 30/4 (2008), p. 159.

Conclusions and challenges

Cold War history, as presented in museums in the U.S., is incomplete at this time and exists with a clear American bias. *NASM* concentrates on one special aspect – the *Space Race*. The gallery focuses on technological developments. *NMAH*, on the contrary, plays with scenographic presentations with a human factor. Hiring a stage designer to install an exhibition means that Cold War history can be emotionally experienced by exposure to representations of soldiers in a reproduced Vietnamese landscape. Music and the noises of a helicopter rotor dislocate the visitor in place and time. The partly privately funded museum at the *Kennedy Library* does not yet take advantage of the fact that it has more money to spend on its presentation. It remains stuck in an old-fashioned and sometimes hagiographic style of historiography. The *International Spy Museum* turns the tables. By choosing a bestseller topic like espionage, a lot of visitors are intrigued right from the beginning. It actually also attracts the so-called “non-visitors”, a target group that every curator would love to see in his or her institution.

Of course, there are more players in the U.S. museum landscape dealing with Cold War history. Francis Gary Powers Jr., for instance, decided as early as 1996 to found a Cold War Museum. He aims to preserve Cold War history and honor Cold War veterans, such as his father who was shot down on a reconnaissance mission over the Soviet Union in 1961 and later exchanged for the Soviet spy Rudolf Abel in Berlin. Still up to today, nothing exists beyond a homepage. From time to time there are announcements on the progress of the project at the permanent location in Vint Hill, Virginia. The legally protected title “Cold War Museum” and its mission statement promise a comprehensive discussion of the Cold War era. Apparently, though, it is not so easy to present Cold War history in a museum. How should this important historical period be exhibited?

Today, in times of scarce funding, it is more important than ever for a museum to find and occupy its own niche. The historical research on the Cold War era, as well as its presentation to the public, need a global perspective to visualize the unique character of this unconventional war. No museum, in the U.S. or anywhere else in the world, has tried to tell a global Cold War history (the different hot and cold spots and their mutual

linkage) in a multifaceted way (not only the macro-perspective of the two blocs but also micro-perspectives, the fates of human beings). National master narratives, the scars of the Cold War and actual conflicts resulting from the Cold War, have a strong impact on not only the exhibition agenda of public museums, but also on policymakers and investors. A real challenge is also the range of objects on display. Of course, there are many large military objects representing Cold War history, but how to display the typical daily routine under a constant nuclear threat, the human factor? It is not always sufficient to spend money on the latest exhibition techniques to present a topic in an aesthetically appealing way.

There are plans to establish a *Center of Cold War* at Checkpoint Charlie in Berlin, Germany. In September 2012 a temporary exhibition pavilion of the *Cold War Center*, called *Black Box*, opened there, at Checkpoint Charlie. Berlin's state government funded it. It is thought to have won new supporters for the project and to have given a first glimpse into how an exhibition of the Cold War could look. Unfortunately, the project faces the obstacle of a political-ideological opposition against the foundation of a new museum. As a matter of fact it is a question of money as well as a struggle for interpretive predominance.⁹⁸ One must await further political decisions, especially after the uncertain results of recent elections to the German Bundestag.⁹⁹

A museum for the history of the Global Cold War is nevertheless an important and necessary desideratum for the worldwide museum landscape. This exceptional conflict is longing for historicizing in a museum, which is open at the same time to both its global impacts and to private human fates.

⁹⁸ See Julia Danylow, Andreas Etges, "A Hot Debate over the Cold War: The Plan for a Cold War Center at Checkpoint Charlie, Berlin", in: Jennifer Dickey, Samir El Azahar, Catherine M. Lewis, *Museums in a Global Context. National Identity, International Understanding*, Washington, 2013, 144-161.

⁹⁹ On September 22nd 2013 Germany elected a new federal government. Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel and the conservative CDU (Christian Democratic Union of Germany) hold the majority but still have to decide on coalition partner. Available for selection are the SPD (Social Democratic Party of Germany) and the Green Party.

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Chapter 2: The nuclear *raison d'état*: rearmament and disarmament

“The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Triangulated Vision”

Kate LEVCHUK

Introduction

The Caribbean Crisis is one of the most researched periods in historical scholarship, boasting not only depth but also a variety of interpretations and viewpoints. The novelty of this work is the presentation of the perspectives of the immediate participants with an aim to reveal the existing differences, similarities and conclusions in view of newly released documents. While performing this kind of comparison, scholars tend to focus disproportionately on one side's vision, either Soviet or American. This work will not only provide a reader with both, but will also show the tendencies and understanding of the Cuban side, which was paramount in the crucial October days of 1962. A common belief is that as time goes by, it is harder to reinvent the wheel, especially in regard to such a well-known case as the Caribbean Crisis. However, accounting for a number of new sources becoming open to the public each year, there is no doubt the topic can be built on and valuable additions can be made. The aim of this work, however, is not to present a new truth, but rather to show that there is no monopoly on truth and that the truth is usually found somewhere at the crossroads of a wide variety of opinions and vantage points.

The Caribbean Crisis period was the most tense and dangerous time during the Cold War. The world was at the brink of an apocalypse and if the two nuclear superpowers had not resolved their disagreements peacefully, our lives today would be very different, if they would be at all. As Winston Churchill once said, “I don't know what will be used during a Third World War, but have no doubt that the Forth one will be fought with sticks and stones”. The quote captures the fatality of the possible Third World War, which was so close in 1962. Indeed, the state leaders' fears and mood, wrong interpretations of orders, bad connection or any unfortunate coincidences and mismatches could have lead to a thermonuclear war. Thus, in-depth and careful research

allows us to analyze and comprehend what led the people in power to turn from the cornerstones of national pride and prestige to the realization of human value, dignity and security. The work puts a particular emphasis on the psychological aspect of the decision-making and consequences evaluation.

In accordance with the aim and ambition of this research paper, the following research question has been formulated: how were the perceptions of the American, Soviet and Cuban sides different and how have these variations and vantage points influenced the decision-making of the participants of the conflict and their assessment of its aftermath? The time frame of this work is from January 1959 to November 1963. The paper captures not only the 13 days of the Caribbean Crisis, but also the period preceedating it. We will start with the victory of the Cuban revolution, which brought Fidel Castro to power (January 1st, 1959) as this enabled the conflict to occur, and then we will examine time following the crisis and the “détente” in American-Soviet relations up to Kennedy’s assassination on the 22nd of November, 1963.

A range of literature has been analyzed for this work with a special focus on memoir sources and newly released documents. The secondary sources used can be conditionally divided into Russian and English language sources. Russian sources allowed us to understand the Soviet perspective of the crisis and the rationale behind crucial decisions.¹⁰⁰ Khrushchev’s son wrote an especially revealing book on his interactions with his father in the days during the Cuban Crisis and afterwards.¹⁰¹ The Cuban perspective was significantly improved in Alekseev’s memoirs, in which he claims that the missile withdrawal has been a complete surprise for him as well as for the whole Cuban government.¹⁰² Memoirs of R. Kennedy,¹⁰³ Dean Rusk¹⁰⁴ and Arthur

¹⁰⁰ A.F. Dobrynin, “Absolutely Privately. Soviet Ambassador to Washington DC During the Presidency of Six American Leaders (1962-1986).” In *USSR in the Contemporaries’ Memories (1939-1991) in 5 Books*, 2: 656, Odessa: Astroprint, 2007; A. A. Gromyko, *Memorable*. Moscow, Politizdat, 2003; G. M. Kornienko, *Cold War: A Testimony of Its Participant*. Moscow: Interbook, 1987.

¹⁰¹ S.N. Khrushchev, *Birth of Superpower: A Book About Father*. Century and Personality, Moscow: Time, 2003.

¹⁰² A. I. Alekseev, *The Caribbean Crisis: As It Was*. Edited by N.V. Popov. International Questions; Events and People. Moscow: Politizdat, 1989.

¹⁰³ R.F. Kennedy, *Thirteen Days. A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis*. New York: W.W. Norton Company Inc., 1969.

¹⁰⁴ Dean Rusk, *As I Saw It*. New York: Penguin Books, 1991.

Schlesinger¹⁰⁵ were paramount in understanding the work of ExComm, the importance of personal connections and psychological reasons directing the actions of American leaders. The limitations of the undertaken research are the ongoing time distortion of the events and deeds as well as the shortage of the relevant material. Work with contemporaries' memoirs and the declassified files on the period help us to overcome inaccuracies and generalizations.

In order to give an answer to the research question, the work is divided into three interrelated chapters. First chapter, "Soviet View", will show the perspective of Soviet officials and modern Russian scholars on the events of 1962. Second chapter, titled "American Side", will reveal the American approach and evaluations of the crisis while in the third chapter called "Cuban Perspective", Castro's rise to power and assessments and reactions to his leadership and role in the crisis will be provided. This work will be concluded with some necessary evaluations and a response to the research question.

Soviet View: "We wanted to protect Cuban revolution and we succeeded"

By 1960, the USSR had established an international position as a strong state promoting its vision and goals in world geopolitics. Having validated itself during the Second World War, the Soviet Union had been only strengthening its international position as a world power and a carrier of Socialism, an ideology pervading more and more states throughout the 20th century while receiving unambiguous approval by many Western states. The US was the only country openly hostile to leftist inclinations, taking every measure to prevent "the spreading of the red disease".¹⁰⁶ That is why the American reaction to Cuban events was so strong, especially since Cuba adopted Socialism.¹⁰⁷

There is solid evidence that after the defeat of the Cuban emigrants' assault at the Bay of Pigs, the Americans were preparing a large-scale invasion of regular troops. According to the data of the Soviet Foreign Minister at the time, A.A. Gromyko,

¹⁰⁵ A.M. Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days of John Kennedy in the White House*. New York, 1966.

¹⁰⁶ G.M. Kornienko, *Cold War: A Testimony of Its Participant*. Moscow: Interbook, 1987.

¹⁰⁷ S.N. Khrushchev, "Cuban Missile Crisis. The Events Went Out of White House and Kremlin Control." *International Life* № 5, 2002, pp. 57–79.

outspoken anti-Cuban propaganda was accompanied by the mobilization of 150,000 reserve troops.¹⁰⁸ Khrushchev took such American steps seriously and viewed a possible Cuban defeat as his own.¹⁰⁹ He was sure this was a perfect time to show the authority and power of the Soviets. An assertion by one of Khrushchev's approximates regarding the existent "inferiority complex" of the Soviet leader is of a particular interest for the understanding of the rationale behind missiles stationing.¹¹⁰ According to the assertion, Khrushchev was concerned that the USSR and the hardliner political elite (so-called Stalinists) was not given due respect, and he wanted people around him to fear him as they feared Stalin.¹¹¹ While seemingly far-fetched, such thoughts by the closest advisors of the Soviet leader shed light on the psychological background on the fateful decisions of the fall of 1962.

It is imperative to say a few words about the head of the Soviet Union in those difficult times as he played a crucial role in the escalation and resolution of the crisis. Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev was realistic, pragmatic, understanding and often respondent to the needs of Soviet people. However, according to Adgubey, the First Secretary's best qualities were his humanity and compassion.¹¹² Braveness equally was an important quality to him, though this occasionally led to unnecessary risk and recklessness, notably during the Caribbean Crisis. Indeed, as we can judge *post factum*, the crisis was caused by these qualities of the Soviet leader.

In regards to more objective factors directing Soviet foreign policy decision-making, the strategic ratio of nuclear weapons was outrageously advantageous for the American side (8:1 according to Soviet and 17:1 according to American evaluations). While definitely pessimistic for the manifestation of Soviet power, the given numbers do not account to more than mathematic calculations when it comes to their actual destructive power. Khrushchev is known to have stated, "we are not that bloodthirsty – they are going to

¹⁰⁸ A. A. Gromyko, *The American Foreign Policy: Lessons and Reality: 60-70s*. International Relations. Moscow, 1978.

¹⁰⁹ Khrushchev, *Birth of Superpower*, op. cit.

¹¹⁰ A.A. Troyanovskiy, *Through Years and Distance*. Moscow: Misl, 1997.

¹¹¹ A.I. Adgubey, *The Crash of Illusions*. Moscow: SP Interbook, 1991.

¹¹² A.A. Troyanovskiy, *Through Years and Distance*, op. cit.

bomb dead – one time would be enough for us”.¹¹³ Nevertheless, a desire for a psychological advantage could have been a reason for getting into such a reckless enterprise, especially since the stationed missiles were able to enhance deterrence between the superpowers and thereby reduce the risk of nuclear war.

A more important reason for Khrushchev’s psychological unrest were the American naval bases in Turkey and Italy.¹¹⁴ American missiles thus could bomb Soviet cities in any moment, which, of course, was not reciprocated and could not be ignored by the Soviet side. Indeed, Khrushchev is known to point to the other side of the sea when having foreign guests and ask them whether they could see the American base. After a negative response, he pointed to their bad vision and claimed he could see the change of guard next to American missiles targeting Soviet cities, saying, “probably this summer house is put on the map too”.¹¹⁵

According to contemporaries as well as Khrushchev’s own explanations, the main reason for sending missiles to Cuba was his genuine desire to protect the Cuban revolution. During his informal visit to Bulgaria, Khrushchev was constantly thinking about the ways Soviet Union could help a newly established ally.¹¹⁶ Back in May of 1962, Khrushchev shared his apprehensions with A.I. Mikoyan and asked for advice on how to protect Cuba from the imminent invasion.¹¹⁷ “Cuban defense was not only the question of Khrushchev’s prestige but of a national prestige and validity of Soviet Union, its ambitions for the status of a superpower,” explains S. Khrushchev in his memoirs titled “Birth of A Superpower: A Book About Father”.

In terms of how to help the allied state, Khrushchev was contemplating several alternative strategies. Thoughts on mutual help and cooperation were considered useless and unproductive. Due to geographical proximity and naval superiority, military

¹¹³ Khrushchev, *Birth of A Superpower*, op. cit.

¹¹⁴ Dean Rusk, *As I Saw It*, op. cit.

¹¹⁵ Adgubey, *The Crash of Illusions*, op. cit.

¹¹⁶ Khrushchev, *Birth of Superpower*, op. cit.

¹¹⁷ S.A. Mikoyan, “A Jump Over The Ocean: Why the Missiles?” *Latin America* N° 1 (2003): 94–103.

assistance was deemed irrelevant.¹¹⁸ Sending missiles was seen as the only way to drastically change the status quo. Although Khrushchev was the main decision-maker and risk-taker in 1962, he did not make this decision without assistance from his closest advisors. The Soviet Commission, created for this end, came to a positive evaluation of the Cuban landscape's appropriateness and its ability to mask all military preparations.¹¹⁹ Despite a widespread misconception on the unilateral viewpoint of the Soviet commandership, the assessments and opinions were varied in regards to the plan.

While Marshal Biruzov was adamant in pleasing Khrushchev with his positive conclusions on the ability of Cuban soil and landscape "to obscure all the military installations", A.I. Mikoyan, who visited Cuba in 1960 in order to investigate the revolution and ideological underpinnings of Fidel Castro, claimed that Cuban plantations would not allow Soviet troops to mask offensive weapons.¹²⁰ However, people often focus on the facts and opinions that further credit their original views, and thus Khrushchev was absolutely satisfied with Biruzov's assessment.

In May 1962, the Soviet leader presented to the Central Committee Presidium the plan of Operation "Anadyr", a transatlantic transportation and secret stationing of Soviet troops and missiles on the Cuban territory. The plan was supported almost unilaterally.¹²¹ The question arises as to why the USSR did not inform the US about missile stationing as the Americans had done regarding US missiles in Turkey, especially considering the diplomatic advantage and validity it could have lent to the operation. Some experts believe that Khrushchev was confident Americans would do everything possible to prevent a public, openly proclaimed stationing.¹²² Thus, Khrushchev deprived himself of such an international tool and the whole operation acquired the flavor of dishonesty and diplomatic cheating in the eyes of the world. He was sure the Americans would have to put up with the missiles once they were in Cuba.

¹¹⁸ A.I. Mikoyan, "That Is How It Was: Discussions over the Past." In *USSR in the Contemporaries' Memories (1939-1991) in 5 Books*, 2:656. Odessa: Astroprint, 2007.

¹¹⁹ S.A. Mikoyan, "A Jump Over The Ocean: Why the Missiles?"

¹²⁰ J.G. Blight, and D.A. Welch. *On The Brink*. New York, 1990.

¹²¹ V. Zubok, "A Warmongering Premier: Khrushchev's Foreign Policy." *Motherland* № 3 (2004): 13–19.

¹²² S.N. Khrushchev, *Birth of Superpower*.

Unfortunately, the Soviet commandship had not taken into account the peculiarities of American foreign policy and its geopolitical configuration, which allowed the US to enjoy its full security as an island-like territory engulfed by waters and weaker states. The Monroe Doctrine, accepted in 1823, was cornerstone of American foreign policy worldview. The Doctrine prohibited anybody's military presence in the Western hemisphere, which was incompatible with the presence of nuclear ballistic missiles 90 miles from its border.

Moreover, a secret realization of such an operation was a powerful psychological factor that left the American government with no alternative but to declare the USSR an aggressor and to implement the required measures. Interestingly, Castro realized the importance and significance an openly proclaimed stationing could bring to his state, as well as to the process of missiles transportation itself.¹²³ Shortly after the beginning of the stationing, he suggested that Khrushchev make the operation public.

However, it was the Americans who made it public before the Soviet leadership could blink. The Soviets had to maintain appearance and international pride after their plan was revealed by an American reconnaissance plane and Kennedy's speech of October 22. Khrushchev wrote a letter of anger and outrage towards the unilaterally taken American decision, "issuing an ultimatum" and passing resolutions without any international right.¹²⁴

The letter says that the Soviet government considers declared quarantine to be "the violation of the freedom of navigation in international waters and constituting an act of aggression propelling humankind into the abyss of a world nuclear-missile war". Therefore, the Soviet government instructed the captains of Soviet ships bound for Cuba to ignore the orders of American naval forces and use weapons in case of an attack.

¹²³ F.M. Burlatskiy, *Leaders and Advisors. On Khrushchev, Andropov and not only*. Moscow: Political Literature, 1990, p. 232.

¹²⁴ N.S. Khrushchev, "Letter from Khrushchev to John F. Kennedy." Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, October 24, 1962. <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/111552>.

On October 24, the world was on the brink of nuclear war. Neither sides wanted nor could afford to cede ground. Nerves were strained to the limit. Soviet ships had several miles left to the quarantine line. Luckily, common sense triumphed within both states. Khrushchev ordered military ships to pause. Despite the quarantine, all other Soviet vessels were let into Cuban waters.¹²⁵ Both leaders were giving silent signals: we are strong, but ready for a compromise. No one wanted a nuclear apocalypse. Despite clear political character and motives both leaders were pursuing in this crisis, no one even entertained the idea of sacrificing millions of their citizens' lives for the sake of a political and tactical victory. Khrushchev's quote is best at illustrating the idea, "life is more precious than prestige".¹²⁶

While the world was experiencing these tense and dangerous times, the Soviets had to recontemplate how it could benefit from for the situation. Khrushchev was concerned with the proximity of American missiles and naval bases to the Soviet cities. These missiles could destroy Soviet cities at any moment, but the same positioning was being denied to the Soviet side in the Cuban crisis.¹²⁷ Beyond a doubt, it was an outrageous injustice. After a considerable time to weigh the alternatives and evaluate his position, Khrushchev wrote a new letter in which he offered a *quid pro quo* exchange to withdraw Soviet missiles if Americans did the same in Turkey. As we now know, the letter was never answered. Part of the reason is the huge role of the behind-the-scenes diplomacy and its influence on leaders' decision-making. The role of reporters and journalists should not be understated, such as the fateful conversation between Fomin and Scali in "Oxidental" or a report on the pending landing of American troops in Cuba.

Regarding the latter example, one of the Soviet agents sent a cable to his government on the imminent American invasion from the coast of Florida, which he heard from a "New York Herald Tribune" journalist during his visit to the international press club.¹²⁸ Whether it was the imprecise information of an American newspaper or carefully

¹²⁵ S.N. Khrushchev, "Cuban Missile Crisis. The Events Went Out of White House and Kremlin Control." *International Life* № 5 (2002), p. 73.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.* 73.

¹²⁷ Allison Graham. *Essence of Decisions: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 107.

¹²⁸ A.M. Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days of John Kennedy in the White House*. New York, 1966, p. 257.

thought-out disinformation, it had a strong influence on the Soviet leader and made him remove the reference to Europe-based American missiles from his letter to Kennedy.¹²⁹ Thus, it can now be safely stated that it was actually him who stepped back first.¹³⁰ Another important meeting, which happened on October 26, was Robert Kennedy's meeting with a Soviet Ambassador A.F. Dobrynin, where the same crucial question on Soviet and American missiles was raised. Robert Kennedy explained to his colleague that due to national pride and allied considerations in NATO, the US could not withdraw Turkey-based missiles unilaterally as it would look like a weak concession to Soviet pressure¹³¹ and a sacrifice of international NATO members' interests in order to secure those of the US.¹³²

The American side was never short on diplomatic justifications and the art of persuading an opponent. Another reason for not publically announcing the withdrawal of American missiles was the perceived bureaucracy of NATO and a need for a joint decision to perform a withdrawal, coupled 4-5 month at minimum time frame for withdrawal if approved.¹³³ Nevertheless, R. Kennedy gave confidential assurances on the secret removal of the missiles in the near future. Interestingly, later it was written in his memoirs, "President Kennedy was going to remove them shortly anyway".¹³⁴

There is no doubt the Soviet side put itself into a diplomatically disadvantageous position and missed out on the opportunities of the period. As it became later known, Kennedy was ready to publicly announce the withdrawal of American missiles if the situation spun out of control.¹³⁵ What the American side was afraid of was an ultimatum

¹²⁹ S.N. Khrushchev, "Cuban Missile Crisis. The Events Went Out of White House and Kremlin Control." *International Life* N° 5 (2002), p. 65.

¹³⁰ A.F. Dobrynin, "Absolutely Privately", p. 556.

¹³¹ Noam Chomsky, "Cuban Missile Crisis: How the US Played Russian Roulette with Nuclear War." *Guardian* (October 12, 2012). <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/oct/15/cuban-missile-crisis-russian-roulette>.

¹³² J.G. Stoessinger, *The Might of Nations. World Politics in Our Time*. New York, 1969, p. 287.

¹³³ Ibid. 560.

¹³⁴ R.F. Kennedy, *Thirteen Days. A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis*. New York: W.W. Norton Company Inc., 1969, p. 224.

¹³⁵ James Nathan, "Diplomacy, Not Deterring-Do." *Foreign Affairs* 91, N° 6 (December 2012), pp. 163–165; Blanton, Thomas. "Annals of Blinksman'ship." Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (summer 1997). http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/annals.htm In 1987 Rusk himself revealed JFK's willingness, had the crisis persisted much longer, to propose a public Turkey-Cuba trade through the United Nations-willingness, in short, to blink.

regarding West Berlin,¹³⁶ which the Soviets did not even hint at. After the Soviet leadership was notified of Dobrynin's unofficial meeting with Robert Kennedy, Khrushchev realized his letter was rushed. Due to technical setbacks, the American side had not received the letter yet, so he decided to write a new one included the *quid pro quo* request. For the sake of speed, the second message was transmitted by radio. Khrushchev wanted to pretend the first letter did not exist, and the Kennedy brothers did the same to his second message.¹³⁷

On Sunday morning of October 28, the Soviet leadership gathered in Novo-Ogarevo. Whether it was cautious of a possible military strike on the Kremlin or decided to show the world its cold-bloodedness, they eagerly waited for two messages from the American counterparts: an official one from John Kennedy and an unofficial one, from his brother. The President's message did not boast much creativity or innovation. The central message was the same, stating "missiles withdrawal on your behalf in exchange for the security guaranties towards Cuba on our behalf". The message's tone was official and dry. The existent White House tension could be easily read. The impression was that the President was crying for help. Thus, the ball was on the Soviet side and it was obvious that a decision had to be made as soon as possible. War was not an option. In case the Americans had undertaken a strike on Soviet installations in Cuba, Khrushchev would have had to swallow it or fight back with nuclear weapons.

Nevertheless, whatever the American sources could have consequently said, the Soviet side never even entertained the possibility of a nuclear strike. Khrushchev excluded war as a solution as he understood the consequences. Actions had to be taken promptly. A recent uncoordinated shooting of an American reconnaissance plane by Soviet generals in Cuba was the last drop in the bucket. As Khrushchev later confessed, this was the moment when he understood how easily the events could go out of control and the "missiles have to be taken".¹³⁸ In his answer, Khrushchev stated that the "President's concerns find understanding in Moscow because the weapons he was talking about as

¹³⁶ M. Beshloss, *Kennedy Versus Khrushchev: The Crisis Years*. New York, 1991, p. 423.

¹³⁷ S.N. Khrushchev, "Cuban Missile Crisis. The Events Went Out of White House and Kremlin Control." *International Life*, N° 5 (2002), p. 73.

¹³⁸ N.S. Khrushchev, *Memories*. p. 308.

offensive really constitute a formidable threat”.¹³⁹ The decision to cease installation as well as to dismantle and return already stationed weapons was announced on October 28.¹⁴⁰ Was not this a pure humiliation? Was not that similar to a naughty child’s play with a forbidden toy, which had to be returned as soon as he was caught? Should not it have been a direct cause of his removal from power? Opinions differ greatly, even within Soviet historiography. Khrushchev himself said that with the US’s sincere assurances on Cuban security, “the motives which prompted the Soviet side to help Cuba are no longer relevant”.¹⁴¹ From such a vantage point, the Soviet Union achieved its aims. Of course, the American interpretation differs from the Soviet one and blames Soviet leader’s weakness as a failure in achieving a desired nuclear parity. The discussion is endless. The facts stand strong: Kennedy was assassinated in November of 1963, Khrushchev was ousted from power in 1964, while Castro remained head of an independent and sovereign Cuban state until 2008.

Looking at the situation without prejudice, the USSR plan was pointless. The transportation of missiles cost millions of dollars and Khrushchev’s political. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the Socialist regime in Cuba would have been destroyed if not for Khrushchev’s decision to play with fire. A verbal assurance on Turkish missiles allowed Khrushchev to avoid political catastrophe when he agreed to withdraw Soviet weaponry from Cuba.¹⁴²

The hurried decision taken by the Soviet side was not coordinated with the Cuban government, resulting in grave consequences for Cuban-Soviet relations immediately after the crisis.¹⁴³ Why had not Khrushchev sought advice from his confidante? There was no time for formalities.¹⁴⁴ As the Soviet leader later stated, transmission of the

¹³⁹ A. A. Gromyko, “Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko’s Instructions to the USSR Representatives at the UN. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, October 28, 1962. <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/111845>.

¹⁴⁰ U. Taubman, “On the Issuance of Protocol Notes of CPSU Central Committee Presidium.” *New and Novel History* № 2 (2004) p. 60.

¹⁴¹ N.S. Khrushchev, *Memories*. p. 312.

¹⁴² A.F. Dobrynin, *Absolutely Privately*, p. 569.

¹⁴³ G.M. Kornienko, *Cold War: A Testimony of Its Participant*. Moscow: Interbook, 1987, p. 213.

¹⁴⁴ S.N. Khrushchev, *Birth of Superpower*, p. 540.

message started before the ending was edited.¹⁴⁵ Fidel had a straightforward assessment of such a decision, “retreat, cowardice, surrender”.¹⁴⁶ A.I. Mikoyan was sent to to improve relations with Cuban leadership. Despite the moribund condition of his wife, the First Deputy Chairman was so devoted to his country that he promptly left for Cuba. There, he was met with a cold shoulder.¹⁴⁷ Throughout their conversation, Fidel stated outrageously that “the Cuban people did not understand how it was even possible to decide its destiny behind its back”.¹⁴⁸ Only the experience and diplomatic skills of the Soviet chairman turned Cuban frustration and rage into a genuine understanding. Castro left for Moscow in April of 1963 after more than a month in Cuba.¹⁴⁹

The direct consequences of the crisis for the Soviet Union were positive. For the first time, America acknowledged the power and validity of the USSR as a world superpower. Only after the crisis of 1962 did Kennedy understand the importance of realism in world politics.¹⁵⁰ The Soviet Union caused a significant psychological change in the American worldview. Both leaders understood that the nuclear race couldn’t be viewed as a power game as the whole of humanity lay on the other side of the scales. A sign of relief of the two leaders in the moment of agreement on withdrawal was a guarantee of a great change in the bilateral relations of the world superpowers. The détente period began.

American Side: “We met eyeball to eyeball, and they blinked first”

The 1960s were a time of genuine American domination and prosperity. The victory in the Second World War brought money and importance to America. And if due to some reasons, such as its limited potential caused by an ongoing confrontation, America had not yet succeeded to spread its influence into every corner of the world, the Western Hemisphere had been gained for good. The idea of Western Hemisphere domination

¹⁴⁵ A.I. Alekseev, *The Caribbean Crisis*, p. 160.

¹⁴⁶ M. Beshloss, *Kennedy Versus Khrushchev*, p. 540.

¹⁴⁷ S.N. Khrushchev, *Birth of Superpower*, p. 556.

¹⁴⁸ A.I. Alekseev, “Cable from USSR Ambassador to Cuba Alekseev to Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs.” Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, October 28, 1962. <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/111213>.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid. 564.

¹⁵⁰ A.I. Adgubey, *The Crash of Illusions*. Moscow: SP Interbook, 1991, p. 323

roots back to the Monroe Doctrine, which declared both Americas to be a zone with no European control whatsoever. During periods as intense as the Cold War, this region gained increased importance for the US as a superpower. According to Kennedy's new foreign policy strategy the balance of power should not change to the disadvantage of the US¹⁵¹, and by no means did the American government intend to lead defensive policies. The US was eager to "help oppositions inside the communist regimes" and to pursue programs aimed at eroding the iron curtain.¹⁵² Obviously, in pursuit of such staunch anti-Communist foreign policy, the American government could not allow the spread of Communism in its main sphere of influence.

It is easy to imagine Kennedy's amazement and disillusionment when an island, situated 90 miles away from the American coast became Communist. He stated that the "communist forces should not be underestimated in Cuba or anywhere else".¹⁵³ After the failure in the Bay of Pigs, he famously stated that the "the complacent, the self-indulgent, the soft societies are about to be swept away with the debris of history. Only the strong [...] can possibly survive".¹⁵⁴

America was fast to act upon Castro's rise. It brought together members of regional organizations in order to exclude Cuba and take collective measures. Apart from all the possible legal measures, secret CIA plans became known recently, ranging from cigar poisoning to spattering Castro's shoes with poisonous chemicals. There is no official reference of Kennedy's orders to kill Castro, but the desire to "get rid" of him clearly became an imperative of American foreign policy at the time.¹⁵⁵ Kennedy's personality played a crucial role in the Cuban crisis, in its escalation as well as its settlement. Since early childhood, his father taught him always to be the first and to yield to no one.¹⁵⁶ An Irish temper and brilliant family roots predestined him to play the leading role wherever

¹⁵¹ Yu. M. Melnikov, *Power and Weakness: Washington's Foreign Policy (1945-1982)*. Moscow: Politizdat, 1983, p. 180.

¹⁵² E.P. May, and P. Zelikov. *The Kennedy's Tapes: Inside the White House. During the Cuban Missile Crisis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 510.

¹⁵³ B.J. Bernstein, "Reconsidering the Missile Crisis: Dealing with the Problems of the American Jupiters in Turkey." In *The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited*, edited by James Nathan. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992, p. 612.

¹⁵⁴ T. Sorensen, *Kennedy*. New York: Hamper&Row, 1965, p. 573.

¹⁵⁵ A.M. Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days of John Kennedy in the White House*. New York, 1966, p. 358.

¹⁵⁶ T. Sorensen, *Kennedy*. New York: Hamper&Row, 1965, p. 127.

he found himself. Thus, his failure to put up with the presence of Soviet missiles in such proximity to America should not have been a surprise. Kennedy's personality as well as political factors such as November mid-term elections led Kennedy to escalate the conflict to a qualitatively new level.

It is possible he was looking for an event to overshadow his Bay of Pigs failure. As we know "all politics is local".¹⁵⁷ Both Robert McNamara and Roger Hillsman claimed that it was the American administration rather than the country itself that was in mortal danger.¹⁵⁸ The official Kennedy foreign policy, such as the flexible response doctrine, allowed the American government to find the necessary solutions to arising conflicts and, most importantly, to achieve a compromise in the Cuban Missile crisis.¹⁵⁹

The Cuban government's nationalization of American property at the island was a major reason for the deterioration of American-Cuban relations. Numerous American companies previously present and dominant at the Cuban market lost their market leverage and profits. The puppet regime of Batista was overthrown and America had to face the willful and ideological government of Castro, which the US was reluctant to tolerate. The Bay of Pigs invasion was the first powerful indication of American hatred towards a new Cuban regime. The surprising negligence of American forces was the reason for its failure, which brought relentless criticism towards the American President and his advisors from all sides of political spectrum.¹⁶⁰ The immediate reaction of the United States was diplomatic (exclusion of Cuba from the Organization of American States followed by a cease of diplomatic relations) and economic (they stopped buying Cuban sugar, their main export).¹⁶¹ American actions pushed Cuba towards the Soviet Union, which provided Cuba with economic aid and adopted Cuban support as its major diplomatic strategy.¹⁶² Khrushchev understood that Kennedy was not going to give up

¹⁵⁷ Phrase coined by former Speaker of the U.S. House Tip O'Neill.

¹⁵⁸ A. A. Gromyko, and A.A. Kokoshkin. *Kennedy Brothers*. Moscow: Misl, 1985, p. 196.

¹⁵⁹ Allison Graham. *Essence of Decisions: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 118.

¹⁶⁰ A. A. Gromyko, and A.A. Kokoshkin. *Kennedy Brothers*. Moscow: Misl, 1985, p. 192.

¹⁶¹ F.M. Burlatskiy, *Leaders and Advisors. On Khrushchev, Andropov and not only*. Moscow: Political Literature, 1990, p. 223.

¹⁶² S.V. Vostrikov, "Equilibrium on the Edge of a Razor. Historical Consequences and Lessons of a Conflict" *Latin America*, № 4 (2003), p 90.

that easily after a recent military defeat. Thus, he started providing Cuba with military equipment as early as May of 1962.¹⁶³ The Americans became aware only after their agents started reporting nightly movements of huge machines full of obscure containers on the Cuban territory.¹⁶⁴

A threshold moment in the history of the Cold War occurred on October 14, 1962, when Mayor Richard Heyser took photographs of Cuban soil showing a drastic divergence from those taken a month before. American experts concluded that the masked objects in the photos contained medium-range ballistic missiles.¹⁶⁵ Kennedy was informed on October 16. From the start, his goal was to get rid of these missiles by all means possible.¹⁶⁶ He was confident that if he did not act decisively, his cabinet would stop taking him seriously and the US would lose the support of its NATO allies.¹⁶⁷

“Last month I said we weren’t going to [permit Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba] and last month I should have said ... we don’t care. But when we said we’re not going to, and [the Soviets] go ahead and do it, and then we do nothing, then ... I would think that our ... risks increase.”¹⁶⁸

Thus, it can be concluded that Kennedy believed he had to remove missiles in order to restore his authority and protect American superpower status. Soon after the information reached the American cabinet, Kennedy had a meeting with the Soviet Foreign Minister, A.A. Gromyko. The discussion was tense and sharp, with the conversation mainly concerning Cuba and the superpowers’ relations with the island. Nevertheless, missiles were not mentioned during this important dialogue. It is clear why Gromyko remained silent on the matter. Possible explanations for Kennedy’s containment could be his unwillingness to engage in a diplomatic settlement, which

¹⁶³ S.A. Mikoyan, “A Jump Over The Ocean: Why the Missiles?” *Latin America* N° 1 (2003), p. 98.

¹⁶⁴ E. Cohn, “President Kennedy’s Decision to Impose a Blockade in the Cuban Missile Crisis: Building Consensus in the ExComm After Teh Decision.” In *The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited*, edited by James Nathan, 642. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992, p. 525.

¹⁶⁵ S.N. Khrushchev, *Birth of Superpower: A Book About Father*. Century and Personality. Moscow: Time, 2003, p. 472.

¹⁶⁶ A. A. Gromyko, *The American Foreign Policy: Lessons and Reality: 60-70s*. International Relations. Moscow, 1978, p. 193.

¹⁶⁷ R.A. Divine, “Alive and Well: The Continuing Cuban Missile Crisis Controversy.” *Diplomatic History* N° 18 (1994), p. 420.

¹⁶⁸ Benjamin Schwarz, “The Real Cuban Missile Crisis.” *The Atlantic* (January 2, 2012). <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/01/the-real-cuban-missile-crisis/309190/>

could have been viewed as a reminiscent of Hitler's appeasement, as well as a lack of guidelines for the situation. According to some Soviet political scientists, instead of looking to deescalate the situation, the US used "crisis diplomacy", in which a situation close to military collision is created in order to demand an unconditional surrender from the opposite side,¹⁶⁹ since the Americans believed the Soviets would withdraw from a "hot" confrontation as the decision-making side bearing the responsibility of the possible escalation. Dean Rusk, the United States Secretary of State from 1961 to 1969, claimed that the fact the crisis had not become public in the first week gave President an opportunity to evaluate all pros and cons in order to make a balanced and mutually acceptable decision.¹⁷⁰

On the other side, Thomas Paterson argues that Kennedy has greatly overstated the Cuban threat and exacerbated the already existent problem.¹⁷¹ In any case, we should not underestimate the courage and wisdom of the American leader, which not only allowed America to become a perceived winner of a confrontation but also improved its world standing and authority. Dean Rusk is known to remind American reporters that American and Soviets met eye to eye and the Soviets blinked first.

It is imperative to understand the American interpretation of Soviet motives for the crisis escalation as well as the American evaluation of possible Soviet actions. This will give us insight into the rationale and main reasons for the behavior and actions of the US. Importantly, the United States saw the Cuban affair as a Soviet attempt to change the disadvantageous status quo and achieve a nuclear parity. Some American experts go as far as to suggest that the Cuban Crisis was the "cry of despair" and the result of Soviet realization that they were losing the Cold War.¹⁷² American officials understood the undertaking as an attempt to bolster an offensive advantage and consequently their positions in other foreign policy situations, such as in Berlin.¹⁷³

¹⁶⁹ A.I. Alekseev, *The Caribbean Crisis: As It Was*, p. 170.

¹⁷⁰ Dean Rusk, *As I Saw It*. New York: Penguin Books, 1991, p. 389.

¹⁷¹ Thomas Paterson, *Major Problems in American Foreign Policy*. 3rd ed. Washington DC: DC Health & Company, 1989.

¹⁷² J.L. Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History*. Clarendon Press, 1997.

¹⁷³ Raymond Garthoff, "Cuban Missile Crisis: The Soviet Story." *Foreign Policy* N° 72 (1988), p. 66.

It is interesting that in contrast to the Soviet's desperate effort to give the USSR the appearance of arms parity, Kennedy's narrow victory in the 1960 election relied upon a fabricated "missile gap" in the Soviet favor concocted to terrify the country and to condemn the Eisenhower administration as soft on national security.¹⁷⁴ The Americans would not recognize that Khrushchev might have had altruistic motives for missiles stationing, and they piled up their explanations into a Soviet desire to "restore justice" in a strategic and psychological sense (giving Americans a taste of their own medicine and to feel the threat just like Soviet citizens of facing close proximity missiles in Turkey). The Socialist explanation of the allied help is viewed as a bluff and "laughable" rhetoric.¹⁷⁵

Summarizing extensive research of Soviet motives, American experts Blight and Welch came to the conclusion that the Soviet decision could be attributed to three main concerns: a desire to prevent American invasion and abolition of the revolutionary Cuban government, an obvious necessity to change a strategic nuclear imbalance, and national pride considerations in that the USSR had a reciprocal right to deploy one's nuclear missiles in the adjunct.¹⁷⁶

The logic of the American people was also a major factor in political decision-making. Unlike the Soviet citizens, Americans were confident that if the Soviets had an opportunity to push the button, there were no reasons for them not to.¹⁷⁷ The aforementioned rationale explains a great psychological crisis America experienced during the Cuban crisis and its leaders determination to remove the missiles from Cuban territory as quickly as possible.

Immediately after the spotting of missiles, the crisis group was formed, called ExComm, in which major figures in American politics gathered to achieve a consensus as to how to respond to the aggressive actions of the Soviet government. It is worth noting that unlike Khrushchev, Kennedy decided to hold the meetings without being

¹⁷⁴ Dean Rusk, *As I Saw It*, p. 405.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 405.

¹⁷⁶ J.G. Blight and D.A. Welch. *On The Brink*. New York, 1990, p. 187.

¹⁷⁷ S.N. Khrushchev, "Cuban Missile Crisis. The Events Went Out of White House and Kremlin Control." *International Life* № 5 (2002), p. 63.

present. This allowed the members to speak openly without trying to please the President. Kennedy's brother Robert played a crucial role in the meetings of the ExComm as well as in the crisis resolution in general.

According to Arthur Schlesinger, Robert was an irreplaceable partner, who helped the President resist strong pressure from the military to employ weapons.¹⁷⁸ It was Robert Kennedy who headed the ExComm meetings, prevented a suggested "massive nuclear strike on Cuba", maintained correspondence with Soviet leadership and held secret meetings with the Soviet Ambassador, A.F. Dobrynin, which according to Khrushchev were the most important part of the political dialogue between the states and allowed a peaceful settlement.¹⁷⁹ However, even the assessment of his role in the crisis is highly debatable, with Sheldon M. Stern's account describing Robert Kennedy as one of the most consistently and recklessly hawkish advisers, pushing not for a blockade or even air strikes against Cuba, but for a full-scale invasion.¹⁸⁰

It is important to note how diversity of opinions and ideas of its members within the Executive Committee. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara stated that there was no difference in the territorial stationing of the Soviet missiles, as the USSR-based intercontinental missiles had the same destructive power as the medium-range ones in Cuba.¹⁸¹

The balanced position of such a distinguished person was crucial to pushing back against the doomed "strike scenario", advocated by higher military commandship. Robert Kennedy viewed everything through the lens of domestic politics and the President's standing within the government. As claimed by American historiography, eventually both Robert Kennedy and McNamara advocated for a blockade.¹⁸² American UN representative Adlai Stevenson II proposed an extensive political plan on the

¹⁷⁸ A.M. Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days of John Kennedy in the White House*. New York, 1966, p. 546.

¹⁷⁹ Graham Allison, *Essence of Decisions: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 118.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid. p. 120.

¹⁸¹ A. A. Gromyko, *The American Foreign Policy: Lessons and Reality: 60-70s*. International Relations. Moscow, 1978, p. 215

¹⁸² Graham Allison, J.L. Gaddis and A.M Schlesinger.

neutralization of American troops in Cuba under direct UN supervision, withdrawal of American “Jupiters” from Turkey and Greece and territorial guarantees to Cuba.¹⁸³ The American higher command on the other side was confident that the Bay of Pigs failure was a direct consequence of American indecisiveness and claimed that the Cuban crisis was a perfect moment to solve the problem of revolutionary. Among the notorious warmongers, Dean Acheson, Paul Nitze and C. Douglas Dillon were the most sophisticated and linked the Soviet missiles problem to the American leadership positions in the Western Hemisphere, advocating immediate and decisive military actions such as a tactical strike.¹⁸⁴ Senator Richard Russell requested an immediate direct invasion of the island.¹⁸⁵ Eventually the “war party” found itself distanced from the decision-making process, which, while beneficial for world security and settlement of the conflict, was a cause of enduring political disagreements.

Evaluating the possible alternatives, the Americans were also trying to predict the reaction of international actors in view of various historical precedents. It was hard to overlook the parallel to Pearl Harbor when contemplating a massive air strike. At the last meeting of ExComm, Robert Kennedy sent his brother a note saying, “now I know what Tojo must have felt planning Pearl Harbor”.¹⁸⁶

To the Soviets would likely blockade Berlin in response, which was why this was not an option for an American government. Finally, McNamara’s assurances that the targeted strike would not be 100% effective was a last straw as remaining missiles could have been directed towards American cities, and the strike option was given up. In his speech on October 22, Kennedy declared an establishment of naval quarantine for offensive weapons. He stated that all vessels carrying weapons of mass destruction to Cuba would be stopped and returned to the ports they had left.¹⁸⁷ He also pointed out that any missile

¹⁸³ A.I. Alekseev, *The Caribbean Crisis: As It Was*, p. 162.

¹⁸⁴ E.Cohn, “President Kennedy’s Decision to Impose a Blockade in the Cuban Missile Crisis: Building Consensus in the ExComm After The Decision.” p. 558.

¹⁸⁵ B.J. Bernstein, “Reconsidering the Missile Crisis: Dealing with the Problems of the American Jupiters in Turkey, p. 481.

¹⁸⁶ R.F. Kennedy, *Thirteen Days. A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis*. New York: W.W. Norton Company Inc., 1969, p. 168.

¹⁸⁷ D. Horowitz and P. Collier. *The Kennedys: An American Drama*. New York, 1984.

“JFK on the Cuban Missile Crisis 1962/10/22,” 1962. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j0MUbVQ19Ns>.

launched from Cuba would be regarded as a Soviet attack and would lead to a full-scale counter-attack on the USSR. The reaction of the world leaders to the American decision varied greatly.

Nevertheless, everyone understood the danger of the situation and the possible consequences of mutual miscommunication. European NATO allies were especially concerned with the escalation of the conflict due to the fact that in the tense days of October 1962, as alliance with the United States potentially amounted to, as Charles de Gaulle had warned, “annihilation without representation.”¹⁸⁸ UN General Secretary U Thant suggested a high level meeting between Kennedy and Khrushchev in order to reach a settlement. If such a meeting took place, however, the American President could have been accused of cowardice and incoherence, and the political spectrum of the US could tilt to the Republicans. Thus, Kennedy took the only possible decision – to put negotiations on hold until the missiles were removed.¹⁸⁹

It is hard to overestimate the panic Americans during October of 1962. Throughout the world, forces went on high alert. World War III seemed imminent and, across the globe, terrified people prepared for Armageddon.¹⁹⁰ People built bomb shelters, bought provision for years to come and waited for the worst while hoping for the best. The order was given for the evacuation of Washington DC. Kennedy was decisive and pertinacious. Recently declassified sources show that the American government was planning a full-scale military invasion in case a compromise was not reached.¹⁹¹ An important factor in such a tense atmosphere was Jacqueline Kennedy’s refusal to evacuate, which, according to some scholars, helped smooth the belligerent attitude of her husband.¹⁹² Apart from Jackie’s position, the meeting between Aleksandr Fomin, the counselor of the Soviet Embassy, and John A. Scali, an ABC reporter, was a decisive point in turning the American position to a more realistic approach. Fomin

¹⁸⁸ J.L. Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History*. Clarendon Press, 1997, p. 320.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 328.

¹⁹⁰ John Swift, “The Cuban Missiles Crisis.” *History Review* (2007). <http://www.historytoday.com/john-swift/cuban-missile-crisis>.

¹⁹¹ “Soviet Report on the American Preparations of War During the Cuban Missile Crisis.” Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, October 31, 1962. <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114527>.

¹⁹² A.M. Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days of John Kennedy in the White House*, p. 546.

invited Scali for a lunch at the old Occidental Restaurant, two blocks from the White House in hope of getting some first-hand information.

According to Fomin's interpretation, during lunch, Scali suddenly began threatening, "if Moscow does not remove missiles in the next 48 hours Pentagon will tear Cuba apart and leave neither missiles nor Castro intact."¹⁹³ An outraged Fomin took the responsibility to retort with the blackmail regarding Soviet retaliation in West Berlin,¹⁹⁴ leaving Kennedy in jitters. West Berlin was an important American foreign policy success and since it was located in the middle of Soviet East Germany, the Soviet threat was real. Thus, Scali was instructed by a concerned American government to transmit the newly formed suggestions on the removal of Soviet missiles in exchange for a guarantee of non-intervention on the US side.¹⁹⁵ This was the final pronounced deal, apart from the secret assurances on the withdrawal of Turkish missiles.

American assessment of the events can be summarized as a unilateral account of American victory and a shameful backing of the Soviet leader. Scholarship immediately following the crisis largely supported this harmful idea. According to James Nathan, such a false characterization of the events had the unfortunate adoption of a "resolve" rather than an acceptable compromise as a main goal of the American Cold War policy.¹⁹⁶ Despite an apparent victory of the American side, an obvious change in the US attitude towards USSR-directed foreign policy warrants consideration.

A pronounced evidence of the increased soberness of American policy making is Kennedy's famous speech at American University in Washington on June 10, 1963, where he acknowledged that the US could not perform the gendarme role forever, but should rather strive to make the world a safer place by accepting a whole multitude of

¹⁹³ Aleksandr Feliksov. "Soviet Intelligence Report on Meeting with Scali and American Proposal." Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, October 27, 1962. <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114528>.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁹⁵ S.N. Khrushchev, "Cuban Missile Crisis. The Events Went Out of White House and Kremlin Control." *International Life* N° 5 (2002), p. 79.

¹⁹⁶ James Nathan, "Diplomacy, Not Deterring-Do." *Foreign Affairs* 91, N° 6 (December 2012), pp. 163–165.

ideologies and worldviews.¹⁹⁷ A degree of realism shown by Kennedy caused some violent assaults by American reactionary powers. Extremist and pro-fascist American organizations operating in the 60s were confident that it was Kennedy who turned out to be a “weakest link.”¹⁹⁸ Some accusations go as far as to suggest that Communists infested the State Department and the war plans were transferred to the Soviet Union.¹⁹⁹

According to Dean Rusk, the deterrent was as important as power.²⁰⁰ As a result of this frightening stand-off, the parties were able to get to know each other and form their opinion on the representatives of the opposite camp. In the aftermath of the crisis, JFK said, “Khrushchev has made an important input in the peace and stability of the world”.²⁰¹ Khrushchev was equally impressed by the statecraft and wisdom of his American colleague.

The Cuban crisis showed that nuclear war was not an option. Both Russians and Americans understood that they were just people and not blind system apologists.²⁰² Talking about the leaders’ role, Khrushchev noted, “any fool can start war and not a hundred of wise man would be enough to finish it.”²⁰³ Indeed, it is hard to imagine what would have happened if Eisenhower was in Kennedy’s place and Stalin was the USSR leader at the time.

Cuban Perspective: “Cuban People Do Not Understand...”

It would be wrong to view the positions of superpowers only in the Caribbean Crisis. Looking only at the global side of the ideological contestation of two-world systems would be same as playing basketball without a court. Cuba was that court during 1962.

¹⁹⁷ Jeffrey Sachs, “J.F.K. and the Power of Practical Idealism.” The New York Times (June 9, 2013). http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/10/opinion/global/jeffrey-sachs-jfk-and-the-power-of-practical-idealism.html?ref=cubanmissilecrisis&_r=2&.

¹⁹⁸ S.V. Vostrikov, “Equilibrium on the Edge of a Razor” p. 88.

¹⁹⁹ L.I. Zubok, and N.N. Yakovlev. *A Novel History of America (1917-1968)*. Moscow: Enlightenment, 1972, p. 325.

²⁰⁰ Thomas Paterson, *Major Problems in American Foreign Policy*, p. 528.

²⁰¹ R.F. Kennedy, *Thirteen Days. A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis*, p. 168.

²⁰² F.M. Burlatskiy, Leaders and Advisors. *On Khrushchev, Andropov and not only*. Moscow: Political Literature, 1990, p. 245.

²⁰³ S.N. Khrushchev, “Cuban Missile Crisis. The Events Went Out of White House and Kremlin Control.” *International Life* № 5 (2002), p. 78.

To a great extent, the October events were linked to the preceding Cuban revolution and Castro's ascent to power. Castro was born to a Spanish immigrant and poor Cuban peasant. Despite this humble upbringing, his parents strived to give Fidel the best education and from early childhood, his educational success was remarkable.²⁰⁴ His revolutionary temper did not go unnoticed either. At age 13, he participated in the workers' revolt at his father's sugar plantation. Max Lestnik, Castro's school friend said, "he possessed unbelievable braveness. They say who follows Castro will either die or win!"

Initially America was favorably disposed towards a new regime. Unaware of the pending turn in Cuban foreign policy, Senator Robert Kennedy joined in on the approval of a new Cuban government as an improvement to the "despotic" Batista's dictatorship.²⁰⁵ Castro was equally inclined towards friendly relations with the US. Indeed, during the Cuban revolution, Cuba had diplomatic relations with the US, but not the USSR. The mistrust and lack of information on the other side precluded the Soviet Union and Cuba from any meaningful interaction until the Soviets examined Castro's plans and ideological standing. Rapid nationalization of American property could not go unnoticed by the Americans and created a fear that the Castro's regime would have a profound effect on the leftist movements in the other Latin American states and start a detrimental impact on American business. Cuban agrarian reform led to the expropriation of American property amounting to 1 \$ billion.

The change in American attitudes was drastic and ill conceived. An ostentatious neglect of the Cuban leader by the American President played a significant role in the decline of mutual relations. Eisenhower redirected Castro to his Vice-President, R. Nixon, choosing to play golf over a scheduled high-level meeting. Castro considered such an attitude towards the President of an independent and proud Cuban republic humiliating.²⁰⁶ Had Eisenhower met with Castro and promised support in his fight with corruption and chaos, would there have been a crisis in the first place? There is reason

²⁰⁴ John Swift, "The Cuban Missiles Crisis." *History Review*, 2007.

²⁰⁵ Thomas Paterson, *Major Problems in American Foreign Policy*. p. 547.

²⁰⁶ S.N. Khrushchev, "Cuban Missile Crisis. The Events Went Out of White House and Kremlin Control." *International Life* № 5 (2002), p. 58.

to believe that Washington did everything possible to push Cuba into the Soviet embrace.

The role of the US economic embargo cannot be overstated. The cessation of sugar imports signified the end of previously blossoming bilateral trade and put Cuba on the brink of economic collapse.²⁰⁷ Soon afterwards the US broke all diplomatic interactions with the republic. In a bipolar world, “my enemy’s enemy is my friend”. The US left Cuba with no choice. The alternative of a strong ally instead of waiting to be annihilated was a welcoming option. The USSR was happy to support a friendly Communist regime in the sphere of American interests. Soon, the Soviet Union became Cuba’s lifeline.²⁰⁸ Due to its reliance on the USSR and in light of the recent Bay of Pigs invasion, Castro announced turned Cuba into a socialist state.

The Americans called Castro’s revolution treason and set out on the annihilation of Castro and his regime.²⁰⁹ The 1963 failed plan, Mongoose, is the most well known though many plans existed before 1962, some of which were really curious. One plan was to apply thallium salts to Castro’s shoes in order for his beard to fall off and destroy his charisma. Another one was to sprinkle Castro’s cigars with a chemical substance, causing temporary disorientation before he was to give a speech.²¹⁰ The duplicity of American liberalism was especially evident in its relation to Cuba, when the notions of state sovereignty, democracy and the will of the nation were disregarded for the selfish national interest of the US.

“We cannot overestimate to what extent CIA officers felt the pressure and urges to take actions in regard to Castro and his regime,” said a CIA agent in 1967.²¹¹ The politics of the time were to get rid of Castro. So why was the US so persistent in its fight of Castro regime? How can we explain its irreconcilable position? According to American

²⁰⁷ E. Cohn, “President Kennedy’s Decision to Impose a Blockade in the Cuban Missile Crisis: Building Consensus in the ExComm After The Decision.” In *The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited*, edited by James Nathan, 642. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992, p. 503.

²⁰⁸ Thomas Paterson, *Major Problems in American Foreign Policy*, p. 555.

²⁰⁹ Ibid. p. 547.

²¹⁰ Ibid. p. 537.

²¹¹ E. Cohn, “President Kennedy’s Decision to Impose a Blockade in the Cuban Missile Crisis”, p. 505.

political scientist, Thomas Patterson, the major reason for American leaders' anxiety was the challenge to American superiority in the Latin America.²¹² Castro's survival was an affront to American pride.

A plausible explanation for American reaction at the time of Castro's rise to power as well as today might be an account of ontological security, thus the need to define itself in opposition to another. The Monroe Doctrine and the perception of Cuba as a defiant power in American sphere of interests could not leave the Americans silent. On August 23, 1963, Kennedy issued National Security memorandum #181, "a directive to engineer an internal revolt that would be followed by US military invasion". One of the most popular planned operations was operation Mongoose, tacitly approved by Kennedy in March 1962, which, again stated that the eventual success of the program would require a decisive US military intervention.²¹³ Military exercises called Filbrixlex-2²¹⁴ involving 40,000 military personnel directed against an imagined dictator called Ortsac (Castro backwards) was a powerful indication of American intentions to invade as well as a validation for the Soviet missile stationing.

Accounting for the numerous sophisticated plans to invade the island, there is no wonder Cubans constantly felt existentially threatened. After the Bay of Pigs invasion, Castro called Kennedy a "new Hitler".²¹⁵ Cuba persisted that its problem was not that the opposition of geopolitical West and East, but rather its pursuit of independence and sovereignty. Nevertheless, it is important to note a sharp geopolitical contestat over the island. At a time when the US was planning yet another full-scale invasion, Soviet leadership was thinking of options to protect the Cuban Revolution. The drastically different standing towards the Cuban Revolution for the procurement of political objectives was the main reason for the Soviet success with an enduring Cuban government. The result of Soviet deliberations was Khrushchev's decision to station

²¹² Thomas Paterson, *Major Problems in American Foreign Policy*, p. 549.

²¹³ Laurence Chang and Peter Kornbluh, eds. *The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962*. 2nd ed. New York: The New Press, 1998.

²¹⁴ John Swift, "The Cuban Missiles Crisis." *History Review* (2007). <http://www.historytoday.com/john-swift/cuban-missile-crisis>; E. Cohn, "President Kennedy's Decision to Impose a Blockade in the Cuban Missile Crisis: Building Consensus in the ExComm After The Decision." In *The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited*, edited by James Nathan, 642. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992.

²¹⁵ Thomas Paterson, *Major Problems in American Foreign Policy*, p. 547.

nuclear missiles on its territory. Indeed, the missiles' transportation would prove Soviet ability to strike the heart of American interests with impunity, and thus signify an important victory for the Soviet people, who were used to seeing the world as a zone of geopolitical contests.²¹⁶

One roll of a dice could restore Soviet international standing, frighten Americans, save Cubans, shut up Stalinists, frustrate the Chinese and gain a potential advantage in the bargain over West Berlin. Risk was medium, reward great.²¹⁷ Thus, a Soviet delegation was sent to Cuba to explain the situation and reach an agreement for weapons stationing.²¹⁸ Surprisingly, Cubans were more than willing to accept murderous weapons. "Let us be the first victims in the fight against American imperialism", stated Castro. Despite being an extravagant character, his decision was motivated by an altruistic sacrifice in the name of socialism.²¹⁹

Soon afterwards, Raul Castro arrived in the USSR to prepare all the necessary documents. A final meeting of Raul Castro and Khrushchev took place on July 8. The secrecy of the operation was especially important. All possible measures were taken to ensure the safety of documents. All materials were written by hand in a single copy.²²⁰ The Cubans offered to make the stationing of missiles public. This not only heightened the prestige of the agreement but also gained Cuba greater importance in the international community. Who would try to preclude the agreement between the two independent governments? If someone in Moscow was considering making Soviet intentions public, it was a recently appointed Soviet Ambassador to Washington Anatoly Dobrynin, who claimed, "we could have predicted a violent reaction of America to Khrushchev's undertaking as soon as it becomes known".²²¹ The covert nature of the operation only escalated the negative perception of it.

²¹⁶ A. Fursenko and T. Naftali. *One Hell of a Gamble*. New York, 1997, p. 363.

²¹⁷ Prospect theory in Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky. "Rational Choice and the Framing of Decision." *Journal of Business* 59, № 4 (1986): 251–278.

²¹⁸ S.A. Mikoyan, "A Jump Over The Ocean: Why the Missiles?" *Latin America* №1 (2003), p. 100

²¹⁹ *Ibid.* p. 97

²²⁰ N.S. Khrushchev, *Memories. Selected*, p. 440; Raymond Garthoff, "Cuban Missile Crisis: The Soviet Story." p. 66.

²²¹ J.L. Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History*. Clarendon Press, 1997, p. 269.

The veterans of the Cuban administration acknowledge that if the Soviet missiles stationing had been public, the US would have had more difficulty resisting due to the precedent of American missiles in Turkey and elsewhere in Europe.²²² Kennedy himself declared repeatedly that the Jupiter missiles were “the same” as the Soviet missile in Cuba.²²³ Thus, the only role they performed was to enhance nuclear deterrence by complicating America’s planning for a successful first strike.

The psychological factor of a secret stationing and a newly acquired US awareness of the fact could not allow them to “sit back and let them do that to us,” as the US Assistant Secretary of State Edwin Martin put it.²²⁴ The fact remained. Missiles were stationed. US leaders were informed. In his speech on October 22, Kennedy did not even try to hide an obviously hostile attitude towards Cuba.

He did not even recognize Cuban attempts to protect itself and ensure its regime’s future. The State Department published a brochure, which called Castro a traitor to common American interests and viewed its Communist regime as a challenge to the stability of Americas.²²⁵ The considerations of the security dilemma were at work here. According to Gromyko, the roots of Cuban crisis can be found in the American desire to ensure its monopoly on security while rejecting the right of other states to protect themselves.²²⁶

Indeed the explanatory force of the security dilemma in the Cuban Crisis case is an astonishing one. It was at play when Americans refused to accept the validity of the Soviet rationale for the stationing of the missiles as well as when the Cuban government did not trust American guarantees of non-aggression.

The tension during October was remarkable. In such a situation, the third player was an additional burden on the decision-making and control. It was hard for two leaders to

²²² Benjamin Schwarz, “The Real Cuban Missile Crisis.” *The Atlantic* (January 2, 2012). <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/01/the-real-cuban-missile-crisis/309190/>.

²²³ Ibid.

²²⁴ Ibid.

²²⁵ Adrian Brito, “The Cuban Missile Crisis: The Eluded Perspectives of the Soviet Union and the Cuban Government” N° 9 (June 1, 2008). <http://www.globalaffairs.es/en/the-cuban-missile-crisis-the-eluded-perspectives-of-the-soviet-union-and-the-cuban-government/>.

²²⁶ A. A. Gromyko, and A.A. Kokoshkin. *Kennedy Brothers*. Moscow: Misl, 1985, p. 190.

come to terms and put themselves into each other's shoes in order to reach a compromise. To know what was going on in the heads of mysterious and irascible Cuban leaders was even harder. In these crucial days when the Cold War tension reached its peak and the order of any Cuban general could cause a nuclear Armageddon, the connection and information exchange with the Cuban side bore a prodigious importance.

An illustrative was the shooting down of an American reconnaissance flight U-2 on October 27, which consequently has been called "Black Saturday".²²⁷ Even though the American public has been long misinformed as to the responsibility of shooting down the plane, it is now known that a Soviet General made the decision without any prior consultation with central command. This was the turning point in the crisis, when the Soviet government realized the danger of the situation in Cuba.

As Khrushchev later acknowledged, this was the moment when he got a gut feeling that the missiles ought to be removed with no further delay,²²⁸ and he decided to accept President Kennedy's proposal of October 28.²²⁹ A number of IRBMs were controlled directly by Cuban commandership. Thus, the possibility of an unexpected situation was multiplied by the existence of a third decision-maker. Practically simultaneous with the Soviet order to ignore the flying planes, Castro ordered his soldiers to shoot down American reconnaissance planes. He believed the Northern neighbor could be influenced by nothing but power. Indeed, he was the leader of the Cuban Republic and American planes were flying over his territory.

The situation in Cuba was escalating every moment. Castro was ready to die together with the Socialist camp. From the newly released documents, we now know that Castro was urging Khrushchev to use missiles if Cuba was invaded.²³⁰ He was not aware of the overwhelmingly American-inclined nuclear balance and had no idea what the explosion of an atomic bomb was or what the consequences of a nuclear warfare would be for all

²²⁷ Raymond Garthoff, "Cuban Missile Crisis: The Soviet Story." p. 72.

²²⁸ N.S. Khrushchev, *Memories*, p. 308.

²²⁹ Raymond Garthoff, "Cuban Missile Crisis: The Soviet Story." p. 76.

²³⁰ John Swift, "The Cuban Missiles Crisis." *History Review* (2007). <http://www.historytoday.com/john-swift/cuban-missile-crisis>.

the sides involved, irrespective of the winning and losing positions.²³¹ He was sure that if the Soviet Union struck first, it would end the arrogant Northern neighbors and the era of freedom, welfare and economic prosperity would reign on the Cuban soil.²³²

Thus, the Soviet decision to withdraw the missiles came out of the blue for the Cuban side. “Up to this very moment we were sure the missiles would be used,” stressed Castro. This was likely the rationale for Castro’s message of October 27, in which he suggested launching a preventive nuclear strike.²³³ The Soviet government, however, decisively rejected such a scenario as one that had never been considered by the Soviets. “Dear comrade,” wrote Khrushchev, “I think your suggestion to be wrong, however, I understand your motivation”.²³⁴ Later on, Castro claimed his intentions were misunderstood in Moscow.²³⁵

However, Castro was not consulted when the final decision on missiles withdrawal was negotiated in the Soviet echelons. On Sunday, October 28, around 7 AM, Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticos notified the Soviet ambassador in Cuba, Alekseev, on the official Soviet resolution. “When Dorticos said that the information could not have been falsified as it was coming from the Moscow radio, I felt myself the most unhappy person on the Earth and I could not even imagine what Castro could have felt,” Alekseev wrote in his memoirs on that famous day.²³⁶ The following expansive cable addressed to the Cuban leader stressed a dangerous time shortage and informed Castro on the positive consequences of the crisis settlement. According to the cable, Cuba was assured of at least 6 years of peace as Kennedy, who “was definitely going to be newly elected was not going to bridge its gentleman’s word”.

²³¹ B.J. Bernstein, “Reconsidering the Missile Crisis: Dealing with the Problems of the American Jupiters in Turkey.” p. 549.

²³² B.J. Bernstein, “Reconsidering the Missile Crisis: Dealing with the Problems of the American Jupiters in Turkey.” p. 549.

²³³ A. Fursenko and T. Naftali. *One Hell of a Gamble*. New York, 1997, p. 74.

²³⁴ J.L. Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History*. Clarendon Press, 1997, p. 277.

²³⁵ A.I. Alekseev, “Cable from Soviet Ambassador to Cuba Alekseev to USSR Foreign Ministry.” Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, October 31, 1962.

<http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/112640>. Apparently, N.S. Khrushchev did not understand me or the translation was not correct since in the cable of 27 [26?] October I did not suggest to be the first in delivering a blow against the adversary territory during the crisis, but in the case if there were an aggression against Cuba and Soviet people would be perishing together with the Cubans.

²³⁶ A.I. Alekseev, *The Caribbean Crisis: As It Was*, p. 71.

The Cuban government, however, was dissatisfied with such a conclusion. The perspective of the Cuban leaders that the Soviet Union completely ignored Castro's ideas on how to resolve crisis were not only credible but bitterly exacerbated by the outrageous negligence of Castro's famous 5 Points by the American government right before the settlement of the crisis. Castro felt he was used as a pawn by the two superpowers.²³⁷ This led to a decline in relations with the Soviet Union and the Cuban regime adopted a general suspiciousness and insular attitude for many years to follow, irritating America and causing the Cuban people to suffer.

Conclusion

Drawing a conclusion from such a controversial and crucial period in human history is more than an ambitious task. However, a summary of the events can be given. The crisis became a turning point in the relations between the two superpowers. It demonstrated how dangerous the possibility of nuclear showdown was and that the only rational way out in such a case would be through peaceful negotiations. Kennedy's quote is an illustrative example of a rational attitude towards international relations, "let us never negotiate out of fear, but let us never fear to negotiate."

The American and Soviet leaders understood the insurmountable danger of another similar misunderstanding and established a red line between Kremlin and the White House. The realization of mutual vulnerability showed the US that the exercise of power is not limitless and the only acceptable way to regulate power in the nuclear age is by negotiation. The new concept of "peaceful coexistence" was accepted in the aftermath, which signified the beginning of *détente* and an understanding that despite a different ideology, the world superpowers do not have to exasperate those differences by military means.

The universally accepted conclusion of the crisis is that it was a definitive victory by the US. Due to greater access of information by the American scholarship as well as

²³⁷ Adrian Brito, "The Cuban Missile Crisis".

intense propaganda techniques, the account of a wise, brave and victorious American leadership long dominated the general narrative. Indeed, if we look at the situation from the position of public appearance and proclamations, there was an unambiguous American victory, but the withdrawal of Turkey-based Jupiters seems to invalidate such a claim. In terms of geopolitics, American victory could be questioned due to the fact that a hostile political regime acquired a strong footing in close proximity to the American border.

The Soviets have usually cited the Cuban defense and the prevention of a US-initiated nuclear war as their main rationale for the stationing of missiles. Clearly, these are the only explanations that could afford them to keep up appearances in the aftermath of withdrawal. Cuba indeed received the assurances of non-intervention and for good or bad, the Cuban regime lasted long. Despite such a positive outcome for the regime, consequences for the Cuban people were less than satisfactory due to a persisting, destructive, economic embargo. As for the second reason of deterring the US from starting a nuclear war, Khrushchev's strategy worked well as he got assurances of the withdrawal of Turkish missiles and then signed a nuclear test ban treaty in 1963.

This work examined how the differences between American, Soviet and Cuban sides influenced the decisions of the participants of the conflict and how these variations can help explain the differences in crisis assessment. From the research, it becomes evident that not only can there be no universally correct account of the events, but also that the politically motivated and acceptable national interpretations create a multitude of equally logical and explanatory motivations and assessments of the events.

The main goal of a researcher is to approach all these interpretations from an unbiased point of view and understand the situation in its complexity. Due to recently released documents of the Soviet side, the account of the event became fuller, eliminating conventional stereotypes and a dominant American view. Despite the smaller influence of Cuban decision-making, a similar addition of Cuban sources would greatly help to understand the psychology of the crisis and the leaders' decisions to engage in such irreversible and risky behavior.

Not only was this paper to show the complexities surrounding the political decision-making and its interpretation, but to imply we should learn from history and not commit the same mistakes if they can be avoided. As Mark Twain once said “History doesn't repeat itself, but it does rhyme. “Even though officially Cold War is over, the tensions existing among some states continue to exist and heighten. And let our prudence and understanding trump over our ambition and self-assertion if we want to continue enjoy the world which we all now take for granted.

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Top Secret Soviet and Hungarian Plans for Pre-empting NATO – USA Unexpected Nuclear Strikes

Rita PARODA

In this article, I would like to focus on the lack of preparation during the Cold War by the countries of the Warsaw Pact (WP) for defense against a nuclear missile attack before the 1980s because their basic strategy was to make a pre-emptive strike. Additionally, I will explore the possible reasons that led them to make defensive preparations. The secret documents of the WP from the 1970s and the 1980s are increasingly available for historians. By analyzing these documents, we can create a more accurate image of the function and intention of the WP. From these documents, we can conclude the point of the WP's military doctrine was to take the offensive in fighting a potential World War III against NATO. This is clearly demonstrated in the nuclear war plans, in which they shifted from a defensive position to an offensive war against NATO forces.

Starting in the 1960s, the Soviets led WP nations to conduct military exercises or Front Command Post exercises every year in some member states involving military forces of the Soviet Union along with those of other WP member states. Annually, with the approval of the Hungarian political leadership, they formulated and modified plans for waging a possible war.²³⁸

These secret documents reveal that even in the 1980s, the Soviet Union was prepared for an offensive war in which they would likely use nuclear weapons. This is demonstrated by a Front Command Post exercise in 1980. In this scenario, "self-defense" would persist until completion of full military invasion of Italy as part of WP forces' pre-emptive strike, in which if they encountered minimal resistance and did not

²³⁸ Presentation of Miklós Horváth in the Terror Háza Múzeum, October 7, 2010.

lose any captured territory, WP forces could move from the Hungarian-Austrian border all the way to Trapani, Sicily. Recent research by military historian Miklós Horváth indicates there was no significant change to this strategy, even after the 1987 Berlin meeting of the WP Political Consultative Committee, in which they decided to strengthen the defensive nature of the WP's military doctrine. In 1987, 32 years after the formation of the WP, in a Front Command Post exercise, for the first time, the Unified Armed Forces were dealing with the challenges of preparing and waging a defensive military operation.²³⁹

The WP countries first began taking increased measures in the 1980s in regards to an unexpected nuclear attack from NATO. In 1981, KGB chairman Yuri Andropov announced that the Politburo decided the KGB and GRU (the Soviet Military Intelligence) were to collaborate for the first time in a global intelligence operation, code-named RYAN (РЯН), from the acronym for *Raketno-Yadernoe Napadenie*, meaning “Nuclear Missile Attack”. The purpose of RYAN was to collect intelligence on the presumed, but non-existent, plans of the Reagan administration to launch a nuclear first strike against the Soviet Union. Operation RYAN slowed during 1984, though it did not end quite then.²⁴⁰ We still do not have enough information about the function and role of this intelligence operation during the early 1980s, so this issue needs further research. Based on the secret correspondence between the Soviet and the Hungarian intelligence services in 1984-1985, we know that Soviet officials drew alerted Hungarian political leaders to the perceived aggressive policies of the USA. Among other aspects, they indicated that

The USA in favor of increasing its military power began the implementation of monumental armament programs. With the mobilization of huge financial and technical resources they began developing new strategic nuclear weapon systems, anti-missile systems, and the preparation of cosmic warfare... The leading circles of the USA ultimately want to create an arsenal which is capable of making the first strike, which allows them to use nuclear blackmail and the unlimited instruments of power politics.²⁴¹

²³⁹ Horváth Miklós: Új szakasz a hidegháború történetének kutatásában? - Mozaikok Magyarország hidegháborús történetéből, 2010, p. 8.

²⁴⁰ Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin: The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB, 2001, pp. 213-214.

²⁴¹ 43 document - ÁBTL 1. 11. 4. EV/84-88/1 3-12.

Some key historical events

Starting in 1977, the Soviets replaced the SS-4 and SS-5 missiles with longer range (5000 km) SS-20 missiles, which was followed by firm reactions from the USA. In May 1978, NATO adopted a new armament program for the next 15 years, including developing a neutron bomb. The armament war between the superpowers accelerated. A NATO meeting was held on December 12, 1978 in Brussels, Belgium. They adopted the Double-Track Decision, in which NATO would deploy 572 American Pershing-II and Cruise Missiles into Western Europe in 1983 if the Soviets refused to disarm the SS-20 missiles.

Meanwhile in 1980, the Wartime Statute of the Combined Armed Forces of the WP countries, drafted in 1978, was approved. In November 1981, President Reagan made a proposal called “Zero Option.” If the Soviet Union disarmed all of their missiles in Europe and beyond the Ural Mountains, then NATO would stop enforcing the 1979 Double-Track Decision. The Soviets rejected this offer. By autumn of 1983, no agreement was reached and negotiations stalled. As a result, the USA deployed the American Pershing-II and Cruise Missiles to Greenham, England, Mutlangen, West Germany, and Comiso, Italy.

These missiles only needed 5-8 minutes to reach their target. As a countermove, the Soviets increased the number of the SS-20 missiles in East Germany and Czechoslovakia. On November 23, 1983, American-Soviet negotiations broke down completely.²⁴² In addition, we can assume that a 1983 NATO war plan may have played a part in the development of the defensive preparations of the WP. In the military exercise, code-named “Able Archer”, NATO member states, with the participation of the government leaders, also practiced preparations for a nuclear war. Able Archer was the final phase, the conclusion of the Autumn Forge 1983 exercise, and was conducted between November 7-11, in which the exercise shifted from conventional war to nuclear war.²⁴³

²⁴² Fischer Ferenc: A kétpólusú világ, 2005. 293-323.

²⁴³ The 1983 War Scare: “The Last Paroxysm” of the Cold War Part I, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book N° 426, Edited by Nate Jones, posted in May, 2013.
<http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB426/>

Soviet intelligence agencies kept a close watch on the maneuvers, and their reports led Andropov and his top aides to conclude that a nuclear attack was imminent. According to John Lewis Gaddis, it was probably the most dangerous moment since the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962.²⁴⁴ The events of the first half of the 1980s like this NATO exercise created a fear of war among the Soviets. According to Richard Rhodes, this “made the Soviet leadership uneasy, so there was very little that prevented them from making the first nuclear strike”.²⁴⁵ Recently declassified secret documents also reveal that even in the 1980s, the world was extremely close to a thermonuclear war, but this issue needs further research.

Instructions for detection of and preparation for nuclear attack

According to the Soviets, “the escalation of the tension between the opposing military forces increases the possibility of the unexpected nuclear strike against the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, and thereby the danger of global thermonuclear war”. Consistent with propaganda materials, the West was the aggressor and the countries of the WP were in the peace camp, the approach assumed that the first nuclear strike would be carried out by the USA, and hence Soviet leaders thought that the Soviet and Hungarian intelligence services had to join forces and make necessary preparations together.

At the beginning of the war, before the first strike, we can read in the letter that despite all the secrecy “the enemy will be forced to make a series of actions in the political, economic, military and social spheres which would be directed to ensure the effectiveness of its nuclear strike and to limit the damage caused by retaliatory strikes. All of this activity inevitably produces abnormal movements, which could be explored with the appropriate use of the work tools available to national security intelligence”. They detailed the processes, activities and preparations for every area, political, military and economic and civil defense, which the initiator, the USA, would make before an unexpected nuclear attack. At the end of the 1984 letter, there was a suggestion that the

²⁴⁴ John Lewis Gaddis: *The Cold War*, 2005, p. 228.

²⁴⁵ Richard Rhodes: *Az atombomba története*, 2013, p.8.

WP countries create and publish an “Action Plan” concerning “the organization of intelligence efforts directed toward detection of the danger of an unexpected nuclear attack”. This action plan was not made prior to 1985, because they sent the proposal for it only at the end of the previous year, proving that the Soviets did not inform their allies properly previously, and that prior to the 1980s, they did not prepare for defense against an unexpected nuclear missile attack, because, they had intended to make the pre-emptive strike at the beginning of the war. Vladimir Kryuchkov, Deputy Chairman of Soviet Union KGB, sent documents regarding this action plan to János Bogye, a deputy leader in the Hungarian Home Office at that time. Their top secret correspondence reveals that the predicting an unexpected nuclear attack from NATO and the USA was a problem at this time; hence they emphasized the importance of early detection.

Kryuchkov drew up the actions and signs related to the preparations for an unexpected attack in the political, military and economic areas and for civil defense.

In the political area:

- “Unusually frequent special sessions of the political decision making bodies and the higher level leaders of the USA and NATO member states”.
- "Increased intensity of the bilateral and multilateral political-military consultations between the USA and NATO allies.”

In the military area:

- “Sudden changes in the activities of the key military leaders of the USA and NATO member states”.
- “Enhancing the combat readiness of the major components of the USA strategic nuclear forces”.

In the economic area:

- “Unusual actions for the protection of the essential industrial objects from the consequences of nuclear strikes”.

For civil defense:

- “Closed meetings between the civil defense leaders of USA and NATO member states and the political and military leadership”.
- “Building further nuclear-proof bunkers and restoring the available ones”.

At the end of the letter, Kryuchkov suggested that they would talk about the “clearing up of the main organizational and practical aspects of the intelligence work related to the unexpected nuclear missile attack and the discussion of the submitted documents” at the consultations to be held in Budapest.²⁴⁶

In his reply to this letter, Major General Bogye provided information indicating that “they had made steps to intensify the state security intelligence activities in this field, to improve the efficiency of their work. Based on the resolution of the meeting of the Deputy Ministers, they worked out a detailed action plan for organizing state security intelligence work for the detection of preparations for an unexpected nuclear strike”.

The next remark deserves special attention, “we are presently establishing the necessary organizational framework and we are working on creating the adequate human and material conditions”, We can also conclude from this that previously they had not made these preparations, because they had not focused on the detection of the unexpected nuclear strike, but that the WP would attack first, and which way, which troops and with which weapons they would begin the pre-emptive attack.²⁴⁷

Conclusion

These 1984-1985 documents prove that the intention of the WP since its establishment was the preparation for a war that would be started with a pre-emptive strike against NATO and the USA, and until the 1980s, they did not put the emphasis on defense or on preparation of defensive plans.

The first half of the 1980s was a critical period in the relations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries, and in my opinion it needs further research. Additional declassified documents from recent years, such as the 1980 Wartime Statute of the WP, could help to clear up several issues and to better understand this period.

²⁴⁶ 44 document - ÁBTL 1. 11. 4. EV/84-88/II. 97-89.

²⁴⁷ 47 document - ÁBTL 1. 11. 4. EV/84-88/II. 90-91.

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Nuclear Madness: What was special about the Brazil-Germany Nuclear Agreement of 1975?

Thomas KOLLMANN

'Nuclear Madness' was the title of a *New York Times* editorial from June 13, 1975 responding to news of the Agreement for Nuclear Co-operation (hereafter the Agreement) signed in Bonn, West Germany on the 27th of June, 1975 by the Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany (Germany), Hans-Dietrich Genscher and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Brazil, Antonio Francisco Azeredo da Silveira.

Nearly two years in the making, the Agreement was an \$8 billion contract with the German engineering consortium Kraftwerk Union (KWU) to provide Brazil with its own nuclear power industry over a 10-15 year period, including 8 power stations. The Agreement appears hugely ambitious today.

Three precedents stand out: the largest and, at the time, the most expensive proposed transfer of advanced technology to a developing country; the first breach of the U.S. monopoly over the world export market for nuclear reactors by a non-American vendor and the transfer of the complete 'cycle' for the production of nuclear fuel including the capability for reprocessing and enriching nuclear fuel - the 'sensitive' elements of the cycle in the conventional non-proliferation view - allowing for the production of plutonium by the recipient country.²⁴⁸ This last ominous feature of the Agreement would become a source of resentments between the United States, Brazil and West Germany, described by one scholar as "one of the most acrimonious debates of the post-World War II era."²⁴⁹ The furore over the Agreement died down somewhat in 1976 but was soon revived by U.S. President Jimmy Carter's diplomatic efforts at non-

²⁴⁸ Ronald J Bettauer, "The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978," *Law and Policy in International Business*, 10, N° 4 (1978), pp. 6, 54.

²⁴⁹ Joan Johnson-Freese, "Interpretations of the Nonproliferation Treaty: The U.S. and West Germany," *Journal of International Affairs*, N° 37 (1984), pp. 291.

proliferation and continued throughout his tenure in office. The aforementioned *Times* editorial was mainly critical of Brazil and Germany and described the Agreement as "a reckless move that could set off a nuclear arms race in Latin America, triggering the arming of a half-dozen nations elsewhere, and endanger the security of the United States and the world as a whole."²⁵⁰

Hostility to the Agreement within the U.S. was exemplified by John Pastore - Senator (D, RI) Chairman of Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Pastore insisted on the Agreement's nullification and suggested a reconsideration of the U.S.'s NATO commitments to Germany to emphasise the U.S.'s stance on nonproliferation.²⁵¹ The historical background of Brazil's foreign relations in the late 1960s and early 1970s puts the controversy generated by the Agreement into perspective and illustrates how politically promiscuous nuclear commerce had become by this time.

The U.S. role as sole supplier of enriched uranium for many countries in the Third World ended in 1971 with the arrival of the Soviet Union in the nuclear marketplace. From the 1950s, the delivery of enriched uranium supplies from the U.S. for the operating lifetime of nuclear reactors was obtained through several bilateral agreements. The U.S. subsidised the prices of these supplies as an inducement for buyers to forego alternatives. However, after raising prices unilaterally in 1971 and 1973, the U.S. lost its reputation as a reliable supplier.²⁵²

Journal do Brasil records that between 1969 and 1973 France, Japan, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Germany and Canada all expanded their investments in Brazil at a faster rate than the U.S. In the year following the world recession of 1973-1974, Brazil's foreign debt exploded. By early 1976 the country was the world's largest single debtor nation, with over \$3 billion in the loan portfolios of U.S. commercial banks, as well as

²⁵⁰ *New York Times*, June 13, 1975.

²⁵¹ Amy Finkelstein, "Brazil, The United States and Nuclear Nonproliferation: American Foreign Policy at the Crossroads," *The Fletcher Forum* 7, Nº 2 (1983), p. 7.

²⁵² Hanns Maul, *Europe and World Energy*, London: Butterworths, 1980, p. 299.

being the principal borrower from the World Bank.²⁵³ Brazil imported 75% of its, mostly crude oil, making it the developing world's leading oil importer. Following the October 1973 Yom Kippur War the country experienced severe balance-of-payments difficulties. Amongst other benefits, acquisition of the technology and knowledge necessary for the complete nuclear fuel cycle would allow Brazil to earn foreign exchange and reduce the costs of its nuclear program.

The Agreement reflects these ambitions, specifying the development of a native nuclear industry to diversify Brazil's power resources and, in the long-term, the export of energy and technical services.²⁵⁴ In addition, the capability to draw on diverse and copious energy sources would give it leverage in negotiations with energy suppliers, particularly the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).²⁵⁵

The U.S. had long been a dominant force in Brazil's economy and was the country's principal source of foreign investment, with \$3.5bn committed by 1974.²⁵⁶ Fortunately for the Brazilian regime, the country's natural wealth meant it could provide a steady supply of iron ore, bauxite, manganese and meat to the U.S., as well as quartz crystals used in electronics, unavailable elsewhere.²⁵⁷

Brazil's economic crises led it to solicit co-operation in nuclear science through diplomacy. By the early 1970s Brazil had signed co-operation accords in this field with France, Israel, West Germany, the U.S., Canada, Bolivia, Peru, Chile, India, Italy, Paraguay, Portugal & Switzerland as well as the European Atomic Energy Community

²⁵³ Cited in Robert A. Packenham, "Trends in Brazilian National Dependency Since 1964" in *Brazil in the Seventies*, edited by Riordan Roett (Washington D.C., American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1976): 99; 111 and Thomas E. Skidmore, 33 in the same volume.

²⁵⁴ Robert Wesson, *The United States and Brazil: Limits of Influence*, New York: Praeger, 1981, p. 79; Juan E. Guglielmelli, "The Brazilian-German Nuclear Deal: A View from Argentina," *Survival* 4, N° 18 1976, p.163.

²⁵⁵ David J. Myers, "Brazil's Reluctant Pursuit of the Nuclear Option," *Orbis* 27, N° 4, 1984, pp. 902-903; Jonathan Kandell, "Brazil Bitter at U.S. Effort to Impose Nuclear Curb," *New York Times*, March 28, 1977.

²⁵⁶ William Perry, *Contemporary Brazilian Foreign Policy: The International Strategy of an Emerging Power*, Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1976, pp. 55, 58.

²⁵⁷ Marvin Howe, "Brazil, Racing for Growth, Tries to Rely Less on the U.S.," *New York Times*, July 2, 1975.

(Euratom).²⁵⁸ Of relevance here is the use of the provision of enriched fuel services by the U.S. to exert pressure on Brazil. John Redick, notes that when the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission Chairman (AEC), Glenn Seaborg, visited Brazil in 1967 he asserted that the provision of nuclear fuel enrichment services for Brazil from the U.S. would continue "unconditionally" even if Brazil stuck to plans to develop peaceful nuclear explosives. The U.S. also provided Brazil with research and consultation on techniques for various uses of nuclear energy in the early 1970s and signed a new co-operative agreement with the country in 1972.

Brazil's agreement for nuclear co-operation with France, announced in May 1967, less than two months prior to Seaborg's visit to the country, included details for the joint development of research and power reactors and the acquisition of French equipment for Brazilian nuclear centers.

Redick suggests that Brazil may have used this agreement as a means of both inducing further technical assistance from the U.S. and as a reaction to U.S. non-proliferation initiatives. Prominent features of the French-Brazilian agreement were joint research on fabrication techniques of thorium fuel and the prospective construction of a thorium/heavy water power reactor, a more expensive process that results in large amounts of easily separated plutonium. In exchange, France lent Brazil \$6 million for uranium prospecting.

The most important precedent for the Agreement was established during the negotiations and subsequent construction of the Atucha natural uranium power plant in Argentina, built by the German firm Siemens AG in 1968. This involved the purchase by Argentina of a sensitive element of the nuclear fuel cycle, heavy water, from the AEC - the only U.S. sale of heavy water to a foreign power in that year. Redick notes that the AEC only approved the sale when Argentina threatened to find alternative sellers.²⁵⁹

²⁵⁸ Jon H. Rosenbaum, "Brazil's Nuclear Aspirations." In *Nuclear Proliferation and the Near Nuclear Countries*, Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing, 1975), 267.

²⁵⁹ John R. Redick, "Nuclear Proliferation in Latin America," in *Latin America's New Internationalism - The End of Hemispheric Isolation*, New York: Praeger, 1976, p. 273.

General Onganía, the leader of Argentina, awarded the nuclear-power contract to Siemens, despite a lower bid by Westinghouse of the U.S. because Siemens was prepared to supply the technology for a natural-thorium reactor, freeing Argentina from dependence on the U.S. monopoly over enriched uranium and the controls over waste that could be reprocessed into weapons-grade materials. According to David J. Myers, Argentina's supply of plutonium from Atucha passed beyond the critical threshold for weapons production in the late 1970s.²⁶⁰

As the Brazilian regime ventured further into nucleonics in 1969, it created a framework for the Agreement by establishing an arrangement with West Germany for nuclear research. The Brazilian CNEN (National Council for Nuclear Energy) created a working party of West German and Brazilian technicians to assess a proposal for the construction of a power plant in either Rio de Janeiro or Sao Paulo by 1976.

A statement by CNEN called, "Nuclear Plans Based on Natural Uranium Supply" states that the main goal of the Brazilian nuclear program was the development of all stages in the production of nuclear energy and the development of auxiliary industries - in sum the infrastructure for the "nuclearization" of Brazil.

The contract to build the first nuclear power plants in Brazil with enriched uranium from the United States, went to the U.S. firm Westinghouse - renewing Brazil's dependence for enriched fuel on a single supplier - a restriction that continued the arrangement begun with Brazil's 1956 admission to the U.S. Atoms for Peace program under which the first research reactors in Brazil were built and maintained.²⁶¹

Competition in the nuclear reactor export market during 1968 - 1975 was cutthroat and the Germans alleged several cases of U.S. interference in this period. In 1973 KWU considered a sale to Yugoslavia closed when they were suddenly beaten to the punch by Westinghouse. This, and a similar case in Spain, led to speculation that U.S. firms had

²⁶⁰ David J. Myers, "Brazil" in *Security Policies of Developing Countries*, Massachusetts: Lexington, 1982, p. 60.

²⁶¹ John R. Redick, *Military Potential of Latin American Nuclear Energy Programs*, Beverly Hills, Sage, 1972, pp. 17-23.

told Yugoslavian and Spanish authorities they would not receive U.S. enriched uranium if they did not buy U.S. reactors. There were also charges that the U.S. had threatened to withhold economic assistance from Argentina if it bought another German reactor, and that U.S. interests had spread rumours of the liquidation of KWU just as the company was negotiating to sell two reactors to Iran.²⁶² Today, the United States and Germany are signatories to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the legal instrument setting out the terms underlying the regulation of trade in nuclear technology and material. The impetus that gave rise to the NPT was a renewed attempt by the superpowers to halt the international spread of nuclear weapons.

The Soviet Union co-operated with the U.S. in part to prevent Germany from acquiring nuclear weapons through its affiliation with the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO). Germany's interpretation of Article IV of the Treaty allowed for access to nuclear energy by non-nuclear weapons states for peaceful purposes. 'Peaceful' explosions such as those that could be used in the creation of canals were prohibited, but the transfer of all other stages of the fuel cycle were allowed, including systems classified as sensitive by nuclear weapons states.²⁶³

The German Government ratified the NPT in May 1975. William Lowerance reports that in a meeting that month between U.S. President Gerald Ford and German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt the Agreement was not discussed.²⁶⁴ Former Brazilian Foreign Minister Araujo Castro, Brazil's ambassador to the United Nations, described the NPT in 1971 as part of an effort by the superpowers to "freeze" the Cold War distribution of power. This view typified the Brazilian attitude throughout the 1970s.²⁶⁵ The wording of the Agreement made it dependent on safeguards agreed upon with the International Atomic Energy Agency. However, as Norman Gall notes, the semi-official

²⁶² Edward Wonder, "Nuclear Commerce and Nuclear Proliferation: Germany and Brazil, 1975," *Orbis* 2 (1977): 293; "Querschüsse aus den USA," *Die Zeit*, 20 Juni, 1975.

²⁶³ Bertrand Goldschmidt, "The Negotiation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty," *IAEA Bulletin* 22, N° 3/4 (1980): 76-80.

²⁶⁴ William W. Lowerance, "Nuclear Futures for Sale: To Brazil from West Germany, 1975," *International Security*, N° 2 (1976): 163.

²⁶⁵ Albert Fishlow, "Flying Down to Rio: Perspectives on U.S.-Brazil Relations," *Foreign Affairs*, N° 2 (1976): 395; Stephen M. Gorman, "Security, Influence and Nuclear Weapons: The Case of Brazil and Argentina," *Parameters*, N°1(1979): 24.

commentary published with the text in the Brazilian press states: "For Brazil, this does not represent a commitment to forgo nuclear devices in the future."²⁶⁶ A *New York Times* article from July 1975 gave some further indications of the move away from the United States and towards European suppliers. By this time European suppliers were strongly entering Latin American markets due to weak domestic demand. The article reports that Brazil's special military relationship with the United States ended in 1970 when General Orlando Geisel, brother of President Ernesto Geisel and Minister of War, decided to nationalise the military equipment industry and buy arms from companies that would establish plants in Brazil because, as the Times reported, "what was wanted most was the technology," the Agreement being a case in point, providing, the technology to build additional reactors.²⁶⁷

These developments were likely reinforced by the imposition by the U.S. of a ceiling on arms sales within the continent in 1968, in addition to verbal attacks on the Brazilian regime's repressive practices in Congress and the U.S. press. France, Britain and the Soviet Union fulfilled Brazilian demands for arms unmet by the U.S., according to Alexandre Barros.²⁶⁸

By mid-1974 negotiations between Brazil and Germany to draft the Agreement were underway. Several German government officials visited Brazilia in the middle of 1974, including State Secretary of Technology Hans Hilgar Haunschild, former Defense Minister Franz Josef Strauss, and State Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Hans George Sachs.

Following a visit by Brazilian Mines and Energy Minister Shigeaki Ueki to Bonn, the Brazilians made the decision to outline a nuclear program founded on the scientific accord of 1969.²⁶⁹ The terms of the deal were agreed on February 12, 1975. The U.S. Ambassador in Bonn, Martin Hillenbrand, was informed a week later on the 19th, and details of the Agreement were first reported in the next day's edition of the U.S. trade

²⁶⁶ Norman Gall, "Atoms for Brazil, Dangers for All," *Foreign Policy*, N° 23 (1976): 159-160.

²⁶⁷ Howe, op. cit.

²⁶⁸ Ibid.

²⁶⁹ Ronald M. Schneider, *Brazil: Foreign Policy of a Future World Power*, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1976, p. 50.

journal *Nucleonics Week*.²⁷⁰ On April 7, Lowerance records that a four-man delegation from the State Department and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) was sent to Bonn to discuss the Agreement, and apparently helped induce Germany to take a less lenient approach toward existing safeguards. On all sides decisions were made at the level of ministerial and industrial personnel.²⁷¹

German officials rebutted critics of the Agreement by stressing that the treaty's safeguards exceeded those required by Canada for its exports of nuclear technology to India and that Brazil had the capability of eventually developing a nuclear industry without foreign assistance. If this occurred, the Germans contended, there would be no international controls on the Brazilian nuclear industry. At this point anxiety over Brazil's rivalry with Argentina was on the rise with news that Argentina was planning to construct a nuclear bomb and that plans were afoot for France to supply Argentina with a plant to produce plutonium, later denied by French sources. Furthermore, the German press had observed that France, which had not signed the NPT, was prepared to provide Brazil with a complete nuclear fuel cycle. Had Germany not agreed to assist Brazil, a far greater danger of nuclear proliferation would have been posed, so the Agreement's German supporters argued.²⁷²

Although it steadfastly refused to yield to U.S. pressures to withdraw from the Agreement, the West German administration of Helmut Schmidt was consistently flexible and responsive in the face of political pressure on the question of the Agreement's safeguards. Analysis of a question and answer session from a press conference at the West German government a day before the signing of the Agreement shows that the Chancellery solicited methods for enhancing IAEA controls over the transfer of nuclear knowledge and material.²⁷³ The Chancellery also intervened to hold up the transfer of blueprints for a pilot enrichment facility to Brazil from October 1976

²⁷⁰ Lowerance, p. 150.

²⁷¹ Ibid.

²⁷² Rosenbaum, p. 262.

²⁷³ "Betr. Nuklearabkommen mit Brasilien, Interviews mit Zeitungen und Zeitschriften, 5-5, 1/HSA010630, Bonn: Archiv der sozialen Demokratie: Helmut Schmidt Archiv.

until after the inauguration of President Carter.²⁷⁴ Memoranda from the German Foreign Ministry shows that Germany was sensitive to the objections from the Americans and the Dutch government to the transfer of these blueprints. German ministerial officials also showed willingness to engage in intergovernmental consultations over the details to a point but were certain of the legality of their position and determined not to undermine their contractual obligations under the Agreement by delaying the transfer any longer.

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Reviewing the U.S. record, a special National Intelligence Estimate from September 1974 viewed "political considerations" as the "principal determinant" of the spread of nuclear weapons, and foresaw the capacity and technological competence to produce nuclear weapons becoming more widespread by the 1980s. The report identifies mutually reinforcing trends in the international environment which the Agreement reflected, namely "the policies of suppliers of nuclear materials and technology and regional ambitions and tensions" and concludes that in the absence of successful methods of preventing proliferation by the US, and USSR and others opposed to proliferation, Pakistan and Iran were the leading contenders in the race for the capability to produce nuclear weapons, with Egypt and Brazil falling into "a second category of likelihood."²⁷⁶

A U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency report on nuclear programs in Latin America published two months later stated that Brazil was, is "seeking foreign cooperation in all phases of the nuclear fuel cycle including uranium enrichment,"²⁷⁷ but that the size of capital investment involved put large-scale uranium enrichment capability out of its near-term reach. Both Argentina and Brazil were noted as "deserving attention as

²⁷⁴ Klaus Wiegrefe, *Das Zerwürfnis: Helmut Schmidt, Jimmy Carter und die Krise der deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehungen* (Berlin: Propyläen, 2005): 88-89.

²⁷⁵ "Betr.: Vorschlag für ein Gespräch des Herrn Bundesministers mit dem Herrn Bundeskanzler am 9.12.1976", Berlin: PA, B35, 005723-005724; "Betr.: Ausbau der Zentrifugenanlage Almelo; niederländische Beteiligung an der "Troika", Berlin: PA, B35, 005794-005797.

²⁷⁶ Memorandum, "Prospects for Further Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," October 2, 1974, NP01382, United States Central Intelligence Agency, 5-6, Digital National Security Archive.

²⁷⁷ Report, "Nuclear Energy Programs - Latin America, United States, Defense Intelligence Agency. Directorate for Scientific and Technical Intelligence, ST-CS-02-212-75, November 1974, NP01389, United States Defense Intelligence Agency. Directorate for Scientific and Technical Intelligence, 16-17, Digital National Security Archive.

potential proliferators in the foreseeable future." However, in contrast with Argentina, an attempt at acquiring the technological basis for the complete fuel-cycle by Brazil was not anticipated.²⁷⁸ The Agency surmised that Brazil with its "modest nuclear energy program is attempting to achieve nuclear independence as rapidly as its limited economic and technological base will permit." Brazilian nuclear activities appeared "to be unrelated to weapons proliferation aspirations, though weapons material is more easily derivable from an independent civilian nuclear energy power program."²⁷⁹

Of the factors that may have compelled the Brazilians to turn to West Germany for nuclear technology in 1973 - 1974 two stand out. The first was the AEC's notification that it could not guarantee the delivery of previously promised enriched uranium. The political consequences of this were compounded by the U.S. refusal to sign contracts committing U.S. sources to investment in further enrichment capacity.²⁸⁰ The second was the refusal of the U.S. to permit Westinghouse to build enrichment and reprocessing facilities in Brazil on the grounds that Brazil refused to adhere to the NPT. Westinghouse had tried to persuade Brazil to participate in an enrichment plant to be built in the U.S. but Brazil insisted that the entire nuclear fuel cycle be under Brazilian control.²⁸¹

Of equal importance to Brazil in 1974-1975 was the need to expand and diversify her resources of oil and other raw materials. This, and the soaring cost of Western capital goods also added to the appeal of Soviet products and, in particular Soviet technology. In addition, Brazil had attempted to promote greater exports of her semi-manufactures, such as shoes and textiles, and import more specialised items including Rumanian oil, Polish coal and machinery and electronic equipment from East Germany and Czechoslovakia.²⁸² Additionally, U.S. nonproliferation efforts in the 1970s were inconsistent. For example, why, wonders Robert Wesson, was the U.S. so concerned with the German-Brazilian Agreement when it was prepared to sell reactors to Israel

²⁷⁸ Ibid.

²⁷⁹ Ibid.

²⁸⁰ Gall, pp. 164, 166.

²⁸¹ Wesson, p. 78.

²⁸² Perry, pp. 71, 73; Wesson, p. 60.

and Egypt, neither of which - unlike Brazil - accepted international controls?²⁸³ One could also ask why the U.S. failed to exert equal pressure on another ally, Canada, over the building of a plant by Atomic Energy of Canada Lt. in Argentina, as the Agreement was taking effect, without any safeguards or even a contract.²⁸⁴

Reviewing the evidence one could answer the question posed by the sub-title of this presentation by saying that Brazil's moves towards national independence in the realm of nuclear self-sufficiency, backed by West Germany's technology, and its late start in the nuclear power plant field (its first plans for a plant were three years behind Argentina's)²⁸⁵ made that country rather than its regional rival Argentina the focus of anxiety over U.S. loss of influence in the world. Coming to fruition at an extraordinarily tense moment for the global economy, the Agreement represented a highly visible challenge to U.S. hegemony by the *primus inter pares* of U.S. allies in Europe and South America and a contraction of the U.S. superpower's sphere of influence.

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²⁸³ Wesson, pp. 87-88.

²⁸⁴ Mark Gayn, "No Safeguards Yet, Canada Building A-Plant in Argentina," *Toronto Star*, July 22, 1975.

²⁸⁵ Redick, *Military Potential*, p. 21.

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Ingredients to the 1983 war scare: Did Operation Able Archer 83 get us close to World War III?

Gábor VÖRÖS

Introduction

While crises are not something out of the ordinary when we talk about the Cold War, the Operation Able Archer 83 and its precursors made the Soviet leaders feel particularly uneasy due to renewed overt antagonism between the two superpowers. Operation Able Archer 83 was a seemingly routine yearly military exercise in the November of 1983 but the aforementioned convergence of circumstances made it a scholarly contested topic. While the existence of the exercise was known for a long time, and some of the American and Soviet reactions are documented and available to the public as well, a trove of documents – over 1000 declassified pages- was just recently released to the public by the National Security Archive. By navigating through the articles characterized by sensationalism, I will try to analyze the event and whether the saying that it was the closest moment to World War III warrants legitimacy.

The structure of the research paper follows: First, I will describe what the world looked like in the late 1970s and early 1980s, to establish a clear picture of the events running up to the Operation Able Archer 83. It was a particularly uneasy period in the Cold War which signaled the end of the détente that characterized the period from the late 1960s up until the late 1970s. Hence events of substantial gravity, like the invasion of Afghanistan, the Euromissile Crisis, the Korean Air Lines Flight 007 shootdown will be analyzed. Additionally, I will take a look at the military-strategic situation, and the balance of power at that time was in Europe and how the United States and the Soviet Union fared in the defensive aspects. Following the background history, the intricacies of the Operation Able Archer 83 will be examined. Then, I will try to uncover how serious the Soviet war scare was in reality.

Background

The Operation Able Archer 83 can be interpreted as a serious event not because of how it played out or what the exercise was focused on but rather because of the political climate that surrounded it. Therefore, to have a grasp of why the Soviets interpreted it in the way they did, we have to take a look at the worsening US-Soviet relations and what events led to it. In the midst of the Cold War, it was in a time that many have thought are some of the darkest days of the rivalry between the two superpowers. The détente, that is the thawing of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union characterizing the majority of the 1960s and 70s, was seen as faltering.

After the Cuban Missile Crisis, both sides thought that the confrontational policy was counterproductive and agreed on two very important treaties, the SALT I and the Helsinki Accords. This is in a sharp contrast to what happened in the years starting with 1979. What made the Operation Able Archer 83 sound so dangerous to the Soviets was actually a confluence of events that led to the severe deterioration of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. I have found 7 overarching developments and 2 unfortunately timed events that could have led the Soviets to a belief that an American attack is imminent.

The seven overarching developments

The *first* development that is said to signal the breakdown of the détente, hence raising the suspicions of both sides in the coming years, was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. While the intervention in itself was a surprise to the West, it was an accumulation of events that necessitated the foray of the Soviet Union. After numerous requests for help by the Socialist oriented government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, the Soviet Politburo decided to send 30 thousand troops into Afghanistan to shore up the government of its client state. While the gains of the mujahideen, the local tribal fighting groups, were reversed, the situation went exactly the other way the Soviet leadership imagined. They were stuck in a quagmire with 100,000 heavily

armed troops holding territory against lightly armed guerrilla fighters.²⁸⁶ This was one of the first occasions when a modern major power had to fight an insurgency with a military conceived for conventional warfare. The Soviet military machine was caught unprepared in this kind of warfare and later, in 1988, it had to withdraw its troops without a lasting solution for the South Asian country. The United States had taken its time to respond to the unfolding events but covertly it armed the mujahideen even in the late 1970s.²⁸⁷

The *second* factor that further deteriorated the American-Soviet relations was actually the American reciprocation to the invasion. The official American response to the event was twofold. Geostrategically, the US responded with the Carter Doctrine which stipulated that the United States will defend the Persian Gulf and use military force against any country which tries to destabilize or take control over the energy-rich region. The doctrine was based on American fears that the Soviet Union will try to dominate the Persian Gulf, with the invasion of Afghanistan only being a prelude.²⁸⁸

The other reaction was more soft power based: the boycott of the Moscow Summer Olympics in 1980. For the Soviet Union, the organization of the 1980 Summer Olympics was a prestige issue since no Eastern European country has ever organized a Summer Olympics game before. The United States reasoned that the invasion of Afghanistan was against the international norms, therefore it will not send any athletes to the Olympic Games. The American public widely supported it and the United States also tried to rally other countries around its cause and even sent Muhammad Ali to several African nations to gather support. Eventually, from the Western bloc countries Canada, West Germany, Norway and Israel boycotted the Olympics and even though some Western states in close relations with the US – like the United Kingdom, Spain,

²⁸⁶ “Milestones: 1977–1980, The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan and the U.S. Response, 1978–1980”, United States Department of State Office of the Historian, 31 October 2013, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1977-1980/soviet-invasion-afghanistan>

²⁸⁷ “Afghanistan: The Making of US Policy, 1973-1990”, Steve Galster, Volume II: Afghanistan: Lessons from the Last War, The National Security Archive, George Washington University, 9 October 2011, <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/essay.html>

²⁸⁸ “The State of the Union Address Delivered Before a Joint Session of the Congress”, The American Presidency Project, 23 January 1980, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=33079>

Italy and France- attended the Olympics, overall there were 65 abstainers.²⁸⁹ The boycotters included some Muslim countries which refused to participate due to the invasion of Afghanistan, a fellow Muslim nation, but did so not because of the call of the United States, rather because the Islamic Conference also decided by a boycott.²⁹⁰

This diplomatic step really hurt the Soviets' image and elevated the Afghanistan issue to worldwide media level through which many more people were familiarized with the events in South Asia. This United States also imposed a grain and high-tech embargo on the Soviets, in addition to suspending the SALT II ratification in the Congress and increasing the US naval presence in the Indian Ocean region.²⁹¹ None of these measures could sway the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan, and it maintained troops there until 1988. But all of this was just the run-up to a more confrontational period between the Soviet Union and the United States.

The *third* development has to do with individuals. The political life of the Cold War was heavily personalized, therefore a change in the détente can also have been contributed to personal changes. Two such changes happened. First, in 1979 Margaret Thatcher was elected Prime Minister in the United Kingdom. Her nickname, "Iron Lady", perfectly described her governing style: strong, resolute, and uncompromising.

But what really changed the political landscape of the 1980s was the election of Ronald Reagan in the United States. He ran on an anti-communist and confrontational platform and won in a landslide against the then-incumbent Jimmy Carter. The people of the United States demanded a stronger president in the face of the Iranian hostage crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Reagan was an actor and definitely not a technocrat,

²⁸⁹ "The Olympic Boycott, 1980", United States Department of State Archive, <http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/qfp/104481.htm>

²⁹⁰ "Most Nations Undecided On Issue Of Boycotting Olympics In Moscow", Sarasota Herald-Tribune, 30 January 1980, <https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1755&dat=19800130&id=U60cAAAIBAJ&sjid=1WcEAAAIBAJ&pg=6653,6392537&hl=hu>

²⁹¹ "Intervention and Regional Security", Neil McFarlane in: "The Evolution of Strategic Thought: Classic Adelphi Papers", The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008, https://books.google.hu/books?id=ziJbBAAQBAJ&pg=PA499&lpg=PA499&dq=islamic+conference+boycott+1980+olympics&source=bl&ots=mXgDKHSq6Q&sig=HbTnkUoET0bu5syjiYED5OCF5TQ&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjs3sfjp6DMAhUBP5oKHT_-D0YQ6AEIQDAJ#v=onepage&q=islamic%20conference%20boycott%201980%20olympics&f=false

but he had a vision nevertheless: to roll back the Soviet Union and with it, the global communism. This vision was based on the rollback strategy of John Foster Dulles and can be deemed quite aggressive in its aims.²⁹² What was later called the Reagan Doctrine was actually a strategy captured in the NSC National Security Decision Directives 75. The Directive articulated:

“To contain and over time reverse Soviet expansionism by competing effectively on a sustained basis with the Soviet Union in all international arenas -- particularly in the overall military balance and in geographical regions of priority concern to the United States. This will remain the primary focus of U.S. policy toward the USSR.”²⁹³

But at the same time, it also stipulated that the United States should engage in negotiations with the Soviet Union and promote internal change in the Communist heartland. The strategy outlined that the United States should limit Western exposure to Soviet economic policies, better convey Western values to combat communism, and most importantly, modernize its conventional and nuclear military capabilities.²⁹⁴ Consequently, Reagan envisioned a 600-ship Navy in which the construction of the Nimitz-class aircraft carriers, Ticonderoga-class cruisers, and Los Angeles-class attack submarines was sped up.

While strides have been made in this military buildup, the target was never reached.²⁹⁵ As an additional measure, the Reagan Doctrine stated that outreach must be made to anti-communist proxy forces, like the mujahideen in Afghanistan.²⁹⁶ The Reagan Doctrine was the single most important strategic feature of that period, one that contributed enormously to the way the Soviets later perceived the Operation Able Archer 83. Had it not been for this assertive rollback strategy, the Soviets would not have necessarily been in a mindset anticipating a first-strike from the United States at any given moment.

²⁹² “Reagan Doctrine, 1985”, United States Department of State Archive, <http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/rd/17741.htm>

²⁹³ “National Security Decision Directives 75”, Federation of American Scientists, 17 January, 1983, <http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-75.pdf>

²⁹⁴ Ibid.

²⁹⁵ “Ship Building 1981-89 - Reagan, Ronald”, GlobalSecurity.org, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/scn-1981-reagan.htm>

²⁹⁶ Stephen S. Rosenfeld, “The Reagan Doctrine: The Guns of July”, *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1986, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1986-03-01/reagan-doctrine-guns-july>

One major development through the Reagan presidency – and our *fourth* factor- that made the Soviet leadership very uneasy was the announcement of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), or as know colloquially, the “Star Wars”, in March 1983.²⁹⁷ It was a hugely comprehensive project to intercept Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in all phases of their flight: boost, midcourse and terminal. The system would have used then-non-existing technologies, like space-based lasers for exoatmospheric interception and ground-based interceptors with kill vehicles.

The whole concept struck apprehension into the hearts and minds of Soviet military and political leaders as if built, the system would have broken down the pillars of mutually assured destruction (MAD) and opened up the possibility of a US first-strike without the fear of retaliation. While the breakdown of MAD would have been a disaster in itself for the Soviets (and in hindsight for the Americans as well), it also signaled a huge technological discrepancy between the two states and forced the Soviet Union to play catch-up. This development – while still relatively new at the time of the Operation Archer 83- heavily influenced the Soviet calculus, since they weren’t sure what capabilities the United States already possesses from the SDI.²⁹⁸

The *fifth* development, and one of the most important, was the so-called Euromissile Crisis. It was a period of tit-for-tat missile deployment in Europe that lasted from 1979 up until the signing of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in 1987. The Soviet Union began the deployment of SS-20, a road-mobile theater ballistic missile with multiple independently targetable warheads (MIRVs). While the missile in itself was not a huge qualitative jump over the previously deployed SS-4s and SS-5s, the transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) made it road-mobile whereas the previous ones had fixed position launchers.²⁹⁹ In 1979, 130 SS-20s were deployed and aimed at Western Europe.³⁰⁰ NATO was forced to counter this by the so-called double-track decision.

²⁹⁷“Strategic Defense Initiative”, Encyclopædia Britannica, 2016, <http://www.britannica.com/topic/Strategic-Defense-Initiative>

²⁹⁸ “Strategic Defense Initiative”, Globalsecurity.org, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/sdi.htm>

²⁹⁹“RSD-10 MOD 1/-MOD 2 (SS-20)”, Missile Threat, 17 October 2012, <http://missilethreat.com/missiles/rsd-10-mod-1-mod-2-ss-20/>

³⁰⁰ “1979 Summary”, NATO Update, 26 October 2011, <http://www.nato.int/docu/update/70-79/1979e.htm>

This constituted the future deployment of American Pershing II missiles and, at the same time, further calls for mutual arms control after the successful SALT I treaty.³⁰¹ The Pershing II missiles did not have the range of their Soviet counterparts but they had one-tenth the circular error probability (CEP) of the SS-20s, making them ideal to strike hardened military targets.³⁰² The planned deployment of these missiles in Europe raised the specter of a potential clash between the superpowers but not because of their strategic value rather because of the message they conveyed: the *détente* is over. In this sense, the Euromissile Crisis can be likened to the Cuban Missile Crisis. Neither did change the military calculus by much but it forced the parties to enter brinkmanship.

The *sixth* strategic development was President Reagan's call to initiate psychological warfare operations (PSYOPs) against the USSR. These were operations specifically designed to make the Soviets feel uneasy and to expose holes in their early warning systems. For this reason, the United States conducted naval and air operations around the clock which were meant to gather intelligence about Soviet radar sites, early warning intelligence operations, troop movements and placements, but most importantly they were performed to strike a sense of uncertainty into the minds of the Soviets. Starting in 1981, US bombers conducted surprise operations directly towards the Soviets border, then veered off course, and US attack submarines practiced attacks on Soviet ballistic missile submarines under the North Pole, all of this irregularly and without any observable patterns.

Additionally, US intelligence ships snooping for data and aircraft carriers practicing naval air operations were stationed near the Soviet coasts.³⁰³ The most flagrant PSYOP was when the USS Eisenhower and 82 other vessels were able to traverse through the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) gap completely undetected by the Soviets,

³⁰¹ Ibid.

³⁰² "MGM-31B Pershing II", Missile Threat, 25 October 2012, <http://missilethreat.com/missiles/mgm-31b-pershing-ii/>

³⁰³ "A Cold War Conundrum: The 1983 Soviet War Scare", Benjamin B. Fischer, Central Intelligence Agency Center for the Study of Intelligence Library, 7 July 2008, <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/a-cold-war-conundrum/source.htm#HEADING1-08>

only to perform attacking run maneuvers on refueling Soviet aircrafts.³⁰⁴ On the other side of the Soviet landmass, the US conducted the FLEETEX 83 naval exercise in the Pacific which is described by some as one of the most powerful gathering of naval armada in history. It happened few weeks after Reagan's televised speech of the SDI and included 3 carrier battle groups with thousands of sailors. The exercise was aimed at antisubmarine and antiaircraft warfare, and the participating aircrafts deliberately forced the Soviets to turn on their search radars to have a fix on their positions.³⁰⁵ While the exercise was not unusual and uncommon in and of itself, the Soviets clearly could have thought that after devising a plan to counter Soviet strategic nuclear forces, the Americans are exercising the denial of Soviet conventional forces, in particular their air and submarine capabilities. Eventually, these PSYOPs bore fruit: gaping vulnerabilities were exposed in the naval surveillance and early warning radar systems of the USSR.

Consequently, the Soviet Union, fearing a likely first-strike from the US, initiated the Operation RYaN, an unprecedented intelligence gathering operation about a potential surprise US attack, which is our last, *seventh*, development. It is debated whether this was a reactionary measure to the American PSYOPs or to the worsening strategic-political situation. Some in the White House saw a clear correlation between the Operation RYaN and the American PSYOPs but the US Intelligence Community challenged that by citing the "absence of forcewide combat readiness and other war preparations in the USSR" which essentially meant that the Soviet Union was not actively preparing for war at the time of the inception of Operation RYaN.³⁰⁶ The Operation RYAN was an intelligence gathering operation never seen before on this scale. It was announced by Yuri Andropov –the then-KGB chief- and Leonid Brezhnev – the then-President of the USSR- in 1981 naming the deterioration of relations between

³⁰⁴ "WarGames for real: How one 1983 exercise nearly triggered WWII", Sean Gallagher, Ars Technica, 25 November 2015, <http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2015/11/wargames-for-real-how-one-1983-exercise-nearly-triggered-wwiii/1/>

³⁰⁵ "The Dead Hand: The Untold Story of the Cold War Arms Race and its Dangerous Legacy", David Hoffman, 22 September 2009, https://books.google.hu/books?id=JQGHqScEFtoC&pg=PA64&lpg=PA64&dq=fleetex+83&source=bl&ots=X8TjASJ-B-&sig=9Lif5INVyvE52_ZTekQ0VY4kbes&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiJnrL-tKLMahVoYpoKHRzsAVQQ6AEIRjAI#v=onepage&q=fleetex%2083&f=false

³⁰⁶ 18.

the two superpowers and US war preparations as a reason for it. Essentially it was an intelligence alert that required each rezidentura and intelligence agency to swoop up as much intelligence as possible on US/NATO political and strategic developments, as well as on the nuclear balance and early warning of a surprise American first-strike.³⁰⁷

While the massive intelligence collection operation was frightening in itself, a much more precarious – and lesser-known – supplement to the Operation RYaN was the development of a RYaN computer model. Starting in the 1970s, it was an intelligence data analysis model – a sort of precursor to today’s big data algorithms- that weighed around 40000 data points regarding military, political and economic situation of the USSR vis a vis the United States.³⁰⁸ The model was based on the World War II logic that if the correlation of the forces was heavily skewed towards the United States then they would attempt a first-strike against the Soviet Union.

The system had to be constantly updated with new data, and the leaders of the project demanded huge intelligence data inflows so the RYaN model can present them with an accurate picture. This picture was in the form of a score which was a percentage of Soviet strength compared to that of the US. If the score was above 70 (or even above 60, according to some officials), the Soviet Union was roughly on par with the United States and was considered safe from a first-strike.

As the international situation got more precarious, the score began to diminish, and subsequently, the intelligence officers demanded more and more precise data. This only made things worse and by 1983 the score may have dipped below 45 – this would have meant that the Soviet Union is open to a surprise attack and has serious strategic deficiencies when compared to the US.³⁰⁹ The watchers of the RYaN computer model have actually discovered the Operation Able Archer 83 exercise and fed the information

³⁰⁷ “Stasi Documents Provide Details on Operation RYaN, the Soviet Plan to Predict and Preempt a Western Nuclear Strike; Show Uneasiness Over Degree of “Clear-Headedness About the Entire RYaN Complex”, Nate Jones, National Security Archive, 24 January 2014, <https://nsarchive.wordpress.com/2014/01/29/stasi-documents-provide-operational-details-on-operation-ryan-the-soviet-plan-to-predict-and-preempt-a-western-nuclear-strike-show-uneasiness-over-degree-of-clear-headedness-about-the-entire-ryan/>

³⁰⁸ p. 19.

³⁰⁹ Ibid.

into the system.³¹⁰ The accuracy of the model is heavily debated and is considered imprecise but this did not stop the Soviet leadership to shudder in fear as they were weekly fed the information by the program. The concoction of these overlapping strategic developments made this period particularly dangerous and with the militaries on a hair trigger, the two superpowers were often dead reckoning the unfolding situation. These strategic factors were accompanied by *two* unfortunately timed events.

Two unfortunately timed events

On September 1, 1983, a Soviet Su-15 shot down the Korean Airlines Flight 007 with 269 passengers on board. The plane had entered Soviet Airspace twice over the Kamchatka Peninsula in the Northern Pacific region but was shot down in international airspace. The move sparked huge international backlash with the United States trying to rally likeminded nations against the Soviet Union to impose commercial boycotts and the denial of landing rights of Russian commercial planes. The Soviet leadership was adamant in its position that the plane was spying as part of a Japanese-American reconnaissance mission. After the FLEETEX 83 exercise, the Soviet air defenses of the region were put on alert, therefore, any overflight over Soviet territory could have been perilous.³¹¹ This event further exacerbated the tensions between the two rivals and provided the rationale for both sides to criticize the other.

The other event can be described as an exceptionally close shave. On September 26, 1983, the newly developed Soviet early warning satellite, called Oko, provided a false alarm about an American ICBM launch. Around this time period, the precursor exercises to Operation Able Archer 83, the Atlantic Forge and Reforger were still ongoing. The early warning satellite reported five Minuteman II ICBM launches from the US homeland which it saw due to their infrared signatures. The officer in charge, Lieutenant Colonel Stanislav Petrov was flabbergasted by the event but he knew that during a possible American first-strike the missiles would fly in droves towards the

³¹⁰ "Forecasting Nuclear War: Stasi/KGB Intelligence Cooperation under Project RYaN", Bernd Schaefer, Nate Jones, Benjamin B. Fischer, Wilson Center, 13 November 2014, <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/forecasting-nuclear-war>

³¹¹ 18.

Soviet Motherland. As the ground-based early warning radars could not have a trace on any missiles, Lt. Colonel Petrov decided to act against all odds and called it a false alarm. Later it turned out that he probably saved the world because of his gut instinct. The alleged heat signatures were actually reflections of sunlight from high-altitude clouds.³¹² An investigation into the Oko system found numerous flaws which were not exactly surprising since not even Lt. Colonel Petrov trusted the just 1-year-old system.³¹³ However, the Soviet military leaders were apprehensive because their satellite-based early warning system was not functioning properly and the ground-based radars could only acquire ICBMs after they passed the horizon, thus limiting the time available for deliberating a counterstrike.³¹⁴

The strategic-military balance

On top of all of that, the soviet leaders faced another fear. The RYaN computer model's score dropped sharply in 1983 for a reason: the USSR was falling behind in economic terms and the military-strategic balance was tipping towards the United States. Economically, the Soviet Union became stuck in a period of stagnation in which between 1981 and 1985 its GDP expanded only at an annualized 1,9 percent, while that of the United States grew by 3,4 percent in the same time period.³¹⁵ ³¹⁶ In the 1980s, the oil prices also sank to their one-third which affected the USSR heavily due to substantial role of oil in their economy.³¹⁷ Their agricultural sector was also in shambles but it did not deter the Soviet Union to spend 20 percent of their GDP on military expenditures.³¹⁸ ³¹⁹ Militarily, while the USSR managed to catch up to the US military

³¹² "1983: The most dangerous year", Andrew R. Garland, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, May 2011, <http://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1902&context=thesesdissertations>, p. 47

³¹³ "Sept. 26, 1983: The Man Who Saved the World by Doing ... Nothing", Tony Long, Wired, 26 September 2007, <http://www.wired.com/2007/09/dayintech-0926-2/>

³¹⁴ 27, p. 49.

³¹⁵ "GDP growth (annual %)", World Bank, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?page=6>

³¹⁶ "Everything You Think You Know About the Collapse of the Soviet Union Is Wrong", Leon Aron, Foreign Policy, 20 June 2011, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/06/20/everything-you-think-you-know-about-the-collapse-of-the-soviet-union-is-wrong/>

³¹⁷ Ibid.

³¹⁸ "The Economic Collapse of the Soviet Union", Thayer Watkins, San José State University Department of Economics, <http://www.sjsu.edu/faculty/watkins/sovietcollapse.htm>

³¹⁹ "One Thing China and the USSR DON'T Have in Common", Harry Kazianis, 26 March 2013, <http://thediplomat.com/2013/03/one-thing-china-and-the-ussr-dont-have-in-common/>

in rough power in the 1970s, now there was an increasing gap between the two in technological sophistication. Both the air and naval legs of the Soviet nuclear triad were vulnerable. The elaborate Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) built by the United States in the GIUK gap and parts of the Pacific was monitoring the movement of Soviet submarines, while the US Navy managed to discover the so-called “Yankee Patrol Boxes” near the coasts of the United States where the Soviet nuclear ballistic missile submarines would have likely launched their attacks.³²⁰

The airborne forces of the Soviet Union were also in a questionable state of readiness, and the deployment of Tomahawk nuclear-tipped cruise missiles and the Pershing IIs complicated their woes even further as they would have been able to strike Soviet airfields in a matter of minutes. It was also assessed that the Soviet leadership would have had 3 minutes of warning while the Pershing II would be able to strike in 6 minutes, potentially making a decapitation strike feasible.³²¹

As I alluded to it earlier, the Soviet Union had a really crude early warning system in the late 1970 and early 1980s. While developments were ongoing, it was still considered only partially reliable, something a military leader does not want to hear when it comes to nuclear issues. The USSR also lacked a “nuclear football”, a mobile nuclear control center in the form of a briefcase from which a nuclear strike could be authorized.

The Soviets were also seemingly unable to keep up with the United States in space. A prime example of this technological discrepancy was the Columbia Space Shuttle which, at least in the view of the USSR, would theoretically be able to lob ordnance at the Soviet Union from the space.³²² The blend of these seven overarching developments, the strategic inferiority of the USSR and two unfortunately timed events caused a sort of paranoia in the Politburo, thinking they are strategically insecure to an American surprise attack.

³²⁰ 19.

³²¹ 27, p. 6

³²² Ibid., p.8.

The Operation Able Archer 83

This was the time when a seemingly routine military exercise, the Operation Able Archer 83, happened. There is a clash between opinions about this exercise, as many are saying that this was the peak of the 1983 war scare and a nuclear faceoff was imminent between the superpowers. Before assessing the credibility of the claims here is a short description of the exercise. The Operation Able Archer 83 in itself was not unusual. It was an annual ten-day command post exercise in which NATO assessed their command, control and communications (C3) capabilities in the event of a nuclear war. It was the culmination of a months-long exercise series which also included the Autumn Forge and the Reforger 83, in which tens of thousands of NATO troops were moved throughout Europe. In the Reforger 83, 19000 US troops were transported over the Atlantic in complete emission control (EMCON).³²³ The Operation Able Archer 83, a nuclear release exercise, was part of the exercise series which, according the newly declassified papers, went like the following:

“The war game describes a confrontation between Blue (NATO) and Orange (a thinly-disguised Warsaw Pact led by the USSR) beginning after a change in Orange leadership leads to resentment and pushback of Blue gains in the Persian Gulf. Orange retaliates in the form of an invasion of Yugoslavia, Finland, and eventually Norway. Blue defends its allies and conventional war descends into chemical, and eventually nuclear war. After Orange gains further advances, "SACEUR requested initial first use of nuclear weapons against fixed targets in Orange satellite countries." However, "Blue's use of nuclear weapons did not stop Orange's aggression." Then, "a follow-on use of nuclear weapons was executed on the morning of 11 November.”³²⁴

While this sounds like a regular wargame, it also included some non-routine elements, like

“the shifting of commands from "Permanent War Headquarters to the Alternate War Headquarters," the practice of "new nuclear weapons release procedures," including consultations with cells in Washington and London, and the "sensitive, political issue" of numerous "slips of the tongue" in which B-52 sorties were referred to as nuclear "strikes.””³²⁵

³²³ “The 1983 War Scare: "The Last Paroxysm" of the Cold War Part I”, *Nate Jones*, 16 May 2013, <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB426/>

³²⁴ “The 1983 War Scare: "The Last Paroxysm" of the Cold War Part II”, *Nate Jones*, 21 May 2013, <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB427/>

³²⁵ *Ibid.*

It is also important to highlight that the exercise was reduced in its scale because originally it would have included political figures as well, like the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Supreme Commander of NATO, the Vice-President and President Ronald Reagan himself in addition to some high-level political attendees from various NATO states.

This reduction is reportedly attributed to the US National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane because it would have made the exercise too high-profile.³²⁶ During the exercise, NATO simulated an elevation up until DEFCON 1 which would have meant that a nuclear war is imminent. In response to this exercise, the Soviets were reportedly placing their forces on high alert: they were loading bombers in East Germany and Poland with nuclear ordnances, 70 SS-20 missiles were readied in Eastern Europe, ballistic missile submarines were dispersed under the Arctic and the intelligence operations were expanded even more.³²⁷ But, from the perspective of Soviets, the exercise ended somewhat abruptly on November 11 after reaching DEFCON 1. Then the forces on both sides were winding down and the chance of war dropped considerably. According to a former CIA officer if the exercise had continued even 24 hours “*the West might have unwittingly stumbled into a nuclear holocaust*”.³²⁸

Assessment of the Soviet war scare

But even if the Soviets were indeed alarming their forces for a possible nuclear exchange, some in Soviet perches say that they did not even know about the Able Archer 83. They did know, however, about the precursors to it, the Autumn Forge and Reforger, and deemed them the most dangerous military exercises.³²⁹ But it would have been very unusual if the Soviets did not know about any NATO exercise since it was one of the general tenets of the Soviet doctrines to keep a close eye on the adversaries military exercises. According to the Soviets, these exercises were explicitly designed to habituate one’s armed forces to them so they would instill a “false sense of security”

³²⁶ 27, p. 60

³²⁷ 19.

³²⁸ 27, p. 65

³²⁹ 39.

which one could later take advantage of and launch a nuclear strike during an exercise.³³⁰ While the Soviet leadership was most probably frightened because of the military exercises, the US Intelligence Community and NATO was not aware or did not want to make others aware of the gravity of the exercise in Soviet eyes at that time. An American intelligence assessment, the 1984 Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE), concluded that while in their view there was a general paranoia and war scare in their perks, the Soviets did not anticipate an imminent attack on their homeland.

Additionally, the CIA also stated that the Soviets reactions to the exercise are not the result of the exercise series itself but rather they are using the war scare as propaganda: the Soviet regime could not manage to improve living standards significantly, therefore they wanted to divert the attention by scaremongering.³³¹ The agitprop did work because there was an evident fear in the Soviet population after the shootdown of the Korean Airlines 007 flight.³³² On an added note, I also have to mention that it was also true of the American population as well.³³³ No wonder that at this time came out the famous movie about the aftermath of a nuclear war, *The Day After*. Even President Reagan was stunned when he saw it.³³⁴

While the American intelligence services downplayed the risk of confrontation, President Reagan was questioning whether the exercises could be interpreted wrongly by the Soviets. He even asked the later famous question from the US ambassador to the Soviet Union: “*Do you think Soviet leaders really fear us, or is all the huffing and puffing just part of their propaganda?*”³³⁵ After the war scare subsided and an early assessment was forwarded to the President, he was genuinely frightened by the prospect that the exercise nearly caused a nuclear war. The change in his confrontational foreign

³³⁰ Leopoldo Nuti, Frédéric Bozo, Bernd Rother, Marie-Pierre Rey, “The Euromissile Crisis and the End of the Cold War”, 2015, p. 54

³³¹ Fritz W. Ermarth, “Observations on the War Scare of 1983: From an Intelligence Perch”, 11 November 2003, https://web.archive.org/web/20060724160027/http://www.isn.ethz.ch/php/documents/collection_17/texts/ermarth.pdf

³³² 18.

³³³ 45, p. 280.

³³⁴ Peter Beinart, “Think Again: Ronald Reagan”, 7 June 2010, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/06/07/think-again-ronald-reagan/>

³³⁵ 38.

policy later in the mid-1980s can partly be attributed to this revelation.³³⁶ In addition to the American President, the British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher was also stunned when she learned that the Soviets could misinterpret the Operation Able Archer 83 and asked what measures can be taken to defuse the tension.³³⁷

In 1990, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) published a report which stated that the Soviet fears were not unfounded and the USSR was genuinely expecting a nuclear first-strike by the US. It states that some of the Soviet military forces were “*preparing to preempt or counterattack a NATO strike launched under cover of [sic] Able Archer*”.

The PFIAB report cites the deterioration of relations and the tilting balance of power in military-strategic terms as a reason for that. This very same report also concludes that the CIA's 1984 SNIE report of the war scare underestimated the risks at the time of the exercise. Now, newly declassified documents show that the war scare was indeed understated by the SNIE report and it was “sanitized” before handing it over to other NATO members.³³⁸ But even in the wake of these assessments, some are questioning the severity of the situation by saying that both the NATO and the USSR knew about each other's war plans and could distinguish between a military exercise or actual preparations for a war.³³⁹ While, based on this information, it does seem that the war scare was indeed real in the Soviet leadership and they really did take some measures to prepare for an imminent American first-strike, the US leadership, however, could not grasp the whole gravity because of two reasons.

First, the top leadership was not provided adequate information at the time of the exercise - only a year later – and second, the US intelligence services did not really think the Soviets are anticipating a surprise attack from the NATO/US side based on the

³³⁶ 19.

³³⁷ “How a Nato war game took the world to brink of nuclear disaster”, Jamie Doward, The Guardian, 2 November 2013, <http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/nov/02/nato-war-game-nuclear-disaster>

³³⁸ Nate Jones, The 1983 War Scare: “The Last Paroxysm” of the Cold War Part III, The National Security Archive, George Washington University, 22 May 2013, <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB428/>.

³³⁹ 46.

assessment that they felt strategically secure. Now, we know that was not the case and the Soviets felt that they were falling behind the United States both in economic and military terms. To answer the subtitle: no, it was not just the Operation Able Archer 83 that brought us close to World War III. It was a combination of factors that made the USSR feel that an American attack is might be in the cards: the whole exercise series that year, that is the Autumn Forge, the Reforger and the Operation Able Archer 83 itself with the nuclear release test and the encrypted communications; the worsening strategic outlook of the Soviet Union; and the precipitous deterioration of US-Soviet relations due to the events starting with 1979.

There is a dispute about whether Operation Able Archer 83 itself could have been a catalyst for a nuclear exchange. In my opinion, Operation RyaN is the most responsible for the war scare. It made the USSR realize that the United States will leave them behind in the long-run and that made them feel anxious. The exercise series would have been fairly routine if it had not been for the damaged relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States.

It was such a tense period because the Soviets could have thought that the strategic situation and the exercises themselves would have been a good ruse for a surprise attack. But I would raise the question: why would the US carry out a first-strike if they had better long-term prospects and knew that they could not escape a nuclear war unscathed? It would have been a really short-sighted way of thinking from the part of the US to use the wargames as a cover for what would most likely have been the destruction of the Soviet Union but with US/NATO losses also in the millions.

As a counterpoint one could say that, if a perceived weakness was seen in an adversary, it opens up the possibility for a decapitation strike. But in each case, it has to bear the consequences for it and in this case, in my opinion, it was not worth it for the United States. It is also very well in the realm of possibility that some in the military and intelligence brass did not interpret the United States' military and economic position correctly or did not want to see it in that way.

Conclusion

On balance, I still have to make a disclaimer that the evidence is inconclusive about the Soviet preparations for immediate nuclear war. While there are certain second-hand experiences in my work, these cannot be called purely unbiased, and the lack of true first-hand evidence (e.g. transcripts of Politburo meetings in the time period of the exercises) does not make it possible to provide a real answer to this question. There are documents that assume that the USSR had every right to fear an imminent attack but there are others which challenge it by saying that the Soviets knew that this was just an exercise but they did take some steps to alert their troops nevertheless.

The sheer range of different opinions on this issue keeps me from providing one answer to the question whether the Soviets were fearing and preparing for an immediate US first-strike. Therefore, the conclusion of the research paper will be based on my opinion on the 1983 Soviet war scare regardless of any first or second-hand account, and solely based on my assessment of the events leading up to it, as well as on the strategic-military balance between the superpowers. Based on this, I conclude this research paper by saying that in my view 1) the Soviet Union was aware of their worsening strategic balance and outlook 2) in its political, military and intelligence leadership there was a permeating war scare 3) they knew the Operation Able Archer 83 and its precursors were just exercises 4) but nonetheless they did anticipate an American first-strike under the guise of the exercises 5) there are, however, no conclusive evidence that the Soviet leadership was actively preparing for a preemptive or counterstrike. Maybe if a few more documents will be declassified both on the American and Russian side, we can strengthen this conclusion or even arrive at a completely different one.

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Pacifism and Reality: Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution

Szabó LEVENTE G.

Introduction

With Japan's role rapidly changing in the 21st century, I think it is important to know the peculiarities of their constitution, and how it is affecting regional and global politics. But to understand their constitution we must understand under what circumstances it was written.

My goal is to summarize the history of the constitution from the Meiji period (1868 – 1912) to the end of the Second World War, (1939 – 1945) with a particular focus on article 9: renouncing the right to declare war and prohibiting the establishment of an army. Furthermore, to see how this limitation on the army was slowly but surely circumvented over the years of the Cold War. Finally, how the constitution is moving inevitably towards complete abandonment. My paper will focus on the military aspects of the Japanese disarmament and the legality of certain weapons.

History of the Constitution:

The first Japanese constitution was the Meiji constitution enacted in 1890. It was based on the Prussian/German and British model because the United States' was deemed too liberal and the French and Spanish were deemed too despotic. The constitution gave considerable power to the Emperor; however, in theory, the Prime minister was the actual leader of the government. In the context of my paper, the most important point of the constitution was Article 11. It states that the supreme leader of the army and navy is the Emperor. "*The army and navy obey only the Emperor, and do not have to obey the cabinet and diet*" (M. B. Jansen 1986). During the waning days of World War II after the German surrender, the Allies met in Potsdam to discuss Japan. Truman, Churchill, and Chiang Kai-shek outlined the Japanese terms of surrender. It included the complete

disarmament of all Japanese forces and a more liberal government. After the US dropped two atomic bombs and the Soviets invaded Manchuria with 1.5 million soldiers the Japanese were shocked sufficiently to surrender on August 15. The Allies occupied Japan, lead by the Supreme Commander of the Allies Forces Douglas MacArthur. He was adamant that new constitution should be made with the Japanese and not forced upon them. The Japanese, however, were reluctant to rewrite the original Meiji constitution so they just made minor adjustments. MacArthur rejected this and ordered his staff to write a new one from scratch. Even though the authors were not Japanese they took the old constitution into account and also took the advice of Minister Shidehara to add an article to prevent Japan from declaring war. The new constitution was completed in less than a week on 13 February 1946. It was enacted on 3 May 1947 as a continuation of the previous constitution, not as a new one. The article that prevents Japan from rearming reads as follows:

Article 9. (1) Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

(2) In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.³⁴⁰

In effect, this article prevented Japan from raising an army, however, global politics steered things in a different direction quite early on. 1950 saw the beginning of the Korean War and some of the occupying forces were redeployed to Korea. This left Japan defenseless and without armed protection, so MacArthur ordered the creation of the National Police Reserve to maintain order. This is where things get complicated and controversial.

From the National Police Reserve to the Japan Self-Defense Forces

The started out as a force of 75,000 men armed with light infantry equipment. Their main job was to maintain order in post-war Japan instead of the Allied troops. The

³⁴⁰ English translation from Ottawa Internet eXchange

agreement with the US was that the NPR would tackle minor internal issues, while the US would defend Japan from external dangers. There was some debate whether to allow a partial remilitarization of Japan, however, these ideas were dismissed by MacArthur. The police reserve was structured as an army, so even from the beginning there were some contradictions, however, MacArthur insisted that the conflict in the neighboring country would resonate throughout the world so a strong police force was necessary.

The NPR was officially formed on July 8. In November, 300,000 Chinese “volunteers” joined the conflict. MacArthur saw the defeat in Korea so he decided that the Japanese “police” would need something stronger than small arms to defeat the T34s. The heavy equipment ordered for Japan included more than 300 M26 Pershing tanks. To avoid breaking the newly formed constitution they gave all military equipment civilian names, so tanks became special purpose vehicles etc.

It was pretty hard to explain why a police force needed tanks (even if they were not named tanks) so the police force was transformed into a defense force with the primary goal of defending Japan from a perceived invasion. As the reserve grew and more equipment was arriving, the need for experienced officers also grew. The need for heavy equipment was dire because of the heavy motorization of communist forces. There was considerable debate whether former military officers could be reinstated into the police force but despite some opposition, the need for a well trained force was greater. By the end of 1951 20% of the officers were former military officials. As the threat grew later even colonel-level officers were reinstated.

By 1952 the size of the NPR was more than 110,000 and was renamed National Safety Forces. A separate branch was added as the coastguard units were within the NPR now they became separate as the Coastal Safety Force. In 1954 The NSF and CSF were joined under the name Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF). The ground forces became: Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF), the navy became: Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) and the air force became: Japan Air Self-Defense Force

(JASDF). The 1954 Self-Defense Forces Act reformed them.³⁴¹ We can see that even from the beginning the lightly armed police force quickly became the last line of defense against perceived communist forces. This meant the armament and expansion of the reserve. Both required the expertise of former military officers, which joined the police and because of the heavy weapons the militarization, also began.

Are the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) an army?

What constitutes an army? The main goal of an army is the defense of the state and its citizens. Since Japan cannot have an army, the police force had to defend the Islands. The other definition of an army is the prosecution of war. Since Japan cannot declare war it is impossible for the army to prosecute it. However, because others can declare war on Japan again the emphasis is on defense. I will try to analyze certain aspects of the JSDF like funding, equipment, and personnel to determine whether it's an army or not.

Today the JSDF has an active personnel count of 247k and a reserve of 56k the budget is fixed at only 1% of the GDP, however, the government circumvents this by assigning certain equipment and tasks the JSDF has and does as civilian, thus financing it outside of the 1% limitation. The \$41 billion budget however still makes Japan the world's 7th largest military spender (although we can see they actually spend more) but considering the 1% limitation, it is the 17th in the world.

The Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force is the naval branch of the police force it has a fleet of 154 ships and 346 aircraft. It is widely regarded as one of the world's best anti-submarine and minesweeper fleets, however recently they started to focus on antimissile warfare, (Aegis system) adapting it in 2003. The changes were due to adapting to post-cold war tactics and the threat of nuclear submarines lessened the threat from North Korea and China Grew. Also in 2003, a new line of ships was developed. Since the constitution prevents Japan from having offensive weaponry they cannot have

³⁴¹ Frank Kowalski, *An Inoffensive Rearmament: The Making of the Postwar Japanese Army*, Naval Institute Press, 2014, p.72.

aircraft carriers, because it is the archetype offensive tool. However, they developed a “helicopter destroyer” class ship the *Hyūga*. She has a full flight deck and is similar in every aspect to a traditional carrier, but it is classified on Lloyd’s Register as a helicopter carrier. In 2013, they launched an every larger similar “destroyer” the *Izumo*.³⁴² This ship has a fighter compliment of 24 jets. Which is arguably a lot smaller than the USS George H. W. Bush’s complement of 90 jets it is still enough to level most countries leadership in minutes.

The Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force is the land-based branch of the JSDF. The approximate size of the ground forces is 150k active personnel and 30k reserve. The ground forces are the largest component considering size, it has about 600 tanks and 4000 other armored vehicles.³⁴³ During the Cold War, the primary strategic mission of the JGSDF was to hold off a possible Soviet invasion of Hokkaido which, in recent times, changed to counter Chinese threats with a huge emphasis on the areas that are disputed between the two countries.³⁴⁴

In my opinion, the JSDF is an army in every way short of actually being named as such. While it might not have the numbers to contend with neighboring countries’ armies it is definitely an army. The organizational structure, the equipment, the doctrines all point toward it being an army.

However, at this point we must also consider how Japanese people see the JSDF. In a 1988 survey over 74% of the people were favorably impressed by the JSDF and 76% of the people saw disaster relief as its primary role. While people are aware that the JSDF’s main task is national security they see them as the primary disaster relief, with over 3,100 operations between 1984 and 1988 (2.1 operations every day) we can see why the majority of the population supports it.³⁴⁵

³⁴² "Japanese Aircraft Carrier". Global Security. 3 August 2012. Retrieved on 5 May 2016.

³⁴³ IISS Military Balance 2008, Routledge, London, 2008, p. 384

³⁴⁴ Senkaku Islands (between Taiwan and the Ryukyu Islands)

³⁴⁵ Ronald Dolan and Robert Worden (1992). "8". *Japan: A Country Study*

The usage of the Japan Self-Defense Forces

The primary role of the Self-Defense Force is the defense of the Japan, which can be interpreted in a variety of ways.

1. First, the physical defense of the island itself, fighting anyone who wants to invade Japan.
2. Secondly, it can be argued that the growing force of neighboring countries poses a threat to Japan and they need to defend themselves from any aggression.
3. Thirdly, the imminent threat as described in international law can be used as a preemptive self-defense against a country posing an instant overwhelming threat leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation.
4. Lastly, Japans interest in the world must be defended which in itself creates 2 versions. The first one being Japanese citizens anywhere in the world, the second one being Japans allies. The rhetoric behind the latter is that if Japans allies are attacked it would weaken Japan so it is self-defense.

We can see that it is up to the government to interpret the law. It started out as 1st then quickly turned into the 2nd and now with Shinzo Abe veering the country into a more active foreign policy, it is moving into the 4th Category. The 3rd category is obviously off limits to Japan because there is no legal way to declare war. As I described it before the usage of offensive weapons are strictly forbidden. These weapons include ICBMs, nuclear weapons, aircraft carriers and/or bomber fleets. I will now describe the current situation of each of these weapons in Japan.

1. ICBM: Inter Continental Ballistic Missiles are forbidden, however, Japan has a very developed and active commercial space program. If the solid fuel rockets were converted to ballistic missiles they would be comparable to the LGM-118A Peacekeeper ICBMs used by the USA
2. Nuclear Weapons: For obvious reasons Japan has renounced any intention of developing nuclear weapons in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, however experts say that Japan has the resources, technology, raw materials and capital to produce nuclear weapons in one year if

necessary and many analysts consider Japan a de facto nuclear state. In 2012 Japan had enough plutonium to produce 1000 warheads and additional plutonium in Europe for a further 4000. The previous point also explains that they could have the necessary delivery system.³⁴⁶

3. Carriers: I have already explained the ambiguousness of the “helicopter destroyers” and in my opinion, they should be considered carriers.
4. Bomber Fleets: The Air Self-Defense Force has an aircraft complement of 777 aircrafts they don’t have a designated bomber and compared to the 800 aircraft of South Korea, 940 of North Korea and the 3100+ aircraft of China perhaps, this is the only point of the offensive weapons ban that is without a doubt observed.

Another argument for the possibility of rearmament is the phrase “war potential”. Proponents of Japanese armament argue that since some neighbors of Japan, specifically China, has a significantly larger army in every sense, a major increase of Japans forces wouldn’t necessarily mean war potential because she is merely defending herself from a much larger force. This is, of course, pure rhetoric however one cannot ignore it. We can see that almost anything short of changing the constitution has been done to create an army.

Arguments surrounding the Constitution

Pacifism

After the war Japan was disillusioned and humiliated, the imperial and nationalistic tendencies were abandoned. The new government wanted to prevent another disaster and adopted pacifism to prevent the country from going to war again. The idea of pacifism since then has become a major part of the culture and the population widely supports pacifists and there is a considerable backlash against every law that would suggest a more warlike state, even though that is prohibited still. Some argue that the

³⁴⁶ "Ships prepare to return 331-kg plutonium stash from Japan to U S", *The Japan Times*. 6 March 2016. Retrieved 04 May 2016.

JSDF itself is a violation of the pacifist clause of the constitution. The recent bill introduced in 2014 which I will discuss later is opposed by 54% of the population while only 29% supported it. This brings up the question whether the population truly supports pacifism or just opposes the bill since Japan has an already well-developed army.

Irrelevance

We can see that the government is using every loophole it can find to expand the power of the army. Finding alternative ways to finance the army to compensate for the 1% GDP limit, classifying carriers as “helicopter destroyers” and attacking the very words of the constitution are just a few examples. International politics force countries to abandon values they might hold dear we just have to think about the USA PATRIOT Act and we can clearly see that abandoning certain points in the constitution is hard but bending the law is much easier. Considering the general population’s deep-seated love and belief in pacifism we can see that Japan will, most likely, won’t abandon clause 9, however, it will pass a series of laws that will inevitably damage the spirit of the clause itself.

Reinterpretation

In July 2014 Prime Minister Shinzo Abe decided to re-interpret article 9 to allow the right of “Collective Self-Defense”. This means that the JSDF would be able to come to the aid and defend allies in trouble, as opposed to the use of strict self-defense. This was supported by the USA but South Korea and China both condemned it saying: “Japan should stay pacifist and avoid going down this dark path”. The prime minister said that this would not mean that Japan would be involved in any land war, but would act as a deterrent. Japan would be able to help the US or other allies directly (protecting shipping, convoys, bases) but still without deploying troops. This reinterpretation uses the broadest meaning of self-defense arguing that if an ally is attacked Japan itself would weaken.

Conclusion

We can see that a country may adopt ideals that are noble and just but the harsh reality of the world is that such ideas must be defended. When the idea of pacifism must be defended with force we inevitably get into the quagmire violating said pacifism. The leaders of a country must defend it from actual or perceived threats, the population may believe in peaceful coexistence but again, the reality is different. Japan was diplomatically isolated from neighboring countries since the II World War; but this tendency has changed. However, we can see also that the threat of North Korea is looming over the whole region and it can explode like a powder keg.

In my opinion, it is important to understand that while voting to abandon the article 9 and “remilitarizing” Japan will definitely change the East-Asian balance of power somewhat, we also have to understand that not being able to use diplomatic means, that all neighboring countries can, is a severe hindrance for Japan. While we can argue about whether Japan has an army or not we can certainly say that the abandonment of one is the special circumstance, not the reestablishment. If Japan chooses to create an official army again then it will only return to a normal state, where a country can have one, and not to a state of extreme militarism. The neighbors perceive that they have a strategic advantage over Japan, even if there is a *de facto* army they can out-produce it anytime. If Japan increases its military spending then Korea and China will have to do the same even if they want to avoid it.

We can consider that the Article 9 at this point is a hindrance for Japan. This country has already a well-developed army, global presence, and diplomatic weight to influence on global politics. While it can be seen as a rearmament process, we interpret it just as a technicality, especially because of the already existing navy and army. Although it is certain that U. S. supports Japan, Korea and China, it will definitely try to convince Japan to keep its pacifist policy. On the long run, we can hypothesize that the restriction could be abandoned; however, it's unpredictable its effects especially having North Korea as neighbor.

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Chapter 3: The Eastern Bloc at the crossroads: resistance, negotiation and conflict

The Second Berlin Crisis: The Importance of Internal Dynamics in the Eastern Bloc

Diego BENEDETTI

Introduction

The second Berlin crisis began in November 1958 and culminated with the edification of the Berlin Wall in August 1961. It was one of the most delicate situations of the Cold War, one in which the Cold War could have become an actual war.

When trying to interpret the crisis, historiography mainly focused on the development of relations between the two blocs. Recently, however, it has been noted that, in order to fully understand the significance of the crisis, we have to focus on relations within the Eastern bloc. The aim of this work is, first of all, to effectuate an analysis of the main facts in the “traditional” way of conflict between the two antagonist blocs. Then, and this will constitute the core part of the paper, I would like to analyze the internal dynamics between the Eastern bloc in order to show how important they were during the evolution of crisis. In particular, it will be explored the ambiguous relationship between the Eastern Germany leadership and the Soviet Union leadership, which during the course of the crisis became at times very tense. Finally, I will assert that the construction of the wall -in retrospect and with the benefit of hindsight- can be seen as an acceptable outcome for all the parties involved in the crisis.

The development of the crisis: The dynamics between blocs

The city of Berlin had strategic importance during the Cold War years. As an enclave of a federal republic in the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Berlin symbolized two different and opposite contests: on the one hand it was the symbol of the division of Germany after the Second World War, on the other hand it represented the hope that Germany could be reunited. Berlin’s special status, which originated from the rights of

allied powers, meant that the division of Germany never fully materialized. Because of this special status and the responsibilities of the allied powers towards the city, the problems connected to Berlin were never just a national question, but they were always connected with East-West relations.³⁴⁷ That is the reason why Berlin is so important: the city on the Spree River was not just the symbol of the division of Germany but also the symbol of the division of the world.

Since the end of the Second World War, in particular since the Berlin Blockade (which began in July 1948 and ended in May 1949), the city represented, in a blunt Khrushchev expression, “western testicles”.³⁴⁸ Despite its isolation, Berlin was deemed instrumental by the West: the city became more and more a competing arena where the two opposing systems wanted to showcase their inspiring values. It soon became evident the superior appeal of Occidental democracy and of free market economy; in other words, the Western-dominated part of the city was considered the outpost of freedom and the showcase of the West. The cultural and ideal link with the West shaped the roots of its identity and was ostentatiously shown in the oriental part of the city.³⁴⁹

Two different and antithetical systems had to cohabit in the same city, which was a situation not to be found anywhere else. Such an extraordinary state of affairs was a source of tension. Therefore, the crisis potential of Berlin was always high, even though between 1949 and 1958 the situation was relatively calm.³⁵⁰ The Federal Republic was established in the zones controlled by the Western Powers and the Democratic Republic was established in the zones controlled by USSR (the first one was recognized by Soviet Union in 1955, the second was not recognized by Western Powers). Between 1949 and 1958, the feared build-up of the Federal Republic and its admission into NATO, uprisings in east Berlin in 1953, and the massive emigration of


³⁴⁷ Marie-Louise Recker tedesca, “L’inasprirsi della questione: la seconda crisi di Berlino” 1958-1961, *Ricerche di Storia Politica*, anno XII, (Bologna: il Mulino, 2009), p. 327.

³⁴⁸ William R. Keylor, *A World of Nations: The International Order Since 1945*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, 107.

³⁴⁹ Marie-Louise Recker, “L’inasprirsi della questione: la seconda crisi di Berlino”, p. 328.

³⁵⁰ E. Barker, “The Berlin Crisis 1958-1962”, *International Affairs*, Vol. 44, 1963, p. 59. Probably “the relative calm is due to the fact that only in 1958 Khrushchev managed to fully win the battle for power began with Stalin’s death in 1953”. Moreover the launch of artificial satellite Sputnik in 1957 seemed to hand the Soviets a technological advantage: “Mr. Krushchev might therefore have felt in a strong enough position to risk a major crisis in relations with the West”. E. Barker, “The Berlin Crisis 1958-1962”, 60.

people from the eastern sector to the western one (which mainly concerned the youngest and most skilled) caused frustration and panic in the GDR. East Germany feared that in a not too far-off future the economy would collapse. The table below shows the flow of people that fled East Berlin from 1950 until the edification of the Berlin Wall. After a peak in 1953, the massive emigration gained again momentum in 1960.



The long-serving Secretary of the SED (*Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands*) and *deus ex machina* of the GDR Walter Ulbricht became increasingly concerned with the massive emigration of people. In late 1957, he promoted a strong campaign against the *Republikflucht*. The people who tried to escape from the GDR were threatened to be punished with up to three years in jail.³⁵¹ In general, Berlin's status was called into question: the SED argued that Berlin was in GDR territory and, therefore, Western Powers had no rights there. Even Khrushchev said that the situation "was not normal" and accused the Western Powers of exploiting West Berlin to organize subversive activities in the GDR.³⁵² The Soviets were very concerned with the possible nuclear build-up of the Federal Republic. Besides, the Kremlin was scared even by the will of the *Bundeskanzler* Adenauer to reclaim a reunified Germany, the "old German lands annexed after the Second World War by the Soviet Union, Poland and Czechoslovakia".³⁵³ Moreover, the isolated and delicate position of West Berlin encouraged Khrushchev to force the events and test the resolve of the Western alliance.

³⁵¹ Marie-Louise Recker, "L'inaspirsi della questione: la seconda crisi di Berlino", 330.

³⁵² Ibid., 331.

³⁵³ Vladislav M. Zubok, "Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis (1958-1962)", Working Paper N° 6, Cold War International History Project, Washington D.C., 1993, pp. 7.

In sum, both the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic were willing to change the *status quo* immediately before the crisis. Khrushchev decided that it was time to act: in November 1958, “his ultimatum...threatened to cut the Western powers’ access routes to the divided city unless they agreed to sign a peace treaty with Germany on Soviet terms within six months”.³⁵⁴

Khrushchev proposed the interim solution of transforming West Berlin into a demilitarized free city; the GDR should have guaranteed the communications and West Berlin authorities should have not allowed hostile activities in his territory;³⁵⁵ this proposal was not accepted by the Western Powers. They feared that, after retiring Western troops, West Berlin would become totally dependent on, and successively incorporated into, East Germany.³⁵⁶

This is the official communiqué of the Western Powers in response to the Soviet Ultimatum:

The Foreign Ministers of France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States met on December 14, 1958 in Paris to discuss developments in the Berlin situation during the past month, including notes addressed to their several governments on November 27 by the Soviet Union.... The Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom and the United States once more reaffirmed the determination of their governments to maintain their position and their rights with respect to Berlin including the right of free access. They found unacceptable a unilateral repudiation by the Soviet Government of its obligations to the Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States in relation to their presence in Berlin and the freedom of access to that city or the substitution of the German authorities of the Soviet Zone for the Soviet Government insofar as those rights are concerned. After further discussion of the Soviet notes of November 27, 1958 the four Foreign Ministers found themselves in agreement on the basic issues to be dealt with in the replies to those notes.³⁵⁷

In practice, the US Government coordinated a unified response from the Western governments that “denied the Soviets could unilaterally divest them of their rights in

³⁵⁴ Vojtech Mastny, “Soviet Foreign policy, 1953-1962”, in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 327.

³⁵⁵ E. Barker, “The Berlin Crisis 1958-1962”, pp. 60

³⁵⁶ Marie-Louise Recker, “L’inasprirsi della questione: la seconda crisi di Berlino”, 330.

³⁵⁷ Four Power Communiqué on Berlin, Paris, 14 December 1958, NSA/Berlin

Berlin and reaffirmed their determination not to abandon the city”.³⁵⁸ In sum, the Western Powers stood firm and tried to gain time, demanding the maintenance of the status quo. It must be stressed that, according to some, Khrushchev had begun the crisis without knowing where his bullish stance would lead and without clarifying which consequences a missed agreement with the Western Powers would have.³⁵⁹ In March 1959, his lack of a clear vision caused him to retire the ultimatum he had handed the Western Powers a few months prior.

The crisis would come back on the table of negotiations at the Conference of Foreign Ministries in Geneva in May-August 1959. Despite some attempts, perhaps a little tentative, to solve the question, no agreement was reached in Geneva and the two opposing parties decided to try to solve the question in Camp David in September 1959. President Eisenhower invited Khrushchev but even this meeting turned out to be quite inconclusive. Nevertheless, the Soviet leader promised that in the future he would avoid sending ultimatums. This contributed, for a while, to a decrease in tensions.³⁶⁰

Moreover, Khrushchev and Eisenhower enjoyed a good personal relationship, which was however suddenly brought to an end by the U2 accident.³⁶¹ Actually, it is not clear if the U2 accident had genuinely contributed to the worsening of relations between US and USSR or if Khrushchev, since the negotiations in West Berlin were not going according to his wishes, sought a pretext to start the crisis over again.³⁶² Khrushchev affirmed that he did not want to negotiate with Eisenhower any longer. The Republican President had almost arrived at the end of his second term and at the beginning of 1961 was replaced by John F. Kennedy.

³⁵⁸ Kori Schake, “A Broader Range of Choice? US Policy in the 1958 and 1961 Berlin Crises,” in J. P. S. Gearson, K. Schake, *The Berlin Wall Crisis* (New York: Mac Millan, 2002), 28. See also the Four Power Communiqué.

³⁵⁹ E. Barker, “The Berlin Crisis 1958-1962”, p. 61

³⁶⁰ Marie-Louise Recker, “L’inasprirsi della questione: la seconda crisi di Berlino”, p. 333.

³⁶¹ Few days before a meeting in Paris, in May 1960, an American spy plane flying on Soviet territory, a U2, was brought down by a Soviet missile. Eisenhower could not deny the plane intentions and Khrushchev, to further increase US uneasiness, decided to publicly criticize the fact. Cfr. Ennio di Nolfo, *Dagli imperi militari agli imperi tecnologici, La politica internazionale nel XX secolo*, Bari: Editori Laterza, 2002, p. 282.

³⁶² E. Barker, “The Berlin Crisis 1958-1962”, p. 61.

The Berlin situation was discussed once again in Vienna in June 1961. The Soviet leader handed Kennedy a memorandum, which more or less resembled the 1958 ultimatum. Kennedy told Khrushchev that he would accept the USSR's right to sign a separate peace with the GDR,³⁶³ but the United States did not want the Soviet Union to unilaterally modify West Berlin's status. The Soviet leader, after the abortive invasion of Cuba by US-backed anti-communist exiles, was convinced that Kennedy was an inexperienced adversary, and threatened war; in turn, also the American President did not rule out that war was a possibility.

For the first time since the start of the crisis the two superpowers openly threatened a nuclear war. The situation was especially risky because the two rivals did not define the *casus belli* and it remained unclear for both parties what was negotiable and what was not negotiable, what they could concede to the opponent and what instead could not be object of discussion. This is what, ultimately, made the Second Berlin Crisis so extraordinarily dangerous.³⁶⁴

In the summer of 1961, Kennedy defined three non-negotiable principles (*essentials*) of American policy in Berlin: 1) presence and safety of troops in West Berlin; 2) safety and vitality of West Berlin; 3) physical access in West Berlin. These referred only to West Berlin so it seemed that, for the US, original rights in the whole of Berlin were no longer considered of vital interest; he was even available to negotiate with East Germany.³⁶⁵ The Western Powers did not form a united front: British Premier MacMillan would have been "available" to "get closer" to the Soviet Union (he feared that a military escalation could lead to a nuclear war); France's de Gaulle was rather content with the American attitude, but did not want to modify the four powers presence in Berlin; in the Federal Republic, the limitation to the three *essentials* was interpreted as a clear alarm signal of a change in American attitude. While the two superpowers faced each other and the Soviet frustration grew stronger because of the impossibility to modify the status quo, the flow of East Germans who went to West Berlin further increased. So, it was decided in August 1961 to isolate West Berlin with a barbed wire

³⁶³ William R. Keylor, *A World of Nations*, p. 107.

³⁶⁴ Marie-Louise Recker, "L'inasprirsi della questione: la seconda crisi di Berlino", p. 335.

³⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 336.

to prevent people from entering. The sealing off proceeded in stages – at the beginning “with barbed wire and only later by the construction of a concrete wall, all on Soviet-controlled territory. The procedure initially served to test the West’s reaction to the violation of the agreements that allowed Berliners free movement through the whole city.”³⁶⁶ After that, measures were taken to block the allies’ right to move freely in and out of their sectors. “For them, however, it was the boldness of the challenge rather than its residual caution that mattered, all the more so since it caught them by surprise.”³⁶⁷

For some weeks, the situation remained very tense and the possibility of a Western intervention continued to be taken into account by the Soviet leadership.³⁶⁸ However, the East German leadership was partially soothed as the outflow of people strongly decreased even though it did not come to a complete stop. Moreover, the GDR government recognized the border between East and West as a state frontier between East and West Germany and so they abandoned the claim for the entire Berlin as part of the territory of East Germany.³⁶⁹ The GDR *de facto* respected the three *essentials* and so military countermeasures were not taken into consideration.³⁷⁰

A few weeks after the division of Berlin over an issue affecting the freedom of access for Western allies in West Berlin, Soviets and Americans troops directly faced each other. However, conflict did not break out.³⁷¹ The barrier that was erected – which *de facto* prevented access to the western sectors by East Germans, but allowed it to Westerners – made it possible to solve the Berlin crisis in practice. However, the larger German problem could be solved only at the end of the cold war.³⁷² On July 25, 1963, after negotiating a moratorium on nuclear tests, the US and the USSR reached a verbal agreement on the Berlin question, which, *de facto*, brought a final end to the crisis. The US would respect European borders as they were at the end of the Second World War

³⁶⁶ Vojtech Mastny, “Soviet Foreign policy, 1953-1962”, p. 329.

³⁶⁷ Ibid., 330.

³⁶⁸ Vojtech Mastny reports that a Warsaw Pact exercise, codenamed Buria (which stood for “Nuclear War”) was “organized in deepest secrecy at the headquarters of the Soviet forces in Germany in the second half of September”, Ibid., p. 330.

³⁶⁹ E. Barker, “The Berlin Crisis 1958-1962”, p. 61.

³⁷⁰ Marie-Louise Recker, “L’inasprirsi della questione: la seconda crisi di Berlino”, p. 336.

³⁷¹ Ibid., p. 338.

³⁷² Vojtech Mastny, “Soviet Foreign policy, 1953-1962”, p. 331.

and would favor the integration of the two Germanys in their respective blocs. The USSR made it clear that in the future they would recognize the status of West Berlin, including the presence of Western troops and would not discuss the three essential principles.³⁷³ After reviewing the crisis from the traditional East-West angle, it is important to concentrate on what happened within the Eastern bloc. In order to fully understand Khrushchev's behavior, it is essential to focus on his ambiguous relation with Ulbricht and on Chinese pressure.³⁷⁴ This will constitute the second part of this work.

The ambiguous Ulbricht–Khrushchev relationship

First of all, it must be stressed that East Germany was very important for the USSR in general and for Khrushchev in particular. He was convinced that if communism failed in East Germany, it would be bound to fail even in the USSR. In 1953 he accused Beria and Malenkov of wanting to betray socialism in East Germany. Moreover, from a strategic point of view, East Germany was the most “western” of eastern countries and directly faced NATO. Ulbricht was aware of the importance of his country and cunningly used this leverage during the crisis.³⁷⁵

The East German leader had long pushed for Soviet leadership to close the border around West Berlin. Also some Soviet representatives in the German Democratic Republic agreed with his view. In February 1958, O. Selyaninov reported to the Soviet Ministry that:

³⁷³ Marie-Louise Recker, "L'inasprirsi della questione: la seconda crisi di Berlino", p. 339.

³⁷⁴ "East German influence on Soviet policy during the Berlin Crisis was much more important than previously believed. The evidence from the newly opened archives also shows that the Soviet leader, Nikita S. Khrushchev, was more interested in reaching a German settlement with the West and preoccupied with preventing East German leader Walter Ulbricht from sabotaging this process than has been recognized. In addition, the documents confirm the view of several scholars that Soviet fear of West German acquisition of nuclear weapons was an important influence on Soviet *Deutschlandpolitik* (policy on Germany) connected with the crisis. Finally, the role of the faltering East German economy looms much larger in the documents than previously known". Cfr. H. Harrison, "Ulbricht and the concrete rose: new archival evidence on the dynamics of soviet-east German relations and the Berlin crisis 1958-1961", Working Paper N° 5, Cold War International History Project, 1993, p. 7.

³⁷⁵ Hope Harrison, "Ulbricht and the concrete rose: new archival evidence on the dynamics of soviet-east German relations and the Berlin crisis 1958-1961", Working Paper N° 5, Cold War International History Project, Washington, D.C, 1993, p. 9

West Berlin continues to be a center of hostile activity against the GDR and other socialist countries, which is aggravated by the absence of closed sectoral borders....We must proceed from the fact that the Berlin question can be resolved independently from resolving the entire German problem, by the gradual economic and political conquest of West Berlin. Particular attention should be paid to strengthening political work in West Berlin and carrying out certain economic and cultural measures. Regarding various types of administrative measures, we should turn to these only in the extreme circumstance of avoiding an undesired aggravation of the situation in the city.³⁷⁶

The Soviet leader resisted for a while, in order not to increase the tension against the Western governments. He was still looking for a broader agreement with the Western Powers, which would have included not only the resolution of the Berlin question but also a peaceful settlement of the German question as a whole.³⁷⁷ But the importance of Eastern Germany “lured” him into action. That motive should not be forgotten as it is as important as the other motives (the Soviet willingness to prevent West Germany from building up, the attempts to break the unity of the Western Powers, or Khrushchev’s determination to show his internal opposition and the Chinese that he was tough enough) when it comes to analyzing the causes which pushed Khrushchev to start the crisis. Ulbricht wanted to revise the status quo as soon as possible and in the following two years pushed Khrushchev to action.

The Soviet leadership was convinced that their combination of pressure and negotiation would eventually foster the desired results³⁷⁸ but Ulbricht, having first-hand experience of the drama of the massive emigration towards West Berlin, felt that he could not wait any longer: in the autumn of 1960, he unilaterally implemented measures to attempt to obtain control at the border and at the access points of Berlin.³⁷⁹ During the crisis, Khrushchev’s behavior was not always compatible with Ulbricht’s will and the tough posture of the German leader often was an obstacle for Khrushchev in his negotiations

³⁷⁶ Ibid., 10

³⁷⁷ Ibid.

³⁷⁸ Petr Lunak, “Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis: Soviet Brinkmanship Seen from Inside”, *Cold War History*, Vol.3, N° 2, 2003, p. 64.

³⁷⁹ Hope Harrison, “The German Democratic Republic, the Soviet Union and the Berlin Wall Crisis,” in J. P. S. Gearson, K. Schake, *The Berlin Wall Crisis*, New York: Mac Millan, 2002, p. 99.

with the Western Powers.³⁸⁰ The SED's Secretary was concerned by the fact that the Soviet Union had recognized West Germany in 1955, while the Western Powers refused to recognize East Germany. In September 1960 "the East Germans announced [...] that Western diplomats accredited to embassies in Bonn had to obtain permission from the East German Foreign Ministry to enter East Berlin".³⁸¹

The Soviet Union thought that these provocations were useless or harmful. The main problem was that there were deep differences between Soviet and German views.³⁸² Ulbricht was uninterested in *détente* with the Western Powers; his main preoccupation was the annexation of West Berlin. Khrushchev, even if he did not accept the *status quo*, wanted the city to be neutral.³⁸³ Besides, the ongoing flow of young and skilled people from East Berlin was a problem of vital importance for Ulbricht, whereas for Khrushchev, Berlin was overall a tactical weapon to use against the Western Powers.

The difference of perspectives was the reason why solutions to solve the Berlin crisis were so different: the Soviet Union wanted to transform Berlin into a demilitarized free city with a treaty, while Ulbricht's main interest was not the signing of a peace treaty but to obtain as soon as possible the "control of the sectoral border and full control over all the GDR territory, including full control over the links between West Berlin and the FRG that go through the GDR".³⁸⁴ Indeed, the SED's Secretary feared a Western embargo (which East Germany could not afford) had East Germany and Soviet Union signed a separate peace treaty.³⁸⁵ The GDR leader was in a similar position to Chinese

³⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 101.

³⁸¹ Ibid., p. 105.

³⁸² "These differences can be boiled down to the following: Khrushchev always saw and used West Berlin more as a lever to compel the West to recognize really Khrushchev's way of using West Berlin as a lever, since the key implication of his separate treaty threat was that the GDR would then have control over the access routes to West Berlin the post-war status quo and the existence of East Germany, and Ulbricht always saw West Berlin more as a prize, although he was certainly willing to exploit it as a lever until he got it as a prize". H. Harrison, p. 11.

³⁸³ "[...] Khrushchev wanted to keep it a neutral territory. He needed it both as a geostrategic Achilles's heel of the Western security system and a Western Hong Kong, a trade link between the communist East and capitalist West Germany. He was prepared to negotiate with Americans, British and French over their presence in and access to West Berlin. But the status quo was unacceptable because it was tantamount to the disruptive presence of rich West Germany at the heart of the weak unstable GDR". Vladislav M. Zubok, "Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis (1958-1962)", p. 16.

³⁸⁴ Hope Harrison, "The German Democratic Republic, the Soviet Union and the Berlin Wall Crisis", p. 110.

³⁸⁵ Vladislav M. Zubok, "Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis (1958-1962)", p. 19.

leader Mao, who, *mutatis mutandis*, had in Taiwan his delicate situation. Both thought that Khrushchev was not tough enough and pushed him to adopt a tougher posture in negotiations vis-à-vis the Western Powers. When the so-called Chinese-Soviet schism did occur,³⁸⁶ Ulbricht did not hesitate to use the “Chinese card” to put pressure on Khrushchev and to exploit the differences between Moscow and Peking in order to get advantages as far as Berlin was concerned. An East Germany delegation went to Beijing in January 1961: the Germans obtained full support from the Chinese for their hard stance and their claim on Berlin.

The Soviets did not know about the trip and only found out about it later.³⁸⁷ Therefore, Khrushchev was in a very uncomfortable position: on the one hand, he had to resist pressure from the Communist Bloc (if at this stage there was one) and, on the other hand, he had to bargain with the Western Powers. The Soviet leader managed to contain Ulbricht’s requests to modify the status quo only for a few months. After criticizing the Soviet posture with Mao, Ulbricht in the successive months of 1961 decided to use the Chinese card in another way. In a Warsaw Pact meeting which took place on 3-5 August 1961, he strongly sided with the USSR against the Chinese and their Albanian allies to show Khrushchev that he could trust him.³⁸⁸

Moreover, in the case of a Western embargo, the USSR’s Eastern Europe satellites were not willing to help the GDR. The East European Socialist leaders all emphasized that they had their own pressing economic issues and so they lacked the capacity to grant significant aid to the German Democratic Republic. Probably this was “the final straw leading Khrushchev to see that he had to agree to close the border around West Berlin to help the GDR”.³⁸⁹ The economic situation in East Germany, strained by the massive emigration, was too difficult. Ulbricht sent several letters to Khrushchev, in which he

³⁸⁶ The relations between the two countries began to deteriorate during the XX congress of PCUS, when Mao was not content with Khrushchev heavy critics of Stalin behavior. In general Mao thought that the Soviet leader was too soft with Western Powers. When Tito was rehabilitated and during the management of the Berlin crisis the relations between the two countries collapsed. At the end of the sixties there was even a short war because of unresolved border problems. Ennio di Nolfo, *Dagli imperi militari agli imperi tecnologici, La politica internazionale nel XX secolo*, (Bari: Editori Laterza) 2002, p. 309.

³⁸⁷ Hope Harrison, “The German Democratic Republic, the Soviet Union and the Berlin Wall Crisis”, p. 109.

³⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 101.

³⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 112.

emphasized how dramatic were the economic conditions of the GDR. Probably, one of the most significant ones was written just some days before the barbed wire went up around West Berlin:

The entire situation, influenced by the open border, hindered us from implementing adequate measures to eliminate the disproportions in the wage structure and to create a proper relationship between wages and performance. . . . Simply put, the open border forced us to raise the living standard faster than our economic capabilities allowed. . . . Of course we had similar difficulties with the transition to agricultural co-operatives as in other People's Democracies. But one should not overlook the fact that some things are much more complicated here. . . . In all the other People's Democracies, in the context of their closed borders, such political-economic issues could be tackled differently than was possible under our political circumstances.³⁹⁰

Besides, Khrushchev did care about the standard of living of the GDR, as he feared that if the country living standards would fall down to the Soviet ones, the regime would collapse.

If we level it [the GDR's living standard] down to our own, consequently, the government and the party of the GDR will fall down tumbling, consequently Adenauer will step in...Even if the GDR remains closed, one cannot rely on that and [let living standards decline].³⁹¹

Rebus sic stantibus, the goal of surpassing West Germany's economic performance seemed now completely unachievable,³⁹² and possibly also darkly ironic. However, it is difficult to assess whether Ulbricht's bleak portraits were completely accurate as he clearly intended to gain support among others Warsaw Pact states for the closure of the border.³⁹³ Anyhow, the SED Secretary finally won over Khrushchev and could eventually proceed to seal off East Berlin.

On the basis of this outcome, it is interesting to reflect on the USSR-East Germany alliance by drawing from Glenn H Snyder seminal study on the dynamics at work

³⁹⁰ Corey Ross, "East Germans and the Berlin Wall: Popular Opinion and Social Change before and after the Border Closure of August 1961", *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol.39, 2004, p. 25.

³⁹¹ Excerpts of Khrushchev Speech at the Conference of first secretaries of Central Committees of Communist and workers parties of socialist countries for the exchange of views on the questions related to preparation and conclusion of German peace treaty, 3-5 August 1961 (p. 170)

³⁹² Corey Ross, "East Germans and the Berlin Wall: Popular Opinion and Social Change before and after the Border Closure of August 1961", *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol.39, 2004, p. 25.

³⁹³ Ibid., p. 26.

within states alliances.³⁹⁴ It was, indeed, in the very interest of the East German leadership to show that the internal situation, if the status quo was preserved, would not be sustainable so as to gain bargaining power *vis-à-vis* the Soviet Union.

The bipolar international system that characterized the Cold War made “highly unlikely”³⁹⁵ that one of the superpowers abandoned a weaker ally, even though the posture of the client is not aligned with the superpower’s one. In other words, the superpower is compelled by the logic of the system to protect the smaller allies even if the latter have an adventurist posture. A loss for one side would mean a gain for the other side hence “de-alignment by the smaller states is ultimately illusory, since their protector will defend them”.³⁹⁶

In sum, on the one hand, it is therefore likely that Ulbricht exaggerated the negativity of East Germany’s economic situation. On the other hand, the open border “hindered the realization of many of the SED’s socio-political aims”.³⁹⁷ The GDR’s leaders were elated when they contributed to the substantial inaction of the Western Powers following the construction of the *Berlinermauer*.³⁹⁸ That enthusiasm did not delude Khrushchev. In October he clearly stated that the USSR would not have supported or even tolerated any unilateral attempt of East Germany against West Berlin to force the new status quo.³⁹⁹ The tension continued until 1962 when a diplomatic accident between East Germany and the USSR occurred.

In May, Ulbricht enigmatically told Soviet ambassador Pervukhin, that should tension rise around the wall, he would not feel responsible for further complications. The Soviet *politburo* ordered Pervukhin to warn Ulbricht that any action concerning West Berlin should have been previously decided with Moscow. Ulbricht wrote a letter to

³⁹⁴ Glenn Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics”, *World Politics*, Vol. 36, N° 4 (Jul., 1984), p. 461-495, p. 484.

³⁹⁵ Ibid. Snyder emphasizes that his considerations mainly refer to the European arena.

³⁹⁶ Ibid.

³⁹⁷ Corey Ross, “East Germans and the Berlin Wall”, p. 26.

³⁹⁸ Vladislav M. Zubok, “Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis (1958-1962)”, p. 29.

³⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 30.

Khrushchev telling him that it was a misunderstanding and blamed the Soviet ambassador Pervukhin for the misunderstanding.⁴⁰⁰

Final Considerations

The second Berlin crisis is one of the most complicated Cold War events to assess. Even if the two rival parts got very close to the outbreak of a war, which was due to the vagueness of the threats and the unclear aims of the Soviet leadership, no superpowers actually wanted to be involved in a conflict. The Soviet leader Khrushchev, maybe underrating Ulbricht tenacity, was in the most uncomfortable position during the entire crisis, having to deal with opposing pressures from the Western Powers and East Germany. The GDR leader, fully aware of the importance of East Germany for Khrushchev,⁴⁰¹ at times exaggerated the seriousness of the East Germany economic situation to push Khrushchev to action⁴⁰², even though overall the negative economic conditions of the GDR were one of the factors that convinced the Soviet leadership to try to change the *status quo*.

The differences between Khrushchev and Ulbricht, which were never fully resolved, made the Berlin Crisis a Soviet-East German as well as an East-West crisis, and Ulbricht behavior added to the intensity of the crisis. The Soviet and East German leaders differed over several issues: how and when to remedy the destabilizing influence on East Germany emanating from West Berlin; how much control East Germany should have over the access routes between East Germany and West Berlin; how to stop the East German refugee flow; the degree to which the Soviets and East Germans should risk a confrontation with the West over Berlin; whether the Soviet Union and other socialist countries should sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany in the event

⁴⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 31.

⁴⁰¹ These are the words that Anastas Mikoyan, one of Khrushchev's closest associates, told the East Germans in June 1961: "*If socialism does not win in the GDR, if communism does not prove itself as superior and vital here, then we have not won. The issue is this fundamental to us. Therefore, we cannot proceed in such a way with any other country. And this is also the reason that the GDR occupies first place in negotiations or in credits.*" 'Anlage 2 zum [Politbüro] Protokoll N° 24 Vol. 6.6.1961. Niederschrift über die wichtigsten Gedanken, die Genosse Mikoian in einem Gespräch mit dem Genossen Leuschner in kleinstem Kreis . . . äusserte,' SAPMO-BArch ZPA, J IV 2/2/766, p. 1–3.

⁴⁰² Hope Harrison, "Ulbricht and the concrete rose: new archival evidence on the dynamics of soviet-east German relations and the Berlin crisis 1958-1961", p. 61.

the Western Powers refused to sign a German peace treaty; the extent of relations the socialist countries should have with West Berlin; and the manner and the extent to which the Western powers should be pressed to recognize formally the existence of the East German regime.⁴⁰³

Indeed, paradoxically, the closer East Germany moved to collapse, the more Ulbricht's bargaining power *vis-à-vis* the Soviet Union increased. However, the construction of the Berlin Wall, a dramatic event for the German population, was ultimately accepted by the Western Powers but also by the Soviet Union⁴⁰⁴, which feared that Ulbricht would try to annex West Berlin *manu militari*. Moreover, the Soviets thought that the Berlin Wall was a good solution to protect the GDR's weak economy, without deeply involving the Soviet Union.⁴⁰⁵ In the words of Khrushchev they "achieved the maximum of what was possible".⁴⁰⁶

In retrospect, the apparently makeshift solution of erecting a wall turned out to be an acceptable outcome for all parties involved in the crisis. For the United States the construction of the wall turned out to be a "blessing in disguise",⁴⁰⁷ as it enabled the government to withdraw from a direct confrontation with the USSR without denying the West its access rights to the city. For the USSR, also, the wall blocked the outflow of people from East Germany and proved to be a powerful tool not only to isolate East Berlin from Western interference but also to contain Ulbricht's ambitions – namely the signing of a peace treaty and the seizure of West Berlin.⁴⁰⁸ By pushing through the construction of the Wall, Ulbricht achieved his primary aim, but also lost his most powerful bargaining tool for achieving his above-mentioned goals. However, when the massive labor drain was eventually brought to an end, the SED could tighten its grip on

⁴⁰³ Hope Harrison, "Driving the Soviets up the Wall: Soviet-East German Relations, 1953-1961" Princeton Studies in International History and Politics, 200, p. 141.

⁴⁰⁴ Hope Harrison, "Ulbricht and the concrete rose: new archival evidence on the dynamics of soviet-east German relations and the Berlin crisis 1958-1961", p. 61.

⁴⁰⁵ Ibid., 62.

⁴⁰⁶ D. Selvage, "The End of the Berlin Crisis, 1961-1962: New Evidence from the Polish and East German Archives," CWIHPB, 11 (1998), p. 221.

⁴⁰⁷ Burton I Kaufman, "John F Kennedy as World Leader: A Perspective on the Literature", in Michael Hogan, *America in the World, The Historiography of US Foreign Relations Since 1941*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 328.

⁴⁰⁸ Petr Lunak, "Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis: Soviet Brinkmanship Seen from Inside", p. 76.

the society and push through “harder” socialist policies as the SED intended reshuffle of the East German society was always going to be impaired if the possibility of “defection” existed. In other words, also for the GDR the wall marked the beginning of a period of greater social and economic stability – and of oppressive control for the East German population.

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Possibility or Necessity? Hungary's Road to IMF Membership

Ágnes REMETE

Introduction

Hungary became a member of the International Monetary Fund in May 1982, after a very fast accession procedure lasting only six months. The whole process, however, took much more time. The membership can be considered an ending point to a nearly 20 year period, during which Hungary strove to achieve a peaceful, potentially even fruitful relationship with the Western Bloc based on mutual interests.

Since the countries of the Socialist Bloc could not conduct independent foreign policy, Hungary had to push through this maneuvering operation in such a way that the interests of the Soviet Union and the countries of the the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) could not be damaged, which was a quite challenging task, considering the international context of the time. Thus, Hungary found itself on the horns of a dilemma between the two opposing blocs, and it had to balance its own national interests with regard to the “Soviet *esprit de corps*”.

In this situation, as highlighted by Csaba Békés, the only option for the respective Hungarian leadership was to exploit the available foreign political space for manoeuvre, always within the given framework of constraints. Moreover, Hungary's foreign political manoeuvrability was not determined solely by the changing relations of the two opposing blocs, but by a more complex system of “tripartite determinism”, including the Soviet Union, the Western countries and the East Central European states. We can conclude that “Hungary had to perform a balancing act to pursue specific objectives in terms of an all-East-Central-European lobby-contest”⁴⁰⁹, which was no simple task.

⁴⁰⁹ Csaba Békés. “Hungarian foreign policy in the Soviet alliance system, 1968-1989”. In: *Foreign Policy Review*, Vol. 2, N° 1, 2004, p. 87-127.

The objective of this paper is to give a short, comprehensive overview of this period, that is, on Hungary's road to one of the biggest world (and importantly Western) financial organizations, the IMF. As I have mentioned, the question of the possible membership was first considered more seriously almost 20 years before Hungary's admission, already in the 1960s. Thus the essay will concentrate only on this short period of time, which finally led to the country's accession to the IMF in 1982. Besides this, I would also like to mention some basic agreements that the country managed to conclude in the first years of its membership that rescued the country from a state of complete insolvency.

I would like to present the events in chronological order, concentrating only on the most important steps and highlighting the different character of certain phases influenced by partly international, partly national necessities. I do not intend to give an overall analysis of the broader international situation of this period, thus I am going to take into consideration only those factors that are relevant, certainly bearing in mind the deterministic nature of the international circumstances and especially Hungary's place in the international bipolar system.

Firstly, I would like to briefly cover the period from after the Second World War to 1968, with special regard to the first timid steps towards the new, Western-based financial organizations. Moreover, I would like to present those economic driving forces, or rather constraints, which pushed Hungary towards considering the issue of membership. I have divided the period of 1968 to 1984 into three parts based upon the division established by one of Hungary's leading financial decision-makers, János Fekete: the "golden age" (1968-73), the "age of illusions" (1974-78) and the "age of realism" (after 1979).⁴¹⁰ Finally, I would like to give my conclusions on the issue, especially by answering the question of this paper: Was Hungary's admission to the IMF an opportunity that the country could "exploit" at the right time, or was it rather an inevitable necessity in order for the nation to escape from its tight corner?

⁴¹⁰ Márer, Pál. "Hungary's balance of payments crisis and response, 1978-84". In: *Country studies on Eastern Europe and Yugoslavia*. 99th Congress 2d Session, 1986, pp. 298-321.

The First Attempts and the Suspension of Negotiations

Hungary had already indicated its intention to join the newly established international financial and monetary organizations after the Second World War. The country's economy was in such a ruined state that it would have been crucial to obtain additional financial resources to rebuild and modernize the structure of the economy. In 1946, despite the unfavorable international circumstances, Hungary submitted its membership application to the IMF and to the World Bank, but being an ally of the Nazi Germany during the war was obviously not a proper reference for the country.

Thus the application was rejected at that time and the question was not seriously reconsidered until the 1960s.⁴¹¹ However, it would have been a logical step to join the Washington twins at the time Hungary joined the United Nations in 1955. This was indeed discussed by the government, but the return to power of the Stalinist Mátyás Rákosi in July 1955 and the return to the pre-1953 economic policies made this step untimely.⁴¹²

For the Soviet Union, it was extremely important to represent the interests of the socialist countries with the votes of its satellite states in the UN, where real decisions were not made. It was unwilling, however, to join the IMF, and expressively “advised” socialist countries to stay away from the “extended arms of imperialism”.⁴¹³ Brezhnev purposefully emphasized at the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee meeting in 1965 that the imperialists were trying to extend their contacts into the socialist countries to influence their domestic lives and to undermine their unity by offering technical and economic incentives.⁴¹⁴ However, the serious economic and financial problems faced by Hungary in the 1960s brought the issue of IMF membership again closer: output stagnated, which was worse than depression, and Hungary experienced a growing current account deficit that was financed by a growing number of foreign

⁴¹¹ János Honvári. *Magyarország gazdaságtörténete Trianontól a rendszerváltásig*. Budapest, Aula, 2005.

⁴¹² László Csaba. “Hungary and the IMF: The experience of a cordial discord”. In: Schönfeld, Roland ed., *The role of international financial institutions in Central and Eastern Europe*. München: Südosteuropa-Ges., 1996, pp. 207-228.

⁴¹³ László Csaba. “Változó erőterben – változó egyensúlyozás: Adalék Magyarország háború utáni gazdaságtörténetéhez”. In: *Competitio*, Vol. 5, N° 2, 2006, pp. 9-22.

⁴¹⁴ Békés, Csaba. “Hungarian foreign policy in the Soviet alliance system, 1968-1989”. In: *Foreign Policy Review*, Vol. 2, N° 1, 2004, pp. 87-127.

loans. The real economic situation was not at all in compliance with the loudly preached promises of accelerating growth. In October 1964, a new reform committee was convened to discuss how to get out of this dead-end. The most radical reform variant was approved and 1968 was chosen as the year to implement the timid version of this reform. 1971-1972 were the targeted years for the introduction of the more radical market socialist variant.⁴¹⁵

In parallel with the elaboration of the economic reform concepts, the idea of IMF membership also came up in the 1960s. At this time only Yugoslavia was a member of the organization from the Soviet Bloc.⁴¹⁶ Yugoslavia had obtained more than \$2 billion in credit from the capitalist international financial organizations by 1968, and a total amount of \$312.5 million only from the IMF, which was quite an attractive amount from the Hungarian point of view as well. The financial minister already indicated the possibility of applying for a total amount of \$150-200 million in long-term credit from Western countries in 1966 and the idea of IMF membership was also introduced as a means to reach this goal.

The National Bank of Hungary submitted a resolution in March 1966 which proposed a start to negotiations with the IMF and the World Bank. Hungarian policymakers regarded IMF membership important because of its possible contributions to reach the goals of the New Economic Mechanism. The initiators of the proposal pointed out that it would have been preferable to obtain the needed credits from socialist countries instead, but it was already clear in the 1960s that it is an unrealistic presumption to hope for financial help from the CMEA countries, simply because of their similarly harsh economic situations. Thus, according to the initiators, Hungary had to turn to international financial institutions for help, and this was to be achieved through personal contacts, not on an official level. In opposition to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, the

⁴¹⁵ László Csaba, "Hungary and the IMF: The experience of a cordial discord". In: Schönfeld, Roland ed. *The role of international financial institutions in Central and Eastern Europe*. München: Südosteuropa-Ges., 1996, p. 207-228.

⁴¹⁶ Poland and Czechoslovakia were founding members of the IMF, but they left the organization in 1950 and 1954, respectively. Romania was admitted to membership in 1972. 'Hungary applies to join IMF, World Bank', *Open Society Archives*, 1981, <http://www.osaarchivum.org/files/holdings/300/8/3/text/36-6-136.shtml>

National Bank regarded the consultation unimportant with all the CMEA countries. However, they also highlighted the importance of informing the Soviet Union about the Hungarian intentions. The proposal gives an overview concerning the functioning and operation mechanisms of the IMF, and it lists the possible advantages and dangers resulting from membership. The proposal concludes that IMF membership would entail significant economic advantages for the country, and the Articles of Agreement does not contain any unacceptable clauses and conditions from the Hungarian point of view.⁴¹⁷

From 1966, discreet negotiations began concerning the possibility of Hungary's IMF membership. Principally, the leaders of the National Bank, Chairman Andor László and Managing Director János Fekete played an outstanding role in the negotiations. At that time, Hungary was only member of one international financial organization, the Basel-based Bank for International Settlements (BIS). In June 1966, Fekete held confidential negotiations with the deputy governor of the institution, Jaspers Rootham, and asked him to intimately inquire about the Hungarian question. Fekete also had an informal meeting with a representative from the Bank of England who assured him that the Hungarian case was welcomed within British Foreign Ministry circles.⁴¹⁸

France also supported the Hungarian case expressively and fostered the admission of socialist countries to the IMF and to the World Bank, with the intention to reduce the already existing Anglo-Saxon hegemony within the international financial life. However, it was obvious that the leading capitalist country, the United States, could not be circumvented, as it alone gave 25% of the total quotas of the IMF member states. Thus Fekete met with American politicians as well; he even had a negotiation with Brzezinski, an advisor from the U.S. Department of State and with Robert Roosa, former Deputy Secretary of Finance. It seems that Hungarian policymakers were aware of the fact that the road to the international financial institutions led through the U.S.⁴¹⁹ Concerning Hungary's relationship with the Soviet Union, we can conclude that the

⁴¹⁷ János Honvári. *Magyarország gazdaságtörténete Trianontól a rendszerváltásig*. Budapest, Aula, 2005.

⁴¹⁸ Csaba Nagy. Az IMF-csatlakozás elvetélt kísérletei. In: Botos, Katalin ed.: *Rendszerváltástól rendszerváltásig*. Budapest: Tarsoly, 2007, pp. 105-188.

⁴¹⁹ János Honvári, *Magyarország gazdaságtörténete Trianontól a rendszerváltásig*. Budapest, Aula, 2005.

Hungarian leadership was playing the role of the loyal, predictable and reliable ally⁴²⁰, regularly consulting with the Soviet leadership on all key issues, including details of the negotiations with financial institutions. Besides Bulgaria, Hungary was the most loyal member of the group of "closely co-operating socialist countries" (except for Romania) being formed within the Warsaw Pact at this time. In exchange for its loyalty, the country could expect to maintain its relative internal independence, not to mention the further Soviet economic assistance that was extremely crucial for the country at this time.⁴²¹

However, Moscow viewed the independence efforts of the satellite countries with growing concern: besides Hungary, Romania, Czechoslovakia, the GDR and Poland introduced some cautious reforms in the 1960s,⁴²² and the possible membership of Hungary in the IMF would have probably induced a strive for particularism within the Socialist Bloc. The Hungarian leadership maintained good relations with the EEC and the GDR in the 1960s, and even concluded a partial agreement with the Vatican in 1964. These steps made it possible for Hungary to then break out from the isolation period of 1956-1962. The culmination of this process could have been Hungary's membership in the IMF, but by this time the Soviet anti-reformist forces, led by Brezhnev and Kosygin, strongly opposed the idea of such a dependent relationship.⁴²³ Following the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, such a decision again became inappropriate.

The "Golden Age" and the New Economic Mechanism (1968-1973)

The 1968 Czechoslovak intervention significantly overshadowed the relations of the socialist countries and the international financial organizations. After the announcement of the Brezhnev-doctrine in 1968, regime changes signaled the shifted Soviet policy towards national reform initiatives: Ulbricht, Gomulka and Dubček were removed,

⁴²⁰ Békés Csaba, Hungary and the Warsaw Pact, 1954-1989: Documents on the Impact of a Small State within the Eastern Bloc. http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/collections/coll_hun/intro.cfm?navinfo=15711#10

⁴²¹ Ibid.

⁴²² László Csaba: Változó erőterben – változó egyensúlyozás: Adalék Magyarország háború utáni gazdaságtörténetéhez. In: *Competitio*, Vol 5, N° 2, 2006, p. 9-22.

⁴²³ Ibid.

while Živkov and Kádár remained in power only by eliminating their internal reformist forces.⁴²⁴ After the “Prague Spring”, it was feared that the events in Czechoslovakia, sooner or later, would transgress the limits that could be tolerated by the Soviet leadership and would disqualify all kinds of reform in the Soviet Bloc, including the Hungarian economic reform.⁴²⁵ Still, economic reform was already on its way in the form of the launched New Economic Mechanism, and the reform process even resulted in unexpected, however only initial, economic successes. The introduction of the New Economic Mechanism was followed by five golden age years: the economy was growing at a good pace, there was no open unemployment or inflation and the balance of payments was in equilibrium.⁴²⁶ Therefore, besides the changed international environment and the Soviet opposition to the Hungarian IMF related conceptions, the positive economic results of the NEM also contributed to the drop of consideration of IMF membership for a period of time.

Historical literature attributes the failure to join the IMF at that time to the Soviet reservations, but according to János Honvári, Hungary’s IMF membership was not postponed because of Soviet disapproval, but indeed simply because of the fact that its economic difficulties were not severe enough to force the country into the arms of the IMF. He highlights that the Soviet Union did not support Hungary’s membership either in 1982; still it managed to join the organization. This could have happened because the USSR finally agreed to accept every step that did not entail a profound change of the socialist system. And besides this, for Hungary, membership was an urgent necessity rather than a matter of choice. For the Hungarian leadership, the main question was not the Soviet opinion in regard to membership, but rather the state of the national economic balance and other, basically economic factors. According to Honvári, it was the unexpected additional Soviet financial help in 1967,⁴²⁷ combined with the initial

⁴²⁴ László Csaba. Változó erőterben – változó egyensúlyozás: Adalék Magyarország háború utáni gazdaságtörténetéhez. In: *Competitio*, Vol 5, N° 2, 2006, p. 9-22.

⁴²⁵ Csaba Békés. Hungary and the Warsaw Pact, 1954-1989: Documents on the Impact of a Small State within the Eastern Bloc. http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/collections/coll_hun/intro.cfm?navinfo=15711#10

⁴²⁶ Pál Márér. Hungary's balance of payments crisis and response, 1978-84. In: *Country studies on Eastern Europe and Yugoslavia*. 99th Congress 2d Session, 1986, p. 298-321.

⁴²⁷ Kádár sent a letter in November 1967 to the Soviet leadership asking for additional financial help. The Hungarian requests surprisingly got positive reaction from the Soviet side and Hungary obtained concessions from the Soviet Union.

positive effects of the NEM that led to the postponement of the issue of Hungary's IMF membership not the Soviet veto.⁴²⁸ On the other hand, concerning the New Economic Mechanism and the Hungarian reform process, Csaba László argues that since the main characteristic of the Hungarian economy in the 1960s and 1970s was the unilateral, absolute dependence on the Soviet and in general on the socialist countries' economies, which were far behind the world economy in the sense of modernity and effectiveness, it is quite imaginary and nostalgic to claim that we can talk about any real modernization and reform in the case of Hungary.⁴²⁹ Still, it is true, and we must admit that the changes made to the system of central planning contributed to the improving numbers of the Hungarian economy: between 1968 and 1974, the rate of the economic growth was 6-7%, while the amount of foreign exchange reserves started to increase.⁴³⁰ Anyway, the issue of Hungarian membership was dropped at this time.

The opinion of the Hungarian Embassy of New York, released in the spring of 1969, unequivocally shows the changed Soviet position in regard to the issue: it strongly opposed Hungary's application for membership in the IMF and the World Bank, because it would be an admission of the country's economic weaknesses and it would initiate dependence on the capitalist financial institutions. Besides this, it would put a limit on Hungary's independent activities, and these institutions would have the opportunity to get an inside view on the country's present economic situation, development goals, etc. In addition to this, the opinion stated that the advantages gained from membership were not considerable at all.⁴³¹ Considering the absolutely negative approach towards the Hungarian intentions, it is quite surprising – as Csaba Nagy points it out – that the members and even the leaders of the Hungarian administration responsible for the guidelines of the economic policy were not aware of the real profoundness of the Soviet political shift. He supports his argument by indicating that the question of IMF membership was put on the meeting agenda of the Political

⁴²⁸ János Honvári. *Magyarország gazdaságtörténete Trianontól a rendszerváltásig*. Budapest, Aula, 2005

⁴²⁹ László Csaba. Változó erőterben – változó egyensúlyozás: Adalék Magyarország háború utáni gazdaságtörténetéhez. In: *Competitio*, Vol 5, N° 2, 2006, p. 9-22.

⁴³⁰ Hegedűs, Babett. *Adósságválság, 1982-90*. Budapest: BKÁE, 2001.

⁴³¹ János Honvári. *Magyarország gazdaságtörténete Trianontól a rendszerváltásig*. Budapest, Aula, 2005.

Committee on December 4th, 1973⁴³² after the proposal of the Financial Ministry, the Foreign Trade Ministry and the National Planning Commission, in which they argue for Hungarian access to the IMF and World Bank. However, at the above-mentioned meeting of the PC, Kádár made it clear that without the consent of the Soviet Union, Hungary could not make a decision in this issue. He also pointed out that to address such a question, political deliberation was needed in the first place.⁴³³ Considering these circumstances, we can conclude that the decision of the Hungarian leadership was absolutely realistic when they suspended the negotiations with regard to the IMF membership.⁴³⁴ Nevertheless, a few years later the decision was no longer a question of deliberate consideration, but rather of urgent necessity. And the years in between these deliberations meanwhile proved to be waste of time, regarding the Hungarian economic situation.

The “Age of Illusions”: IMF Membership as a Possibility (1974–1978)

The “age of illusions” refers to the policymakers’ response to the external shocks Hungary suffered after the oil crisis of 1973: rising energy and raw material prices, large deterioration in terms of trade, and consequently the rising level of convertible currency debt. Policymakers believed that the shocks were temporary and that the best policy response was to accelerate the rate of economic growth. For this, Hungary needed to purchase a rising share of energy and raw materials on the world market for convertible currency. The modern technology was available largely in the West, again only for convertible currency. It resulted in a growing amount of convertible currency imports, which led to the rapid growth of the country’s level of debt, which was the most serious consequence of the “age of illusions”.⁴³⁵

⁴³² For further detailed information, see the 1. point of the minutes of the HSWP PC meeting held on 4th December, 1973 discussing the question of the accession to the IMF and to the World Bank. HSWP PC minutes (288. 5/625.) http://www.digitarchiv.hu/faces/kereso.jsp?RADT_ID=1257

⁴³³ Csaba Nagy. Az IMF-csatlakozás elvetélt kísérletei. In: Botos, Katalin ed. *Rendszerváltástól rendszerváltásig*. Budapest: Tarsoly, 2007, pp. 105-188.

⁴³⁴ László Csaba. Változó erőterben – változó egyensúlyozás: Adalék Magyarország háború utáni gazdaságtörténetéhez. In: *Competitio*, Vol 5, N° 2, 2006, p. 9-22.

⁴³⁵ Pál Márér. “Hungary's balance of payments crisis and response, 1978-84”. In: *Country studies on Eastern Europe and Yugoslavia*. 99th Congress 2d Session, 1986, pp. 298-321.

As Csaba László points out, the 1970s saw the replication of the eastward-looking, import-substituting industrialization endeavors of 1949-1953 and 1958-1963, indicating how strong an ideological bias can be against clear-cut economic realities.⁴³⁶ Moreover, at the beginning of 1974, most of the people in leadership positions were replaced by anti-reformist forces, which was a crucial point since without them, Hungary could have elaborated a program of adaptation in response to the new economic environment, and it may have avoided serious indebtedness in the following years. Nevertheless, the fifth five-year plan did not contain any economically rational response to the deteriorating external balance of the country.⁴³⁷

With regard to Hungary's international relations, it was at this time when the philosophy of ranking the country's foreign relations took shape. The most important partners were – not surprisingly – the socialist countries; they were the first contact if the country needed any kind of goods or had any problems. The Third World countries were regarded as the second in this rank, and the Western capitalist countries were regarded as “last resorts”.⁴³⁸ However, Hungary's economic needs dictated the continual fostering of relations with the West. Only a gradually growing economy could secure political stability and a rise in the standard of living promised by the Kádárist concept.⁴³⁹ The Helsinki Summit provided the necessary leeway for Hungary to attempt to join the IMF. Talks were successful, but the Hungarian leadership asked for formal approval from the Soviet Union. “The answer was a flat *niet*”. But according to the participants in the discussions, the answer was not so clear: Kosygin state that “it is your job, comrades” and then followed with a litany of complaints against the IMF as the “extended arm of American imperialism”.⁴⁴⁰

⁴³⁶ László Csaba. “Hungary and the IMF: The experience of a cordial discord”. In: Schönfeld, Roland ed. [1996]: *The role of international financial institutions in Central and Eastern Europe*. München: Südosteuropa-Ges., 1996, pp. 207-228.

⁴³⁷ Csaba Nagy. Az IMF-csatlakozás elvetélt kísérletei. In: Botos, Katalin ed. [2007]: *Rendszerváltástól rendszerváltásig*. Budapest: Tarsoly, 2007, pp. 105-188.

⁴³⁸ Ibid.

⁴³⁹ Békés. “Hungarian foreign policy in the Soviet alliance system, 1968-1989”, op. cit.

⁴⁴⁰ Csaba, Változó erőterben – változó egyensúlyozás: Adalék Magyarország háború utáni gazdaságtörténetéhez, op. cit.

By 1977 it was obvious that the situation was even worse than expected (the net debt of the country reached \$6 billion by the end of 1978), thus the Political Committee gave mandate to examine several comprehensive issues. However, the question of indebtedness was handled in top secret; even members of the Central Committee did not know the exact numbers concerning the country's debt.⁴⁴¹

In October 1977, the leadership decided to turn westward again. But before this, in July, the Political Committee examined the question of the country's economic situation.⁴⁴² The Committee concluded that Hungary was in severe economic trouble, and because of this, they should ask for the help of the Soviet Union, in compliance with the idea of hierarchical economic relations. Prime Minister of Hungary György Lázár indicated, however, that another possible solution for overcoming the financial distress by expanding credit resources could be through the settlement of relations with the IMF and the World Bank. From that time on, the issue of IMF membership was on the agenda of Hungarian policymakers, even if the Prime Minister's proposal was ultimately not included in the PC resolution.

Also in July 1977, Kádár met Brezhnev at the usual Crimean summer meeting⁴⁴³ and asked for Soviet financial help in order to remedy the problems of the Hungarian balance of payments. Surprisingly, Brezhnev was quite receptive and promised to grant financial support to Hungary.⁴⁴⁴

In October 1977, the question was again discussed by the Central Committee⁴⁴⁵, where Rezső Nyers pointed out that it was in the crucial interest of Hungary to join the IMF, even if it was definitely not in the interest of the Soviet Union. However, he also considered it important to get the approval of the Soviets to start the negotiations. At this time, the proposal was again rejected and was not included in the final resolution.

⁴⁴¹ Nagy, Az IMF-csatlakozás elvetélt kísérletei, op. cit.

⁴⁴² Minutes of the HSWP PC meeting (288. 5/722.)
http://www.digitarchiv.hu/faces/kereso.jsp?RADT_ID=2237

⁴⁴³ For the summary of the meeting, see the 1. point of the minutes of the HSWP PC meeting held on 28th July, 1977. HSWP PC minutes (288. 7/723.) http://www.digitarchiv.hu/faces/kereso.jsp?RADT_ID=2589

⁴⁴⁴ Nagy, Az IMF-csatlakozás elvetélt kísérletei, op. cit.

⁴⁴⁵ Minutes of the HSWP CC meeting, held on 20th October, 1977 (288. 4/151-152.)
http://www.digitarchiv.hu/faces/kereso.jsp?RADT_ID=518

By the beginning of 1978, the situation was so severe that the Hungarian leadership had to become resigned to the fact that substantial changes were needed in order to avoid insolvency. For this, there were two choices to be considered: either asking for help from the Soviets again, or turning to the IMF and World Bank, which would be a more realistic solution. As for Kádár's position, we can deduce that he was convinced that Hungary had to examine the question seriously, since it was mainly and primarily a political question. Thus the Soviet leadership had to be consulted before any decision.⁴⁴⁶ However, a new element to the arguments of the Hungarian leadership by this time was the fact that it was stated expressly that the chance for Hungary to obtain another financial bailout from the Soviet Union was extremely low. Consequently, the question of membership was gradually evolving into a constraint for Hungary.

The “Age of Realism”: IMF Membership As an Inescapable Necessity (1979–1984)

In the 1970s, the communist regime institutionalized economically unrealistic, utopian ideas. Foreign credits in the period from 1974 to 1987 partially financed excess demand for public goods and personal consumption of individual products.⁴⁴⁷

After the oil crisis of 1979, Hungarian foreign debt reached 50% of the country's GDP,⁴⁴⁸ thus by this time the Kádár regime could not remedy the effects of the external shock by growing indebtedness, as it had done after the oil crisis of 1973. In 1979, even this possibility was unavailable, since the conditions were not given to obtain more credits from financial markets.⁴⁴⁹ As a result, Hungary got “caught” in a severe balance of payments crisis. The Kádár leadership turned its back on Moscow again, but before that, a significant change happened within the Hungarian leadership. The Political Committee discussed the issue of IMF membership again in February 1979⁴⁵⁰. At this meeting, Kádár stood up for the country's access to the IMF, arguing that the alternate

⁴⁴⁶ Nagy, Az IMF-csatlakozás elvetélt kísérletei, op. cit.

⁴⁴⁷ Béla Csikós-Nagy. “Appreciation of the IMF and World Bank activity in Hungary”. In: *Acta Oeconomica*. Vol. 42, N° 3-4, 1990, pp. 253-265.

⁴⁴⁸ Babett Hegedűs. *Adósságválság, 1982-90*. Budapest: BKÁE, 2001.

⁴⁴⁹ Csaba, Változó erőterben – változó egyensúlyozás: Adalék Magyarország háború utáni gazdaságtörténetéhez, op. cit.

⁴⁵⁰ Minutes of the HSWP PC meeting, held on 6th February, 1979 (288. 5/765.)
http://www.digitarchiv.hu/faces/kereso.jsp?RADT_ID=1372

possible, albeit more favorable solution of Soviet help, did not seem to be realistic. This time Kádár's proposal was included in the resolution, and it can be regarded as the first formal political decision in favor of Hungarian IMF membership.⁴⁵¹ In March 1979, Kádár met Brezhnev again. By this time, however, the Hungarian leadership tried to play the card of what were later called "implicit subsidies". They told the Soviets that Hungary would follow Romania, which had joined the IMF in 1971 without prior discussion. References were also made to Polish membership.

The Hungarian "bargaining strategy" was based on the argument that Hungary was ready to refrain from this step if the Soviet Union could find an extra couple million tons of crude oil to be paid for in soft currency. This strategy proved to be a winning one. Brezhnev began his talk with Kádár by stating that joining the IMF would be an infringement of socialist brotherhood and a couple million tons of oil would not be an issue among true allies.⁴⁵²

The Hungarians took Brezhnev's words at face value and convinced Kádár that in this situation, it would not be appropriate to decide for the Hungarian access. Consequently, the Political Committee decided to postpone the question of membership, and again – but for the last time – the Soviet veto encumbered the culmination of a long process.⁴⁵³ This could have happened because the Hungarian policymakers neglected the fact that the world had changed, and there was absolutely no reason to believe that the Soviets would honor their promise.

Two years later, in July 1981, Brezhnev could not bring up any new arguments against Hungarian IMF membership and he implicitly accepted the idea as an inevitable fact.⁴⁵⁴ He simply could not do anything else, because the economic problems of Hungary were so severe that the situation threatened with the possibility of political destabilization, not only in the case of Hungary, but within the whole Socialist Bloc as well.

⁴⁵¹ Nagy, *Az IMF-csatlakozás elvetélt kísérletei*, op. cit.

⁴⁵² Csaba, "Hungary and the IMF: The experience of a cordial discord", op. cit.

⁴⁵³ Nagy, *Az IMF-csatlakozás elvetélt kísérletei*, op. cit.

⁴⁵⁴ Ibid.

The Hungarian decision was also enhanced by the Soviet declaration of October 1981, stating that all increments in oil supplies had to be paid for in hard currency.⁴⁵⁵ This was an extremely well-timed announcement, and after a few decades of flattering and opposition, personal anger was the last motive that convinced Kádár and the regime of neglecting the old dogma of “eternal socialist brotherhood”.⁴⁵⁶

After the decision of the Political Committee, the Central Committee formally declared the access of Hungary to the IMF and the World Bank, on 22nd October 1981.⁴⁵⁷ The decision was, however, not so simple and unanimous. During the debate, the anti-reformist forces, led by Mihály Komócsin and Gyula Dabronaki presented their reservations. However, Ferenc Havasi, Rezső Nyers and Kádár himself stood up for access, and this was enough to convince reluctant members in favor of the membership.⁴⁵⁸

Just 60 minutes after the Central Committee had approved Hungary’s IMF access, János Fekete’s plane was taking off for Washington.⁴⁵⁹ Hungary had formally applied to join the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) on November 4th, 1981.

Since all the macroeconomic data related to the country’s economic situation were handled as top secret issues, the news of the accession arrived as a shock to the general public. From an economic point of view, however, it is unquestionable that there remained no other possibility for the Hungarian leadership to escape from the serious economic problems.⁴⁶⁰ Actually, this was a typically Hungarian rescue operation. May 1981 had been the last time the country could tap medium-term international funds. During that summer, Romania had covered its insolvency by means of dubious

⁴⁵⁵ Csaba, “Hungary and the IMF: The experience of a cordial discord”, op. cit.

⁴⁵⁶ Csaba, “Változó erőterben – változó egyensúlyozás: Adalék Magyarország háború utáni gazdaságtörténetéhez”, op. cit.

⁴⁵⁷ Minutes of the HSWP CC meeting (288. 4/181-182.)
http://www.digitarchiv.hu/faces/kereso.jsp?RADT_ID=537

⁴⁵⁸ Nagy, Az IMF-csatlakozás elvetélt kísérletei, op. cit.

⁴⁵⁹ Csaba, “Hungary and the IMF: The experience of a cordial discord”, op. cit.

⁴⁶⁰ Csaba, “Változó erőterben – változó egyensúlyozás: Adalék Magyarország háború utáni gazdaságtörténetéhez”, op. cit.

practices, and by September, Yugoslavia had to reschedule its foreign debt. Polish insolvency was a fact by that time. Following the imposition of martial law, a lending embargo on the Soviet Bloc was declared. This prompted the de facto Soviet-run International Bank of Economic Cooperation and some Arab investors to withdraw deposits of \$1.5 billion from the National Bank of Hungary, to relend the money to Poland and to bridge Soviet cash-flow problems. This would surely have knocked out the Hungarian economy, had not the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and Margaret Thatcher both extended their help. These exceptional forms of assistance would hardly have been conceivable had not the Hungarian application for IMF membership been well underway. Thanks to these operations, Hungary could maintain its solvency.⁴⁶¹

Whether the timing was foresight or just plain luck is difficult for an outsider to judge. Hungary became a member of the IMF and the World Bank at record speed⁴⁶² in May 1982; since then it has obtained a considerable amount of financial assistance from, or with the help of these institutions. Shortly after Hungary joined the IMF it obtained temporary “bridging” credits totaling \$510 million from the BIS. In December 1982, the IMF approved a \$600 million stand-by loan to Hungary to support its economic stabilization program. Upon the completion of the first program, in January 1984, Hungary obtained a second stand-by loan of \$440 million (SDR 425 million) to support the government’s further economic and financial program. Thus, during its first two years of membership, Hungary obtained almost \$1 billion in loans from the IMF, which it used largely to repay the BIS and for debt service payments to other lenders.⁴⁶³ Without these, Hungary could not escape from the “result” of the “age of illusions”, which was dominated by unrealistic economic ideas.

⁴⁶¹ Csaba, “Hungary and the IMF: The experience of a cordial discord”, op. cit.

⁴⁶² According to Bea Szombati, it could be attributed to three factors. First, it was appreciated that during the two-three years before the accession there was a marked shift from the stimulation of growth to the improvement of the external balance took place in Hungary’s economic policy. Second, Hungary introduced a broad market oriented reform since 1968. Thirdly, Hungary enjoyed the support and the confidence of the international financial community. For more details, see: Szombati, Bea, *The IMF’s Role in the Hungarian Reform Process*. In: Schönfeld, Roland ed., *The role of international financial institutions in Central and Eastern Europe*. München: Südosteuropa-Ges., 1996, p.229-235.

⁴⁶³ Márer, op. cit.

Conclusion

The IMF membership of Hungary signaled the end of the “Soviet-first” approach that had shaped the first 25 years of Kádár’s rule. The complexity of the Hungarian situation is clearly outlined in the speech of Ferenc Havasi, Secretary of the Central Committee in charge of the economy to Parliament in 1982:

“As you know, at the beginning of this year, Hungary has run into exceptional difficulties in her international financial relations. First, we were turning to our allies. Unfortunately, they were all preoccupied with their own headaches. They were not in a position to help us... Then we were turning to our Western partners. As the Hungarian proverb says: it is in times of difficulty when you find out who your real friend is. We were assisted, and I can report to the Parliament with pride: the financial crisis has been overcome.”⁴⁶⁴

Hungarian foreign policy deriving from the 1970s was built on relative autonomy. It was based on the concept that the current Soviet standpoint should always be supported, or at least, steps should not be openly taken against it. However, this did not mean that Hungarian behavior was passive within the Warsaw Pact.

The Hungarian leadership often made independent initiatives, but only if they knew that these were not contrary to Soviet intentions.⁴⁶⁵ The policy of “constructive loyalty”, as Csaba Békés denotes it, included conflict prevention on the one hand, and flexibility and adjustment to Soviet requirements, with a willingness to cooperate on the other. The content of this principle until 1988 implied that “what is not forbidden is allowed”. In practice, it meant that the Hungarian leadership tried to influence the Soviet leadership within the framework of bilateral relations, which served the concrete interests of Hungary.⁴⁶⁶ Hungary joining the Fund was also a clear expression of intentions and efforts, having already existed in several Central and Eastern European countries since the middle of 1970s, to open up their economies to the West and to launch economic management reform.⁴⁶⁷

⁴⁶⁴ Csaba, “Hungary and the IMF: The experience of a cordial discord”, op. cit.

⁴⁶⁵ Békés, Csaba: Hungary and the Warsaw Pact, 1954-1989: Documents on the Impact of a Small State within the Eastern Bloc. http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/collections/coll_hun/intro.cfm?navinfo=15711#10

⁴⁶⁶ Békés, “Hungarian foreign policy in the Soviet alliance system, 1968-1989, op. cit.

⁴⁶⁷ Csaba, “Hungary and the IMF: The experience of a cordial discord”, op. cit.

However, György Matolcsy criticized the activity of the IMF in Hungary harshly, because, according to him, the United States and Western European countries intended to make use of the indebtedness of the socialist countries in order to undermine the stability of the Soviet Empire. The Western credits granted to socialist countries served the same purpose; that is to make the Eastern Bloc dependent on Western capital as much as possible. They knew that beyond a certain period of time, economic reforms would implicate political and social changes as well.⁴⁶⁸

I agree with Matolcsy on the point that it was definitely in the interest of the Western organizations to enhance closer relations with the socialist countries, even with the intention of loosening cohesion within the Soviet Bloc. It is also true that the BIS deliberately granted credits to Hungary in order to prevent the fall of the Hungarian “liberal socialism”.⁴⁶⁹

But I assume that this relationship with Western financial organizations was not a unilateral interest at all; Hungary had a considerable stake in the “transaction” as well. Based on mutual benefits, the attempts made by the Hungarian leadership to open up the country’s economy towards the West can be regarded as an endeavor to gradually turn away from the Soviet Bloc. Hungarian foreign policy, however, always remained within the framework of the “socialist brotherhood” and therefore it did not challenge the unity of the Bloc directly.

In conclusion, the final answer to the heading question of the paper could be summarized as the following. For many years, especially in the period between the end of the Second World War and the first oil crisis in 1973, there really was a possibility for Hungary to join the IMF. However, due to international circumstances and the deterministic nature of Soviet-Hungarian relations, Hungary was understandably not in the situation to act freely with regard to its international relations. After 1973, the question of membership was no longer a choice. It was definitely a constraint to get closer to the Western financial institutions, particularly after the second oil crisis of

⁴⁶⁸ Hegedűs, op. cit.

⁴⁶⁹ Czabán, László. “Magyarország nemzetközi pénzügyi helyzete 1982-1989 között”. In: *Gazdaság és társadalom*, Vol.1, N° 4, 1990, p. 52-74.

1979, when after several years of hesitation and fence-sitting, Hungary's fate was sealed; it could not choose. It had to rely on the financial help of the IMF, and this was an inevitable necessity for the country to survive.

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Armed anti-communist resistance in Slovenia 1945–50

Oskar MULEJ

This paper strives to provide an introduction to the topic of the organized armed resistance against the political order and authorities of the People's Republic of Slovenia, as a part of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia that was taking place roughly between the years 1945 and 1950.

In contrast to the cases of armed anti-communist struggles in the Baltic countries - as well as in Ukraine or Romania for instance - the anti-communist resistance in Slovenia represents a fairly understudied, rarely addressed and relatively unknown topic. It has not yet received much attention from the Slovene historiography. Thus, it has also not become an object of public discussion, as most Slovenes are not even aware of its existence. This is not only due to the important fact that the scale and intensity of this resistance was fairly low, but partly also due to the considerable difference in the public perceptions of the communist past.

Secondly - and even more importantly – the available sources on this topic are scarce. They mostly consist of documents created by and for the use of Yugoslav communist secret services and of records from court trials that took place against the real or alleged insurgents. A few rather short memoirs also exist, written either by former members of the security forces or by people who had been involved in organizing the anti-communist resistance, but were usually not fighting on the ground. During the last decade, two monographs⁴⁷⁰ have been published that deal with the topic of anti-communist insurgency. Both provide an overview of data from the materials mentioned

⁴⁷⁰ Martin Premk, *Matjaževa vojska 1945-1950* (Matthias's Army 1945-1950) (Ljubljana: Društvo piscev zgodovine NOB Slovenije, 2005); Mateja Čoh, *"Za svobodo, kralja in domovino". Illegalne skupine v Sloveniji med letoma 1945 in 1952* ("For Freedom, King and Country". Illegal Groups in Slovenia between the Years 1945 and 1952) (Ljubljana: Študijski center za narodno spravo, 2010).

above, but offer different explanations for the principal causes behind the armed resistance. Premk's 2005 book attributed this role primarily to the activities of *émigré* centres in conjunction with the British and American secret services. Mateja Čoh, on the other hand, laid more stress on the participants' individual motives for rebelling against the regime – most importantly the discontent with regime policies among Slovene peasantry.

Albeit being based on the above discussed sources, my paper will leave the questions of principal causes and primary motives aside and shall limit itself to an account of some general figures and facts that can be discerned from the known data. The main aim shall be to provide an overview of the forms and activities of the armed anti-communist groups, as well as the measures employed by the Yugoslav security forces for fighting them.

The Origins of Communist Rule in Yugoslavia

Yugoslavia, which was invaded by the Axis forces on April 6, 1941 and in turn carved up into annexed territories, occupation zones and puppet states, subsequently experienced a number of internal conflicts. In addition to the anti-Axis struggle, interethnic wars raged in most of the nationally and religiously mixed parts of the country, such as Dalmatia, Bosnia, Herzegovina and Kosovo.

These were in most cases also intertwined with ideologically-based conflicts, above all between the Communist-led partisans, which were - apart from fighting the occupiers - also engaging in a revolutionary struggle for power, and various counterrevolutionary military organizations. Most notable of the latter were the forces under the command of General Dragoljub (Draža) Mihailović, who was acting as Minister of War for the Yugoslav King and the official government in London.

Competing with the official Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland (popularly called the Chetniks), the partisans led by Josip Broz Tito gradually gained an upper-hand in achieving Anglo-American support. This was mostly due to pragmatic considerations

based on intelligence data that gave the impression that the partisans posed a more significant and direct threat to the Axis occupation forces and had succeeded in gaining ground among all Yugoslav nationalities and in operating in almost all regions of the country.

The constant struggles between Croat and Serb members of consequently unstable royal governments also contributed to the Western Allies' decision to transfer their support to Tito's Communists. After the June 1944 Allied-sponsored agreement between Tito and Ivan Šubašić, the Prime Minister of the Yugoslav government in-exile, Mihailović was deposed as War Minister and the partisans proclaimed the official Yugoslav army.

In contrast to the other parts of Yugoslavia where the situation was more complicated due to interethnic conflicts - and to an extent similarly as in Serbia - the internal conflict in Slovene lands was based exclusively on ideological lines. Particularly the Southern part of Slovenia, originally occupied by fascist Italy, experienced revolutionary violence and a state of civil war between 1942 and 1945. These occurred in Slovenia under foreign occupation and simultaneously with resistance to it. Since the latter came to be monopolized by the Communist-dominated *Liberation Front of Slovene Nation* (*Osvobodilna fronta slovenskega naroda*) and due to various other factors, the counter-revolution in large part came to adopt the role of military collaboration with first the Italian and later the German occupying forces.

At the end of the war in May 1945, Communist rule was swiftly established. During the summer of the same year, the great majority of returned or captured counter-revolutionaries were systematically massacred – the approximate figure of those killed (for Slovenes alone) stands at 13,500.⁴⁷¹ The final takeover of power and its formalization after the federal elections in the autumn of 1945 were thus results of a “self-made revolution, “which”started early, in special circumstances.”⁴⁷² Being

⁴⁷¹ Božo Repe, “Changes in Life Style and Social and National Structures in Slovenia after World War Two” in 1945 – *A Break with the Past, A History of Central European Countries at the End of World War Two*, Zdenko Čepič ed. (Ljubljana: Inštitut za novejšo zgodovino = Institute for Contemporary History, 2008), pp. 195-212, p. 200.

⁴⁷² Jera Vodušek Starič, “The making of the communist regime in Slovenia and Yugoslavia” in Crimes committed by totalitarian regimes: reports and proceedings of the 8 April European Public Hearing on

“modelled and influenced strongly by its only living example – the Soviet Union”, the regime “developed its main characteristics earlier than the rest of Eastern Europe.”⁴⁷³ A greater part of the anti-communist fighting in Slovenia therefore occurred under the circumstances of the Second World War and before the actual communist *regime* was established. Its nature was thus counterrevolutionary and, due to special conditions, also partly took the form of military collaboration with the occupational forces. During the concluding phase of WWII, the two military formations fighting the Communist-led⁴⁷⁴ partisans in Slovenia were the Home Guard (*Domobranci*) and the Slovene section of the Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland (Slovene Chetniks). The former was high in numbers, reaching up to 18,000 soldiers. They were armed by the Germans and formally acted as an auxiliary police force under German command. In fact, in certain respects, the Home Guard nonetheless operated quite autonomously, being in addition perceived as the Slovenian army by a considerable part of the population in the territories where it operated.

The “Chetniks”, on the other hand, were numerically few, at no point numbering more than a couple hundred soldiers. They did not stand under German command and enjoyed secret support by some of the Home Guard units, whose officers were secretly members of the Chetnik movement. Among the more important leaders and organizers of the Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland in Slovenia was Major (later Lieutenant Colonel) Andrej Glušič. In June of 1944 he was arrested by the Gestapo, sent to Dachau concentration camp, and after the war acted as one of the most important organizers of armed resistance against communist rule.⁴⁷⁵

Armed Resistance Against the Communist Regime

During the first postwar years, a number of armed groupings existed throughout Yugoslavia with the common characteristics of illegality and hostility towards the

Crimes Committed by Totalitarian Regimes, Peter Jambreč ed. (Ljubljana: Slovenian Presidency of the Council of the European Union, 2008), pp. 25-38, p. 37.

⁴⁷³ Ibid.

⁴⁷⁴ Communist-led and not simply and thoroughly communist, as most of the fighters were not communists, even if majority of them also supported certain forms of radical social change in addition to liberation from Axis occupation.

⁴⁷⁵ For more on Glušič see: Mateja Čoh, “Dosje Andreja Glušiča (*Dossier Andrej Glušič*),” *Studia Historica Slovenica*, nr. 2-3, vol. 11 (2011): pp. 201-224.

existing political regime. Their origins and goals, affiliations and motives, however, varied highly between various parts of the country and among specific groups within them. In Croatia, Dalmatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, for instance, groups of Croatian separatists - usually also of the Ustasha background - prevailed, although pro-Yugoslav, as well as Serb nationalist, “Chetnik” ones were also present.⁴⁷⁶ Some of them were composed of members of WWII military formations that had remained in Yugoslavia and were hiding from authorities, whereas some others were formed by discontented peasants, army deserters and former partisans. There were, of course, also instances of “mixed” units.

The extent and intensity of the armed anti-communist resistance in Slovenia (and Yugoslavia in general) never reached or even approached the state of full scale war. It was fairly limited in terms of the number of people involved or immediately affected, and did not include larger combat actions from either of the both sides. Nevertheless, in Slovenia alone, around 35 larger illegal armed groups operated between 1945 and 1950 that had emerged as a form of resistance to the measures of the communist authorities.⁴⁷⁷ Most of them formally adhered to a joint platform, acting under the banner of “Slovene Troops of the Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland” (*Slovenske trupe Jugoslovanske vojske v domovini*), also known as the “Matthias’s Army” (*Matjaževa vojska* – Matjaž being the name of a mythical “Slovene king”, based loosely on the memory of the Hungarian king Matthias Corvinus) or “Crusaders” (*Križarji*)⁴⁷⁸ and presented themselves as loyal to the Yugoslav king Peter II and his émigré government.

⁴⁷⁶ See: Zdenko Radelić, *Križari: gerila u Hrvatskoj 1945-1950* (Crusaders: Guerillas in Croatia 1945-1950) (Zagreb: Hrvatski institute za povijest, Dom I svijet, 2002), and Zdenko Radelić, “Projugoslavenska protukomunistička gerila u Hrvatskoj nakon drugog svjetskog rata” (Pro- Yugoslav Anticommunist Guerillas in Croatia after the Second World War), *Časopis za suvremenu povijest*, N° 2, vol. 35 (2003): pp. 463-487.

⁴⁷⁷ Mateja Čoh, “Characteristics of the judicial system in Slovenia between 1945 and 1951,” in *Crimes committed by totalitarian regimes: reports and proceedings of the 8 April European Public Hearing on Crimes Committed by Totalitarian Regimes*, Peter Jambrek ed. (Ljubljana: Slovenian Presidency of the Council of the European Union, 2008), pp. 61-70, p.65.

⁴⁷⁸ *Crusaders* was also the name with which most of the Croatian separatist armed groups identified. The Slovene pro-Yugoslav and Croatian separatist Crusaders were however not related to each other, apart from using the name and the symbol of a cross in order to identify with Christendom and point out their anti-communist orientation (common slogan of the Croatian insurgents being *Za Hrvatsku I Krista – Protiv Komunističke* – “For Croatia and Christ – Against the Communists” (Radelić, *Projugoslavenska*, 466.)

The post-war anti-regime insurgency in Slovenia represented a phenomenon distinct to the civil war that was taking place during the Axis occupation, although of course not entirely disconnected from the previous events. It affected a major portion of the Slovene territory, but was at the same time far more intense in the northeast, which had previously been left largely unaffected by the civil war. Moreover, in addition to the majority of the organizers and a considerable proportion of the supporters, which had adhered to the anti-partisan camp during the WWII, a large share of insurgents and their supporting base came from the population that had sided with the partisans during the war and even included ex-partisans, including a few former Communist Party members.

In terms of periodization, three different “phases” may be discerned when speaking about the type and dynamics of post-WWII insurgency in Slovenia. This periodization corresponds roughly to the phases that were defined already in the detailed reports on insurgency written by officers of the Slovenian Administration for State Security (*Uprava državne varnosti – UDV*, colloquially called *UDBA*).⁴⁷⁹

During the first “phase”, immediately after the end of the war and the subsequent establishment of communist rule, large groups of WWII counter-revolutionary and collaborationist troops were still present in Slovenia, scattered throughout its territory. These were mainly uncoordinated groups of former Home Guards that were hiding from the winning side, although there were also some better organized Chetnik units that had most probably remained in Slovenia intentionally. The strength of these groups, which were usually armed with light automatic weapons, hand grenades and explosives, varied from less than 10 to more than 150 soldiers in certain cases. Altogether there were around 2000-armed men hiding in Slovenian forests in June 1945.⁴⁸⁰

These armed groups were, however, quickly diminishing in strength. This was in large part due to the intense pursuit campaigns conducted by the units of secret police – “Department for the Protection of the People” (*OZNA*), from 1946 on “Administration

⁴⁷⁹ “Razvojna obdobja banditizma” (Developmental Periods of Banditism), in *Iz arhivov slovenske politične policije: UDBA, OZNA, VOS* (From the Archives of the Slovenian Political Police: UDBA, OZNA, VOS), Jože Pučnik ed. (Ljubljana: Veda, 2002), pp. 148-150.

⁴⁸⁰ Premk, Matjaževa, 313.

for State Security” (*UDBA*) – together with special military units of “Popular Defense Corps of Yugoslavia” (*KNOJ*), as well as units of the regular army. The main goal of most of these men being to survive, most of them managed to escape over the Austrian or Italian border or turned themselves over to the authorities after general amnesty had been proclaimed in August 1945. At the beginning of 1946, less than 100 armed former counterrevolutionaries were thus still in Slovenia.⁴⁸¹

As mentioned, the majority of these men were, above all else, hiding from the authorities and trying to escape across the borders. Some of them though also organized themselves as rebel units, conducted acts of sabotage, attacked military installations and transport infrastructure and were particularly active in spreading anti-communist and royalist propaganda.

The latter became especially intense during the weeks before the general elections in November 1945⁴⁸², after which the communist-led “Popular Front” officially took power and the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia was proclaimed. These groups sometimes even organized secret political meetings in villages, where they agitated against the elections.

By the time of the general elections, the establishment of an organized and coordinated resistance had already begun. A few of the above discussed groups established contacts with émigré centres in Italy and Austria, from where they started receiving instructions and propaganda materials. Already by the autumn of 1945 they were joined by new, “genuine”, rebel groups, which were not comprised of former Home Guards in hiding, but of civilians and army deserters. These groups operated mostly in the northeast of Slovenia, close to the border area. Originally they had operated on their own, but at the same time had sought to establish contacts with the émigré anti-communist organizers across the border.

⁴⁸¹ Cf. Ibid. 76.

⁴⁸² Čoh, *Za svobodo*, 92.

First messengers began to secretly enter Slovenia - mostly through the Austrian border - to gather intelligence and organize resistance. Mainly belonging to the ranks of former Chetniks and Home Guards, some of these messengers – most notably the first leader of “Intelligence Center 400” in Graz, Miloš Glišić - were also trying to establish links with the Yugoslav Chetnik leader Draža Mihailović, who was still hiding in Bosnia with some of his remaining troops. This did not succeed though, and Mihailović himself was captured in March 1946 and executed after a public trial.⁴⁸³

By the spring of 1946, most of the remaining groups of WWII fighters were already gone from Slovenia while, at the same time, intelligence centres had been established by the Yugoslav political emigrants in Austria. The “second phase” of illegal group’ activity in Slovenia had commenced, distinguished by the highest degree of insurgency activity.⁴⁸⁴ Most importantly, coordinated attempts from the outside (that is from émigré centres in Austria and Italy) to create broad-scale armed resistance took place. Armed units, called “assault groups” and “assault detachments” (usually between 5 and 50 people), some of them trained in espionage and military tactics, were permanently present in Slovenia. They were making public appearances and were supposed to establish themselves as the core of the future “liberation army”.

Intelligence centres in Austria and Italy succeeded in establishing contacts with some of the already existing units and in sending groups of organizers across the border. The aim was to create a guerrilla force along with an organized network of supporters. Skilled propagandists and intelligence officers from the former Home Guard and Chetnik ranks were sent to accomplish this task. The units on the ground were furthermore provided with arms and logistical equipment. Some of them maintained radio contacts with intelligence centres abroad. The clandestine groups operated at night and were hiding in secret bunkers in forests or on desolate farms during the daytime. They perpetrated acts of sabotage, gathered intelligence and spread anti-communist, royalist, pro-Western and pro-democratic propaganda. In addition to that, a few assassination attempts - some successful, some unsuccessful - took place against visible

⁴⁸³ He remained an important symbol for anti-communists, though, as his name was later mentioned in the official war song of Matthias’s Army.

⁴⁸⁴ Cf. Čoh, *Za svobodo*, p. 93.

communists. The members of armed insurgent groups were mostly peasants and people in hiding⁴⁸⁵ (members of former counterrevolutionary units, army deserters, as well as some common criminals). Illegal groups operated in all parts of Slovenia but were most numerous, active and successful in the northeast, where they managed to establish a broad network of supporters.

Most of the armed actions happened there, and the presence of guerrilla groups was permanent. In other parts of Slovenia, the activities of the clandestine groups were less overt and more sporadic, being limited mostly to propaganda, espionage and single acts of sabotage. Most importantly, their presence was not permanent.

A major portion of the armed insurgent groups claimed to be affiliated with the “Slovene Troops of the Yugoslav Army” or “Matthias’s Army”. They presented themselves as anti-communist, pro-democratic and loyal to the monarchy – often also carrying the official royal Yugoslav insignia⁴⁸⁶ - and were, to some extent, coordinated from centres abroad.

These centres stood formally under the supreme authority of Yugoslav King Peter II in London and the “Central National Committee of Kingdom of Yugoslavia” in Rome, which was led by prominent members of the pre-war political parties, such as Živko Topalović from the Yugoslav Socialist Party, Adam Pribičević from the Independent Democrat Party, Juraj Krnjević from the Croatian Peasant Party and Miha Krek from the Slovene People’s Party. Several other national committees were subordinated to the central one in Rome. Among those was also the “National Committee of Kingdom of Yugoslavia” in Salzburg led by former Chetnik officer and Serbian Radical politician Stevan Trifunac. This committee was in charge of establishing the already mentioned intelligence centres in Austria and Italy, which had a principal role in creating the strategy and directing the activities of “Matthias’s Army”.

⁴⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 89.

⁴⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 76.

The principal intelligence centre was located in Salzburg and led by lieutenant colonel Andrej Glušič, who was formally subordinated to the commander of “Slovene Troops of the Royal Yugoslav Army” General Ivan Prezelj, but was in fact himself in charge of organizing and coordinating the resistance. A number of other intelligence centres were subordinated to him:

- “400” – Located in Graz and led first by Miloš Glišić – Zlatibor up until his capture in January 1946, when he had tried to establish contact with general Draža Mihailović. After that, its operations were headed by Karel Kornhauser up until 1948 and Avgust Kovač and Lieutenant Jože Saje thereafter.
- “101/501” – Located in Klagenfurt and led by former Home Guard and Chetnik officers Ivan Drčar and France Grum.
- “305” – Located in Trieste and led by Dušan Lajovic.
- “505” - located in Gorizia and led by Anton Kostnapfl.

All of these centres were supported by and cooperated with the US Army’s “Counter Intelligence Corps” and the British “Field Secret Service”, the extent and significance of this cooperation not being entirely clear. Their objectives included the establishment of an intelligence network in Slovenia, the organization of a network of local councils that would represent a political base of the resistance movement and eventually form a national government, and the creation of a military organization in the form of “assault groups”. These groups would eventually form larger units such as battalions and were given the name of “Matthias’s Army”, whereas the political organization was named “Matthias’s Movement”. Creation of an underground network of supporters succeeded only in parts of northeastern Slovenia, and even there only partly.

More successful was the propaganda activity, which included dissemination of *Matjažev glas* (“Voice of Matthias”), a newspaper printed in Austria, secretly brought to Slovenia and usually distributed there by mail. It delivered accounts about better life in the West, the undemocratic nature of the Yugoslav regime and political repression. High communist officials were slandered – Tito, for example, for being “a glutton, drunkard

and sexual maniac”⁴⁸⁷ - and those assisting the secret police threatened with the names of secret police agents sometimes being exposed. Appeals were issued to the Slovene people to rebel against the regime, whereby the strength of the “Matthias’s Army” was often deliberately grossly overestimated. During 1947 and 1948, a radio program was broadcast to Slovenia from the intelligence centres in Austria.

Apart from espionage and propaganda, the insurgents also engaged in assaults on police (“People’s Militia”) stations, local administration offices and military installations. Since a majority of them consisted of peasants, and with collectivization of agriculture being one of the most directly hated government measures, collective farms represented the most common targets of armed attacks.

Local communists, public officials and supporters of the regime were threatened by the insurgents; some were also killed. The latter actions were conducted mostly without previous approval from abroad, as the armed groups acted quite independently and did not always strictly follow the instructions that were given to them. In addition to the “Matthias’s Army” units, entirely independent groups also existed, including the “Yugoslav Liberation Movement” (*Jugoslovanski osvobodilni pokret* - JOP), “Slovene Voluntary Army” (*Slovenska prostovoljna armada* -SPA), Slovene Anti-Communist Organization (*Slovenska antikomunistična organizacija* - SAKO) and Balkan Guard (*Balkanska straža*), as well as a few groups of common criminals. In 1949, when Yugoslavia was at the highest point of conflict with the USSR, one group emerged that was not anti-communist, but adopted a pro-Soviet position.⁴⁸⁸

The resistance was met with a swift response by the Communist Yugoslav security forces – primarily the secret police and special military units of *KNOJ*. These units regularly launched large-scale missions in which they examined large sections of terrain, thereby searching for insurgents and destroying them. One of the officers taking part in these actions, who had been a partisan during the war, wrote in his memoirs:

⁴⁸⁷ *Matjažev glas*, yr. 2, N°. 4 (March 1948), quoted from: Premk, Matjaževa, 259.

⁴⁸⁸ Pučnik, Iz arhivov, 416.

“How strangely the history repeats itself (...) they are bandits as we were for the Germans before. They fight and organize themselves in the same manner, as we did. In some areas they enjoy a considerable support from the locals, exactly as we did.”⁴⁸⁹

He also gave an account of one of the clashes with insurgents:

“Somewhere, we track a peasant house with Crusaders inside. Dark windows. Encirclement. Shots coming from the house. Members of KNOJ return fire. It does not help, KNOJ officer gets shot. We burn the house with rifle grenades. No one comes out, no one surrenders. The house burns down. Soldiers drag out burnt corpses. A row of dead bodies is put on ground – Crusaders and a peasant family.”⁴⁹⁰

Another form of destroying the resistance was the use of special agents, acting as insurgents – usually adopting the role of messengers coming from Austria. Their task was to assassinate the leaders or bring the group into an ambush. UDBA succeeded in developing a widespread field network of informants and infiltrating agents into the insurgent groups. This enabled a fairly successful uncovering of the groups’ operations and collection of data on their members.⁴⁹¹ Furthermore, the secret police were forming whole units of fake insurgents to check the terrain for supporters and clues, some of these special groups were even staging clashes with army units.⁴⁹²

Heavy pressure was also put on the insurgents’ families, who were often arrested, forcibly resettled to desolate regions and deprived of jobs or pensions (so called “economic punishment”). There were cases of UDBA arresting groups of civilians as “collectively responsible” when an act of sabotage happened or propaganda leaflets appeared, - basically taking hostages to put pressure on the insurgents to turn themselves in. Last but not least, public shootings of civilians accused of helping the resistance were also counted among possible methods.⁴⁹³

⁴⁸⁹ Zdenko Zavadlav, *Križarji. Matjaževa vojska na Slovenskem* (Crusaders. Matthias’s Army in the Slovene Lands) (Ljubljana: Horvat MgM, 1994), pp. 23-24.

⁴⁹⁰ Zavadlav, *Križarji*, p. 25.

⁴⁹¹ Čoh, *Characteristics*, p. 65.

⁴⁹² Premk, *Matjaževa*, p. 311.

⁴⁹³ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 245, 312.

This extreme measure is however not known to have ever been implemented in Slovenia.

Captured “bandits”, as the insurgents were referred to by the regime, were tried in a series of large public trials. Leaders of the groups and some of the members received death sentences, whereas others were sentenced to forced labour (usually 5-20 years). Alleged supporters of the illegal groups, very often family members as well as many Catholic priests also received punishment by forced labour, usually between 1 and 10 years. The authorities usually also confiscated their property.

UDBA noted in its reports that in 1947 “the emigration suffered a final defeat in the field of banditry” and that most of the armed units were destroyed.⁴⁹⁴ Nevertheless, anti-communist activities led by intelligence centres persisted but adopted new strategies. Thus, the “third phase” of anti-communist resistance between 1948 and 1950 was distinguished by smaller units of commandos, spies and messengers. Their activities were mainly limited to espionage and propaganda, although they also committed acts of sabotage. Even in February 1950, 1,000 leaflets with anti-communist content were disseminated in the streets of the Slovenian capital Ljubljana alone.⁴⁹⁵

Moreover, in 1949 the émigré centres lost Anglo-American support as the Western powers began supporting Tito, after Yugoslavia came into conflict with the Soviet Union and its allies. In the second half of the year, the centres were disbanded because their activities were banned by American and British authorities. The last messenger tried to cross the Yugoslav border in September 1950. At the end of 1950, the department of secret police dealing with fighting against the “banditry” still recorded 23 insurgents in Slovenia.⁴⁹⁶

According to the secret police data, around 165 insurgents and supporters were killed in battle between 1945 and 1950. This figure does not include the remains of counterrevolutionary forces in 1945. Together with those it amounts to 250-300. Approximately 600 members of armed groups were captured (together with former counterrevolutionaries 3,100) and around 1,900 alleged supporters and collaborators

⁴⁹⁴ Pučnik, Iz arhivov, p. 162.

⁴⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 417.

⁴⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 417.

were arrested or killed.⁴⁹⁷ The number of casualties caused by insurgents is not known. Judging on the basis of available data, one may conclude that the presence and activity of armed anti-communist groups in Slovenia was relatively limited and small-scale, and could therefore not have posed a serious threat to the regime. At the same time, however, the figures concerning killed and arrested fighters and supporters reveal that it was not a completely negligible force either.

As such, it represents a topic of Slovene modern history that should certainly not be overlooked, as well as a small piece in the mosaic of Central and Eastern European Cold War history. Many questions remain open - especially the ones concerning the role of the Western Allies and the exact extent of influence and control over the armed groups on part the émigré intelligence centres. The degree of possible involvement of the Yugoslav secret police, which might have used “banditry” as a precedent and an instrument for persecuting the “class enemy” or any other alleged opponents of the regime, remains also unclear.

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⁴⁹⁷ Ibid., 162, 271-272, 323-324, 416-417.

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The Armenian Genocide in Soviet Armenian Collective Memory

Éva MERENICS

Both the organization of the process and the consequences of the Armenian Genocide show similarities with later genocides of the 20th century. Moreover, most of the analyses of these similarities are formed in the Jewish-Armenian perspective. For example, in comparison to processing the trauma of the Holocaust, Armenian survivors and future generations also reacted to the events similarly, while various parallels were shown during the organization and execution of the extermination plans.⁴⁹⁸ Viewing the consequences of the Armenian genocide, both constructive and destructive responses to – processing strategies of or attitudes towards – the trauma are present, which may serve as bases to prognoses concerning the aftermath of other mass traumas – not only genocides, but also civil wars and international and ethnic conflicts. The current study examines the frameworks and the processing of collective trauma present in the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR).

When analysing the aftermath of the Armenian genocide it can be assumed that all survivors and refugees experienced nearly the same traumatic events, the effects of which influenced all survivors psychologically- irrespective of their future location. Miller and Touryan-Miller experienced and described six attitudes⁴⁹⁹ regarding memories of the events based on their interviews taken from survivors in the United States. These strategies vary in intensity and means. The six ideal types of reflections do not constitute a scale and are possibly present on the individual level in each community of survivors and their descendants. One of the least visible strategies is avoidance and repression. This means that the given survivor is not able to speak out the trauma and/or

⁴⁹⁸ Richard G. Hovhannisian (ed.) *The Armenian Genocide in Perspective* (Transaction Publishers; New Brunswick), (London, 1991), 86, 177.

⁴⁹⁹ For descriptions of the strategies see: Donald E. Miller –Lorna Touryan Miller: *Survivors. An Oral History of the Armenian Genocide*. (University of California Press, Berkeley), (Los Angeles, London, 1999), 158-159, HOVANNISIAN 1991, 191–199.

avoids events, which could recall the memories of the genocide. Another attitude is resignation and despair, which may also result in silence, albeit by a conscious *refusal* – in contrast to *avoidance* described above – of the events. In this case the given survivors “[...] seemed to lack the emotional strength to rise above their past [...]”⁵⁰⁰ Explanation and rationalisation are also possible strategies which mean that survivors attempt to find a meaning behind the events. (I.e. divine plan, destiny of the nation, suffering for Christian faith, etc.) Reconciliation and forgiveness is also present among survivor attitudes. This means recalling the events regularly and, on the other hand, having an optimist view of the future.

Outrage and anger is another strategy, which involves verbal or non-physical violence towards the direct perpetrators and those who were responsible for the genocide as organizers or supporters. The last form of trauma progressing is revenge and restitution, which means physical aggression against the above mentioned perpetrators or those who are symbolic targets as “followers” of the perpetrators. In other words, against those who still deny the Armenian genocide and burden its recognition. In one of their works, Miller and Touryan-Miller also consider symbolic revenge – e.g. when survivors assume that natural disasters affecting real or supposed perpetrators mean divine retribution – corresponding to this strategy.⁵⁰¹ In contrast, the author of this study classifies the latter phenomenon as outrage and anger because it does not result in physical violence.

Although the trauma was common for all survivors; furthermore, a periodical generational change in their attitudes is present, Armenian communities settled in different parts and countries of the world have not reacted unanimously in a given period. There has usually been a given community which played a leading role or served as a catalyst in promoting different attitudes from previous ones during a given phase, while some other communities did not even participate in the progress of the given period and were following their earlier strategies.

⁵⁰⁰ Ibid., p.159.

⁵⁰¹ Hovhanissian, p.199.

Although most of the Armenian diaspora was silent about the trauma, Armenians in Lebanon, who were recognised as a state-constituting minority, built a chapel in memory of the victims.⁵⁰² Similarly, when public progressing of the trauma began, Armenians in Turkey stayed silent, as the state had condemned Armenian genocide commemoration.⁵⁰³ Furthermore, the third generation terrorist movement probably would not have evolved without the often tense and militarily active social and political environment of Armenians in Lebanon.⁵⁰⁴ Finally, the phase usually labelled as integration by Armenian scholars was encouraged by Gorbachev's reforms. Reviving national sentiments of the latter period also contributed to the Karabakh conflict, during which Armenians in the Armenian SSR started to feel threatened in a manner like the Armenian Genocide.⁵⁰⁵ The earthquake of 1988 in Northern Armenia had a similar effect.⁵⁰⁶ Due to these events, Armenians in the diaspora started to cooperate in supporting those living in the home country, which had become independent a few years after the mentioned events.

In conclusion, apparently only those of the six individual trauma processing strategies described by Miller and Touryan-Miller have been present on the collective – social, political or public – level, which has been made possible by the given Armenian communities' host state. Hereinafter, this hypothesis will be tested in the current study of the Armenian SSR.

The collective speak out of the trauma started simultaneously in the Armenian SSR and the United States. Experts on the topic consider 1965, the 50th anniversary of the beginning of the Armenian genocide, as the initial year. Due to the Cold War environment, this parallel start of collective trauma processing most probably emerged

⁵⁰² Armenian National Institute (ANI)
http://www.armenian-genocide.org/Memorial.100/current_category.70/memorials_detail.html download: 21. 05. 2013. 14:32

⁵⁰³ Rubina Perroomian, *And Those Who Continued Living in Turkey After 1915. The Metamorphosis of the Post-Genocide Armenian Identity as Reflected in Artistic Literature*. (Armenian Genocide Museum-Institute, Yerevan, 2008), p. 59.

⁵⁰⁴ Michael M. Gunter, *Pursuing the Just Cause of Their People. A study of contemporary Armenian terrorism*. (Greenwood Press, New York and Westport and London, 1986), p. 33.

⁵⁰⁵ Levon Abrahamian, *Armenian Identity in a Changing World* (Mazda Publishers, Costa Mesa 2006), p. 262.

⁵⁰⁶ Donald E. Miller – Lorna Touryan Miller, *Armenia. Portraits of Survival and Hope*, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles and London, 2003), p. 4.

independently at the two different locations. In the Armenian SSR, Armenians constituted the major ethnic group. Therefore, it cannot be stated that they lived in a socio-political environment determined by a host state or its respective dominant ethnic group. In contrast, the Armenian SSR did not act independently in domestic and foreign politics; the principles of these areas had been determined by the actual Soviet central power in Moscow. Therefore, while testing the hypothesis, instead of a host state, the term ‘host environment’ will be used in the study. The society of the Armenian SSR had to adapt to the frameworks of this environment.

The examination period lasts from the beginning of Soviet rule in Armenia in 1920 until 1985 the beginning of the first secretary period of Gorbachev. The establishment of Soviet state power ensured quite different frameworks of genocide commemoration and reflections than the previous environment of the Republic of Armenia.

While in the Gorbachev era three parallel processes – the collapse of the USSR, the demand for social and political reforms, the re-evoked Armenian nation-building process and the Karabakh conflict with Azerbaijan – resulted in dynamic changes and a diversity of collective approaches to the genocide within a very short period. An analysis of these newly emerged trends would exceed the scope of this study.

In testing the hypothesis, various elements of the Soviet-Armenian public will be examined in which indicators of the need for speaking out the trauma could have appeared, thereby the strategies of trauma processing possibly affected a broader part of society. As a result of societal impacts, political actions related to the trauma could have been initiated: In the areas of the arts, science and the activity of NGOs. All of these were controlled by the state during Soviet times. The non-governmental sector was totally absent and the sectors mentioned above probably reflected what state power tolerated. Furthermore, changes in activities within these fields had possibly followed changes of the central party-state ideology; while on the other hand, possibly reflected some bottom-up initiations.

In the current study literature is chosen as an indicator of the arts, as the process of literary work, printing and publishing requires complex organization – in this case also authorisation – while the result may affect broad masses of society. In parallel, the quite narrow ways, aspects and frameworks of scientific research related to the genocide will be also examined. As it has been mentioned, the non-governmental sector was prohibited in the Soviet Union, but one certain, partly non-governmental movement, the process of “re”-settling diaspora-Armenians in the Soviet Union is possible to analyse.

Refugees of the genocide fled from Western Armenia – Eastern Anatolia – to various places where they had established their organisations and arranged the return of tens of thousands of Armenians in cooperation with the leadership of the Armenian SSR. The local organisations of the diaspora lacked total control by the Soviet authorities and most of them were at least partly based on civic initiation. Also, political actions naturally related to the examined social phenomena will be examined.

Beside these collective trends, there is a useful instrument to reconstruct individual responses. Ethnographer Verjiné Svazlian has collected hundreds of interviews from survivors. A feature of these is that due to the frequently non-party-conformist content and the restricted ways and areas of Armenian genocide research, this oral history collection was published only after the change of the regime. As a result, these interviews most probably offer a non-restricted overall picture of the reactions of Soviet-Armenian individuals.

In the initial post-genocide period most Armenian literary authors in the diaspora did not mention the traumatic experience in their works. They either reconstructed the memories of the homeland or were occupied with issues concerning the rebuilding of their lives.⁵⁰⁷ Until the 1930s this stillness was also featured in Soviet Armenia. At that time a new generation of writers were emerging who started to deal with questions of Armenian historical and cultural heritage. These authors also recalled the memory of the genocide. Some of their works reflected on the events as traumatic phenomena but dealt

⁵⁰⁷ Rubina Perroomian, *The Armenian Genocide in Literature. Perceptions of Those Who Lived through the Years of Calamity*. (Armenian Genocide Museum-Institute, Yerevan, 2012), p. 84.

at the same time with the possibilities and hope offered by the Armenian SSR. In some cases, these works reflected only on one aspect of the question (I.e. only the trauma, only establishing normal life circumstances, etc.). A very plastic example for genocide trauma processing is a short story entitled *Lar Margar*⁵⁰⁸ by Axel Bakunts. The main character Margar had become supervisor of the irrigation canal in the village he settled. He had started a fresh life in a new homeland by bringing up his grandson and planting apricot trees. However, he constantly remembered the atrocities. He let go of the memory of his old home through a symbolic act, throwing the keys of his old house into the sea while being transported by ship away from the Ottoman Empire. The short story ends with an image of Margar seeing his grandson at the schoolyard and simultaneously viewing his growing apricot trees. This is a literary representation of the ideal type of reconciliation.

Bakunts does not contradict communist ideas, such as equality, for Margar pays attention to providing equal quantities of water to all in the village. In addition, there is no sign in this work of an attempt to defeat communism. On the other hand, in this period merely mentioning the Armenian genocide was labelled as nationalistic. Furthermore, Bakunts used the national symbols of Mount Ararat and apricots in this short story.

This and similar kinds of approaches to Armenian cultural and historical heritage including the genocide resulted in the extermination, imprisonment and/or Siberian exile of the writers' generation of the 1930s. ~~Most of them were imprisoned and~~ the Union of Writers of the Armenian SSR was filled with artists loyal to the regime after having silenced Bakunts, Yeghishe Charents and Vahan Totovents, together with other writers or poets. The charges against them were nationalism and the refusal of communist principles.⁵⁰⁹

⁵⁰⁸ Akszel Bakunc, "Hosszú Markar", *Belépő. Dorogi irodalmi almanach*, (Dorog Város Barátainak Egyesülete, Dorog, 2009). (Krajcsir Piroška transl.), pp. 127–132.

⁵⁰⁹ Norajr Adaljan, "Xosch Eliše Čareni masin" ["A Word About Yeghishe Charents"] *Azg Armenian daily*: <http://www.azg.am/AM/culture/2012042804>.

It can be assumed that until members of this generation started to raise their voices, silence about the genocide was spontaneous, as it was both a characteristic of diaspora and Soviet-Armenian writers. On the contrary, after the 1937-1938 extermination wave silence was not a sign of repression and avoidance anymore, but a present need for dealing with the trauma of the genocide, which was not allowed to gain public space.

The next experiment for collective processing began in the Khrushchev era. Paruyr Sevak's philosophical and epic poem, "The Unsilenceable Belfry," which was written in 1957 and published in 1969, was among one of the earliest attempts of this period to reflect on the genocide. The work is about Komitas, the Armenian clergyman, folk music collector and composer who was deported among the first Armenian intellectuals in 1915. The composer turned dumb because of the events of the genocide.⁵¹⁰ Thereby, Sevak expressed a need to break the collective silence. Hovhannes Shiraz, another emblematic member of this generation, also started to publish his works on the genocide and Armenian heritage in the late 1950s. His most famous genocide-related work is *The Armenian Dante-esque* calling for the establishment of a spiritual monument to the victims of the Armenian genocide.⁵¹¹

Similarly to them, Silva Kaputikyan also started to turn towards the issues of Armenian national identity in the same period.⁵¹² Her 1961 poem, "Midway Reflections"⁵¹³ lists and addresses the various trauma-progressing attitudes, including revenge and resignation. She gives an extensive explanation of the strategy she chooses and calls for Armenians to follow her. This approach asks for commemoration in a peaceful way, without the intent of blood-thirsty revenge, and for building the new homeland (symbolized by Yerevan) instead of the lost lands of the refugees (symbolized by Van).

⁵¹⁰ Online collection of Paruyr Sevak's works: <http://www.paruyrsevak.org/>.

⁵¹¹ Richard G Hovhannisian, (ed.) *The Armenian Genocide: Cultural and ethical legacies* (Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, 2007), pp. 103.

⁵¹² A. A. Ter-Minasjan "Silva Kaputikjani mtorumnerə čanaparhi kesin ev heto" [Silva Kaputikyan's reflections at the midway and after], *Lraber Hasarakakan Gituthjunneri*, HH GAA hratarakčuthjun, Erevan, 2001. 2001. № 1, pp. 175-185, 176.

⁵¹³ Silva Kaputikyan's House-Museum: <http://kaputikyanmuseum.com/6-3-Silva%20Kaputikyan.html>.

The main message of the poem can be determined by the following sentence of the poem, “You must take revenge by living [...]”⁵¹⁴ As it is visible, this is again a typical representation of reconciliation by remembering the genocide on the one hand, and building, creating, living on the other – offering a positive image of the future. Amongst authors of Armenian prose of the same period, Hrachya Qochar wrote his novel *Nahapet* in 1964.⁵¹⁵ The main character Nahapet – even his name is symbolic, meaning forefather – after experiencing the massacre of his wife and family, decided to settle in a different country in a new village than he used to live, started farming and began a new family with a similarly widowed woman Nubar, who lost her child too.

Beside the intent to rise from the tragedy of the Armenian genocide, the novel frequently indicates respect towards the Soviet ideal of life, while some episodes introduce the ways of interpretation of communism by average Armenians living at the periphery of the Soviet Empire. In addition to the demand for genocide remembrance and representation of the memories, the novel expresses an optimistic view of the future. The political system had not silenced such opinions during this period; therefore, literature represented the atmosphere of a meltdown after the Stalin era, and the strategy to be followed became reconciliation.

This move in literature continued even after the Khrushchev-era. During the 1970s and early 1980s many of the above mentioned works had been reprinted⁵¹⁶ or were adapted for motion pictures.⁵¹⁷ Similarly, the majority of authors from the 1930s writers’ generation were rehabilitated by the state and their works became authorized for publication. The meltdown in literature had been an indicator and, most probably, also a catalyst for political developments concerning the genocide-issue. Possibly neither the political leadership of the Armenian SSR, nor the central power in Moscow could have predicted that the new approach suggested by the new writers’ generation would have

⁵¹⁴ For the poem in Armenian see: (Armenian) National Center of Education Technologies: http://www.ktak.am/e107_plugins/forum/forum_viewtopic.php?1453.120.

⁵¹⁵ Hracsja Kocsar, *Nahapet* (Kornétás Kiadó, Budapest, 2008).

⁵¹⁶ See for example Silva Kaputikyan’s House-Museum: <http://kaputikyanmuseum.com/6-3-WORKS.html>.

⁵¹⁷ Cinema of the World (A comprehensive library of Arthouse. Cult, Classic, Experimental and rare movies from all over the world.) <http://worldscinema.org/2013/03/henrik-malyan-nahapet-aka-life-triumphs-1977/>.

led to spontaneously organised mass-demonstrations in 1965. Such initiations had been previously banned and were prohibited also after the 1965 events in the Soviet Union. On April 24, the 50th anniversary of the imprisonment and extermination of Constantinople's Armenian intelligentsia and the beginning of deportations, demonstrations evolved in numerous Soviet Armenian cities and in the capital. As a result of social pressure, state permission was given in May 1965 for a public competition to plan and construct a memorial for the victims of the Armenian genocide. A possible resistance to the Soviet central power was defeated by the efforts of the First Secretary of the Armenian Communist Party and other state leaders. This was reflected by the president of the Supreme Council of the Armenian SSR, Nagush Harutyunyan, who stated the following shortly after the demonstrations:

“Yes, until World War II, the Medz Yeghern [the Armenian term used for Armenians' extermination in the Ottoman Empire before the creation of the term genocide] of 1915 was unprecedented not only in the history of our people, but in the entirety of humankind. An entire people, an entire nation coming from the depths of millennia was killed, was dying.

We condemn genocide [genotsid] or zhoghovrtasbanutiun [“folk-murder”] with all our heart and soul.

There is and there cannot be either juridical justification or any motion of prescription for genocide.

Genocide, be it the horrifying slaughter of Armenians in Der [Z]or in the banks of the Euphrates in 1915, or the torturing death by massacre of the other peoples during World War II in Majdanek and B[u]chenwald, must always be condemned without reservations, and its perpetrators must be condemned by all of humankind”⁵¹⁸

This approach not only raises the issue of genocide commemoration to the state level, but a broader perspective of the speaker can be observed by associating the Armenian genocide with the Holocaust. Thereby, this is an attempt to prove that both events were rooted in racist ideologies. The Soviet Union considered these ideologies and their supporters as their enemies. Therefore, in this speech, a possible way of the genocide-issue's implementation into Soviet ideology is represented. The competition for the construction of the monument had also inaugurated a new approach [earlier approaches will be introduced later in this study] to diaspora Armenians as they were now given the

⁵¹⁸ The Armenian Weekly: <http://www.armenianweekly.com/2013/05/15/the-exact-translation-how-medz-yeghern-means-genocide/>. The location names Der Zor and Buchenwald were mistyped in the original text as “Der or” and “Büchenwald”.

possibility to participate. The construction was funded through voluntary financial or work contributions by the citizens of the Armenian SSR. Despite these facts, the memorial was banned from the city centre. Therefore, its location became Tsisternakaberd, a hill in the surroundings of the centre of Yerevan. By choosing this place the state willingly or unwillingly adapted genocide commemoration to Armenian funeral and burial traditions.⁵¹⁹ As a result, the Armenian Genocide Memorial Complex became a sacral place in the officially atheist Soviet social and political environment.

In a similar way, the eternal flame and the surrounding open circular walls of the monument symbolize resurrection and the eternal life of the victims' souls, while the obelisk belonging to the monument represents the rise of the Armenian nation. In conclusion, through the memorial complex optimism and remembrance was manifested in an architectural form. Thereby expressing the strategy of reconciliation as suggested by literary forerunners of collective trauma progressing.

The monument was opened in 1967 and the inauguration ceremony was synchronized with the celebration of the establishment of Soviet power in Armenia.⁵²⁰ After this, the memorial complex served yearly on April 24 as the place for mass-processions, which were also attended by state leaders. From the 1970s on, the political leadership of the country had started the official commemoration on the Memorial Day.⁵²¹ Therefore, it is obvious that the strategy of reconciliation had become internalized by the state.

As it has been expressed before, the process of Armenians' 're'-turning from the diaspora was also a crucial factor in the Armenian SSR's social and political life. The issue of masses of Armenian refugees had become an essential concern for the newly established communist leadership of the 1920s. This had been constantly a subject for Soviet Armenian political leaders reminding them of the Armenian genocide despite any restriction. Head of the Council of People's Commissars in Armenia Aleksandr Miasnikyan had written most probably the first analysis and determinative action plan

⁵¹⁹ Harutyun Marutyan, *Iconography of Armenian Identity. The Memory of Genocide and the Karabagh Movement. Volume I.* (Gitutyan Publishing House of NAS RA, Yerevan, 2009), p. 42.

⁵²⁰ Museum-Institute of the Armenian Genocide:

http://www.genocide-museum.am/eng/Description_and_history.php.

⁵²¹ Marutyan, pp. 39.

about diaspora Armenians in the Armenian SSR. In his work, he strongly opposed the ruling (Dashnak) Party of the short-lived Republic of Armenia (1918-1920). Even if he criticised the two further historical Armenian parties, he considered cooperation with these organisations as vital for the creation of a communist homeland and he projected Armenians of the diaspora as instruments for spreading the communist world revolution.

Finally, cooperation between Armenian organizations became broader in scale than a mere political step. The Armenian Assistance Commission (Hay Ognut'yan Komite) had been established by diaspora and Soviet Armenian intellectuals to achieve cooperation for the development of refugees' social circumstances. A similarly broad-scale cooperation was founded for the 're'-patriation of Armenian refugees in Soviet Armenia. The process involved public promotion of the possible return, gathering refugees willing to settle in Armenia, and organization of their travel and accommodation. Cooperation and organizing projects in the diaspora communities were completed by the local Armenian National Fronts.⁵²²

The "Great Home Turn"⁵²³ of tens of thousands started in the 1930s and reached its peak between 1946 and 1948. In spite of widespread efforts, the new homeland had been lost for more than 20,000 returnees. They became subject to Stalinist suspects, who often assumed that they were western imperialist spies and supporters of the Dashnak Party, the ruling party of the failed independent Republic of Armenia. The peak of this persecution was in 1949.⁵²⁴ The suspicions and tense relations with the diaspora finally started to melt down in the 1960s, the decade in which diaspora Armenians had the possibility to study in the Armenian SSR,⁵²⁵ but mainly those living

⁵²² Karlen Dallachjan, *Haj sphjurchi patmuthjun*, (Erevan, Zangak, 1997), p. 137.

⁵²³ Armenuhi Stephanjan, *XX. dari hajrenadardzuthjunə hajo inchnuthjan hamakargum*, [The XX century repatriation in the system of Armenian identity], (Erevan, HH-GAA <<Gituthjun>> hratarakčuthjun, 2010), p. 73.

⁵²⁴ Hajastani Hanrapetuthjan Sphjurchi Naxararuthjun, HH Gituthjunneri Azgajin Akademia, Erevani Petakan Hamalsaran, <<Noravanch>> gitachrtakan himnadram (eds.), *1946-48 thth. Hajrenadardzuthjunə ev dra daserə. Hajrenadardzuthjan himnaxndirn ajsor: Hamahajkakan gitažolov: Zekuumneri žolovau*, [Repatriation and Its Lessons. The Issue of Repatriation Today: Pan-Armenian Conference: Collection of Presentations.], (Limuš, Erevan, 2009), p. 141-142.

⁵²⁵ Ronald Grigor Suny, *Looking toward Ararat. Armenia in Modern History*. (Indiana University Press, Bloomington-Indianapolis, 1993), p. 228–229.

in “non-imperialist” countries. For humanities and social sciences the Armenian genocide had also been a forbidden topic. Mentioning the trauma was labelled as nationalism, in the same way as it had been also characteristic in literature.

A forerunner in new approaches during the Khrushchev era was the aforementioned Verjiné Svazlian, who had lived in Egypt before moving to Armenia, and who was the daughter of Garnik Svazlian, one of the main ideologists of the “Great Home Turn.” Due to this past, she started to research the heritage of the Armenian Genocide. Her work in this field began in the mid 1950s, when she started to visit places where immigrants from the diaspora had settled in en masse. She officially researched their dialects, folk poetry, and traditions. Moreover, she was also hiding another archive, in which she had systematized the memoirs of genocide survivors. These will be analyzed later. Presently, the further atmosphere of scientific work in the field is described.

According to Svazlian’s accounts, her interviewees would first – fearing repeated persecution – not let her into their homes, even if she asked for their cooperation in documenting the folk culture of these migrants. Moreover, she had to make even greater efforts when she asked them to share their painful memories with her.⁵²⁶ Facing these facts, it is evident that research related to the genocide was not supported by state power and gathering information on this issue was a hard task.

After the meltdown, which can be also observed in literature and politics, social scientists and experts in humanities received the possibility to research some questions related to the genocide, albeit in a restricted way. Only those events which had been recorded during the genocide in (written) documents were permitted for research. For the reason that the memory of the genocide has been maintained mainly by oral history, several distortions can be observed within the historiography of the Armenian genocide in the Soviet period. These still affect Armenian collective memory.

As an example, besides the two well-documented resistance movements against deportations in Van and the Musa Dagh, resistance at other locations had not been

⁵²⁶ Interview: Verjiné Svazlian, 02. 06. 2011.

analyzed until recent years. The existence of such Armenian efforts at other, little-known places has recently begun to appear; such that, average Armenians have had even more limited access to this information than historians.

The ‘lack’ of resistance still undermines the self-esteem of many Armenians, who rely on the collective self-image suggesting that Armenians had been slaughtered like sheep during the genocide.⁵²⁷ With the intent of completing historical research in the examination period, Verjiné Svazlian made several efforts after 1965 to introduce survivors and their experiences during the genocide on television thus creating public access to their memories. Her attempts were not supported by the state during that period.⁵²⁸

Remembering and commemorating the genocide therefore still remained between restricted frameworks. The efforts of Soviet Armenian leaders and the presumable early resistance by Moscow suggests that the central power had tolerated, rather than supported, the political frameworks while the Soviet Armenian political leadership attempted to find the balance between social pressure and the central power.

Having viewed the collective responses to the genocide, in order to create a comparison to the individual strategies the latter have to be reconstructed. In the already mentioned collection of interviews with survivors, there are a hundred⁵²⁹ Historical Memoir-Testimonies of Soviet-Armenian citizens recorded during the examination period. Two of these testimonies have been maintained as manuscripts from the period before Svazlian’s research. Eighteen of the interviews (cursive numbers in the references) only described the events experienced by the survivors during the genocide without mentioning their future lives or interpreting the genocide in any way. A further four

⁵²⁷ Marutyan 2009, 32-33.

⁵²⁸ Interview: Verjiné Svazlian, 02. 06. 2011.

⁵²⁹ Verjiné Svazlian, *The Armenian Genocide: Testimonies of the Eyewitness Survivors*, (“Gitoutyoum” Publishing use of NAS RA, Yerevan, 2011), Historical Memoir-Testimonies Nr. 1, 7, 25, 50, 82, 88, 101, 112, 149, 150, 153, 172, 183, 190, 274, 282, 283, 315, 8, 18, 87, 90, 92, 94, 96, 98, 99, 105, 106, 110, 123, 124, 133, 135, 143, 148, 155, 156, 166, 168, 175, 182, 191, 199, 200, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 209, 213, 217, 218, 222, 223, 224, 229, 230, 232, 233, 235, 236, 237, 239, 241, 248, 249, 251, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 266, 269, 273, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 288, 289, 290, 293, 294, 295, 298, 300, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 313, 314.

survivors expressed outrage and anger towards the perpetrators (bold numbers in the references). One of them stated, “[...] *Let our new generation understand well what kind of hypocritical, bestial, criminal, plundering, ruthless, unjust, perfidious enemy we lived with in order to maintain our existence.* [...]”⁵³⁰

Another one also mentioned that according to his opinion Turks are brutes. The third testimony in this group only states the intensive hatred the given survivor felt against Turks.⁵³¹ The fourth such interviewee, expressing outrage and anger, said: “[...] The Turk’s favourite way of killing was to slaughter the Armenian, to dismember the Armenian’s body and to watch the blood flowing like a fountain. You see, he would thus go to Allah’s paradise...”⁵³² In one case an earlier desire for revenge was expressed by a survivor (underlined number in the references). He stated that though he had planned revenge for a long time, he was unable to attack unarmed people, children or women.⁵³³

Ten of the interviews represent the strategy of rationalization (framed numbers in the references). These describe the most unique interpretations of the reasons for the genocide ranging from the Turks’ jealousy of Armenians’ wealth, their need for Armenians’ goods, to some mythical descriptions as Talaat pasha’s gambling with one prominent Armenian leader or Russians selling the Armenian lands to the Turks for treasures.⁵³⁴ In two cases, the escape of the certain person or of numerous survivors is rationalized. One of these describes the escape of the interviewee as being a result of divine wonder. In a further case, the survival of the participants of the Musa Dagħ resistance is explained also by a miraculous apparition that stopped soldiers from further attacks on the mountain and its inhabitants.⁵³⁵

Sixty-seven interviews, a vast majority of the examined testimonies, reflect a positive image of the future of the refugees. They usually finish the description of the genocide

⁵³⁰ Ibid., 350.

⁵³¹ Ibid., 431.

⁵³² Ibid., 501.

⁵³³ Ibid., 503.

⁵³⁴ Ibid., Historical Memoir-Testimonies Nr. 203, 213, 230, 235, 241, 249, 276, 280.

⁵³⁵ Ibid., Historical Memoir-Testimonies Nr. 290, 307.

with telling how they started a new life, began a new family, built their homes, started work, farming and became active members of the Armenian SSR's society. The possibility of a new start, emphasized by most of them, was offered most probably by the 'Soviet dream' through the promise of equality, education, work, home, financial security and social welfare. Even if these had been limited by the totalitarian regime, Armenians had been deprived of these completely during the genocide. Some of these memoirs also reflect on the exile of 're'-settled Armenians to Siberia or describe temporarily returning post-traumatic symptoms of the interviewees. However, the vast majority still remembered the genocide while reflecting positively on the future, thereby again the strategy of reconciliation can be observed. These individual responses do not correspond to the tendencies observed on the collective level. For example, all but one interview reflecting on the aftermath of genocide recorded before the meltdown already expressed the strategy of reconciliation.

This individual strategy was overwhelming during Soviet times irrespective of the philosophy emphasized by the actual state and party ideology, while other approaches had been also present at the individual level, albeit at a lesser extent. However, concerning the small number of memoirs recorded before the mid 1950s, it cannot be stated for sure whether the official ideological principles had caused the dominance of reconciliation, or whether these principles had been created and shaped by social majority.

Four trauma processing strategies were surely present at the individual level in Soviet Armenian society. Furthermore, the existence of the remaining two other approaches cannot be excluded. Three of the undoubtedly existent ones – outrage and anger, revenge and restitution, and finally rationalisation – had not become official state strategies. It has been also mentioned that during the Stalin era the fourth strategy, reconciliation and forgiveness was not permitted either.

Thereby, it can be assumed that in the examination period in the Armenian SSR, only those genocide processing strategies appeared on the collective level which were permitted and/or encouraged by the Soviet member-states, the central power and the

official ideological principles. Based on these conclusions, the hypothesis is proved for the examination period in the Armenian SSR.

Beside this fact, further research and analysis are needed to prove whether reconciliation as a collective strategy evolved from a bottom-up initiation. This would have been an exceptional phenomenon in a totalitarian regime. On the other hand, a top-down effort for controlling the commemoration processes was also present after the meltdown. This is represented by the attempt of literary authors and political leaders who consciously and explicitly tried (had) to interpret the need for speaking out and commemoration within the official ideological framework of the Soviet state. The latter phenomenon does not clearly suggest the direction of the process, but offers the possibility of a crossing point of top-down and bottom-up moves, which could have been also a unique phenomenon in the Soviet Union.

The appearance of reconciliation and forgiveness on the collective level is also worthy of further analysis, as this is the one of the few trauma processing strategies described by Miller and Touryan-Miller among Armenians which shows a creation or recreation oriented path for survivors and their descendants, while it does not have a threatening impact on the descendants of perpetrators.

In addition, this strategy keeps the memories of the past alive, thereby possibly making signs for future genocides more visible, and thereby contributes to genocide prevention. Finally, it also proves that a revival of a community after mass trauma is possible, and that trauma processing is feasible without self-blaming, self-destructive or revengeful actions. This has to be considered especially when lobbyists attempt to restrict Armenian genocide commemoration for fear of the negative reactions by the victims' community.

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Chapter 4: Exporting the Cold War: Diplomacy, pragmatism and interventionism

Between economic interests and Cold War motives: German activities in the Central African Region during the Second Scramble for Africa

Torben GÜLSTORFF

“After my Africa-trip, it is my conviction - like it is for numerous clear-headed people in the Federal Republic – that the future of Berlin and the German East Zone will not be decided on the conferences of the Big Four but in Africa and Asia.”⁵³⁶

The quotation above was used by the West German Elsie Kühn-Leitz in March 1960, as an argument to draw the attention from the West German Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano on the African continent. Kühn-Leitz had been a founding member of the party section of the conservative political party *Christlich Demokratische Union* (CDU) in Hesse and the social organisation *Deutsch-Französische Gesellschaft Wetzlar* (DFG Wetzlar).

As one of many West Germans who were interested in Africa and privately sought for an increase of German-African relations, she espoused an intensification of the commitment of the West German state on the African continent. Already in 1959, Kühn-Leitz had semi-privately undertaken – as she was acquainted with Chancellor Adenauer – a journey to Africa. She was one of the first West Germans who were able to make semi-governmental contacts with African politicians, parties, and mass organisations.

Early on, the Belgian Congo emerged as an emphasis of her commitment. Therefore, the

⁵³⁶Kühn-Leitz to von Brentano - Minister (West German Foreign Office, 7 March 1960), PA AA, AA, B 34, 221 [translated by the author]. Original quotation: “*Nach meiner Afrika-Reise habe ich die völlige Überzeugung gewonnen, - wie viele zahlreiche denkende Menschen in der Bundesrepublik, - dass die Zukunft Berlins und der deutschen Ostzone nicht auf den Konferenzen der grossen Vier entschieden wird, sondern in Afrika und Asien*”.

conference *Table ronde belgo-congolaise*, on which the decolonisation of the Belgian Congo was discussed from 20 January to 20 February 1960, proved to be of use. On 23 February 1960, a bus of the DFG Wetzlar crossed the German-Belgian border in the direction of Wetzlar on her initiative. On board the bus, there were three party officials of the Belgian Congolese political party *Mouvement Nationale Congolaise - Lumumba* (MNC-L): its Director of politics, Christophe Gracis, its Vice President, Victor Nendaka Bika, and its President, Patrice Lumumba – who just one year later would die and become noted as the martyr of African liberation. Their trip initiated a new phase of the West German activities not just in the Belgian Congo, but also in the Central African region as a whole.⁵³⁷ Accordingly, their entrance to the *Federal Republic of Germany* (FRG) was accompanied by difficulties, as several Belgian officials still wished to maintain a purely Belgian sphere of influence in the Belgian-Congo. Just one day before, the Belgian intelligence service *Sûreté de l'État* had successfully prevented their border crossing. But as the Belgian government Eyskens was divided in this question⁵³⁸ and Kühn-Leitz had several contacts within the Belgian government and intelligence service at her disposal, she finally succeeded in bringing the future Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to her private mansion *Haus Friedwart* in Wetzlar. During the following two days, Lumumba and his party colleagues established contacts with the semi-governmental organisation *Deutsche Afrikagesellschaft* (DAG), the Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, and several agents of the West German private economy.

The Congolese asked for permission and state support to establish a MNC-L office in the FRG⁵³⁹ and further support of their party – most likely for the upcoming election campaigns in May – by West German companies.⁵⁴⁰ As a matter of fact, Marcel Lengema, representative of the MNC-L in Germany and special secretary to Lumumba, received an office for party politics from the DAG in March. Furthermore, the Press and

⁵³⁷Steltzer – department 307 (West German Foreign Office) to West German Foreign Office, (24 February 1960), PA AA, AA, B 34, 221.

⁵³⁸Kühn-Leitz to von Brentano - Minister (West German Foreign Office), day and month unknown 1960, PA AA, AA, B 34, 221.

⁵³⁹Kühn-Leitz to Steltzer – department 307 (West German Foreign Office), (1 March 1960, PA AA, AA, B 34, 221.

⁵⁴⁰Kühn-Leitz to West German Foreign Office, date unknown, PA AA, AA, B 34, 221.

Information Office of the Federal Government was consulted to improve the political staging of the party in the German media.⁵⁴¹ Not for no reason, the popular West German magazine *Der Spiegel* published a six-page interview with Lumumba in June.⁵⁴² It might even be that the MNC-L received two further offices from the company *Burger-Eisenwerke*, which had already operated in the East of the Congo for several years and since then had maintained intense contacts with the MNC-L and Lumumba.⁵⁴³ In return for this support, Lumumba bound himself and his party – by contract – to lead the MNC-L on a pro-western political course.⁵⁴⁴

Meanwhile, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) had unexpectedly established first contacts with the future Congolese political elite either. Already two months earlier, on 15 December 1959, the Congolese Antoine Gizenga, leader of the pro-soviet political party *Parti Socialiste Africain* (PSA), had entered the GDR by crossing its border in West Berlin. Several Congolese parties – among them also the PSA⁵⁴⁵ – had formed a loose political association, entitled the *Cartel*, to enforce the Congolese demands on the already mentioned *Table ronde belgo-congolaise*. On behalf of this association, Gizenga asked for permission and support to establish a Congolese information office in the GDR. Furthermore, he requested – if the Belgians should deny a quickly completed independence of Belgian Congo – to establish the office of a Congolese exile-government in East Berlin.⁵⁴⁶

The fact that these Congolese, who soon would play major roles in the development of the DRC, had chosen Germany of all possible allies to strengthen their position in the process of decolonization had not been a coincidence. Both German states represented – because of their outstanding reconstruction after 1945 – an exemplary economic, social

⁵⁴¹Steltzer – department 307 (West German Foreign Office) to West German Foreign Office, (18 March 1960), PA AA, AA, B 34, 221.

⁵⁴²cf. Robert Julius Greiff and Günther Steffen, “Man grüßt sich mit Uhuru: Spiegel-Gespräch mit dem Kongo-Politiker Patrice Lumumba,” *Der Spiegel*, (22 June 1960), 34-39.

⁵⁴³Krämer – executive director (Afrika-Verein) to Steltzer – department 307 (West German Foreign Office), 11 March 1960, PA AA, AA, B 34, 61.

⁵⁴⁴Schneider (West German Foreign Office) to Kühn-Leitz, (12 December 1960), PA AA, AA, B 34, 221.

⁵⁴⁵Gizenga (PSA) to Council of Ministers of the GDR, (16 December 1959), PA AA, MfAA, C 799/74, 96-99.

⁵⁴⁶Schüßler (East German Ministry for Foreign Affairs) to unknown recipient, (15 December 1959), PA AA, MfAA, C 799/74, 100.

and political ascent for the young African political elites. Furthermore, the FRG and the GDR were able to manoeuvre – even though officially involved in the global system contradiction of Cold War – their foreign policy concepts between the ones of the global super powers and the ones of the European colonial powers. This provided the German states with a unique profile that many Africans perceived attractive enough to wish for a close partnership.

Though it was not just the preference of the Congolese that had led to this example of German-African encounter. Already a decade prior, officials of both German states had realized the economic and political potential of the Belgian Congo in regard to the purposes of their respective states. Resources – mineral as well as botanical – were abundant in the Belgian colony. Furthermore, its infrastructure was highly developed by African standards. For these reasons, West⁵⁴⁷ and East Germany⁵⁴⁸ had established considerable trade relations with the colony already at the beginning of the 1950s. However, it was not just the Belgian Congo in which the West and the East German state had shown interest. In the wake of decolonization, a second struggle on spheres of influence had begun in the Belgian Congo, the Central African region, the African continent, and the emerging 'Third World' as a whole – a struggle, the FRG and the GDR could not afford to ignore.

The thesis

The practical execution of this struggle by West and East Germany – their activities – is central in my macrohistoric and comparative arranged thesis of which this paper shall give a brief insight into. In it the developments of the activities of governments, economies, and societies of both German states are represented and analysed by using the Central African region as a projection surface. In doing so not a simple case study on a single state of German interest but a complete region serves as a geographical frame of this German-German topic.

Prior to this paper's completion, scholarship on German foreign relations had not spend

⁵⁴⁷Torben Gülstorff, *Die westdeutsche Kongopolitik, 1954-1975* (Magister's thesis, Christian-Albrechts Universität zu Kiel, 2007), pp. 14-17.

⁵⁴⁸Unknown sender to West German Foreign Office, (21 August 1951), PA AA, AA, B 60, 1. Abg., 5.

much time on this region, as it lies at the periphery of all German interests known to the current state of research. Usually, studies regarding this topic focus on main areas of German interest as Western and Eastern Europe or North America, to draw their pictures of the German foreign relations – thereby often trying to enlarge it to a global view. Against this, I argue in my thesis – and this paper – that it is reasonable to undertake research regarding this topic in such an area precisely because of its peripheral position.

As main areas of interest usually form an exception – leading to an exceptional German behaviour – it is reasonable to focus on the much more common periphery, to make general statements on the German foreign relations. Therefore, this study is not simply dedicated to an improvement of scholarship on German activities in the Central African region and the African continent, but also on their global characteristics in general.

The cornerstone of my thesis is the question, in how far – in the cases of the both German states – economic motives actually ranked behind political motives? Strictly speaking, was the German-German contradiction, manifested in the maintenance respectively the breach of the Hallstein doctrine, actually more important than the economic needs of the German countries?

In 1955, the West German Walter Hallstein had installed the Hallstein doctrine in West German foreign policy to weaken its East German counterpart by preventing the diplomatic relations of the latter with states of the 'First' and the 'Third World'. It said that a diplomatic recognition of the GDR would implicate its recognition as 'a' German state and thereby undermine the West German claim of representing 'the' German state as a whole. To prevent such a development, the West German Foreign Office was allowed and equipped to initialize counter-measures coming down to a full termination of diplomatic relations with each state threatening this doctrine. Since the 1950s, scholarship has outlined this policy – and its counter policy by the GDR – as the integral parts in German foreign policies' history. To this day, the German-German contradiction is one of the most popular myths in German history. But did economic motives actually had to step back behind this sheer political interest? After all, 'flag follows trade' is a common saying to paraphrase the process of European imperialist

expansion during the first scramble for Africa even today. So, should the saying in the case of the German expansion during the second scramble really have to be transformed to 'trade follows Hallstein'?

The demystification of the Hallstein doctrine – and therefore also the German-German contradiction – and three further paradigms in German foreign policies' history – nucleate my thesis with the title *Trade follows Hallstein? German Activities in the Central African Region During the Second Scramble*. In it, the German activities in an area, defined by the UNO as *Middle Africa*,⁵⁴⁹ but by myself as the Central African region, are examined. It contains nine Central African states: Chad, Cameroon, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, the Central African Republic, the Republic of Congo, the DRC, Angola, and Sao Tome and Principe. In addition, a brief look is taken on the German activities on the African continent as a whole either. The subjects, this thesis tries to outline and analyse – defined as German activities – involve a wide range of activities of the German states, economies, and societies.

The activities of the German states include regular diplomatic activities, development policy and aid, economic policy and aid, cultural policy and aid, public relations and the support of foreign media, military policy and aid, and finally, unconventional and intelligence policy and aid. The activities of the German private, semi-governmental, and state-owned economies involve activities of manufacturing companies, trade companies, and banks as well as financiers. Finally, the activities of German private and semi-governmental social organisations contain activities of political parties, trade unions, and the catholic and protestant churches – in the case of the FRG – as well as the organisation *Afro-Asiatisches Solidaritätskomitee* – in the case of the GDR. Furthermore, the dealing of Central African issues within German societies and media will be analysed briefly either.

As this thesis attends to basic research, it had to fall back on a wide range of sources, situated in a great number of archives. These were the Political Archive of the Federal

⁵⁴⁹ cf. Composition of Macro Geographical (Continental) Regions, Geographical Sub-regions, and Selected Economic and Other Groupings, <http://millenniumindicators.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm#africa> 2013.

Foreign Office in Berlin, the Federal Archive in Berlin, Koblenz and Freiburg, the Federal Archive, section movie archive, in Berlin, the Archive of the State Security Agency of the GDR in Berlin, the Archive of Social Democracy in Bonn, the State Archive of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern in Greifswald, the Central Archive of the Protestant Church of Germany in Berlin, the University Archive of the Free University of Berlin in Berlin and the State Archive of Austria in Vienna. Altogether, more than one million pages have been run through. In addition, some contemporary witnesses were interviewed and a wide range of secondary literature was consulted.

What Is the Second Scramble?

When the African states gained their independence around 1960, a global run on the African continent – a second scramble for Africa – began. It was contingent on imperial, postcolonial and Cold War⁵⁵⁰ conflicts, as its catalyst – the contemporaneous process of decolonisation. Former scholarship has hardly taken this topic into account. Usually, the term 'second scramble' was and is still used as a postcolonial catchphrase – commonly, by African politicians and progressive authors.⁵⁵¹ Therefore, this paper shall provide a brief insight into its actual meaning.

Common official justifications for the second scramble formed the Cold War,⁵⁵² the development of the 'underdeveloped' continent on a political, economic and social level, and, in the cases of Germany, China, Korea – and temporary also Vietnam –, the conflicts about the claim to sole representation of divided nations. Be that as it may, the actual motives for commitment in Africa were closely connected with the economic and

⁵⁵⁰Marc Philip Bradley, "Decolonization, the Global South, and the Cold War, 1919-1962," in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War. Vol. 1: Origins*, ed. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 485. / Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 396.

⁵⁵¹cf. Julius Kambarage Nyerere, "The Second Scramble," *Julius Nyerere*, http://www.juliusnyerere.info/images/uploads/the_second_scramble_1962.pdf. / Daniel Tetteth Osabu-Kle, "African Blood For Imperialist Interests: The First And Second Scrambles For Africa," *allAfrica*, <http://www2.carleton.ca/africanstudies/ccms/wp-content/ccms-files/African-Blood-For-Imperialist-Interests.pdf>.

⁵⁵²Robert J. McMahon, "Heiße Kriege im Kalten Krieg," in *Heiße Kriege im Kalten Krieg*, ed. Bernd Greiner, Christian Th. Müller and Dierk Walter (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition HIS Verlagsgesellschaft, 2006), p. 16.

geopolitical interests of the respective states. Around 1950, according to the West German foreign office, the West produced 97% of its diamonds, 62% of its manganese, 55% of its gold and 47% of its chrome on the African continent – to a large extent in the Central African region.⁵⁵³ Uranium and Cobalt were produced here as well, but in their cases information on their precise production quantities cannot be provided, as they were military relevant and therefore information on their production rates highly classified. Furthermore in the case of botanical resources, 81% of palm kernel, 64% of palm kernel oil, 70% of cocoa beans, 52% of sisal and 100% of gum Arabic were produced in Africa – to a large part in the Central African region either.⁵⁵⁴ In the cases of wood, fur and fruits, no indication on their quantity, compared to their global production rates, can be made. This high relevance, which Africa had not just for Western, but also for global imports of several vitally needed products, was also reflected in the value of African exports. Between 1937 and 1950, its exports increased from 4,6 billion DM to 16,7 billion DM.⁵⁵⁵ Scholarship still underestimates the relevance of the supply of these resources – especially of the strategic ones – for the national markets in the world at that time.⁵⁵⁶

All over the globe, states entered the African stage to participate in the second scramble. In Western Europe, the former colonial powers, France, Great Britain, Belgium, Portugal and Spain, but also the FRG and Italy became significant competitors. Although the commitment of the former colonial powers, especially the ones of France⁵⁵⁷ and Great Britain,⁵⁵⁸ remained mainly concentrated on their former colonial empires. In Eastern Europe, it primarily was the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) that participated. Additionally, Czechoslovakia and the GDR took part to a certain extent. To a smaller degree, even Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary can be

⁵⁵³Kordt (West German Foreign Office) to West German diplomatic missions at Great Britain, France, Belgium, Egypt, Spain, Portugal, Liberia, South Africa, Kenia, Namibia, Mocambique, Rhodesia, 2 July 1953, PA AA, AA, B 11, 613, pp. 72-74.

⁵⁵⁴Ibid., pp. 75-77.

⁵⁵⁵West German Foreign Office to West German Foreign Office, date unknown, PA AA, AA, B 11, 613.

⁵⁵⁶David S. Painter, "Oil, Resources, and the Cold War, 1945–1962," in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War. Vol. 1: Origins*, ed. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 506.

⁵⁵⁷Rainer Tetzlaff and Cord Jacobeit, *Das nachkoloniale Afrika. Politik, Wirtschaft, Gesellschaft* (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2005), p. 227.

⁵⁵⁸Ibid., p. 215.

mentioned. The Near and the Middle East were initially represented mainly by Israel. Since the end of the 1960s, it was joined by Iraq, Persia and Saudi Arabia. In East Asia, the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Japan became involved primarily in the scramble, but also Taiwan, North and South Korea showed some interest. In North and Central America, the United States of America (USA), Canada and Cuba participated, in South America, Brasilia showed most notably some commitment. On the African continent, Algeria and Egypt – later on, Libya either – participated in the north, the Republic of South Africa in the south. Also regional centres of power, like Nigeria, Zaire, Tanzania, Guinea and Ghana, can be mentioned here.

Already in the late colonial period of the 1950s, first non-colonial powers had started to invest bigger amounts of money in the African territories of the colonial powers. Thus, they had not just done some business but also established and consolidated their influence in the respective regions. Nevertheless, the colonial powers could most widely retain their influence monopoly, as it was backed by the colonial status of these territories.

When the *Treaties of Rome* were signed in 1957, the colonies became associated with the European Economic Community (EEC), whose member states confirmed the influence monopoly of the colonial powers. In return, EEC member states received additional liberties and rights for their activities in the associated territories. This provided them with several economic, political and diplomatic advantages against their non-European competitors.⁵⁵⁹ After decolonisation, this arrangement of influence distribution continued. Admittedly, a jurisdiction backing it no longer existed, but the actual structures, that had grown over the years, were sufficient.

The networks of the former colonial powers were able to assert themselves against their new international competition. The EEC and its member states were able to achieve a similar successful economic position. Therefore, they concluded the development aid

⁵⁵⁹ Sven Grimm, *Die Afrikapolitik der Europäischen Union. Europas außenpolitische Rolle in einer randständigen Region* (Hamburg: Institut für Afrika-Studien, 2003), 78-80. / Thomas Moser, *Europäische Integration, Dekolonisation, Eurafrika. Eine historische Analyse über die Entstehungsbedingungen der eurafrikanischen Gemeinschaft von der Weltwirtschaftskrise bis zum Jaunde-Vertrag. 1929-1963* (Baden-Baden: Nomos-Verlagsgesellschaft, 2000), p. 503.

Treaties of Yaoundé in the 1960s which were followed by the *Treaties of Lomé* in the 1970s and 1980s and the instalment of the trade system *Système de Stabilisation des Recettes d'Exportation* (Stabex), which stabilised the commerce between Europe and Africa. In doing so, they were able to retain the independent associated states under West European influence and to interconnect their markets with the markets of the EEC.⁵⁶⁰ Almost exclusively super powers, like the USA, the USSR, and later also the PRC, could actually challenge this hegemony of the EEC and its member states, including the former colonial powers.

The superpowers also had a stimulating effect on the involvement of the Cold War in the second scramble. The USA pursued a radical policy of “*global transformation*” to establish “*societies in conformity with [their] system*”, and integrate them in the US-American sphere of influence.⁵⁶¹ In contrast, the West as a whole pursued a more moderate policy. A military cordon sanitaire, reaching from Norway to the Republic of South Africa, and a second one, connected with an economic “*prosperity zone*” reaching from Morocco to Egypt, should secure the African continent against Eastern interventions.⁵⁶² Furthermore, regional powers, which were powerful enough to influence the hinterland and their surrounding neighbour states for Western purposes, should receive an intense support either. The primary objective of the West was to secure transportation routes with strategic importance, like the route around the cape – 65% of Western European and 28 % of US-American oil imports were transported on this route⁵⁶³ –, and the production of several strategic resources.

In contrast to the USA and the West, the USSR exercised primarily restraint. It seems to have expected an evolutionary transition of the African continent either – even though

⁵⁶⁰Grimm, *Die Afrikapolitik der Europäischen Union*, p.103.

⁵⁶¹Marc Frey, “Die Vereinigten Staaten und die Dritte Welt im Kalten Krieg,” in *Heiße Kriege im Kalten Krieg*, ed. Bernd Greiner, Christian Th. Müller and Dierk Walter (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition HIS Verlagsgesellschaft, 2006), p. 59.

⁵⁶²Sanne – department 205 (West German Foreign Office) to Dg 20, department 204 (West German Foreign Office), 11 July 1961, PA AA, AA, B 130, 2306A [translated by the author]. Original quotation: “*Wohlstandsgürtel*”.

⁵⁶³William J. Foltz, “Africa in Great-Power Strategy,” in *Arms and the African. Military Influences on Africa's International Relations*, ed. William J. Foltz and Henry S. Bienen (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), p. 21.

an evolutionary transition towards socialism. Against this, the PRC,⁵⁶⁴ Cuba, and sometimes even individual states of the Socialist State Community (SSC) showed a much more radical commitment. In the case of the PRC, this contradiction even led to an open competition with the USSR on supremacy of the socialist movement in Africa. Furthermore, the European, Asian and African communist parties showed a radical commitment either, thereby animating the USSR and the SSC to a radicalisation of their Africa policies. For the execution of the latter, the socialist states operated primarily from bases in Egypt, Guinea, Ghana, and later also Tanzania. From these bases, they tried to gain influence on the African continent. Similar to the West, their preferred target areas were the North African states and the bigger regional powers.⁵⁶⁵

Primarily here, the conflicts of Cold War inflamed. Besides the Egyptian Suez Crisis, the Central African region – with its Congo Crisis and its Angola Crisis – became the hot spot of the Cold War in Africa between the 1950s and 1970s.⁵⁶⁶ The much smaller conflict which appeared in Cameroon between the mid-1950s and the beginning of the 1960s can be put in this context as well.⁵⁶⁷ When one of these hot spot states was in danger of drifting on the Soviet side – for instance, because of the existence of a strong pro-Soviet liberation movement – firstly, it became isolated by the West to contain the actual and ideological centre of conflict and prevent a greater material aid by the SSC or the USSR. After that, refugee villages and fortified villages were built and a counter revolution was initiated, to take the movement its support in the population once and for all.⁵⁶⁸ This strategy worked out in the Congo but failed in the Portuguese overseas territory Angola, where in 1975 the socialist People's Republic of Angola was founded.

At the beginning of the 1970s, the ties between the Western and the Eastern states fell loose. The USA had to face a high indebtedness, because of its Vietnam War. In the

⁵⁶⁴cf. Sergey Radchenko, "The Sino-Soviet split." In *The Cambridge History of the Cold War. Vol. 1: Origins*, ed. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 349-372.

⁵⁶⁵cf. Elke Tüttenberg, *Der Beitrag der Staaten des Ostblocks zur Wirtschaft der Entwicklungsländer Afrikas* (Sankt Augustin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 1977).

⁵⁶⁶Tetzlaff, *Das nachkoloniale Afrika*, p. 210.

⁵⁶⁷Louis George Sarris, "Soviet Military Policy and Arms Activities in Sub-Saharan Africa," in *Arms and the African. Military Influences on Africa's International Relations*, ed. William J. Foltz and Henry S. Bienen (New Haven: Yale University Press 1985), p. 38.

⁵⁶⁸cf. Jürgen Horlemann, *Modelle der kolonialen Konterrevolution* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1968).

course of its development, the dollar was released of its gold parity,⁵⁶⁹ what lead to a financial crisis and, combined with the Oil Crisis of the 1970s, to an economic crisis in the West. The macroeconomic ideology of the West broke away from Keynes's "*global regulation*", its development ideology fell loose from a "*general development ideology*".⁵⁷⁰ On an international level, what followed was a reinforced cooperation between states which had been separated by the global system contradiction heretofore. Joined projects of Western, Eastern and 'Third World' countries were initiated.⁵⁷¹ In the East, officials even thought about further reaching political cooperation with 'imperialist' Western states against the USA. It was in this context, the East German ambassador Heinz Deutschland wrote to the East German Ministry for Foreign Affairs in July 1970,

“For us it is important that the line Kairo-Brazza[ville] could become a barrier for the further expansion of the [US-]American imperialism and its allies in the South of Africa to the North. Here, the thought has to be admitted in how far common interests could exist between the socialist camp and the French imperialism against the US-imperialism.”⁵⁷²

To sum up, in comparison with the first Scramble for Africa, which had mostly been carried out by European powers, the Second Scramble was a global struggle. Besides the Cold War and besides the super powers, even powers as the PRC, Japan and Brasilia – and West and East Germany – got a chance and were able to expand their spheres of influence on the continent.

⁵⁶⁹Giovanni Arrighi, “The World Economy and the Cold War, 1970-1990,” in *The Cambridge history of the Cold War. Volume III: Endings, 1975-1991*, ed. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 30-31.

⁵⁷⁰ Andreas Rödder, *Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1969-1990* (München: Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, 2004), 49 [translated by the author]. Original quotation: “*Globalsteuerung*” and “*allgemeine Entwicklungsideologie*”.

⁵⁷¹Patrick Gutman, “West-östliche Wirtschaftskooperationen in der Dritten Welt,” in *Ökonomie im Kalten Krieg*, ed. Bernd Greiner, Christian Th. Müller and Claudia Müller (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition HIS Verlagsgesellschaft, 2010), p. 409.

⁵⁷²Deutschland – Ambassador (East German Embassy in the Central African Republic) to Weidemann (East German Ministry for Foreign Affairs), 19 July 1970, PA AA, MfAA, C 817/74, 78 [translated by the author]. Original quotation: “*Für uns ist wichtig, daß die Linie Kairo-Brazza[ville] zu einer Barriere für das weitere Vordringen des amerikanischen Imperialismus und seiner Bündnispartner im Süden Afrikas nach Norden werden könnte. Hier muß man sogar einmal den Gedanken erwägen, inwieweit es sogar gemeinsame Interessen des soz. Lagers und des franz. Imp. gegen den USA-Imperialismus geben könnte*”.

The German Role in the Central African Second Scramble

It is difficult to figure out the concrete extent of the German participation in the second scramble in the Central African region. Therefore, a certain degree of uncertainty has to be accepted. Quality and quantity of the two German states varied from target area to target area and therefore make it difficult to provide exact information which applies to the Central African region as a whole. The German commitment was notably intense in states with large strategic mineral and energy carrier resources and with a simultaneous high endangerment of security of supply. Corresponding to this, the German commitment was greatest in the hot spots of the Cold War: in the DRC and Angola.

Here, the FRG supported primarily the moderate powers, who sought an evolutionary development of their states towards the West which would ensure an adequate security of supply for the West German private economy. Therefore, in the Belgian Congo, a greater financial support for the Belgian colonial power was initiated already during the process of decolonisation. In 1958 and probably in 1959,⁵⁷³ bonds of the Belgian Congo, worth 120 million DM, were bought by the FRG. Furthermore, in 1960⁵⁷⁴ and 1961,⁵⁷⁵ after the decolonisation of the country, Belgian bonds, also worth 120 million DM, were bought, most probably as financial support for the Belgian development aid for the Congo.

Besides, when the Congo Crisis erupted, the FRG at first supported the moderate, anti-lumumbist powers, like the political party *Alliance des Bakongo* (Abako), later, after the murder of Lumumba, also partly radical pro-western powers. Financial support counted among their efforts. For instance, trade businesses between companies in Hamburg and the Congolese cooperative *Société Coopérative dy Bas Congo*, which maintained close ties with the Abako, were stimulated with trade guarantees by the West German

⁵⁷³ Soehring – Ambassador (West German Embassy in Belgian Congo) to West German Foreign Office, (17 December, 1959), PA AA, AA, B 68, 45.

⁵⁷⁴ Unknown sender to East German Ministry for Foreign Affairs, (20 September 1960), PA AA, MfAA, C 805/74, p. 14.

⁵⁷⁵ Unknown sender to East German Ministry for Foreign Affairs, date unknown, PA AA, MfAA, A 17822, p. 6.

financial institution *Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau*.⁵⁷⁶ In doing so, the West German state supported indirectly the anti-lumumbist opposition movement. Another West German option to intervene indirectly into the political development of the Congo formed its media support. A printing office, the *Imprimerie Concordia*, was installed in the Congolese capitol Léopoldville by the West German intelligence service *Bundesnachrichtendienst* (BND) for 23 million DM to raise a printing monopoly for the West (German state) in the Congo and to establish a BND headquarters for the complete West and Central African region.⁵⁷⁷ Its revenue financed bribes of politicians, unionists, journalists, and editors. Furthermore, telecommunication⁵⁷⁸ and intelligence expert staff were sent to support the Congolese central government and its army. Even the renegade government Tshombé of the Katanga province received West German weapons and vehicles as well as mercenaries.

As it seems, around 600 West German mercenaries fought for Katanga in 1961 alone – managed secretly by the West German military intelligence agency *Militärischer Abschirmdienst*.⁵⁷⁹ In Angola the West German support was concentrated on moderate powers as well. During the Portuguese Colonial War, the FRG supported the Portuguese colonial power financially and militarily. In 1960⁵⁸⁰ and 1961,⁵⁸¹ the FRG assigned government credits each worth 150 million DM. Furthermore, Portugal received by military aid and purchased a greater quantity of weapons and military vehicles – including even planes and ships – worth hundreds of millions of DM.⁵⁸² In contrast, the liberation movements only received little assistance, which was of nearly no consequence, by the West German churches and social movements – and a smaller armament supply, probably by the BND.

⁵⁷⁶ Gülstorff, *Die westdeutsche Kongopolitik*, 41–43.

⁵⁷⁷ Grabert – Secretary of State (Federal Chancellery) to Eppler – Minister (Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development), 13 April 1973, PA AA, AA, Zwischenarchiv, 103058.

⁵⁷⁸ Federal Ministry of Post and Telecommunications to Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, department III B 5 (West German Foreign Office), 24 November 1964, PA AA, AA, B 68, p. 242.

⁵⁷⁹ Hähnel – Deputy Consul and Attaché (General Consulate in Egypt) to East German Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 4 March 1961, PA AA, MfAA, A 13765.

⁵⁸⁰ Haas – department 412 (West German Foreign Office) to Harkort – Secretary of State (West German Foreign Office), 21 July 1961, PA AA, AA, B 34, 273.

⁵⁸¹ West German Consulate in Angola to West German Foreign Office, (25 January 1962), PA AA, AA, B 68, 63.

⁵⁸² Helga Haftendorn, *Militärhilfe und Rüstungsexporte der BRD* (Düsseldorf: Bertelsmann Universitätsverlag, 1971), 124–125.

Meanwhile, the GDR sought to support moderate powers, which aspired an evolutionary pro-soviet development of their countries, also to ensure an adequate security of supply for their economy. During the early Congo Crisis, the government Gizenga received an indirect support of military equipment⁵⁸³ and financial aid⁵⁸⁴ - mainly clothes as well as cloth and yarn to produce uniforms. Later, the *Comité National de Libération* (CNL) was provided with weapons training,⁵⁸⁵ military equipment and weapons. The last included 2,000 sub-machine guns with 60,000 bullets ammunition, 100 *Panzerbüchsen* RPG 2 (a weapon similar to a bazooka) with 2,000 grenades and five mortars with 360 grenades.⁵⁸⁶

In Angola, the GDR supported the liberation movement MPLA. Since the beginning of the 1960s, this support contained indirect financial support and supplies of military equipment and since 1967 small amounts of weapons supplies.⁵⁸⁷ Not until some months before the outbreak of the Angola Crisis in November 1975, the aid was extended. Following this, greater amounts of military equipment and weapons were shipped from the East German international port Rostock to the harbour of the People's Republic of Congo and from there flown with a socialist airlift to the Angolan capital Luanda. In this way, the MPLA received ten recoilless guns B-10 with 2,000 fragmentation grenades and 2,000 cavity grenades, 10,000 sub-machine guns with 10 million bullets ammunition, forty pistols, and 10,000 grenades.⁵⁸⁸ German activities

⁵⁸³ Politburo of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany to Politburo of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, 14 February 1961, BArch, SAPMO, DY 30 / J IV 2/2 / 749.

⁵⁸⁴ Schüller - Undersecretary (East German General Consulate in Egypt) to third extra-european department (East German Ministry for Foreign Affairs), Office of the Authorized Agent of the GDR in Egypt, 27 August 1962, BArch, SAPMO, DY 30 IV 2/20/419, 295-297.

⁵⁸⁵ Scholz – Authorized Agent (Office of the Authorized Agent of the GDR in Egypt) to Stibi – Deputy Minister (East German Ministry for Foreign Affairs) and Kiesewetter – Deputy Minister (East German Ministry for Foreign Affairs), 27 January 1965, PA AA, MfAA, VS-65, 25.

⁵⁸⁶ Politburo of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany to Politburo of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, 5 January 1965, BArch, SAPMO, DY 30 / J IV 2/2 / 969.

⁵⁸⁷ Hans-Georg Schleicher and Ilona Schleicher, "Waffen für den Süden Afrikas. Die DDR und der bewaffnete Befreiungskampf," in *Die DDR und Afrika. Band 2: Engagiert für Afrika*, ed. Ulrich van der Heyden, Ilona Schleicher and Hans-Georg Schleicher (Münster and Hamburg: Lit-Verlag, 1994), 26.

⁵⁸⁸ Ilona Schleicher, *Zwischen Herzenswunsch und politischem Kalkül. DDR-Solidarität mit dem Befreiungskampf im südlichen Afrika. Annäherung an ein Erbe* (Berlin: Gesellschaftswissenschaftliches Forum and Helle Panke, 1998), 49.

played a significant role for the developments in these two hot spots of the Cold War. In the beginning of the Congo Crisis, the FRG appeared to have been one of the most important supporters of a moderate, pro-western development in the DRC. During the Portuguese colonial war, the GDR supported the pro-soviet powers in the MPLA and therefore seems to have had a share in its government takeover in November 1975.

Compared on an international level, the East German commitment kept within limits. Be that as it may, a tighter research on the exact worth and extent of the East German investments still remains to be done. Anyway, the FRG seems most likely to have been one of the most important powers, operating at these African hot spots. But as empirical studies on the concrete activities of the further involved states are still limited to date, a comparison is possible, but should only be undertaken while being conscious of its weak empirical basis.

Contrary to these hot spots, the German commitment was low in countries with small strategic mineral and energy carrier resources and with a simultaneous low endangerment of security of supply. The FRG concentrated its commitment in the development of its already existing economic networks by the extension of already existing economic structures. German projects, which included the development of completely new economic complexes, like the construction of mining and production sites, formed an exception in the Central African region, only to be found in Angola and the DRC.

In Angola, the West German company *Krupp* cooperated with the *Companhia Mineira do Lobito* (CML) and the *Sociedade Mineira de Lombige* to build a mining and production site for iron ore near Lobito. Altogether, Krupp and West German bank consortia⁵⁸⁹ made investments worth about 375 million DM. In exchange, Krupp and several West German steel companies should receive the major part of the Lobito iron ore production for a reduced price for several years.⁵⁹⁰ In the DRC, the international

⁵⁸⁹Eduardo de Sousa Ferreira, *Strukturen der Abhängigkeit. Wirtschaftsbeziehungen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland zu Angola und Mozambique* (Frankfurt am Main: Lembeck, 1975), pp. 37-42.

⁵⁹⁰Müller-Roschach – Ambassador (West German Embassy in Portugal) to West German Foreign Office, 21 December 1966, PA AA, AA, B 68, 452.

consortium *Association Internationale de l'Industrialisation du Nord-Est du Zaïre* (Assinez), which was lead by the West German company *Klöckner-Humboldt-Deutz*, planned investments worth 2 billion DM in the North East of the country.⁵⁹¹ In exchange for industrialisation of this region, the members of Assinez should receive resources, like copper, manganese, wolframite, zinc, and lead, at a discount on a long-term basis.⁵⁹² In contrast, the GDR abstained from these activities – at least until 1975. Thus, the activities of both German states seem to have effected and accelerated an evolutionary development of the Central African economies and their networking not just with the international and the respective European, but also with the German markets.

By international comparison, it is a hard task to specify the German rank in the Central African second scramble. What is sure is that it was high enough to increase the German economic influence in the region. The share Central Africa had in the West and East German global commerce may have decreased financially – as secondary literature shows –, but simultaneously, it increased materially. Here, the success of the German Africa policies – fixated on trade and not on economic investments – becomes apparent. During the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, quantity and quality of the products, which Germany imported from Africa, could be raised, while the prices of the products could simultaneously be lowered. Therefore, the German participation in the second scramble in Central Africa was a success – at least from the standpoint of the two German states.

Economy and Hallstein – Hallstein and Economy

In my thesis – as already mentioned – four paradigms of scholarship on West and East German history concerning the foreign activities of the two German states, are put into question. In the following, my disapproval of the most important of them – the superior relevance of the Hallstein doctrine – shall serve as a brief summing up of this paper. In context of scholarship on the West and the East German activities in the Central African region and the African continent (as well as the world as a whole), the most common

⁵⁹¹ Assinez to West German Foreign Office, (3 June 1975), PA AA, AA, Zwischenarchiv, 103051.

⁵⁹² Schlegel (West German Foreign Office) to Kremer - department 403 (West German Foreign Office), 3 September 1975, PA AA, AA, Zwischenarchiv, 103052

paradigm states that between 1955 and 1969/72 the German-German contradiction – in the form of a maintenance respectively a breakthrough in regards to the Hallstein doctrine – has been the leitmotif for German Africa policies and all activities regarding it.⁵⁹³ Only when the German-German basic treaty was signed in 1972, was this policy replaced by a 'new' leitmotif – the German economic interests. However, this superior relevance, in which the German-German contradiction was awarded, can be questioned. Already before the issuing of the Hallstein doctrine in 1955, a commitment on behalf of the FRG and the GDR on the African continent had existed. Moreover, the commitment did not receive a boost with the implementation of the doctrine and it did not relapse after it had ended (neither with the instalment of the Scheel doctrine in 1969 nor with the signing of the German-German basic treaty in 1972).

Admittedly, the German-German contradiction became a significant argument in the internal discussions to handle the regulation and utilization of the available resources in both German states in the 1950s and 1960s. But its excessive usage originated primarily in the official formalities and unofficial regulations of the German ministerial bureaucracy. Nearly all project proposals – written to receive resources from the state – forwarded to the respective ministries, were reasoned with the German–German contradiction. But, only a fraction of these proposals finally received government subsidies. Instead, economic – sometimes also geostrategic – arguments led much more often to a successful proposal. Actually, economic interests were of primary importance. Their implementation received a substantial amount of the economic, cultural, and military aid of the German states.

Indeed, several cases of development and intelligence aid can be made out as attempts to influence African decision makers – but just not in context of the Hallstein doctrine. For that, another instrument of foreign policy was used: briberies. For instance, the

⁵⁹³This is a common view in historical and political scholarship. Every survey on German history and foreign policy mentions and respects this paradigm. Therefore, it is impossible (and unnessecary) to give an overview on the secondary literature applying to this point. Instead, three works that focus on the phenomenon Hallstein doctrine shall be mentioned here: Rüdiger Marco Booz, *Hallsteinzeit: deutsche Außenpolitik, 1955-1972* (Bonn: Bouvier, 1995). / Werner Kilian, *Die Hallstein-Doktrin: der diplomatische Krieg zwischen der BRD und der DDR. 1955-1973* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2001). / William Glenn Gray, *Germany's Cold War: The Global Campaign to Isolate East Germany, 1949-1969* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003).

Foreign Minister of Cameroon, Okala, received 10,000 DM (approximately \$2,500) in cash and a pre-examination for a liposuction at the clinical centre of Bonn Venusberg from the FRG for a speech he gave at the United Nations Organisation (UNO) in 1960.⁵⁹⁴ When Jean-Bédel Bokassa took over power in the Central African Republic in 1966, a West German ambassador extraordinary with a check worth 80,000 DM (approximately \$20,000) was sent, to influence future votes of Bokassa's country in the UNO.⁵⁹⁵ These are examples that show how the German states took action when the German-German contradiction was at stake. In this case, not millions or billions, but hundreds, thousands and ten thousands of DM were invested. In contrast, millions and even hundred of millions were invested for economic and geostrategic reasons – e.g. in projects of development and military aid. Therefore, the primacy of the Hallstein doctrine has to be denied.

Certainly in the case of the GDR, parts of its commitment can also be interpreted as an attempt to breach the Hallstein doctrine. After all, non-recognition made it difficult to conclude agreements – not least a barrier for the economic development of the GDR. But looked at more closely, the overtures of the GDR concentrated themselves mainly on some economically relevant states and therefore suggest an economic background either. Therefore, the German-German contradiction cannot be referred to as the *leitmotif* in context of an evaluation of the West and East German activities. At best, the doctrine can be conceded a greater meaning in the field of propaganda and public relations. Instead, economic interests played a major role. The German-German contradiction only flanked this and the other interests and masked them with its popularity in the German societies. Therefore, the paradigm of a primacy of the Hallstein doctrine seems to have been something propaganda and public relations always produce – more fiction than reality.

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⁵⁹⁴ Böhling to department 307 (West German Foreign Office), 1 September 1960, PA AA, AA, B 34, 157.

⁵⁹⁵ Federer to West German Foreign Office, (7 December 1966), PA AA, AA, B 34, 689.

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“Friends” with Benefits: Relations between Hungary and countries of the Middle East during the Cold War

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Introduction

This paper will focus on Hungary’s relationship with Middle Eastern countries in the following aspects: First, after this short introduction I would like to give a glance at the background of the political relationship between Hungary and the countries of the region, paying special attention to the role of communist parties of these countries. Second, the paper will shed some light on the economic aspects of the links between the states in question. Finally, I would like to present a short analysis of Hungary’s role in the Eastern Bloc’s policy regarding the Middle Eastern region.

Due to scarcity of secondary literature at the time of writing this paper, I will mainly lean on the relevant primary sources we collected during the above mentioned research process. Nevertheless, in order to put the whole subject into a sound context, I will use some vital secondary sources that cover the Middle Eastern region during the Cold War era.

After much consideration I chose to leave out Israel from this paper. The reason for this is that because of the reasonably large number of Hungarians with Jewish background in Hungary and likewise many Israeli citizens with Hungarian roots means that this relationship was such a special and delicate one during this era that it would not be possible to fully present this relationship together with those, Hungary had to other Middle Eastern countries in one conference paper. This is why the paper will ignore relations between Hungary and Israel and focus mainly on the links to other Middle Eastern countries that were “friendly” as far as the Eastern Bloc is concerned.

This takes us to our next question: what does the term “friendly” states mean? By this expression I mean those states that were part of the Soviet sphere of influence at a certain time during the Cold War. I put the word friendly between quotation marks since one of the objectives of this paper is to demonstrate that links between these countries and Hungary were characterised mainly by the pursuit of self-interest and not by friendship rooted in ideological understanding⁵⁹⁶. I will further demonstrate this by presenting some examples in the domain of economic cooperation. Consequently, relations with other Middle Eastern states that decided to side with the US and its allies will not be covered here. The other objective of this paper is to demonstrate that although Hungary’s foreign policy was largely influenced by Moscow, Budapest was still able to play a somewhat autonomous role as part of the Soviet Bloc.

Political Relations

Despite the fact that Hungary maintained centuries-long relations with the countries and peoples of the Middle East⁵⁹⁷, these links had atrophied to an almost non-existent state before and during World War II. Besides, the post-war Soviet occupation and the ensuing Stalinization of the country left little room for manoeuvre as far as foreign policy was concerned⁵⁹⁸.

After the take-over by the communist party in 1948, Hungary had to follow the foreign policy dictated by Moscow. For a number of possible reasons Stalin chose not to focus his attention on the Middle East. Besides the obvious fact that both Moscow and Washington focused their attention on Europe at this time, according László J Nagy, the very logic of the Zhdanov Doctrine that divided the world into two camps left little

⁵⁹⁶ Nevertheless, since the contemporary jargon described these states as friendly, I decided to go ahead and use the expression myself.

⁵⁹⁷ Before World War II Hungary had diplomatic relations with only Egypt and Iraq. For more information regarding the pre-1945 History of contacts between Hungary and the Middle East see J Nagy, László, *Hungary and the Arab World – Connections, opinions, standpoints 1947-1975* [Magyarország és az arab térség – Kapcsolatok, vélemények, álláspontok 1947-1975], JATE Press, Szeged, Hungary, 2006, pp.9-22.

⁵⁹⁸ Viktor Csornoky was the first and last ambassador of Egypt before the take over of the Communist party of the government in Budapest in 1948. Shortly afterwards he was called back to Budapest, tried and sentenced to death by the Rákosi government in 1948. Ibid. pp. 28-29.

importance to places that were not members of either bloc⁵⁹⁹. Moreover, one has to keep in mind that during the late 1940s into the early 1950s most of the Middle Eastern territories were still under the control of European colonial powers. As US President Harry Truman chose to leave this region to be dealt with by the colonial rulers⁶⁰⁰, Stalin probably considered this region either as in the sphere of interest of the UK and France or did not personally feel powerful enough to deal with the Middle East when there were much to worry about in other regions as well. Since during the last years of Stalin Hungarian foreign policy was very closely aligned to that of the Soviet Union, this era is characterised by very low-key connections between Hungary and the Middle East.

Relations between the Soviet Bloc and the Middle East intensified after Stalin's death. This might be down to the fact that by the middle of the 1950s the US managed to integrate many Middle Eastern countries bordering the Soviet Union into pacts linked to the Western powers, such as CENTO. I would not like to analyze whether the intensification of Soviet foreign policy in the region was the cause or the result of the intense activity of the US administration orchestrated by Dulles at that time⁶⁰¹. Nevertheless, what Bernard Lewis described as the Soviet Union's "leap-frogging" into the region after 1955⁶⁰² led to a more active Hungarian foreign policy as well.

Connections with "friendly" states such as Egypt (until the 1970s), Syria, Iraq and Libya lay on a double-layered foundation. On the one hand, there were the official channels between governments and embassies. On the other hand, however, the Hungarian government kept close working relationships with the communist parties of these countries as well. There were regular meetings of communist party delegations from several countries in Hungary including those from the Middle East⁶⁰³. Thus the

⁵⁹⁹ Ibid., pp.23.

⁶⁰⁰ Douglas Little, *The Cold War in the Middle East: Suezcrisis to Camp David Accords* in: Melvyn P. Leffler, Odd Arne Westad, *The Cambridge History of the Cold War – Volume II, Crises and Détente*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2010, pp. 305-306.

⁶⁰¹ The creation of CENTO in 1955 is the best example for this.

⁶⁰² Bernard Lewis, *Rethinking the Middle East*, *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 71, Number 4, CFR, New York, 1992.

⁶⁰³ Every year the Political Committee (PC) of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party (HSWP) discussed the upcoming visits for that year. For one example for a record preserving this information see: HSWP Central Committee (CC) Department for Foreign Affairs, *Motion fro the PC for the plan o the non-socialist inter-party relations in 1979*. (5 December 1978) [Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt (MSZMP)

flow of information from these “friendly” countries reached Budapest from a number of resources. The above-mentioned communist parties provided some vital, but many times flawed, information to the Hungarian officials and through Foreign Ministry officials residing in these countries. Besides, the official connections between the states obviously provided data through the Foreign Ministry as well. Moreover, Moscow made sure its allies were provided with all necessary data and insight in order to enable them to keep to the line favoured by the Soviet Union⁶⁰⁴.

The reconciliation of all the information from these sources meant a challenge. One good example is presented by László J. Nagy in connection with the 1965 coup d'état in Algeria⁶⁰⁵. In this case, the military power-grab led by Boumedienne was presented in a very negative tone by the Hungarian embassy in Algiers since most of the ambassador's information was collected from the Algerian Communist Party. Foreign Ministry officials in Budapest, however, were much more sober in their analysis of the same situation, and thought twice about condemning the coup⁶⁰⁶. This turned out to be the good decision, because the new government decided to keep a positive attitude towards the Eastern Bloc. In this situation, we can clearly see a dilemma between realpolitik and foreign policy based on ideology.

It was not always easy to reconcile these two factors during the Cold War era for a member of the Soviet Bloc, but most of the time, realpolitik gained the upper hand. Another good example of this is the fact that Hungary failed to condemn the persecution of Egyptian communists during the 1950s although an internal report by the Hungarian embassy in Cairo could find little difference between Egyptian state forces and “the Nazi regime in Germany as far as their methods are concerned”⁶⁰⁷. In spite of this,

Központi Bizottság (KB) Külügyi Osztály, *Javaslat a Politikai Bizottságnak a nem szocialista reláció pártközi kapcsolatainak 1979. évi tervére* Hungarian National Archives, [Magyar Országos Levéltár] henceforward MOL M-KS 288. f. 5/762. ö. e. (1978.12.28.)

⁶⁰⁴ On many occasions the Soviet ambassador to Budapest briefed the Hungarian Foreign Ministry officials on actualities including the Middle Eastern Affairs. See: Hungarian Foreign Ministry, *Foreign Ministry memorandum on Soviet ambassador Tito's briefing on Soviet foreign policy* (26 June 1970), MOL XIX-J-1-j-SzU-146-00358/17/1970

⁶⁰⁵ J Nagy, László, op. cit., pp.85-86

⁶⁰⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁰⁷ Hungarian Foreign Ministry, *Annual report of the Hungarian embassy from 1958*. MOL Küm, XIX-J-1-j, Kairó Tük, 1945-1964 13.d. 139/1959.

Hungary chose not to condemn the aggressive acts of the Egyptian state apparatus against the local communists. It seems the communist movement in Egypt was expendable in order to keep Egypt in the Soviet sphere of influence and to avoid damaging valuable economic ties.

The examples mentioned above shed light on a number of things. Ideology played only a secondary or even less significant role in the relationship with these “friendly” Middle Eastern countries. In this sense, Egypt is one of the best examples as to why we need to use the term friendly with a citation mark. While it is true that Nasser adopted many leftist elements as far as the government was concerned such as nationalisation of key sectors, land reform, anti-western foreign policy (rooted in anti-colonialism and Arab nationalism), secular state structure, and a conscious choice of not implementing the separation of powers,⁶⁰⁸ it did not mean that the Egyptian government was ready to go down the road of communism. These leaders used, and sometimes abused, the relationship between them and the Soviet Bloc, and within it Hungary, in order to further their own and their nation’s interests. In this aspect there is nothing new under the sun.

Economic Relations

The economy and especially trade played a major role in the relations between Hungary and the Middle Eastern countries. In a sense, both sides needed one another. Hungary needed markets for its goods in order to obtain hard currency, as there was a chronic shortage of this due to the fact that throughout the years between 1956 and 1989 the country ran a continuous trade deficit vis-à-vis the western countries⁶⁰⁹. The Middle Eastern countries’ markets presented an opportunity to market not only agricultural goods and products of the food industry, but those industrial products that were otherwise not competitive on the Western capitalist markets⁶¹⁰.

⁶⁰⁸ Adeed Dawisha, *The second Arab awakening*, W. W. Norton & Company, New York, 2013, pp. 69-71.

⁶⁰⁹ Attila Mong, *Kádár’s Credit*[Kádár hitele], Libri kiadó, Budapest, Hungary, 2012.

⁶¹⁰ For a recapitulative report on trade between the „friendly” countries of the region and Hungary see: Hungarian Foreign Ministry, *Report on the relations between Hungary and the Arab states in the mid 1960s*, MOL Küm, XIX-J-1-j, Arab országok Tük, 1965 111 d. IV-14.

The fact that for Hungary there were no other major countries to which the country could sell its industrial products for hard currency, such as US Dollars, in big quantities is yet another reason why realpolitik played a much greater role in relations between these states. This reliance on the flow of foreign currency meant that Budapest needed the goodwill of the partner governments. However, these economic relations were not without problems. Firstly, some of these countries themselves lacked the hard currency Hungary needed so badly. One way to remedy this situation was to enter into barter agreements. But in many cases the problem was that these countries did not have the kind of goods that Hungarian industry could absorb on a mass scale. As a Foreign Ministry report stated: "...the biggest problem is that the majority of these countries cannot offer goods that are useful for our domestic economy and could offset the value of our exports..."⁶¹¹

This resulted in a number of uncomfortable situations when Hungary was forced to re-export the goods it obtained in exchange for its own exports. By re-exporting vast quantities of a given good such as cotton, the result was a downward pressure on the price of that good in question on the world market. The consequent decrease of the price of the good meant huge damages for the country that tried to make up its accounts to Hungary. Indeed, this paradoxical nature of trade relations towards some countries of the region can be best described by the above mentioned memorandum from the Foreign Ministry in 1965, warning about the deteriorating foreign currency conditions of some of these countries, which meant Hungary needed to allocate loans to these countries in order to keep these relations from freezing altogether⁶¹². This is indeed a damning picture of the partners that were supposed to act as markets for products of the Hungarian industry. This difficult situation eased somewhat after the skyrocketing of oil prices after 1973. Afterwards, a number of Middle Eastern countries boasted major income from petroleum exports, thus they found themselves in a much better financial position. The result was a turn-around in the directions of loans. Instead of Hungary providing loans for countries of the region, some of these Middle Eastern countries lent

⁶¹¹ Ibid.

⁶¹² Ibid.

money to Hungary⁶¹³. As the financial situations of countries such as Iraq and Libya further improved during the 1970s and 1980s,⁶¹⁴ so did Hungary's financial situation become increasingly worrisome. This issue was caused by the ever-present negative trade-balance as mentioned earlier. To mitigate the problem, Hungary asked these cash-rich trading partners to deposit large amounts of hard currency in Budapest⁶¹⁵. Hungary's financial situation underwent a liquidity crisis at the beginning of the 1980s that eventually left the government with the necessity to join the IMF and the IBRD. The fact that during these months the financial institutions of these Arab countries chose to remove deposits in question from Budapest further demonstrates the limited scope and trust of these "friendly" governments towards Hungary⁶¹⁶.

When talking about export markets for products of heavy industry, one must not forget the "special" trade relations with these countries. The word "special" obviously refers to the defence industry in the archive documents. As early as 1947, Egyptian politicians tried to set up cooperation between Budapest and Cairo in this dimension as well, but it only materialised some years later in the 1950s⁶¹⁷. However, one has to keep in mind that Hungary never played a significant role in providing military hardware to countries in the Middle East. In Kádár's words, "the actual suppliers were two socialist countries"⁶¹⁸. It is more than likely that the two countries in question were the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia.

The intention of importing civilian and military products from non-western countries was part of a wider attempt by the governments of the Middle East to break ties once and for all between them and their former colonial masters. The determination to develop an industrial sector that is not dependent upon the post-colonial economies of Western Europe naturally pushed these countries towards the Eastern Bloc.

⁶¹³ Attila Mong, Kádár's Credit, pp.156.

⁶¹⁴ However, the conflict between Iran and Iraq meant increasing difficulties for Iraq from the beginning of the 1980s.

⁶¹⁵ op. cit., pp. 200-202.

⁶¹⁶ Ibid.

⁶¹⁷ J Nagy, László, op. cit., pp.34-37.

⁶¹⁸ See: Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, Political Committee, *János Kádár's comment at a HSWP Political Committee meeting on military support for "friendly" Arab countries in 1967* (18 July 1967), MOL M-KS 288. f. 5/430. ő. e. (1967.07.18.)

Hungary managed to profit in two further aspects from the development of economic cooperation in the “special,” military field between the Middle Eastern governments and the Soviet Bloc. On the one hand, with the military cooperation inevitably had some spill-over effects into the civilian sectors of the economy. This was the sector from which Hungary could profit the most. For instance, the deepening “special” ties between Egypt and the Soviet Bloc meant interest for other products of the Hungarian heavy industry, such as diesel engines, bridges, etc.,⁶¹⁹ increased significantly from the 1950s onwards.

In addition, the increased demand for military hardware from these governments sometimes led to shortages in the Soviet stockpiles⁶²⁰. This resulted in Hungary’s offering of some hardware (such as radars) from its own stocks. This led to the development of some sectors of the Hungarian defense industry as well in order to enable the Soviet Bloc to match the increased demand from its Middle Eastern “friends”⁶²¹. So, in some instances, the very shortages that strained the relations between the Soviet Union and some countries of the Middle East could have positive effects on the Hungarian defense industry.

Hungary’s Role as a Member of the Soviet Bloc

It is true that Hungary played a secondary role in foreign policy between the Soviet Bloc and the countries of the Middle East. But this does not mean its role was not significant in some cases. As a member of the Warsaw Pact, the country needed to align itself to the policies dictated by Moscow but there was always some limited room for maneuver. After all, the national interest of Hungary sometimes differed from those of other Eastern Bloc countries. A good example for this is the official visit of a high-profile Hungarian delegation to Syria in 1972. At the end of the visit, the two sides failed to issue a joint statement, which would have been a sign of political understanding. The Syrian government and the Hungarian delegation failed to agree on

⁶¹⁹ J Nagy, László, op. cit., pp.37.

⁶²⁰ Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, Political Committee, *Report for the Politburo on weapons exports to the UAR and Syria by Minister of Defense Lajos Czinege* (21 October 1969) MOL M-KS 288. F. 5/501 ő. E (1969.10.21.)

⁶²¹ Ibid.

main ideological principles, such as condemning the anti-communist sentiment in the region⁶²². However, a Czechoslovak delegation visiting about the same time did not have such a problem⁶²³. These events demonstrate that the foreign policy of the Eastern Bloc countries were not hand-controlled from Moscow.

Hungary's role in respect to negotiations with Iran further supports this idea. In 1981 the relationship between Tehran and Moscow was very frosty. Thus, the Soviets asked the Hungarian government to act as a mediator between the two sides⁶²⁴. This document further demonstrates that Moscow did not shy away from using the diplomatic services of its allies when there was a problem in a bilateral relationship with a given country. Besides, this further increased the significance of the autonomous role the countries of the Eastern Bloc could play in foreign policy during the years of Soviet dominance.

Conclusion

This paper presented a quick glance into the complex relationship between Hungary and the countries of the Middle East. While pursuing its own self-interest Budapest needed to keep a delicate balance in regards to the realities of the Soviet Bloc. As far as the “friendly” states of the Middle East are concerned, this “friendly” attitude was a result of domestic and historic necessities. The anti-colonialist ideology paired up with a left-leaning nationalist agenda made the Eastern Bloc a convenient “friend” to these regimes. However, the “friendliness” of these governments had their clear-cut limits. The way the communists treated their own communist parties is very telling alone. But the fact that the persecution of Middle Eastern communist activists never really jeopardized the relations between the Soviet Bloc and these governments sheds light on the fact that political and economic interests were always above ideology as far as these relationships are concerned.

The effects of the closer than average relations between these countries and Hungary can still be felt today. Hungary is still well-known by many in the region. In the

⁶²² Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, Political Committee, *Minutes of the PC's session* (3 May 1972), MOL M-KS 288. f. 5/580 ö. e. (1972.05.03)

⁶²³ László J Nagy, op. cit., pp. 125-126.

⁶²⁴ Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, Central Committee, *Information by the Soviet Ambassador in Budapest on the situation in Iran* (4 July 1983), MOL, M-KS-288 f. 11./4415.ö.e.

framework of economic and political cooperation, there were many students from these countries who studied in several Hungarian Universities during these decades. Some of these students returned to their homelands, but many remained, creating a small, but rather well-educated, Muslim population in Hungary⁶²⁵. The current government's new foreign policy agenda, the so-called Opening to the East, also aims to warm up these relations between the Middle Eastern countries and Hungary. Relations that were friendly at times, but never lacked the clear aim of maximizing benefits, even if it meant sacrificing ideology.

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⁶²⁵ For more insight into this question see: Sulok, Sultan, *Muslim Minority in Hungary*, in: Jaroslav Bureš (ed.) *Muslims in Visegrad*, Institute of International Relations, Prague, Czech Republic, 2011 and Csicsmann, László, Vékony, Dániel *Muslims In Hungary: A Bridge Between East and West?* in: Jaroslav Bureš (ed.) *Muslims in Visegrad*, Institute of International Relations, Prague, Czech Republic, 2011.

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Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, Political Committee, *Minutes of the PC's session* (3 May 1972), MOL M-KS 288. f. 5/580 ő. e. (1972.05.03)

Broadening the limits: Austrian foreign policy under four power occupation

Dóra HORVÁTH

Following the Second World War, the situation of Austria was special. On the one hand, the country was occupied by both Eastern and Western powers, just like as in Germany. On the other hand, there was no coherent verdict about the role of Austria in the War. According to the Moscow Declaration, Austria was the first free country to fall victim to Adolf Hitler's aggression.

However, Austria was also deemed responsible by the Declaration for its participation on Nazi Germany's side. Due to this paradox, the legal form of the post-war treaty raised some questions. Austrian politicians highlighted the victim-role of their country. They wanted to sign a state treaty because this would have meant the re-establishment of an independent and democratic Austria following the occupation by the German troops. Austrian politicians wanted to avoid signing a peace-treaty which the Allies used with defeated countries.

While Austria was trying to run away from its past troubled by the *Anschluss*, it found itself exposed to a cross-fire between the East and West. Its future was determined by the course of the Cold War. The young republic had to learn how to balance between the East and West in order to achieve sovereignty.

In this paper I would like to investigate the question whether Austria could have an influence on the treaty with the Allied powers and on its own future, or its destiny was at the mercy of the Cold War. I would like to prove that Austrian leading politicians and diplomats could affect the decisions of the four occupying powers on the Austrian treaty, even though Austria had a narrow room for maneuver as I will demonstrate later.

Between West and East

The idea of the state treaty suited the strategy of the U.S. reflecting the tension between the U.S. and the USSR. The sovereignty of Austria promised both economic and political advantages to the U.S. in this region and could impede the long-term occupation of the Eastern Zone by the Soviets.⁶²⁶ However, such a treaty did not materialize because of the opposition of the USSR which wanted to economically exploit the Austrian Soviet Zone. The occupation was also important for the Soviets as a pretext for stationing the Soviet Army in Hungary and Romania.⁶²⁷

The four occupying powers signed the First Control Agreement on July 4, 1945. This was meant as a short term solution for the period up to the establishment of a freely elected Austrian government recognized by the four powers. The Allied Commission for Austria was established which had two suborganizations: the Allied Council which consisted of the supreme commanders of the troops of the four occupying countries and exercised the supreme authority and the Executive Committee made up by the senior military officers of the occupiers.⁶²⁸

Failing to reach consensus on Austria's future, the Allies signed the Second Control Agreement on June 28, 1946 and established a special committee of foreign policy experts from the occupying countries. The Austrian Treaty Commission had to create a preparatory form for the Austrian treaty. It became clear that the process of drawing up a treaty for Austria would take more time and would be strongly influenced by the relationship between the occupying powers. The Second Control Agreement gave certain rights to the Austrian government. The government had a certain degree of maneuvering in foreign policy decisions as well; however, any international agreement required a notice to the four powers. Any agreement could be considered as accepted if it was not appealed within 31 days by the Allied Council.⁶²⁹

⁶²⁶ Eva-Marie Csáky, *Der Weg zu Freiheit und Neutralität. Dokumentation zur österreichischen Aussenpolitik. 1945-1955*, p. 2.

⁶²⁷ Zoltán Maruzsa: *Az osztrák külpolitika a szövetséges megszállástól az európai integrációig (1945-1995)*, p. 39.

⁶²⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 19.

⁶²⁹ Gerald Stourzh: *Um Einheit und Freiheit*, p. 48

There were two basic factors influencing the course of the Austrian treaty on the international stage. One was the economic interests of the main occupying powers, perceptible especially during the first part of the negotiation process. The other was their international political strategies during the Cold War.

Economic Strategy of the U.S.

U.S. leaders after World War II were aware that the wartime economic boom would soon be over and that the international economy would need new stimulation to grow. American economists were convinced that only a liberal world trade environment could sustain demand.⁶³⁰ In the American strategy after 1947, the economic factor gained an especially important role. The U.S. wanted to focus on economic initiatives rather than military rearmament because they saw the Soviet threat in this first period of the Cold War primarily as political and psychological, not a military one. They wanted to answer to the Soviet challenge with economic strength and with a network of economically strong, self-supporting European and Asian power centers which stayed outside the Soviet orbit. Therefore, Western Europe and Japan had to be revived economically.⁶³¹

To achieve the above mentioned aim in Europe, the U.S. government was ready to provide substantial assistance in the frame of the European Recovery Program (ERP). The so-called Marshall Plan was essential to the postwar European economy because it successfully addressed the continent's serious dollar shortfall and thereby enabled its economic recovery. It became possible for the beneficiary states to put in place costly welfare systems which also defined their political choices.⁶³² Beside the economic importance of the Marshall Plan, its political and cultural impact on the beneficiary states was enormous as well.⁶³³ The ERP unified the beneficiary states and the U.S. by economic links as well as ideological and security ties.⁶³⁴

⁶³⁰ Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad: *The Cambridge History of the Cold War. I. Volume*. p. 68.

⁶³¹ Ibid., p. 77.

⁶³² Ibid., p. 164-165.

⁶³³ Ibid., p. 165.

⁶³⁴ Ibid., p. 154.

During the course of the negotiations of an Austrian treaty, the U.S. European strategy and Austria's joining of the ERP were important for two reasons. First, the Marshall Plan made up 14%⁶³⁵ of Austria's GNP which was the highest figure among the beneficiaries. Therefore, the ERP was especially important both for Austria's economy and for the political and cultural attitude of the country. For the U.S. it was essential to strengthen the Austrian economy so that the country surrounded by several states of the Soviet sphere of influence could resist the pressure of the USSR.

Secondly, Austria was the only Soviet-occupied country to join the ERP, the Soviets having refused the Marshall Plan. The idea of the ERP marked "the Rubicon" with no return in the course of the Cold War.⁶³⁶ To accept the aid meant also a choice between the West and East. Therefore, the fact that the divided Austria joined the program enhanced tensions and slowed down the negotiation process. Smart diplomacy on Austria's side was needed to avoid a more serious crisis with the Soviet Union.

Economic Strategy of the USSR

After having lost at least 27 million people and about a quarter of its reproducible wealth⁶³⁷ as a result of the war, the USSR's main economic interest was the acquisition of as many assets as possible in the occupied territories. According to Austrian statistics, the Soviets took around 60-70% of Austrian oil production, most of which was in their zone, during their occupation of the country.⁶³⁸ They acquired the whole oil industry of the Eastern Zone and the facilities of the Danube Steam Shipping Company.

Around 63,000 people worked in the so-called USIA-factories owned by the USSR in Austria. Because of this confiscation, the relationship between the Austrian government and the occupying Soviets became strained at an early stage. The USSR claimed a significant share in the most important strategic industrial branches referring to the Potsdam Agreement concerning the so called "German Assets", properties which

⁶³⁵ Ibid., p. 178.

⁶³⁶ Ibid., p. 167.

⁶³⁷ Melvyn P Leffler and Odd Arne Westad: The Cambridge History of the Cold War. I. Volume. p. 90.

⁶³⁸ Bader, William: Austria between East and West, 1945–1955, p. 121.

previously belonged to the Germans in Austria. First, Austria tried to curb Soviet ambitions with an act of nationalization, later tried to rebuy the German Assets from the Soviets, but all attempts failed.⁶³⁹

Confrontation of the Superpowers' Foreign Policies above Austria

The other important factor which determined the process of preparing the Austrian treaty was the political relationship between the U.S. and the USSR. The tension and rivalry between the two superpowers started to grow immediately following the end of the World War. Their strategies and actions were determined by their fears and beliefs concerning the aims of the other. In the years I am examining, their strategies changed according to the current international situation which of course had an effect on the fate of the Austrian treaty. The tension between them was growing constantly until the death of Stalin. There were some international cases during the Cold War which had a particularly strong effect on the Austrian story; such as the deterioration of the relationship between the USSR and Yugoslavia, the proclamation of the ERP, the communist takeover in Czechoslovakia and the negotiations on Germany.

Stalin spoke in February 1946 in which he called capitalism the main source of wars and a threat to Soviet security. This speech was understood by the West as a call for ideological struggle and Soviet expansion.⁶⁴⁰ The West's answer was the demand that the Soviets leave Iran and the famous speech of Winston Churchill about the *Iron Curtain* in Fulton in March 1946. The relationship between the Western powers and the USSR began to deteriorate even further at this time. The creation of the Austrian treaty was stymied during the first committee meeting in 1947. Besides the problem of how to define the German assets, the Yugoslavian territorial and material claims also caused difficulties because they were accepted by the USSR but refused by the Western powers and Austria. Yugoslavia, as a socialist country, was supported by the Soviet Union, despite the fact that it was not a Soviet bloc country, but not by the Western countries.

⁶³⁹ Eva-Marie Csáky. *Der Weg zu Freiheit und Neutralität. Dokumentation zur österreichischen Aussenpolitik. 1945-1955.* p. 10.

⁶⁴⁰ Leffler, op. cit., p. 100.

In the spring of 1947, the Austrian Treaty Commission worked out the so-called Cherrière Plan regarding the German Assets. The Plan⁶⁴¹ proposed the Austrian purchase of German Assets using government credits and envisaged to supply different commodities to Great Britain and France and oil to the USSR for five years. This plan could have been a good basis for the negotiations.⁶⁴² However, at this time the Cold War powers did not want to negotiate any longer. On March 12th 1947, two days after opening the conference in Moscow about the Austrian treaty, the American President, Harry Truman, proclaimed his doctrine against Soviet expansion. Moreover, international tensions increased in June when the ERP was proclaimed.

A modified form of the Cherrière Plan came again into play at the London conference between 25th of November and 15th of December 1947⁶⁴³. This plan would have given the Soviets a significant influence on the Austrian economy. The USSR would have gained control of 58% of Austrian oil production for thirty years, certain equipment of the Danube Steam Shipping Company would have remain in Soviet possession and Austria would have supplied commodities to the value of one hundred million dollar within seven years.⁶⁴⁴ The USSR was open to negotiate the details with greater demand. However, the Western Allies did not want to give up their position. Austria was an important strategic point between north and south, between the western zone of Germany and Italy.⁶⁴⁵

In 1948 the negotiations on the treaty continued, but soon stopped, as the news of the communist takeover in Czechoslovakia spread. This shocked the Western powers and Austria because Czechoslovakia appeared to be successful in balancing between the East and West and because there was not even one Soviet soldier in this country. This issue changed the strategy of the occupying powers. The USSR became more flexible about the content of the treaty; the Western powers were rather uncertain. The situation became more difficult as the USSR withdrew from the German Allied Commission in

⁶⁴¹ Szirtes, J. I.: Austrian Foreign Policy 1945-1985. p. 25.

⁶⁴² Eva-Marie Csáky.: Der Weg zu Freiheit und Neutralität. Dokumentation zur österreichischen Aussenpolitik. 1945-1955. p. 10.

⁶⁴³ Szirtes, op. cit. 26; Gruber, p. 184.-185.

⁶⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 26.

⁶⁴⁵ Csáky, op. cit., p. 11.

March 1948. The tension further rose as the USSR set up a blockade around West-Berlin, following currency reform in Western Germany. The breakdown in relations between Tito and Stalin created a good opportunity for the Austrian treaty. On Austrian initiative the occupying powers sat down again. The Yugoslavian claims were reduced significantly. But now, the parties could not agree on the German Assets. However, the real reason behind the failure of the meeting had more to do once again with the current international situation.

The USSR succeeded in detonating its atom bomb so the U.S. no longer possessed a monopoly on nuclear weapons. This increased American concerns regarding the Soviet intentions; this also slowed down the negotiations between the two countries. Tension between them was growing intense. In May 1949, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) was established in the West, while in October the German Democratic Republic (GDR) was proclaimed in the East. German unity obviously failed which was especially relevant regarding Austria. The two cases were often mentioned together on international negotiations. Both countries were occupied by Western and Eastern powers and they both needed an agreement between the Eastern and Western occupiers in order to be independent and unified. This objective failed now in case of Germany.

Besides all of these international happenings which resulted in a deep gap between the West and East, even the American policy was divided on the issue of Austria. The State Department hoped that the occupying powers would agree. However, the U.S. Department of Defense did not want an agreement.⁶⁴⁶ As the European strategy of the U.S. changed in the 1950s,⁶⁴⁷ the latter got a larger role in American politics. They wanted to strengthen their European presence not only economically, but also militarily as underlined by the establishment of NATO in 1949. As a result, the U.S. did not want to pull out of Austria. The negotiations continued to the end of 1949. At the beginning of the 1950s, only five uncertain points remained in regards to the treaty. However, it was during this time that the Cold War reached its zenith. During the Korean War both

⁶⁴⁶ Csáky, op. cit., p. 13.

⁶⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 13.

powers tried to reinforce their European foundations.⁶⁴⁸ The time was not apt for them to agree on the Austrian issue. Negotiations broke down again. Both the U.S. and the USSR offered options for agreement which the other side could simply not accept. For example, the Soviets linked the Austrian issue with the situation in Trieste.⁶⁴⁹ They impugned the Austrian measures against former Nazis and the remilitarization of Austria by the Western powers. They wanted Austria to reimburse the aid they gave after the World War. Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, representing the USSR, created the solution for Germany with a precondition for the reduction of the occupying troops from Austria.⁶⁵⁰ The Western powers also had enough fantasy; they created a draft for a short treaty, which did not even mention the case of the German assets.

It became clear that none of the Cold War powers wanted an agreement on the Austrian question. As a result, Austria tried to bring its case to the forum of the United Nations.⁶⁵¹ However, the competence of the UN was also bounded by the Cold War. The Security Council of the UN could make binding decisions, but both the U.S. and the USSR held veto power in the Council. Only consensus between the U.S. and the USSR could have offered a solution. The opportunity for an agreement came in the year of 1953. Stalin died and Julius Raab became Austria Chancellor. These two events fundamentally changed the relationship between the Soviet Union and Austria. Both governments started to make concessions. The USSR took over the costs of the maintenance of the Soviet occupation. Austria was willing to withdraw the plan of the short treaty. In 1953, a marked-change of tone between the two countries gradually took place.⁶⁵² In February 1954, at the Berlin Conference of Foreign Ministers, Molotov

⁶⁴⁸ Melvyn P. Leffler and Westad, Odd Arne: *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*. I. Volume. p. 295.

⁶⁴⁹ Trieste is a city and a seaport in northeastern Italy. The city was a strategically important port hence both Italy and Yugoslavia wanted to acquire the territory after the World War II. In 1947, Trieste was declared an independent city state under the protection of the UN as the Free Territory of Trieste. The city and its surroundings were divided into two zones. The Zone A was governed by the U.S. and Great Britain. The Zone B was under Yugoslavian administration. In 1954, in accordance with the Memorandum of London the vast majority of Zone A was given to Italian civil administration, while the Zone B to Yugoslavian civil administration along with four villages from Zone A. The final border line with Yugoslavia and the status of the ethnic minorities in the area were only settled in 1975. More about the case of Trieste see in Leffler, Westad.

⁶⁵⁰ Melvyn P. Leffler and Westad, Odd Arne: *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*. I. Volume. p. 315.

⁶⁵¹ Heinrich Siegler, *Österreichisches Weg zur Souverentität, Neutralität, Prosperität. 1945-1959*. p. 30.

⁶⁵² Heinrich Siegler, *Österreichisches Weg zur Souverentität, Neutralität, Prosperität. 1945-1959*. p. 35.-45.

proposed an addition to the treaty.⁶⁵³ It would forbid Austria any involvement in coalitions or military alliances and the establishment of foreign military bases on Austrian territory. Molotov also proposed that the occupying powers would defer the deduction of their troops from Austria until the conclusion of the peace treaty with Germany. This last point was unacceptable for Austria, but also for the U.S.. Foreign Minister J.F. Dulles interpreted Molotov's whole proposal as an octroi. According to Dulles, only an independent state could decide not to join any alliances. This idea played an important role later when it was agreed that Austria would declare neutrality as an independent state.⁶⁵⁴

In early 1955, Molotov became more flexible about the connection of the German and Austrian cases. He was willing to drop this point if Austria could guarantee that *Anschluss* would not occur anymore.⁶⁵⁵ He mentioned the need for bipolar reconciliation between the USSR and Austria in order to reach an agreement. The Austrian government responded that it was glad that the USSR was open to settle the unresolved issues; however, all occupying powers should be involved.⁶⁵⁶ Furthermore, the Austrian government agreed to make sure an *Anschluss* would not occur again. The government wanted to understand how they should guarantee that *Anschluss* would not occur anymore. The USSR promised to investigate the question of the guarantee against the *Anschluss* and agreed that all powers would have to be involved in the developments.⁶⁵⁷ The above presented exchange of notes was a prelude for an invitation of Austrian statesmen to a Moscow bipolar meeting. An Austrian government delegation visited Moscow in April 1955. The parties agreed on the redemption of the German assets by Austria for a much lower price than stated in the earlier plans. Molotov made it clear that it would not be enough to make a simple declaration about Austria's intention to avoid military alliances and establish foreign military bases in its territory, the Austrian delegation promised a declaration of neutrality.⁶⁵⁸ At a

⁶⁵³ Report of the Austrian Federal Government on the Berlin Conference of Foreign Ministers. Sten. Prot. NR. VII. GP., 33. session, 24. Ferb. 1954. Quoted by Felix Ermacora

⁶⁵⁴ Felix Ermacora: 20 Jahre Österreichische Neutralität. p. 33 - 34.

⁶⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 36.

⁶⁵⁶ Wiener Zeitung, Nr. 63. 17. 03. 1955. Quoted by Felix Ermacora.

⁶⁵⁷ Wiener Zeitung, Nr. 70. 25. 03. 1955. Quoted by Felix Ermacora.

⁶⁵⁸ Walter Kindermann, Flug nach Moskau. Ermacora, Felix: 20 Jahre Österreichische Neutralität, p. 45.-46.

commemorative meeting of the National Council and the Federal Council, Chancellor Raab highlighted in a speech on April 27th 1955 that the neutrality declaration can only be adopted after the State Treaty has been signed because such a declaration would make only sense if it was adopted by a full sovereign state.⁶⁵⁹

Role of Austria in the Birth of the State Treaty

The influence of the Cold War on the arrangement of the Austrian State Treaty is obvious. However, Austrian policy played a significant role in the birth of this treaty as well. This was not an easy role considering that Austria did not have the needed sovereignty to follow its own ways in political decision making. Because of this, Austrian political leaders had to find unconventional ways to enforce the country's interests. I would like to present some resources of Austrian politics and diplomacy which helped Austria to drive the occupying countries towards an agreement. Austria was able to exploit its narrow room for maneuver; first, because its political elite succeeded in joining forces for concrete state interests like independence or international acceptance of the "victim role".

Secondly, its diplomacy was able to pursue a flexible foreign policy. This aimed at gaining tangible advantages (like joining the Marshall Plan), while also avoiding unilateral constraints by continuously maintaining good relations with both sides.⁶⁶⁰ The unified strategy of the Austrian foreign policy after the Second World War pointed to a policy of balance. Austria tried to build good relations with both of the Cold War superpowers without any commitment,⁶⁶¹ just as Switzerland did.⁶⁶² This strategy also fell in after 1955 with the Austrian neutrality. The main goal of the political leaders was to obtain the sovereignty of the country. That was a big difference compared to the interwar period. After 1945, the Austrian people, the political elite at least, believed in the viability and the future of their country, which was not the case in 1918. It did

⁶⁵⁹ Felix Ermacora: 20 Jahre Österreichische Neutralität. p.48.

⁶⁶⁰ Peter Filzmaier and Pelinka, Anton: Außenpolitik und Neutralität, p. 5.

⁶⁶¹ Csáky, op. cit., p. 16.

⁶⁶² Helmut Kramer, Strukturentwicklung der Außenpolitik (1945-2005). p. 809. President Theodor Körner in February 1952, quoted by Stourzh, Gerald: Der österreichische Staatsvertrag und die Voraussetzungen seines Zustandekommens, p. 74.

matter for the negotiations to be successful that the Austrian political parties were able to cooperate with each other. This was already noticeable right after the war. The first important step was the meeting of the Austrian regions from the Western zones in 1945.⁶⁶³ They accepted the Renner government which was established in the Soviet zone instead of making a counter-government. They urged for the expansion of its competence to the whole of Austria. They did so even though the Renner government was established in the communist zone with some communist ministers.

One of the main perspectives of Austrian politicians was that they wanted to forestall the partition of the country. It also helped to forward the Austrian interest that - in contrast to the interwar period - both political sides now paid attention to the stability of their internal affairs. Although there were occasionally tensions and disputes between the two main political parties (ÖVP and SPÖ) concerning some concrete decisions, on the general line and the main orientation of the foreign policy there was a consensus between the two parties.⁶⁶⁴

The political elite exploited everything for the aim of independence. This behavior occasionally resulted in opportunistic attitude.⁶⁶⁵ Austrian leaders agreed that it would only serve the country's swift independence and its future in the international community if Austria would be seen as a victim of the German aggression rather than an ally of the Nazi Germany. Hence they wanted to avoid bearing any responsibility for the crimes of National Socialism. For this reason the Austrian government and the state authorities were not open for discussion on questions such as reparations for Jewish victims or the facilitation of the return of Austrian emigrants. Moreover, because of this aspiration, no real confrontation and discussion could emerge about Austria's recent past and the role of Austrian National Socialism.⁶⁶⁶ The Austrian strategy aimed first of all at expanding the rights of the Austrian government in foreign policy decisions.⁶⁶⁷ This was succeeded with the Second Control Agreement in June 1946 which regulated the Austrian government's sphere of influence and the functions of the Allied

⁶⁶³ Heinrich Siegler, *Österreichisches Weg zur Souverentität, Neutralität, Prosperität. 1945-1959*. p. 12.

⁶⁶⁴ Kramer, op. cit., p. 132-136.

⁶⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 810.

⁶⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 810.

⁶⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 809.

authorities and armed forces. In foreign policy issues Austria could take decisions except of certain fields. The occupied country was allowed to establish diplomatic relations with other governments for example. However, any international agreement required a notice to the Allied powers and could be considered as accepted only if it was not appealed within 31 days by the Allied Council.⁶⁶⁸

The structure of foreign policy had to be organized as well. Actually, this began before the provisional government was established. On April 16th 1945 a fruitful, efficient meeting of the former employees of the foreign affairs institution took place, where they negotiated about reorganizing.⁶⁶⁹ Senior Nazi Party members were asked to leave, but nobody left. In this first established institution of foreign affairs, onetime Christian Socials predominated.⁶⁷⁰ In the developing state framework foreign affairs belonged to the Chancellor's Office and this remained until 1959. Guidelines were published aiming at the unified action of the Foreign Service, keeping in mind the interests of the state. These guides were among others about topics such as Austria's victim role or the viability of the country. For the control of the country's international image the Foreign Service sent delegates to the Austrian News Agency.⁶⁷¹

Having established the internal organization of Foreign Service, Austria started to build up relations abroad. However, the country was dependent upon the permission of the occupying powers. First, Austria could only establish representations in the capitals of the occupying countries. Upon the request of Foreign Service leader Karl Gruber, the Allied Council allowed the Austrian government to set up political representations in states which acknowledged Austria – except for Japan and Germany.⁶⁷² After the Second Control Agreement Austria could commence diplomatic relations with member states of the UN without the special permission of the Allied Council. Under Karl Gruber's administration (1945-53) mainly experienced professionals were selected to

⁶⁶⁸ Stourzh, Gerald: *Um Einheit und Freiheit*. p. 48

⁶⁶⁹ Maruzsa, Zoltán: *Az osztrák külpolitika a szövetséges megszállástól az európai integrációig* (1945-1995). p. 26.

⁶⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

⁶⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 27.-28.

⁶⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 30.

represent Austria abroad, instead of pure politicians.⁶⁷³ Despite the modest financial and human possibilities, the Austrian Foreign Service under Karl Gruber's management made a big effort to expand the network of representations all over the world.

In 1949 there were already twenty embassies, four political representation and twelve consulates.⁶⁷⁴ Austria also built up relations as soon as possible with international institutions;⁶⁷⁵ it joined the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) by 1948 and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1951. Even though Austria had not yet joined the UN, the Austrian League for the United Nations was established in 1946 which aimed at spreading the objectives of the UN and at raising awareness on the need for Austria's integration into the international community of states.⁶⁷⁶

The Austrian government exploited every auditing opportunity at the negotiations to bring its conception closer to the occupying powers.⁶⁷⁷ Austrian diplomacy even confronted Washington after 1949 when the U.S. was reluctant to restart the negotiations. Politicians of both big parties tried to exploit their party-relations as well for the aim of speeding up treaty negotiations.⁶⁷⁸ In 1947, Figl, then Austrian chancellor, turned to the French president, Léon Blum with his claims about the treaty. Until 1955 the whole infrastructure of the Foreign Service was working for a swift contract with the occupiers.⁶⁷⁹

Austria's Case and the UN

After the failure of negotiations in 1952, Austria sent a memorandum to all members of the UN concerning its case. The memorandum highlighted that Austria was actually a

⁶⁷³ Beer, Siegfried and Gémes, Andreas and Göderle, Wolfgang and Muigg, Mario: Institutional Change in Austrian Foreign Policy and Security Structures in the 20th Century, p. 184-185.

⁶⁷⁴ Maruzsa, Zoltán: Az osztrák külpolitika a szövetséges megszállástól az európai integrációig (1945-1995), p. 30 -31.

⁶⁷⁵ Filzmaier, Peter and Pelinka, Anton: Außenpolitik und Neutralität. p. 5.

⁶⁷⁶ Albrecht, Robert Karl: Der UN-Standort Österreich und der außenpolitische Status Österreichs nach 1945, p. 20.

⁶⁷⁷ Csáky, op. cit., p. 8.

⁶⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 8.

⁶⁷⁹ Zoltán Maruzsa: Az osztrák külpolitika a szövetséges megszállástól az európai integrációig (1945-1995). p. 31.

liberated country and if the occupying powers could not reach an agreement, Austria would turn to the UN General Assembly. However, Austrian politicians were of the opinion that Austria could not be effective if it would turn to the General Assembly alone, as a non-member state.

This initiative would be only effective if a member state of the UN would bring the case in front of the Assembly. They planned to start negotiations with a state which was a member of the UN, but was not a member of the NATO so that Austria could avoid that the initiative looks as a unilateral action.⁶⁸⁰ In the end, Austrian leaders decided to make contact with Brazil for this aim. According to Gruber's explanation⁶⁸¹ Brazil would be a suitable partner as it was a UN member, but non-member of the NATO; it was an important country and quite independent from the two superpowers. Gruber writes that the government was choosing between Brazil and India.

They found that India represented neutrality too strongly to come up with this initiative in front of the Assembly which was sensitive and did not affect the Indian sphere of interest.⁶⁸² Austria started negotiations with Brazil.⁶⁸³ As a result Brazil urged the General Assembly of the UN to make a statement to the four powers insisting on their responsibility for reorganizing a free and independent Austria.⁶⁸⁴ In December 1952, Gruber gave a speech in front of the UN General Assembly.⁶⁸⁵ He explained the country's situation, highlighted Austria's merits and stressed the need for an early agreement.⁶⁸⁶ All of these efforts resulted in an appeal of the General Assembly on December 20, 1952 to the signing powers of the 1943 Moscow Declaration for the fulfillment of their pledges towards Austria.⁶⁸⁷ The General Assembly noted with concern that the negotiations since 1947 had failed to bring real result and called upon

⁶⁸⁰ Karl Gruber: *Zwischen Befreiung und Freiheit. Der Sonderfall Österreich*. p. 280.

⁶⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 280.-281.

⁶⁸² Karl Gruber: *Zwischen Befreiung und Freiheit. Der Sonderfall Österreich*. p. 281.

⁶⁸³ For details, see Gruber, Karl: *Zwischen Befreiung und Freiheit. Der Sonderfall Österreich*. p. 283.-289.

⁶⁸⁴ Heinrich Siegler: *Österreichisches Weg zur Souverentität, Neutralität, Prosperität. 1945-1959*. p. 30.

⁶⁸⁵ Gruber, Karl: *Zwischen Befreiung und Freiheit. Der Sonderfall Österreich*. p. 295.

⁶⁸⁶ Albrecht, Robert Karl: „Der UN-Standort Österreich und der außenpolitische Status Österreichs nach 1945. p. 23.

⁶⁸⁷ Resolutions of the UN General Assembly, 409th plenary meeting, 20th December 1952. [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/613\(VII\)&Lang=E&Area=RESOLUTION](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/613(VII)&Lang=E&Area=RESOLUTION)

the occupying powers “to compose their difficulties and establish a lasting peace.”⁶⁸⁸ The appeal notes that the Austrian people have made “successful efforts towards the restoration and democratic reconstruction of their country.”⁶⁸⁹ The appeal highlights that the solution of the Austrian case would be an important step in elimination of other disagreements of the great powers as well and this way it would be a big step towards the world peace. The Austrian treaty would contribute to international peace, security and to friendly relations among states of the UN. The General Assembly addressed an “earnest appeal”⁶⁹⁰ to the governments concerned to reach an agreement and sign an Austrian treaty “with a view to an early termination of the occupation of Austria and full exercise by Austria of the powers inherent in its sovereignty”⁶⁹¹.

The Austrian State Treaty – 1955

Despite earlier Austrian struggles, the foreign policy of the Austrian government became very determined after 1953, under the government of Julius Raab. He succeeded in reaching an agreement with the USSR, with whom Austria had had the most conflicts. It was a big step because the USSR gave up most of its claims and its significant impact on the strategic industrial branches of Austria. However, we have to bear in mind that at this time the USSR also wanted the quick realization of the treaty because they hoped it would set a good precedent for the question of the German case to prevent West-Germany from joining NATO.⁶⁹² After a process lasting ten years, on May 14, 1955, the occupying powers met in Vienna to sign the Austrian State Treaty. Figl, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, succeeded in the last minute in removing the clause about the responsibility of Austria for participation in the war on the side of Nazi Germany.⁶⁹³ It is also important for Austria that the Treaty *restored* the independent state not *established* it.⁶⁹⁴ This expression also confirmed that Germany had occupied the sovereign state before. Austria also achieved that neutrality wasn't part of the State

⁶⁸⁸ Ibid., p.5.

⁶⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 5.

⁶⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 6.

⁶⁹¹ Ibid., p. 6.

⁶⁹² Zoltán Maruzsa, *Az osztrák külpolitika a szövetséges megszállástól az európai integrációig* (1945-1995). p. 48.

⁶⁹³ Csáky, op. cit., p. 19.

⁶⁹⁴ Manfred Rotter: *Der Staatsvertrag*. p. 123.

Treaty but the Austrian Parliament could take decision on it.⁶⁹⁵ On May 15, the State Treaty was signed by the ministers for foreign affairs of the occupying powers, ensuring sovereignty and freedom for Austria during the thick of the Cold War. Later other twelve countries joined the treaty acknowledging Austria as a sovereign, independent and democratic state and pledged to respect Austria's independence and territorial inviolability.⁶⁹⁶

Since the process of the Austrian treaty negotiations took place during the Cold War which created a very tense international environment; the destiny of the treaty and of Austria depended highly upon the relationship between the two blocks. On the one hand, I wanted to demonstrate how the history of the Cold War period and the international environment affected the arrangement of the treaty. On the other hand, I wanted to prove that Austrian politicians and diplomats did still have an affect on the decisions of the four occupying powers. They could speed up the negotiations and influence the final decision, even though they had only a narrow room for maneuver.

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⁶⁹⁵ Ibid., pp. 122-123.

⁶⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 123.

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Chapter 5: Soft power, propaganda and socio-cultural effects

Psychological Warfare and Soft Power: A State of Total War

Fatima DAR

Introduction

The term “war” is associated with images of organized violence, strategic bombing and physical combat between rival combatants. War operates as an explicit mechanism aimed at either annihilating the enemy or forcing surrender by completely damaging the enemy’s capability for resistance. While extermination could be the most direct and physical means to facilitate disarmament from an enemy force, the concept of war also entails various non-lethal activities, targeted at the minds of enemies instead of their bodies. These activities aim to assault not just enemy combatants, but also the entire political body of the enemy.

The term “psychological warfare” has been used to represent these activities that target minds in order to destroy the morale of the enemy, enhance the morale of friendly forces and allies and to win support from neutral audiences. This shift toward unorthodox methods of warfare, however, has changed the dynamics of how strategic warfare in the battlefield is understood. This article intends to explore the relationship between psychological warfare and soft power in context of the Cold War. In doing so, this article aims to argue that when psychological warfare interacts with soft power, it civilianizes the battlefield, creating a perpetual state of total war.

The Cold War Propaganda Machine

The Cold War propaganda machine is a profound case study that demonstrates sophisticated frameworks that shaped the totality of war beyond a nuclear battlefield that never materialized between the United States and the Soviet Union. The lack of physical confrontation needed to civilianize the conflict between the two powers. Thus,

psychological warfare⁶⁹⁷ and soft power⁶⁹⁸ became crucial tools to facilitate this purpose. Nearly every aspect of civilian life was weaponized with psychwar and viewed as a potential battlefield for the “hearts and minds”⁶⁹⁹ of the population. Soft power tactics and propaganda interacted with dynamics of civilian culture, media, radio and social capital to broaden and modify the understanding of unconventional warfare for the fulfillment of strategic aims of the Cold War rivals.

The enhanced role of the intelligence and military community within the distinctly civilian consciousness of the body politic played a pivotal role in blurring the identity of combatants and non-combatants. Even though intelligence and military are understood to be central to the conventional operations of armed warfare, interaction between psychological warfare and soft power reshaped this understanding during the Cold War. Public communications and information dissemination were viewed as part of the war strategy. Consequently, intelligence and military became more pertinent to civilian spheres.

This production of a civilianised battlefield of psychological warfare and tactics of soft power that were employed does not follow the hard power dynamic of two or more well-identified rivals. Instead, the identity of the perpetrators and planners of propaganda in many cases was purposefully obscured, while inherently combatant bodies of the war machine, such as the intelligence community and army found enhanced roles in non-combatant civilian parts of the body politic. The consequence of this perpetual state of war was an appearance of a mainstream American culture of conformity that relied heavily on propagation rather than substantial realizations of material life. Disillusionment with this propagation gave birth to the counterculture movement as a backlash to the state of total war and culture of conformity.

⁶⁹⁷ Joseph S. Nye Jr., *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs 2004), p. 5.

⁶⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

⁶⁹⁹ Ross Johnson, *Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty: The CIA Years and Beyond* (Washington, D.C. : Woodrow Wilson Center Press ; Stanford, Calif. : Stanford University Press, 2010), p. 8.

Use of radio as a propaganda tool

The use of media as an instrument by the American intelligence community to expand the Cold War's cultural reach was extensive. Radio was one of the most profound mechanisms in which the battlefield infiltrated civilian life and attempted to include non-combatants into the variables of war. The biography of C.D. Jackson, authored by John Allen Stern, quotes the example of Radio Free Europe (RFE), an American radio station used as a pivotal instrument of propaganda to exercise American soft power and psychological warfare in countries behind the Iron Curtain⁷⁰⁰. RFE gave voice to the European political exiles with a strategic ambition to empower internal opposition to Communism in Eastern Europe. As a result, RFE exploited a wide range of elements of civilian life including news, music and culture to operationalize the battlefield of psychological warfare, thereby facilitating the creation of total war.

Stern emphasized that the identity of the perpetrators behind RFE propaganda was kept a mystery for strategic reasons and the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) relationship with RFE was not disclosed.⁷⁰¹ Thus, only the soft power dimension of this form of warfare allowed for such obscurement of the identities of the perpetrators of psychological warfare tactics, and the example of RFE reinforces this. The relationship between soft power and psychological warfare also civilianized the identities of combatant intelligence outfits such as the CIA, which furthered the formation of total war. RFE was a significant public communications project that emerged out of the interaction between soft power and psychological warfare that transformed the role of the intelligence community away from the combat zone and into civilian life.

Importance of Credibility

As revealed by the relationship between the CIA and RFE, the intelligence community not only became increasingly relevant to the civilianized battlefield that it facilitated, but it also went to the farthest extent possible to remain credible within this civilian sphere. Author Frances Stonor Saunders in the *Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the*

⁷⁰⁰ John Allen Stern, *C.D. Jackson: Cold War Propagandist for Democracy and Globalism* (New York: University of America, 2012), p. 60.

⁷⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 66.

World of Arts and Letters discussed the relationship between the CIA and National Committee for a Free Europe and calls the National Committee one of the CIA's "most ambitious fronts"⁷⁰² disguised as a group of private American citizens. Great emphasis was placed on establishing and maintaining the identity of RFE as private. Saunders explains different methods and mechanisms that were employed to disguise the secret financial relationship between the radio station and the CIA. One method that was adopted was the use of philanthropic foundations because it was "the most convenient way to pass large sums of money... without alerting the recipients to their source".⁷⁰³

However, the nature of this mechanism was only a guise and the actual relationship was much different than a typical private organization. This is because, as Saunders mentioned in a quote from the 1952 Congress Committee, the power of the relationship was unchecked by the stockholders which made the relationship starkly different from a typical public corporate structure.⁷⁰⁴ This led to the question of the strategic necessity behind this effort of maintaining a private identity, especially in ensuring that the monetary relationship with the CIA remained a well kept secret. The answer to this question can be found in the dynamics of the civilianized battlefield and total war.

Creators of RFE understood that when civilians were viewed as variables of war, credibility was an important weapon to achieve victory in the battle of ideas and information. They acknowledged the noncombatant nature of their target audience. Consequently, the necessary goal to accomplish credibility among civilians could not be achieved if ties with the CIA were exposed because civilian views of intelligence community were largely associated with deception. Author Cord Meyer in "The CIA and Radio Free Europe" agreed with this assertion when he wrote that the later decision to make news reports as accurate and as objective as possible was crucial to the RFE operation, a function not assumed by Voice of America and BBC because they were known as government-supported entities. Establishing a high quality of credibility among listeners was the driving force behind this emphasis on neutrality and objectivity

⁷⁰² Frances Stonor Saunders, *The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters*. (New York: New Press, 2000), p. 45.

⁷⁰³ Ibid., p. 49.

⁷⁰⁴ Saunders, *The Cultural Cold War*, p. 64.

in broadcasts.⁷⁰⁵ From this understanding, it can be deduced that exposing the CIA's relationship with the Committee and the radio stations would have worked against the interest in establishing credibility. Hence, great caution was adopted in ensuring that the relationship remained a secret.

Civilian Role of American Military

Along with the intelligence community, the military also facilitated the creation of total war by civilianizing the battlefield. The American military entered the civilian sphere when it assumed responsibility for cultural dissemination, which included activities that were inherently non-combatant and non-violent in nature. The military attempted to use soft power to introduce American way of life to civilian populations particularly in Germany. It conducted psychological warfare by using artistic and cultural expression to shape opinions and control information.

For example, music served as a compelling soft power instrument in postwar Germany as noted by Amy C. Beal. She traces the connection between U.S. military ensembles and post-war music in Germany as an integral part of the reeducation program designed by the Information Control Division (ICD) under the supervision of the U.S. Military Government in Germany (OMGUS). Even though OMGUS was a strictly military organization, it facilitated the ICD in conducting cultural renewal within civilian spheres of Germany.

Officers of the military government undertook tasks of popularizing American classical music and diversifying German views of Western music. The military sponsored musical tours of performers from the West and also established an international musical library called the Inter Allied Music Lending Library, which was "lending scores and parts to individuals and orchestras throughout occupied Germany".⁷⁰⁶ Thus, the heightened role of the military in designing public information and cultural policy in

⁷⁰⁵ Cord Meyer, "The CIA and RFE," *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs*, 1.1 (Winter/Spring 2000), p. 127-130.

⁷⁰⁶ Amy C. Beal, "The Army, the Airwaves, and the Avant-Garde: American Classical Music in Postwar Germany," *American music* 21, N° 4, Winter, 2003.

civilian spheres worked to augment the state of total war by blurring the dynamics of conventional warfare. The Cold War policies that civilianized the battlefield and created a state of total war had consequences that impacted social and cultural dynamics of civilian lifestyle, as discussed in the next section.

Conformity Culture and the Global Counter-Culture Movement

A mainstream American culture of conformity emerged as the most ardent consequence of state of total war in the 1950s. As the state of total war deepened, it impacted cultural aspects of an increasingly weaponized civilian life and created a lifestyle of conformity. The overarching societal impetus was to conform to the Cold War narrative and to live a life consistent with that narrative in every aspect of behavioral expectations. The culture was based on an American way of life that upheld ideals of freedom and prosperity that allegedly depicted the American ideology of democracy as opposed to the communist tyranny of the Soviet Union.

This culture operated through massive levels of consumption and the free market economy. Hence, it created a culture of conformity to a way of life that reflected an ideal living standard of the American middle class. Ownership of comfortable homes in growing urban areas along with an income that allowed purchasing of consumable goods became central to the projected culture of ideal American life rooted in conformity.

Jeremi Suri in “Counter-Cultures: The Rebellions Against the Cold War Order, 1965-1975” argued that the state of total war created a need to project a certain image of American prosperity asserted as the core of good and democratic American life in order to confront the image of communist Soviet Union⁷⁰⁷. Because the battlefield entered civilian lives, there was a strong pressure to conform as American civilians had to fall in line with the anti-communist expectations of the American way life. The fear of

⁷⁰⁷ Jeremi Suri, “Counter-Cultures: The Rebellions Against the Cold War Order, 1965-1975,” *The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Volume II: Crises and Détente*, ed. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 460.

communist infiltration propagated due to the state of total war made conformity the expectation and reality of civilian life. However, this culture that emerged out of a civilianized battlefield was based largely on propagated ideas instead of substantial realizations of material life. Heavy dependence on propagation caused overarching disillusionment in the American people⁷⁰⁸. This disillusionment was created by what was perceived to be an empty ideology, and it gave rise to the counter-culture movement as a backlash to state of total war and culture of conformity.

The counter-culture movement was not confined to America, but was global. The frustration with the dominant Cold War culture “gave voice to criticisms of the basic social assumption”⁷⁰⁹ regarding political status quo of the era. Counterculture was a unique rebellion that took shape differently from previous forms of resistance to dominant Cold War ideas and policies. This rebellion originated not externally, but within “the universities, the literary circles and even bedrooms of mainstream society”⁷¹⁰. Counter-culture posed challenges not only to the authority but also to the very basic ideas about the good life and underlying notions of social life. Thus, counter-culture can be viewed as the unintended consequence of Cold War policies meant to resist social change.

These policies unintentionally established and encouraged the social change that they were intended to prevent. Leaders of states introduced policies of research, development, education and innovation to initiate strong competition against global adversaries. However, these policies equipped citizens with intellectual and ideological tools to rebel against social norms that emerged from the policies of Cold War. Particularly, the younger generation in many countries “now had the means and motivation to challenge their leaders for failing to meet their stated goals”⁷¹¹. Citizens began to question not just the credentials of their leaders, but also their values. Consequently, the United States, West Germany and even the Soviet Bloc witnessed youth movements that protested the state of total war created by the Cold War narrative.

⁷⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 476.

⁷⁰⁹ Suri, “Counter-Cultures,” p. 480.

⁷¹⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹¹ Ibid., p. 481.

Both progressive as well as conservative movements arose out of the counter-culture revolution as a consequence of the civilianized battlefield produced by the dominant Cold War culture. In the United States, the Civil Rights movement, which protested racism in a society propagated as epitome of equality, freedom and liberty emerged as a subgenre of the counter-culture movement. The environmental movement, anti-war movement and feminist movement also surfaced as progressive subgenres of the counter-culture movement. However, along with these progressive movements, backlash to civilianization of battlefield also took the shape of domestic terrorism and violence. As Jeremi Suri argued, right-wing conservative groups “mixed counter-culture politics with paramilitary behavior,”⁷¹² which gave rise to politics of “law and order”⁷¹³ in the early 1970s. Leaders were determined to “restore rationality, reasonableness, and domestic peace”⁷¹⁴. Consequently, mainstream politics moved away from the revolutionary sentiment of counter-culture because of its violent streak.

Media served as the impetus to internationalize the counter-culture sentiments that arose as a backlash to the state of total war. The growth of media acted as a mechanism to increase exposure to international events that embodied frustration with the dominant Cold War culture. Media gave voice to the sentiments of revolution and became a platform for civilians to project disillusionment with the Cold War narrative that civilianized the battlefield. Both television and film played a pivotal role in spreading the disillusionment with the state of total war created by Cold War politics.

The Vietnam War in particular was the first armed conflict to be televised all over the world. With the help of television, American citizens in particular were subjected to first hand accounts of the devastation of war for the first time in history, which strengthened the anti-war sentiment within the counter-culture revolution. Hollywood films, as a part of counter-culture revolution, shaped the views of Soviet civilians about their own leaders while Soviet films shaped American views. As argued by Shaw and Youngblood in *Cinematic Cold War*, foreign influences through films and the growing

⁷¹² Suri, “Counter-Cultures,” p. 479.

⁷¹³ Ibid.

⁷¹⁴ Ibid.

reach of media internationalized the scope of the counter-culture revolution⁷¹⁵. In the Soviet Union, American movies made by filmmakers who enjoyed freedom from bureaucratic and governmental influences, infiltrated the cinematic world and reinforced the superiority of American ideals and values. Soviet civilians experienced a social irony in which there “was the coexistence of the very brutal and aggressive anti-American propaganda in all mass media with an obvious predominance of US movies on Soviet screens.”⁷¹⁶ American films eventually caused withering Soviet patriotism and civilians began to show frustration with hypocritical Cold War policies based on criticism of the West rather than the realities of Soviet civilian life. Thus, the media and the interplay of American and Soviet films served as platforms for civilian discontent created by the total state of Cold War.

Conclusion

The perpetual state of war of ideas and information targeted minds of whole populations for political support. Hence, as a result of Cold War policies, the battlefield entered the civilian world and civilians became decisive factors in determining victory or defeat. Both the United States and the Soviet Union waged propaganda wars to win the ideological war between the capitalist West and communist USSR. Military and intelligence communities became more pertinent to civilian life. Rather than indulging in conventional warfare, they employed policies of culture and media as a tool to bring the combat zone into civilian life. This civilianization of the combat zone created a total state of war which perpetuated a culture of conformity in American life. However, this culture eventually faced backlash as sentiment of counter-revolution exhibiting disillusionment with the total war narrative of Cold War gained momentum globally.

⁷¹⁵ Tony Shaw and Denise J. Youngblood, *Cinematic Cold War: The American and Soviet Struggle for Hearts and Minds* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2010), p. 59.

⁷¹⁶ Sergei Zhuk, «Hollywood's insidious charms: the impact of American cinema and television on the Soviet Union during the Cold War», *Cold War History*, Volume 14, Issue 4, 2014.

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Cold War propaganda: the case of the Italian Communist Party in the 1956 Hungarian crisis

Aniello VERDE

In postwar Italy, US-friendly coalitions of centrist parties were keeping the Italian Communist Party (PCI – Partito Comunista Italiano) at the margins of the political power. Though a minority, the communist constituencies were still large and influential in both political and social aspects. The legacy of the anti-fascist struggle was not the only factor for such a large political consent. Particularly in the Cold War context, the prestige socialism and the Soviet Union had gained -as a model of society and of progress alternative to the Western-type one- were an important pillar of the communist political strength. The events of 1956, and particularly the outbreak of the 1956 Hungarian crisis, were the first serious challenge to the very ideology of the PCI.⁷¹⁷ That situation urged the communists to react to the crisis and to produce their own narrative on the Hungarian crisis through propaganda means. With a focus on the 1956 Hungarian crisis as a case study, the concern of this paper is to analyze the evolution of the Italian CP's propaganda and to highlight political and strategic factors that influenced its decision-making during the Hungarian crisis, and contributed to shape the elements of the communist political discourse on Hungary 1956.

The Italian Communist Party's strategic thinking and the role of propaganda

Although the coalition game permanently located the PCI at the opposition in the Parliament, the communists tried to pursue a strategy to leapfrog the so-called *conventio ad excludendum*.⁷¹⁸ Basic elements of this strategy were what historiography has often

⁷¹⁷ Lucio Magri, *The tailor of Ulm: Communism in the Twentieth century*, New York: Verso, 2011, p. 128.

⁷¹⁸ By *conventio ad excludendum* is meant the coalition agreement among Christian-democrats, republicans, liberals and social-democrats to join their political force and de facto exclude the Left from the power.

called “permanent interests” (*interessi permanenti*.)⁷¹⁹ The first and probably most important strategy was the political and symbolic linkage between the Italian CP and the Soviet Union, not only as an international agent, but as a bearer of an alternative political model and allegedly more moral than the Western-type democracy and capitalism – of which the centrist government coalition was a valiant defender. As a result of this political-symbolic linkage, the public prestige of the Italian CP became dependent on the international prestige of the USSR itself and of its very model of democracy.

Second, by mid-1950s, the Direzione – the leading organ of the Italian CP – was trying to restore the unity of the Leftist front, firmly in the belief that a united Left could challenge more effectively the predominance of the centrist political forces in the domestic scenario.⁷²⁰ However, the Italian Socialist Party (PSI for its acronym in Italian) and its influential leader, Pietro Nenni, had traditionally been quite reluctant to put up with the communist uncritical attitude to the Soviet Union. In the context of the Hungarian crisis, the PSI-PCI rapprochement was at stake again: the submission of the communist to the Soviets could discourage the socialists and have a negative impact on the Italian CP’s alliance strategy.

Third, one of Togliatti’s major achievements had been the creation of a new party model (*partito nuovo*), embodied by a mass-party organization relying on democratic centralism. But the outbreak of the Hungarian crisis might have paved the way to the emergence of “non-muscovite” voices within the party, and the leadership perceived the risk of potential alternative currents within the party itself.⁷²¹ In other words, the communist establishment was concerned about potential disintegrative effects of the Hungarian crisis.

⁷¹⁹ Sidney Tarrow and Donald L. M. Blackmer (ed.), *Communism in Italy and France*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975.

⁷²⁰ Francesco Malgeri, *La stagione del centrismo: politica e società nell’Italia del secondo dopoguerra* (Soveria Manelli, Rubbettino, 2002), p. 244.

⁷²¹ Mario Einaudi, Jean-Marie Domenach, Aldo Garosci, *Communism in Western Europe*, Hamden: Archon Books, 1971, pp. 193-195.

All these strategic interest had a common denominator: political and moral elements were inherently combined in sustaining the public prestige of the leadership and the very strategy of the party. Therefore, in the attempt to pursue its strategic interests, the PCI had to appear as a trustworthy political agent to the left-friendly public opinion and to its political interlocutors. One implication was that public opinion and political discourse were crucial in this strategy. In order to defend its strategic interests from the impact of the crisis, the PCI indeed mobilized its propaganda means to construct a communist-friendly political discourse diametrically opposed to that of centrist parties. The communists tried to create and disseminate a narrative of the Hungarian crisis that was seemingly coherent with its vision of domestic and international politics. Additionally, the analysis of the PCI's strategic thinking in constructing its political discourse and in defining the characters of its propaganda cannot miss to take into account that the decision-making of Botteghe Oscure – the Rome-based headquarters of the PCI – was connected to multiple centers.

The first was surely Moscow as a center of final political decisions that the PCI cared about never contradicting. This implied that the exchanges of views between the Italian and the Soviet party had a clear influence on the Italian party's political discourse and on its propaganda. The second center of influence was in Budapest. Italian communists, in fact, were concerned about the changing position of the Hungarian Workers' Party (HWP) during the crisis, and they were hoping and expecting the new leaders to regain control of the uprising – at least as long as the Soviets also did so. These considerations imply that the evolution of the PCI's political discourse must be understood in the context of a strategy whose centers of decision-making were not all located in Italy only but are necessarily connected and influenced by the international actors involved.

24 October-29 October: shock and defense

On 23 October 1956, *L'Unità* – the press organ of the Italian CP – had just put aside its ambivalent assessment of the Polish situation and celebrated Gomułka's accession to power as a further step towards the “construction of socialism” – wrote Pietro Ingrao.⁷²² Yet, Botteghe Oscure had no time for relief. By that night the demonstration of

⁷²² Pietro Ingrao, “Gli avvenimenti polacchi”, *L'Unità*, 23 October 1956, p. 1.

solidarity to Poland taking place in Budapest, in the afternoon had already turned into an uprising whose outcomes were as dangerous as they were unpredictable. The deployment of Soviet troops that followed the riot caused further embarrassment to the Italian CP since it exposed the real face of the Soviet domination over the so-called “satellites.” In this context, the very first reaction of the Italian communist establishment was characterized by a state of shock and astonishment combined with a growing anxiety for the unpredictable outcome of the events in Hungary.

The lack of a clear Soviet strategy to face and overcome the crisis contributed to this perception. The Kremlin, indeed, moved troops into Hungary but it still remained in a waiting position basically. The Soviets in fact “tolerated” the dismissal of the ruling group (Ernő Gerő as First Secretary of the Hungarian Workers Party and András Hegedűs as Prime Minister) and the appointment of Imre Nagy – the leader of the “new course” of 1953-55 – as Prime Minister and of the home-communist János Kádár as leader of the party. This move had the twofold purpose to consolidate the control of the communists and to isolate radical elements and insurgency. However, in the very first stages of the crisis- neither the new Hungarian leaders nor the Soviets managed to keep the escalation under control. The intervention of the Red Army, in fact, provoked a radicalization of the confrontation and an escalation of the guerrilla.⁷²³

As of 24 October, the political position of the Italian CP on the Hungarian events mirrored the Soviet one. In the communist political discourse a strong criticism of the upheaval itself coexisted with an attempt to provide an endorsement. In fact, *L'Unità* maintained a form of situational prudence in constructing its narrative of what was happening in Hungary: the exposure of an alleged “reactionary coup” – described by the correspondent Adriana Castellani on 24 October – was dissociated from the celebration of the “patriotic and socialist” mass-movement, claiming for new ways of socialism but surely not engaged in a fight with the ruling-party.⁷²⁴ From this viewpoint, the mass-movement was still considered to be a genuine expression of the blossoming spirit of

⁷²³ Johanna C. Granville, *The first domino. International decision-making during the Hungarian crisis of 1956* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2004), pp. 65-66.

⁷²⁴ Adriana Castellani, “Scontri nelle vie di Budapest provocati da gruppi armati di contro-rivoluzionari”, *L'Unità*, 24 October 1956, p. 1.

the Hungarian socialist democracy, attempting at an actual correction of Stalin-era “mistakes” as well as at a removal of Stalinist leaders. The very first interpretation of the crisis found its theoretical foundations on a distortive syllogism that qualified the masses as “democratic” because of their “socialist” connotation. One implication of this was that, though paradoxical, the communists depicted the tension between the HWP and the masses as an ideological victory for the world workers’ movement.

Such a positive assessment of the mass-movement extended to the new leaders who were trying to restore the authority of the HWP. Imre Nagy was described as an enlightened figure whose “brave opposition to the crimes of Stalin and Rákosi [was] well-known all around the country” – wrote Orfeo Vangelista, correspondent from Prague, on 25 October.⁷²⁵

Another significant implication of this interpretative pattern was the definition of the enemy. Since the mass-movement was socialist and democratic alike, such a movement could not be the origin of the uprising whose character was surely “fascist” because “anti-socialist.” Therefore, the origin of the turmoil had to be actually found in the traditional external enemy, the West, and in its internal agents, alleged “fascists landowners” preventing Hungarian people “[from] seek[ing] their way, the least painful, to socialism” – wrote Ingrao in his leading article titled “What would they want to restore?” (*Cosa vorrebbero restaurare?*) on 25 October.⁷²⁶ This line of thinking can be also retraced in a letter Palmiro Togliatti addressed to Paolo Spriano, an influential communist intellectual who expressed his doubts on the PCI’s position on Hungary: “the use of armed violence ... is not admissible in all countries. ... If mass-protest, in a non-capitalist country, goes beyond the boundaries and turns into an insurrectional attempt, we have the right to consider that to be the outcome of the contribution of the enemy, either from the beginning or at any time later.”⁷²⁷

⁷²⁵ Orfeo Vangelista, “Chi sono i membri del nuovo governo?”, *L’Unità*, p. 1.

⁷²⁶ P. Ingrao, “Cosa vorrebbero restaurare?”, *L’Unità*, p. 1.

⁷²⁷ Archivio Fondazione Antonio Gramsci (Rome), fond: Palmiro Togliatti; serie 3: Carte Ferri-Amadesi; subserie 14: 1956 – 5. corrispondenza; archival unit N° 24: 22 February 1956-30 November 1956. See also: archivionline.senato.it.

In this first phase of the crisis, the political discourse of the PCI was centered on the dichotomy between socialism as real democracy and fascism as a simmering tendency of any form of anti-socialism. In the midst of confusing news coming to Italy from Hungary, this propaganda was persuasive in the eyes of the communist-friendly public opinion, but the Italian CP's response to the outbreak of the crisis jeopardized the chances of the party to continue the dialogue with their potential allies- the socialists. At the very beginning of the upheaval the socialist press organ *Avanti!* did not, in fact, position itself in clear ideological contrast with the communists: Italian socialists, like the communists, were concerned about the potential contribution of fascist-type and reactionary elements in the riots.⁷²⁸

Yet, the close-minded attitude of the communists, so much involved in a dogmatic defense of the USSR, contributed to enlarge the distance about the two leftist parties. On 26 October, Pietro Nenni himself spoke out from the pages of the party's newspaper and his words sound like a criticism of the PCI-line. In his article, metaphorically titled "The pure water-stream and the dirty lather" (*La corrente pura e la sporca schiuma*), Nenni claimed that the socialist revolutions needed to be defended, but "the defense of the working-class revolution either relied on the shields and the hearths of the workers or it [was] impossible."⁷²⁹ As a result of the communist uncritical alignment to the Soviet position, the alliance strategy of the PCI failed and the communists ended up to be basically isolated from the other parties of the left.

But further problems for the PCI might originate within the party itself. Interestingly, one day later (27 October) after the publication of Nenni's article, Giuseppe Di Vittorio, leader of the CGIL (the communist-dominated and largest labor union in Italy) and influential member of the PCI, stated a position, which showed views quite close to Nenni's- and in contrast to Togliatti's. Even though Di Vittorio maintained the point that uprisings against communist-led power are uprisings, he pinpointed that "social progress and the edification of a society with no capitalist exploitation of labor are possible as long as the working class actively takes part [in this process] as a grantor of

⁷²⁸ Tullio Vecchietti, "Il dramma di Budapest", *Avanti!*, 25 October, 1956, p. 1.

⁷²⁹ Pietro Nenni, "La corrente pura e la sporca acqua", *Avanti!*, 28 October 1956, p. 1.

freedom and national independence.”⁷³⁰ Although Di Vittorio soon clarified that he did not mean to criticize Togliatti-line, his statement was perceived as a signal of dissent which could possibly endanger the unity of party and internal cohesion.⁷³¹

In conclusion, the very first interpretation of the crisis in the PCI’s propaganda recalled an old and very established *topos* in the communist political discourse: the move forward of socialism violently challenged by reactionary forces. Yet, the reports of Soviet troops shooting on factory workers were sharply in contradiction with the communist statements, and this factor impacted negatively on the relations between the PCI and the socialist and the unions alike.

29 October – 31 October: stalemate and radicalization

The events of 28-29 October had changed the political situation in Hungary: the Red Army started – at least apparently – withdrawing from Budapest. However, they continued concentration of troops on the Hungarian-Soviet border, and Moscow *de facto* accepted to negotiate a permanent withdrawal of the troops, and to grant some concessions to the reform-oriented wings within the HWP. Yet, the extent of a reform process was still unpredictable because Nagy and Kádár were still experiencing relevant troubles in taking full control of the internal situation. Therefore, in this stage, any political calculation of the Soviets was difficult and any strategy was tentative.⁷³²

In the eyes of the Italian communist establishment, the Soviet decision to placate the riot with negotiations rather than with stronger military involvement was a factor of confusion leading to an ambivalent reaction: the more the events became uncertain, the more the Italian CP radicalized and expected the Soviet to end the Hungarian reform course.

⁷³⁰ “Presa di posizione della CGIL sugli avvenimenti di Ungheria”, *L’Unità*, 28 October 1956, p. 1.

⁷³¹ Michele Pistillo, “Togliatti e Di Vittorio. Dissensi e convergenze sui fatti d’Ungheria”, *Critica Marxista* (Bari: Edizioni Dedalo, 2007), pp. 79-80.

⁷³² J. C. Granville, p. 68.

This reaction was quite understandable because Botteghe Oscure perceived the Soviet withdrawal as a move that contradicted what the Kremlin had done earlier, and the stalemate in Hungary increased the uncertainty about the outcomes of the crisis as well as the contradictions in the PCI's position. In these circumstances, the Italian communists were concerned about how their popular base would react in learning that the Soviet Union, arguably seen as a myth for its uncompromised fight against imperialism and fascism, was negotiating with the "counter-revolution." A dangerous contradiction lied on this terrain: what was true? The leftist base could believe either that the insurgents were fascists or that the USSR and the HWP would come to terms with them, but not the two together.

Furthermore, this perception of uncertainty combined with an ideological radicalization that was also a reaction to the "bourgeois" press celebrating the Hungarian freedom regained and comparing the Soviet domination to the fascist rule in Europe. Togliatti, in fact, was nervous about the latest Soviet moves and urged the Kremlin to reconsider their choices. Aware of the inherent risk in compromising with the counter-revolution – Togliatti sought to break the stalemate and to stimulate the Soviets to take a clearer chance about what to do with the Hungarian case.

On 30 October, the Italian leader sent a telegram to the Soviet Central Committee with a warning about the reactionary tendencies in the Hungarian government and pinpointed the contradictions in the Soviet moves. "In the very moment when we defined the riot as a counter-revolution, our position was different from the HWP's one, and it is now the Hungarian government itself to glorify the uprising."⁷³³ This document is very informative about Togliatti's perception of the impact of the crisis on the unity of the party apparatus and on the strategy alliance.

After informing the Soviets about the troubles in the communist-socialist dialogue, Togliatti expressed his concerns about the loss of confidence in the Direzione and the emergence of groups – allegedly gathering around Di Vittorio – aiming to take control

⁷³³ The text of the telegram is available in: Federigo Argentieri, *Ungheria 1956. La rivoluzione calunniata* Venice: Marsilio, 2006, pp. 135-136.

of the party and to abandon a Moscow-friendly view on the Hungarian crisis.⁷³⁴ Even if the party had reached a deadlock, the PCI had to reshape its political discourse by mixing an uncompromising condemnation of the counter-revolution with a sort of prudent approach to any outcome of the crisis. Togliatti's article on the communist review *Rinascita* (30 October) exemplifies this attitude: the communist leader strongly defended the prestige of the USSR by warning Italian communists about "the reactionary, anti-communist, anti-socialist, anti-Soviet wave trying to exploit the midst of the events in order to deceive public opinion."⁷³⁵

The idea that "the popular and socialist regimes can be compared to fascism, and the Soviet Union to an imperialist country" was "grotesque" – wrote Togliatti.⁷³⁶ Yet, the Secretary of the PCI admitted that "non counter-revolutionary workers joined the riot" but he still blamed the Western promises for "liberation from socialism" for that.⁷³⁷

A turning-point occurred on 31 October, when the Soviets responded Togliatti: "In your evaluation of the situation in Hungary and of the Hungarian government's tendencies to move in a reactionary direction, we are in agreement with you. According to our information, Nagy is occupying a two-faced position and is increasingly falling under the influence of reactionary forces. For the time being we are not speaking out openly against Nagy, but we will reconcile ourselves with the turn of the events toward a reactionary debauch."⁷³⁸

The Soviet Central Committee, in fact, already deliberated for a new military intervention on 31 October. Suslov and Mikoyan suggested on 29 October, the Kremlin kept on gathering troops at the Hungarian-Soviet border while withdrawing the units deployed in Hungary as a tactical move.⁷³⁹ These words clarified that the Soviets would

⁷³⁴ F. Argentieri, p. 136.

⁷³⁵ Palmiro Togliatti, "Sui fatti d'Ungheria", *Rinascita*, October 1956, pp. 492 (in the collection of the issues of the newspaper in the National Library of Rome.)

⁷³⁶ P. Togliatti, p. 493.

⁷³⁷ P. Togliatti, p. 493.

⁷³⁸ Johanna C. Granville, "Soviet documents on the Hungarian Revolution, 24 October – 4 November 1956", Cold War International History Project [CWIHP] Bulletin, N° 5 (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars, Spring 1995), p. 33.

⁷³⁹ J. C. Granville, CWIHP Bulletin, N° 5, Spring 1995, p. 32.

not tolerate the latest developments in Hungary (i.e. the abolition of the one-party system) and they gave Togliatti the reliable expectation of a strong reaction against Nagy. This new perspective allowed the Italian CP to redefine its propaganda and to inject new elements in its political discourse.

1 November – 5 November: the communist counter-offensive

By 31 October the situational perspective of the Italian CP had changed significantly, and the PCI was finally able to go from a defensive to an offensive position. Such change was possible due to a number of external factors that did not occur before 31 October – 1 November.

The first factor was not dependent on any of the political actors involved, but rather a matter of organization and timing. Most of the Western press – correspondents, photographers, journalists – had been just unable to enter Hungary before the Soviet withdrawal and many of journalists arrived in Budapest on the very last days of October – as the Italian press did.⁷⁴⁰ Therefore, as soon as they were actually able to report the events from Budapest, they witnessed directly or indirectly, episodes of mob-violence at their highest peak. Such a factor influenced the perception of some events: the famous massacre of Köztársaság tér (30 October), for instance, was accidentally among the first happenings Italian press documented *in loco* and it appeared, in the eyes of the public opinion, as a piece of evidence in support of the interpretation of the crisis the communist had been disseminating.

The second factor was a result of the Soviet diplomacy: between 30 October and 2 November Khrushchev found a widespread consensus among socialist countries – from China to Yugoslavia and Poland – to repress the Hungarian deviationism. Therefore, the world workers' movement agreed on one point: the Hungarian uprising was a counter-revolution and repression, even a violent one, was justified.⁷⁴¹ This view sounded alike Togliatti's telegram basically. Finally, the parallels between the Soviet withdrawal from

⁷⁴⁰ On the Italian press in Hungary during the uprising, see: Indro Montanelli, *La sublime pazzia della rivolta. L'insurrezione ungherese del 1956*, Milan: Rizzoli, 2006.

⁷⁴¹ J. C. Granville, CWIHP Bulletin, N° 5, Spring 1995, pp. 95-97, and footnote N° 42, p. 217.

Hungary and the British-French attack on Egypt provided the communist propaganda with further argumentations to blame “Western imperialism” and to praise the positive function of the USSR as a grantor of world peace. In this new context, two new features characterized the political discourse of the Italian CP. One of them was the rise of the scale of verbal violence and of confrontation. From the viewpoint of the Italian communists, a violent counter-propaganda could succeed to regain the confidence of the popular base after the embarrassment of the last days.

Aiming at that objective, the communist press employed the category of “white terror” to construct in the mindset of the readers a sort of horror-like scene, with images that continuously recalled bodies hanged in the streets and illegal executions of party-members.⁷⁴² Illustrative examples of this rhetoric constructions can be found basically everywhere on *L’Unità* issues from 1 and 2 November: e.g. Orfeo Vangelista reported the mass-killing of 130 communists before the Party House (1 November), which truly happened, but the number of the victims was significantly less.⁷⁴³

The second feature of the political discourse in this new phase of the Hungarian was the employment of “Italian categories” to describe the evolution of the events. What is meant by “Italian categories” is that *L’Unità* over-stressed certain aspects of the Hungarian crisis that might arguably recall in the eyes of the leftist public opinion images and characters of the political confrontation between leftist-democratic and rightist-reactionary forces. Significant examples of that was the exaggeration of the role of the Church – and of Cardinal Mindszenty, a concept that Italian communists had learnt from their own experience within the domestic context.⁷⁴⁴ Yet, such distortions were “logical” in the communist strategy and they sounded “logical” to the readers: the propaganda needed to relate the Hungarian tragedy by speaking the language of class struggle in Italy. In this way, the communist discourse intended to create a sort of

⁷⁴² Some examples are the following: “Farkas, both father and son, had been executed in jail” (29 October, p. 7); “Erő Gerő executed by a group of counter-revolutionaries!” (25 October, p. 1); and again, “Erő Gerő killed by the counter-revolutionaries”, 5 November, p. 1.)

⁷⁴³ O. Vangelista, “I controrivoluzionari impiccano centotrenta comunisti che avevano difeso fino all’ultimo la sede del partito”, *L’Unità*, 1 November 1956, p. 1.

⁷⁴⁴ O. Vangelista, “Il cardinale Mindszenty vuol fondare un partito. Imre Nagy ha denunciato il Patto di Varsavia”, *L’Unità*, 2 November 1956, p. 8.

theoretical connection between communist struggle in Italy and in Hungary. The news reported and the writing style was intended to “translate” the Hungarian crisis in the same terms political confrontation and class struggle were related in Italy. The result of this construction was intended to evoke empathy between the Italian communist base and the victims of the uprising in Budapest.

This political discourse became even trustworthier in the eyes of the communist-friendly public opinion after the Hungarian declaration of neutrality (1 November.) In fact, the chronological sequence of the events was misleading. Correspondents in Budapest truly thought that the Soviet attack (4 November) was a consequence of the declaration of 1 November.⁷⁴⁵ This understanding of the historical events gave communists a further pretext to depict the Hungarian government as a reactionary faction within the HWP. However, historians now know that the Hungarian government chose to declare neutrality because the Soviet troops were already maneuvering into the Hungarian territory as early as 1 November. After a meeting with Andropov, the Soviet ambassador in Hungary, who was unable to provide sufficient justification for the troop movements, the Nagy cabinet sought political support from abroad by declaring neutrality.⁷⁴⁶

In the political discourse of the PCI, the construction of the category of white terror during the days preceding 4 November served the purpose to provide the prospective military intervention with a preventive moral justification: the invasion of Hungary, as well as its human cost, were morally acceptable for a good communist because the Soviet Union had the moral obligation to “end the chaos and the white terror” – explicitly wrote Vangelista on 5 November.⁷⁴⁷ As a result of this propaganda, as soon as the Soviet intervention was announced, the communist-friendly public opinion was already expecting that Moscow would intervene to rescue Hungary from an alleged

⁷⁴⁵ F. Argentieri, p. 50.

⁷⁴⁶ Csaba Békés, János Rainer, Malcom Byrne (ed.), *The 1956 Hungarian Revolution. A history in documents* (Budapest and New York: CEU Press, 2002), document N° 53 (Working notes of the CPSU CC Presidium meeting, October 31st); N° 65 (Report by Yuri Andropov to the CPSU CC Presidium, November 1st); N° 66 (Telegram from Nagy declaring neutrality), pp. 307-311 and, pp. 330-334.

⁷⁴⁷ O. Vangelista, “Le truppe sovietiche intervengono in Ungheria per porre fine al caos e al terrore bianco”, *L'Unità*, 5 November 1956, p. 1.

fascist outburst. Although paradoxical, this interpretation of the second Soviet invasion as a humanitarian intervention was coherent with the international climate following the outbreak of the Suez crisis. *L'Unità* launched, in fact, a “call for peace” and blamed on the Western imperialist tendencies the suffering for the Cold War crises, both in Hungary or Egypt. As the document of the Direzione stated: “every move back of the socialist camp, every action against the Soviet Union weakens the forces of peace, [and] increases the risk of war.”⁷⁴⁸

The conceptual association between “peace” and enhancement of the “socialist camp” entered the communist political discourse in the last stage of the crisis and served a strategic purpose: the PCI tried to “reverse” the effects of the crisis, that is to move the moral burden of the turmoil in Hungary from the shoulders of the communists to those of their opponents – the West and their Italian allies, the non-communist parties.

Yet, such a violent propaganda provoked some reactions. A number of cases of dissent are quite famous. The most relevant is the so-called “Manifesto dei Centouno” – a document of dissent signed by one hundred-one communist intellectuals in the last days of October. Other signs of dissent emerged within the CP’s Cultural Commission: the intellectual Gastone Manacorda questioned a dogmatic application of democratic centralism and denounced the “orthodox attitude” of the party cadres.⁷⁴⁹ He gave also a definition of what he called “orthodoxy”: the attitude to think that “the party-élite is the depository of the truth”.⁷⁵⁰ Another voice of opposition arose from the high-ranks of the PCI during the VIII Congress (Rome, December 1956)- even some influential comrades of old militancy (e.g. Antonio Giolitti) casted doubts on the conduct of the PCI.

Yet, unlike some party members and a few of intellectuals, the communist political base reacted to the crisis alongside with the party, and accepted the party-line because the followers and the party actually shared the same vision of the world. Paolo Spriano, a

⁷⁴⁸ “L’Unità”, 1 November 1956, *Communiqué* of the PCI Direzione.

⁷⁴⁹ Albertina Vittoria, “La commissione culturale del PCI dal 1948 al 1956”, *Studi Storici*, N° 1 (Rome: January 1990), p. 159.

⁷⁵⁰ A. Vittoria, p. 159.

critical voice among the communist intellectuals, lamented that there was a tendency “to forget that unforgettable year, and the base of the party, its popular base, reacted in a way diametrically opposed to that of the intellectuals.”⁷⁵¹ As Miklós Vársárhelyi explained it was, after all, easy for the communist base to accept the “slandorous” – as Argentieri named it – interpretation of the Hungarian crisis because they were never willing to reconsider their own vision of the world, that is everything that had thought about communism and about the Soviet Union.⁷⁵²

Conclusion

Palmiro Togliatti was so impressed by the impact of the Hungarian crisis on the Italian public opinion and on his party that, in 1958 when the general vote was imminent, he urged Khrushchev to intercede with the Hungarian government for the Italian comrades to postpone the execution of Imre Nagy. In this way, Togliatti intended to save the party from a potential loss of votes. The electoral performance of the PCI was in fact positive, with a slight increase in spite of a loss of members at the end of 1956. This observation demonstrates that the Italian CP managed to respond the impact of the Hungarian crisis, whose dangerous potential consequences it never disregarded. Through a considerate usage of propaganda the Italian communists were able to keep and to consolidate the symbolic-political linkage between the party and the USSR as well as the ideology-centered empathy with the communist-friendly public opinion. Nonetheless, the consequences of the Italian CP’s position on Hungary 1956 had a very negative impact on the alliance strategy resulting into a political isolation of the communists.

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⁷⁵² F. Argentieri, pp. 104-105.

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Bursting the Savior Myth: Intellectual Backlash against Radio Free Europe

Adriana POPA

Introduction: Radio Free Europe (RFE) in the Context of Cold War Propaganda

RFE was a vital part of America's "battle for hearts and minds" in the Cold War. While both sides brought radio into the field as a powerful weapon of propaganda, the West eventually triumphed. But was its victory inevitable? Was RFE the universally loved, unquestioned beacon of hope and democracy that its reputation points to? Or did it struggle with contestation, distrust and dismissal, just like its adversaries, the national radio stations behind the Iron Curtain? The focus of this paper is intellectual opposition/counteraction against the RFE. Beyond technical maneuvers of backlash (such as signal jamming), meant to stop or limit its influence, RFE had to fight intellectual backlash (ordered or not), such as disparaging or invalidating commentary. The radio had to contend with its share of criticism, both from its listeners and from its supporters back in the US, and its brand of broadcasting was not universally convincing, as it is often believed.

This area of RFE's history is rarely mentioned, and a limited body of research exists regarding it. Reading critical letters from listeners seems all the more surprising given the impression of almost non-existent contestation and religious following RFE seems to have had in formerly communist Eastern European countries. Ross Johnson/Eugene Parta⁷⁵³ write that, since the end of the Cold War and the shattering of the Iron Curtain, the effectiveness of Radio Free Europe broadcasts has never been questioned. Testimony on the impact of RFE's work has come from leaders, as well as citizens in Eastern Europe. As a result, "what could almost be termed a mythology has developed

⁷⁵³ Ross A Johnson, *Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty: The CIA Years and Beyond*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, California, 2010.

about RFE's effectiveness."⁷⁵⁴ Beloved as the RFE might have been, it had its share of critics, and its victory should not be taken for granted. This is especially relevant in today's age, when the US is once again facing at least one great ideological foe (extremism), and where radio remains an important instrument in the battle for hearts and minds. Perhaps the West's biggest vulnerability would be reliance on what is believed to be the universal appeal of its values, message, and way of life. This appeal wasn't guaranteed in the Cold War, when dealing with populations much more similar culturally and historically, and it is not guaranteed now, in a world brought together by globalization, but still marked by profound rifts.

RFE's Intellectual/Strategic Value: A Mouthpiece for Truth and for An Émigré Community

American Cold War radios, RFE in particular, brought accurate, timely information to the people behind the Iron Curtain, information often obtained and broadcast by its workers, émigrés from communist countries. RFE and RL (Radio Liberty) became "full-service substitute national broadcasters, surrogate broadcasters"⁷⁵⁵ for the people behind the Iron Curtain. RFE was essentially "an anti-communist émigré propaganda network"⁷⁵⁶ that symbolized "the culmination of efforts in the 40s and 50s to harness the talents of recent émigrés from the Soviet Union and Soviet-controlled Eastern Europe to promote the US's national interests."⁷⁵⁷ The essential purpose of RFE propaganda was to "contribute to the liberation of the nations imprisoned behind the Iron Curtain by maintaining their morale and stimulating in them a spirit of non-cooperation with the Soviet-dominated regimes."⁷⁵⁸ Programming refrained from "directly addressing

⁷⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 1.

⁷⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

⁷⁵⁶ Walter Hixson, *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture and the Cold War*, Palgrave Macmillan, 1998, p. 60.

⁷⁵⁷ Ross Johnson, A. *Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty: The CIA Years and Beyond*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, California, 2010, p. 7.

⁷⁵⁸ Walter Hixson, *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture and the Cold War*, Palgrave Macmillan, 1998, p. 61.

underground resistance groups, and avoided political subjects”⁷⁵⁹ and “broadcasters constantly emphasized their common national identity with the listeners.”⁷⁶⁰

At least in one way, RFE was both a very pragmatic American weapon in the war against the Soviet Union and communism and an effort aimed at enlightenment, freedom and empowerment, universal values. As John Allen Stern explains in his chapter on C. D. Jackson, CIA funding gave RFE considerable freedom and flexibility, and the programming echoed the funding’s “combination of idealism and deceit.”⁷⁶¹ The project “intended to undermine communism by sowing uncertainty and distrust among people living under communist dictatorships.”⁷⁶² The US State Department “defined RFE’s aims as keeping alive (among captive) peoples their sense of connection with the West and with Free World ideals.”⁷⁶³ RFE was characterized as having “extraordinary importance for US policy, with its unique ability to counter phony Russian propaganda in Eastern Europe.”⁷⁶⁴ RFE’s ultimate objective was “the ultimate liberation of the enslaved nations.”⁷⁶⁵ In support of this mission, RFE’s founders, especially C. D. Jackson, “advocated a course of action that would employ the services of the Eastern European exiles: the recruitment of the ever-growing population of Iron Curtain escapees into an exile army.”⁷⁶⁶

RFE aimed at accuracy and objectivity, which it perceived as being the most effective in its crusade, especially when compared to national media in communist countries and communist propaganda bodies. For the most part, the strategy of RFE was “not to allow Western broadcasts to sound like crude attacks on communist adversaries – it tried to be objective and factual, therefore more credible.”⁷⁶⁷ The aim was that RFE’s programming would be “wholly devoid of vitriol, but still effective.”⁷⁶⁸ The message for

⁷⁵⁹ Ibid

⁷⁶⁰ Ibid

⁷⁶¹ Stern, John Allen. C.D. Jackson: Cold War Propagandist for Democracy and Globalism, University Press of America, New York, 2012, p. 16.

⁷⁶² Ibid., p. 18.

⁷⁶³ Ibid

⁷⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 90.

⁷⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 20.

⁷⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 31.

⁷⁶⁸ Ibid.

the people behind the Iron Curtain was “liberation and democracy over enslavement and totalitarian communism.”⁷⁶⁹ Stern quotes C. D. Jackson himself as saying that the “product we (RFE) are selling is freedom – keeping alive the hope for freedom and maintaining the will for resistance.”⁷⁷⁰ The émigrés recruited by RFE supported its strategy – “news had to be useful – real news. The exiles understood that and knew their former countrymen. Propaganda had to appear informative, and untainted by political ideology.”⁷⁷¹ The unique contribution of exile workers proved its value, because RFE’s work was “painstaking in its detail and analysis”⁷⁷² and because RFE has to “understand the psyche of its listeners.”⁷⁷³ For both aims, émigrés were vital. RFE programming focused on “the essential freedoms that came with the struggle against Russian oppressors”⁷⁷⁴, and RFE (together with VOA – Voice of America – and RL) could be employed “both tactically and strategically to highlight the differences between East and West.”⁷⁷⁵

Truth or Selective Presentation?

For all of their insistence on truth and accuracy, and the reputation that they achieved for adhering to these, all US radios during the Cold War presented US history and culture in somewhat romantic terms, glossing over negative episodes such as race relations or Native American treatment. While the image they succeeded in portraying of the free, prosperous, exuberant West was certainly a decisive victory against Soviet propaganda, it also contradicts (at least partially) the moral high ground upon which the US pronounced and believed itself to be on. The people behind the Iron Curtain could not have verified the reality of life across the ocean – the only reality they knew was that of their own countries, which indeed did not match what communist authorities tried to portray. Perhaps knowing this, Soviet authorities focused on dismantling the image of American life portrayed by the radios more than on countering the images they were

⁷⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷⁷¹ Ibid., p. 38.

⁷⁷² Ibid.

⁷⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 66

⁷⁷⁵ Ibid.

presenting of Soviet life, as Walter Hixson⁷⁷⁶ explains. But for all of America's insistence (especially through RFE) that they were presenting "the truth" to those captives behind the Curtain, US propaganda, like Soviet propaganda, minimized negatives to the point of complete omission. Perhaps it was America's understanding that the goal justifies the means, or perhaps the people in the US at that time truly believed their propaganda was (more) morally meritorious than that of their enemy.

Indeed, not only the public but crucially, those involved in the propaganda efforts seemed to truly believe that the truth was a distinct American monopoly. Edward Barrett maintained that "in the contest for men's minds, truth can be peculiarly the American weapon"⁷⁷⁷, and that organizations like RFE and VOA delivered "not opinion, nor conjecture, but facts."⁷⁷⁸ Despite the superiority of American propaganda, given that it was presumably the mouthpiece of the truth, its success was not guaranteed – it was "powerful only when linked with concrete actions and policies."⁷⁷⁹ Tailored, contextualized propaganda was needed, because, unless it "chooses terms that are meaningful and persuasive to that particular audience"⁷⁸⁰, "what sells soap in Indiana can unsell democracy in India."⁷⁸¹ Most importantly, American propaganda was tasked with delivering "news without the slightest trace of color or bias"⁷⁸², because its effectiveness depended on the "bad being told with the good, failures admitted alongside successes."⁷⁸³ Truth being the foundation of American propaganda did not stem simply from moral belief, but from confidence in its practical application - "we are convinced that truth offers not only the moral, ethical course, but the cold, practical, effective."⁷⁸⁴ History has proven this belief to be accurate. With all of its limitations and the difficulties it posed for waging a war against an unscrupulous enemy whose weapon was the manipulation of information, the truth was placed at the forefront of the

⁷⁷⁶ Hixson, op. cit.

⁷⁷⁷ Barrett, Edward, *Truth Is Our Weapon*, Funk and Wagnalls, New York, 1953, p. ix

⁷⁷⁸ Creel, George, *How We Advertised America*, Harper & Brothers Publishers, New York, 1920/Forgotten Books, 2012, pg. 71

⁷⁷⁹ Barrett, op. cit., p. ix

⁷⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 140

⁷⁸¹ Ibid., p. x.

⁷⁸² Creel, George, *How We Advertised America*, Harper & Brothers Publishers, New York, 1920/Forgotten Books, 2012, pg. 73

⁷⁸³ Ibid.

⁷⁸⁴ Barrett, op.cit., p. 131

American strategy. This was rooted in the confidence that it, if anything, would help win the war - “truth may be a straight-jacket, but at least, it is a jacket that wears well.”⁷⁸⁵

Intellectual Backlash Against Radio Free Europe

US Cold War international information programs, of which RFE was a part, were meant to export democracy and freedom. Through the “dissemination abroad of stories, news, interpretation, and commentary, it sought to counter Communist propaganda through the international propagation of the democratic creed, a Marshall plan in the field of ideas.”⁷⁸⁶ For RFE and its cousin, Radio Liberty (RL), if their stated goal of “broadcasting freedom”⁷⁸⁷ was to succeed, their message had to be “fact-based, balanced and credible to an often skeptical audience.”⁷⁸⁸ As a result, “great care was taken to assure objectivity and to avoid any attempted news manipulation for propaganda purposes.”⁷⁸⁹

RFE is perhaps best remembered for “providing listeners with an intellectual bridge to Western Europe and the United States”⁷⁹⁰, and system of reference, informed by timely facts, which could help “preserve the independent thinking that the controlled domestic media sought to control or suppress.”⁷⁹¹ The premise that supported this independent thinking would “prevent the authoritarian governments in the Soviet sphere from fully consolidating their power over the societies they ruled”⁷⁹² would be proven correct by historical developments.

Some of the intellectual backlashes RFE had to contend with was false or “ordered”, such as attempts at infiltration/misrepresentation authored by Soviet and Eastern European communist authorities. For example, “the Soviets routinely infiltrated the staffs and controlled double agents, who would pretend to defect with loud accusations

⁷⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 132

⁷⁸⁶ Johnson, Ross A. *Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty: The CIA Years and Beyond*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, California, 2010, p. 4

⁷⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁸⁹ Meyer, Cord, *The CIA and Radio Free Europe*, *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 1, N°1 (Winter/Spring 2000), Georgetown University Press, p. 129, accessed 5.4.2016.

⁷⁹⁰ Johnson, op. cit., p. 6.

⁷⁹¹ Ibid.

⁷⁹² Ibid., p. 6.

that they had been hired as CLA spies while working for the stations.”⁷⁹³ On one occasion, “the Russians tried to smuggle a doctored tape into the West German RFE library to convince the West German government that an anti-German policy was being pursued.”⁷⁹⁴ In addition, letters were written by Party members/sympathizers behind the Iron Curtain, posing as ordinary citizens, or by citizens obligated to write such letters, sought to disparage the authenticity, relevance, and effectiveness of RFE programming. These attempts mostly failed, but RFE still had to contend with criticism on both sides of the Atlantic.

US Nay-Sayers/Contestation from the West

The intellectual backlash against was not so much RFE’s mission, but the form its activity took, marked its very beginnings in its country of origin. Frank Altschul, secretary of the Council on Foreign Relations and one of the founders of the Free Europe Committee (FEC), from which RFE was born, asked in 1950 “to what extent is RFE the voice of the émigré groups, rather than the voice of American citizens using émigré groups to the maximum advantage?”⁷⁹⁵ This suggested a potentially Machiavellian use by Americans, RFE’s creators, of its non-American staff, for their own national security objectives. The State Department defended RFE, answering that “it was the voice of émigrés themselves, as represented by the national councils supported by the FEC.”⁷⁹⁶

Moreover, conflict erupted in 1951 with VOA (Voice of America), one of the other American radios tasked with spreading the gospel of freedom and democracy. The accusation was that RFE, rather than complementing VOA’s work, and adhering to its different mandate, was “duplicating the work of VOA’s own Munich Programming Center, and VOA’s programs in the Baltic states.”⁷⁹⁷ The conflict was partially resolved

⁷⁹³ Meyer, Cord, *The CIA and Radio Free Europe*, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 1, N°1 (Winter/Spring 2000), Georgetown University Press, p. 129, accessed 5.4.2016

⁷⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁹⁵ Johnson, Ross A. *Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty: The CIA Years and Beyond*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, California, 2010, p. 17

⁷⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁹⁷ Johnson, op. cit., p. 22

in November 1951, at a State Department-CIA summit, which resulted in the postponing of RFE broadcasts launch in the Baltic States, and the reduction of the Crusade for Freedom's focus on RFE.

For some in the US, the government should not have pursued the path of propaganda that RFE was associated with - "many on the left thought the government ought not to be in the "dirty" business of promoting propaganda at home or abroad; to many intellectuals, the creation of bodies designed specifically to spew out what they saw as the "party line" was a disquieting notion for a liberal democracy – it was better left to totalitarian societies, even in the midst of a Cold War."⁷⁹⁸

Added to this were the problematic accusations of "duplicity"⁷⁹⁹, of RFE and its counterparts collecting intelligence under the guise of gathering information. RFE's now legendary accuracy and objective reporting was not its hallmark from the beginning. In fact, early criticism of RFE by BBC's Central European Service visiting Munich just after the start of RFE operations, referred to its "mixing opinion with fact in newscasts, denouncing Communist collaborators with little evidence, and ignoring policy restraints on content and tone of presentation."⁸⁰⁰

As a result of these initial findings, the BBC decided to keep its distance from RFE, limiting itself to offering it technical assistance and avoiding public association. RFE and RL also had to contend with contestation and accusations in the 1970s, a "perfect storm"⁸⁰¹ that almost saw them closed in 1971.

This domestic backlash emerged from the public disclosure of CIA funding, coupled with "personal hostility from the powerful chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and congressional insistence on ending all funding for the Radios from the intelligence budget."⁸⁰² However, the reputation of their broadcasting and research saved the radios, contributing to congressional, media and public support (as well as the

⁷⁹⁸ Stern, op. cit., p. 99.

⁷⁹⁹ Johnson, op. cit., p. 235.

⁸⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 41.

⁸⁰¹ Ibid., p. 202.

⁸⁰² Ibid.

support of the foreign affairs establishment) for their continued existence in the 70s, 80s and beyond.

Iron Curtain Contestation/Backlash from the East

RFE also faced criticism and accusations from its target audience, the people behind the Iron Curtain, the very people it sought to help. One of the darkest episodes in the history of RFE relates to its role during the 1956 Hungarian revolution. RFE was accused of having induced listeners into believing that Western military support for their revolt would come, and therefore was directly responsible for the chaos and violence that occurred in Hungary in 1956.

Hungarian escapees, while agreeing that “Western propaganda did not cause rebellion, declared they had been led to expect support from the West.”⁸⁰³ However, the CIA concluded that “no RFE broadcast (...) could be considered as inciting an armed revolt, and no broadcast implied promises of US or NATO intervention, with occasional straying from authorized factual broadcasting to offer tactical advice.” RFE was found not guilty of inciting the Hungarian revolution, “which was instead the resolute of ten years of Soviet repression.”⁸⁰⁴ Similar accusations surround RFE’s role in the East German and Polish uprisings. As Walter Hixson explains, RFE and the peoples of the countries in question likely bear a shared responsibility, and “the important propaganda fact is not what people hear, but rather what they think they hear.”⁸⁰⁵ However, these events served as a lesson for the US, and led to the toning down of the psychological warfare the radios, especially RFE, were in charge of, and also to a stricter supervision of broadcasts.

Direct contestation from listeners from behind the Iron Curtain also came directly, in the form of letters addressed to RFE, or phone calls during RFE’s programs and outside of them. It is difficult to establish which of these negative responses, if any, were “commanded” by communist authorities, either impersonating listeners or directing them to challenge RFE. However, it would not be a stretch to imagine that at least some

⁸⁰³ Hixson, op. cit., p. 63.

⁸⁰⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁰⁵ Ibid.

of them were. Even so, these accounts provide an original and valuable view of the types of contestations ordinary listeners could have plausibly made. My research on this body of evidence is still advancing, and these pieces are often not easy to find, but for the purpose of this paper, the below examples are illustrative. In 1956 Polish citizen Czeslaw Morwaski sent a letter to RFE, letter which was published in the communist magazine *Chlopska Droga* and was signed “Communist Sympathizer”. The letter describes opposition to the “reality” of kolkhoz (form of a collective farm) life in Poland presented in one of RFE’s programs. He denies that peasants and farm workers live in “poverty and slavery”⁸⁰⁶, and denounces RFE/its staff as a “filthy yapper that barks in the service of traitors, industrialists and landowners”⁸⁰⁷, commenting that, contrary to RFE’s message, life for the Polish peasant was far worse before Soviet rule.

Morwaski states that “what Free Europe is saying is nonsense that disgusts every normally thinking peasant, just mocking the nation and its achievements.”⁸⁰⁸ He refers to the “siren song of RFE”⁸⁰⁹, meant to sow discord among the Polish people and make them hostile towards the Soviet Union. According to Morwaski, “this station (...) wishes to set our people against each other, to weaken our country, to disarm it, so that the capitalists and landowners may loot it.”⁸¹⁰

An article published in *Rude Pravo* (the official newspaper of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia), in 1967, discusses three Czechoslovak citizens who “have become the victims of the untrue and distorted information spread of Radio Free Europe.”⁸¹¹ The RFE broadcast apparently sought to spread misinformation by broadcasting that the three citizens were members of the Czechoslovak handball team that had participated in the world championship in Sweden, and they had sought political asylum there. However, according to the article, the three citizens gave a press conference in Prague upon their return, stating that RFE had broadcast completely false information, as they

⁸⁰⁶ Morawki, Czeslaw, How I Became a Correspondent of Free Europe, *Chlopska Droga*, 1956, Item N° 7911/56, Open Society Archives, Budapest.

⁸⁰⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁰⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁰⁹ Ibid.

⁸¹⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹¹ Ibid.

had returned to the country and had not sought asylum. This is, according to the article, an example of the “incorrect and unfair manner in which RFE reports about Czechoslovakia, and its misuse of broadcasting for ideological diversion.”⁸¹² Finally, a letter sent from the Union of Slovaks Imprisoned and Persecuted by Communists in 1953 to C. D. Jackson complains about the misrepresentation of facts in RFE programming. The letter refers specifically to the “the celebration of the Communist revolt in the summer of 1944, which left the most horrible recollection in the memory of the Slovak people.”⁸¹³ According to the letter, on several occasions, “RFE lent itself to the celebration of this revolution, which offended not only the anti-communist political prisoners (...) but also the Slovak people who have not forgotten the terrible Communist cruelties of that time.”⁸¹⁴ In addition to exposing “this abuse by the radio station”⁸¹⁵, the letter asks “the leadership of the Slovak broadcasting of RFE be entrusted to persons who are politically unprejudiced.”⁸¹⁶

Radio Free Europe’s Legacy

The impact RFE and its sister stations have had, in Eastern Europe in particular, is significant, and it has been underlined in numerous bodies of work, as well as in testimonies of leaders and ordinary citizens from the region. RFE, together with RL, has been “widely praised in both the East and the West as contributing to the end of communism in Europe and Eurasia.”⁸¹⁷ A number of documentaries showing the efforts of the radios have been produced in several Eastern European, formerly communist countries: “Voice of Hope” (Poland), “Cold Waves” (Romania), Waves of Liberty (Spain), “To Russia with Love” (Germany). Today, the efforts of RFE and its counterparts are brought into discussion for the US’s “soft power campaign aimed at

⁸¹² Defectors Who Did Not Defect, Or the Wishful Thinking of Radio Free Europe, Rude Pravo, 1967, Open Society Archives, Budapest.

⁸¹³ Ibid.

⁸¹⁴ Letter to C. D. Jackson, Union of Slovaks Imprisoned and Persecuted by Communists, 1953, OR 263 – Free Europe Committee/Radio Free Europe (I), White House Central Files, Office File 1953 – 1961, Box # 755, Eisenhower Presidential Library and National Archives, Abilene, Kansas, US.

⁸¹⁵ Ibid.

⁸¹⁶ Ibid.

⁸¹⁷ Ross A Johnson, *Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty: The CIA Years and Beyond*. Stanford, Stanford University Press, California, 2010, p. 1.

winning hearts and minds in the Muslim world and elsewhere.”⁸¹⁸ The US campaign of disseminating information behind the Iron Curtain, of which RFE was a vital part, “the truth, skillfully told, (...) was central to the triumph of American propaganda.”⁸¹⁹ RFE and its leaders, through their vision, developed “a common bond with the exiles of the five radio stations and galvanized much of the energy of the exile population.”⁸²⁰ RFE’s efforts and success also contributed to the elevation of the status of radio - “the radio, through RFE, became a symbol of liberation behind the Iron Curtain.”⁸²¹ Asked in 1990 if RFE had contributed to the triumph of Solidarity in Poland, “Lech Walesa responded rhetorically: “Is the Sun important for the Earth?”⁸²²

Conclusion

RFE and the campaign it was part of remain relevant today, when the US “faces many of the same challenges that it did during the Cold War, only the names of the enemies have changed.”⁸²³ Cord Meyer explains that even in Eastern Europe, RFE continues to influence political and civic development, supporting the emergence of civil societies in formerly authoritarian countries – “many democratic leaders in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union rely on Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty to support the development of political pluralism, market economies, and an independent media.”⁸²⁴ In assisting Eastern European democracy mature, watching out for human rights, creating an example for the post-communist media, and keeping the East connected to the West, RFE and its sister stations “continue to play a unique and vital role in America’s ongoing struggle to bring freedom to the world.”⁸²⁵ While in the Cold War, RFE, together with the other American radio stations, “helped keep hope for liberation and freedom alive in the satellite countries”⁸²⁶, it continues to support the US’s vision in and

⁸¹⁸ Ibid.

⁸¹⁹ Stern, op. cit., p. 80.

⁸²⁰ Ibid., p. 100.

⁸²¹ Ibid.

⁸²² Johnson, op. cit., p. 1.

⁸²³ Stern, op. cit., p. 108.

⁸²⁴ Meyer, Cord, *The CIA and Radio Free Europe*, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 1, N° 1 (Winter/Spring 2000), Georgetown University Press, p. 130, accessed 5.4.2016.

⁸²⁵ Ibid.

⁸²⁶ Shawn Parry-Gilles, *The Rhetorical Presidency, Propaganda and the Cold War: 1945 – 1955*, Praeger, 2002, p. 53.

of the world. And “because threats to American hegemony remain, C. D. Jackson’s legacy is permanent”⁸²⁷, and, as that of its creators, so is RFE’s.

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⁸²⁷ Stern, op. cit., p. 108.

A Penny For Every Word: Radio Free Europe's Call for "Truth Dollars"

Monique KIL

Introduction

Anxieties over a breakdown in social order characterized the early years of the Cold War. The Second World War had disrupted formerly entrenched social patterns of class, race, gender and religion. The national draft had lumped men of diverse backgrounds together in the army. While these men were shipped off to Europe to join the war effort, women, African-Americans, and other groups previously excluded from the workforce enjoyed unprecedented opportunities.

However, when the soldiers returned home, many of them advocated for the *status quo ante*. This caused frictions, which in turn increased the concerns over social unrest. On top of this, the "postwar demobilization would unleash some eleven million veterans onto the American economy, and many experts believed that postwar cutbacks in federal defense spending would trigger an economic downturn, if not a full-blown depression."⁸²⁸

With the elimination of the common wartime goal, both public and private institutions sought to unite America in new ways, in order to prevent a state of national turmoil, as well as to halt the spread of state-socialism.⁸²⁹ The Advertising Council (Ad Council) was paramount in this effort. Previously an instrument of the American government, it reorganized in 1945 "as a private nonprofit foundation dedicated to 'public service'

⁸²⁸ Wendy L. Wall, *Inventing the "American Way": The Politics of Consensus: From the New Deal to the Civil Rights Movement* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 168; For other causes for social unrest in postwar America, see for instance Campbell Craig & Frederik Logevall, *America's Cold War: The Politics of Insecurity* (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2009); Elaine Tyler May, *Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era*. (New York City: Perseus Books Group), 2008.

⁸²⁹ Ibid. 169-170.

advertising.”⁸³⁰ It engaged in a variety of projects to create domestic consensus on the nation’s core values or, in other words, on the “American Way.” Among these core values were American-style capitalism and American freedom.⁸³¹ The Ad Council was the creator of the “Crusade for Freedom” advertisements and the inventor of “Truth Dollars,” a concept used in these advertisements. The Crusade for Freedom was a domestic fund-raising campaign for Radio Free Europe. Through visuals and rhetoric, three advertisements created for the “Truth Dollars” campaign exemplify the manner in which they promoted the “American Way,” often setting it in opposition to the Soviet Union. These advertisements were classic Cold War propaganda. An analysis of the very concept of “Truth Dollars” demonstrates its association with the Cold War American ideology. Truth became a commodity, and the Ad Council used the same strategy for selling it as it would have used for any other consumer item.

Radio Free Europe

Radio Free Europe (RFE) is an American broadcasting organization founded in 1949 under the auspices of the National Committee for a Free Europe (NCFE).⁸³² RFE operated in Eastern Europe during the Cold War where it, according to its official mission statement, intended “to transmit uncensored news and information to audiences behind the Iron Curtain.”⁸³³ However, scholars have considered this objective ambiguous and have interpreted RFE’s intentions differently. Historian Walter L. Hixson described RFE as: “An anti-communist émigré propaganda network” that fostered “the illusion of being a genuine private station.”⁸³⁴ RFE indeed claimed to be a nongovernmental organization. It declared to operate as the voice of private American

⁸³⁰ Ibid. 173. Wall notes that the Ad Council justified its decision to cut its ties with the government by claiming that centralized federal control was at odds with the principles of a democracy.

⁸³¹ Ibid. 178; For specific literature on the Ad Council, see for instance Daniel L. Lykins, *From Total War to Total Diplomacy: The Advertising Council and the Construction of the Cold War Consensus* (Santa Barbara: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2003); Robert Griffith, “The Selling of America: The Advertising Council and American Politics, 1942,1960,” *The Business History Review* 57, N° 3 (1983): 388-412.

⁸³² Richard H. Cummings, *Radio Free Europe's "Crusade for Freedom:" Rallying Americans Behind Cold War Broadcasting, 1950-1960* (Jefferson: McFarland, 2010), 9. RFE broadcasted its first program on July 4, 1950 (Ibid. 24).

⁸³³ “Then And Now: Free Media In Unfree Societies,” last modified December 2008, <http://www.rferl.org/info/history/133.html>

⁸³⁴ Walter L. Hixson, *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War*. (New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 1997), 59.

citizens, in contrast to the Voice of America, another broadcasting organization that was seen as the official spokesman for the United States. In reality, RFE was heavily subsidized and influenced by the CIA.⁸³⁵ In addition, the public-private relationship of a number of directors and board members of the overarching NCFE was blurred. Examples include future CIA director Allen Dulles and future president Dwight D. Eisenhower.⁸³⁶

Crusade for Freedom

To maintain the illusion of RFE being a privately financed organization, parent organization NCFE initiated a domestic fundraising campaign in 1950.⁸³⁷ They called it the “Crusade for Freedom” (CFF) and highly publicized it during the early years. The Freedom Bell, modeled after the iconic Liberty Bell, became the symbol of the fundraising campaign and of RFE in general.⁸³⁸ General Dwight D. Eisenhower officially opened the campaign on Labor Day, September 4, 1950.

In a nation-wide radio broadcast, he introduced the CFF to the American citizens and urged every individual to support the campaign by signing a “Freedom Scroll.”⁸³⁹ In doing so, they would not only donate money to the cause, but also show their moral support. Indeed, mobilizing the support of American citizens was one of the prime objectives of the campaign.⁸⁴⁰ Interestingly, this “enrolment” in the CFF bears resemblance to a military enrolment: symbolic soldiers were assembled to fight this

⁸³⁵ Ibid. 59-60; Arch Puddington, *Broadcasting Freedom: The Cold War Triumph of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty* (Kentucky, University Press of Kentucky, 2015): 23; John Allen Stern, *C.D. Jackson: Cold War Propagandist for Democracy and Globalism* (Maryland: University Press of America, 2012), p.19.

⁸³⁶ Cummings, *Radio Free Europe's*, 9. Some of the organizations with whom RFE/NCFE collaborated were similarly ambiguous in their private-public relationships. For instance, the Ad Council had previously been a gov. org. and many of its board members had been directly involved in federal business

⁸³⁷ Hixson, *Parting the Curtain*, 59; Michael Nelson, *War of the Black Heavens: The Battles of Western Broadcasting in the Cold War* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1997), 47-48; Puddington, *Broadcasting Freedom*, p. 22.

⁸³⁸ Ibid.; Scott Lucas, *Freedom's War: The U.S. Crusade Against the Soviet Union, 1945-1956* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), 101-102; Puddington, *Broadcasting Freedom*, 20; Cummings, *Radio Free Europe's "Crusade for Freedom"*, p. 17, 21.

⁸³⁹ Ibid. 30-31. Nelson, *War of the Black Heavens*, 47-48; For an analysis of Eisenhower's speech see: Martin J. Medhurst, “Eisenhower and the Crusade for Freedom: The Rhetorical Origins of a Cold War Campaign,” *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 27, N° 4 (1997), p. 646-661.

⁸⁴⁰ Puddington, *Broadcasting Freedom*, p. 22

symbolic war; a war that was “cold” and not “hot.” Besides the salience of the Freedom Bell and the Freedom Scrolls, many activities were carried out to gain publicity for the CFF and prominent individuals like Eleanor Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan openly endorsed the campaign.⁸⁴¹ Advertisements created and dispersed for the cause were another key component.

Start of the Advertising Campaign

In June 1949, before the CFF had officially started, the NCFE had formed an advertising committee. This committee contracted the public relations firm John Price Jones Company, who suggested in their *Analysis and Plan of Fund Raising* report that the advertisements should make a threefold appeal: to emotion, reason and action. As quoted in Richard H. Cummings’ *Radio Free Europe’s “Crusade for Freedom,”* one of the aims should be to “capitalize on the public’s anti-communist sentiment, beat the drum of immediate danger, and paint a bold picture of the personal loss that is bound to follow Communism.”⁸⁴² The NCFE took this advice to heart and enlisted the help of the Ad Council to design such advertisements.⁸⁴³

The NCFE and the Ad Council devised a different slogan for each campaign year.⁸⁴⁴ The incentive of the advertisements of the first years was in line with the larger goal of the Crusade: to both expand the operations of RFE and to gain publicity and moral support.⁸⁴⁵ To that end, the advertisements were propagandistic in nature. Historian Walter L. Hixson has defined propaganda as “the attempt to influence behavior by shaping the attitudes of masses of people.”⁸⁴⁶ “By appealing to people’s emotions” could be added to this definition.⁸⁴⁷ One of the earlier advertisements dates back to 1951

⁸⁴¹ Cummings, *Radio Free Europe’s*, p. 39-43, 82-83.

⁸⁴² Ibid., p. 13-15.

⁸⁴³ The Ad Council helped to create other promotional material as well, such as films, window stickers and leaflets, Ibid. p. 51-52.

⁸⁴⁴ Ibid., p. vii; Puddington, *Broadcasting Freedom*, p. 23.

⁸⁴⁵ Cummings, *Radio Free Europe’s*, p.14.

⁸⁴⁶ Hixson, *Parting the Curtain*, p.1.

⁸⁴⁷ Propaganda is one of the psychological warfare techniques used during the Cold War. Soft power is another one. The main difference between propaganda and soft power is that the latter uses more subtle and less overt messages to “shape the preferences of others” through appeal and attraction. Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), p. 5.

and uses the theme of a religious crusade. The headline reads: “Give us this day... Our daily truth.” This sentence must have sounded familiar to people, except that the Christian *Pater Noster* prayer talks about “bread,” not “truth.” Right under the headline is a picture of a Czechoslovakian family gathered around the radio listening intensely to—presumably—RFE. The women have their hands folded in praying gestures. On top of the radio is a print that reads in the Czech language: “Where there is love, there is God’s blessing.” The religious connotations continue in the text under the image. The phrase in the headline is referred to as “the whispered prayer of millions behind the Iron Curtain.” RFE is said to fill their hearts with hope, and their language is reminiscent of the way in which a Reverend would preach in a church service: “Hour after hour, day after day, Radio Free Europe speaks to them. Words they can believe... words of news, words of encouragement, words of warning (...).”⁸⁴⁸ The Czechoslovakian family, representing all Eastern Europeans, is not just hungry for food, but hungry for “truth,” which the advertisement refers to as “the greatest hunger of all.”

Shift to “Truth Dollar” Advertisements

The concept of “Truth Dollars” was first introduced in the 1953-1954 campaign. It was the focus of most advertisements produced up to 1956. After 1956, “Truth Dollars” were still mentioned, but they were no longer the focus of the advertisements. They seemed to have become an integrated concept, mentioned matter-of-factly in a small-sized line at the bottom. Consequently, three advertisements from the 1953-1956 period, when the concept of “Truth Dollars” was most pronounced, were most important.⁸⁴⁹

During this period, the propaganda became more coercive in nature when compared to the advertisements from 1950-1952. Whereas the earlier dated advertisements were quite placid, they bordered on aggressive from 1953 onwards. The previously discussed “Give us this day...” advertisement can serve as an illustration here, when contrasted with the later “Truth Dollars” advertisements. In the former, the headline above the

⁸⁴⁸ Frank Altschul Papers, 1884-1986: Series VIII: Organizations, 1908-1980, Box 161, Folder 449

⁸⁴⁹ In the following sections, references are made to these three advertisements. All quotes, unless otherwise specified, have been taken from them. The advertisements have been included in the Appendix (fig 1-3), which can also be consulted for their original location.

picture is in a bigger font than the rest of the text and the word “truth” is underlined. While it grabs your attention, it is not dramatically present. This is different for the advertisements centering on “Truth Dollars,” in which the headlines stand out. For instance, in one advertisement, “World War III” is written at the top in bold, capitalized, large-sized letters, threatening with war if “truth” would not be broadcasted. There is also an increased emphasis on certain words, these being either in italics, underlined or in bold. Besides the assertive typography, the printed images are more violent too. The “Give us this Day...” advertisement depicts the harmonious scene of a Czechoslovakian family at home, while the “Truth Dollars” advertisements feature, among others, a raised fist and a battleground with armed soldiers. In addition, the earlier advertisement quoted and portrayed others (the family from Czechoslovakia), whereas the later ones more directly address—and in some cases even represent—you: the viewer and American citizen.

The CFF advertisements likely used more forceful propaganda from 1953 onwards because by that time RFE and its fund-raising campaign had become known at the grassroots level. Among its targets had been campus newspapers and Boy Scouts. Local communities had set up their own activities in support of the campaign, ranging from the lighting of “Freedom Fires” to the performance of special “Crusade for Freedom” dances.⁸⁵⁰ Due to all these promotional efforts, the objectives of the Crusade could shift away from pure publicity and focus directly on gaining moral support, as well as financial contributions. The messages could be more coercive. The very idea of “Truth Dollars”—raising money, raising dollars, raising Truth dollars—obviously fit well with this undertaking.

World War III: How \$1,00 from you can help end it before it starts

This 1952-1953 advertisement opens with the line “World War III,” which is without doubt the focal point with its large-sized, capitalized, bold letters. It lived up to one of the aims of the advertising campaign, as put forward in the earlier mentioned John Price

⁸⁵⁰ Cummings, *Radio Free Europe's*, 35, 42-43, 110-111; Puddington, *Broadcasting Freedom*, p. 23.

Jones Company report: “to beat the drum of immediate danger.”⁸⁵¹ The idea of a Third World War played into the fears of American citizens. It should be viewed in light of the historical circumstances, when the nuclear arms race had heightened the anxieties about the Cold War turning into a hot war, leading to global destruction. Yet the advertisement alludes to a remedy: “How \$1,00 from you can help end it before it starts.” The last three words of this sentence are underlined to give them more emphasis. They stress that the viewers must act now, “before it starts,” and should not wait until it is too late. The audience of this advertisement must have felt relief in learning that such a simple act as donating one dollar could help prevent a worldwide catastrophe. They are ensured in the first paragraph that they would benefit the organization “which is concentrated on the single most important job in the world (...) helping to keep World War III from happening.” Yet while the viewers might have been convinced of the significance of donating dollars, they must have been curious about the ways in which their dollars would be able to make a difference.

The answer is already hinted at the bottom of the page, where the viewers’ attention is drawn to next. The large-sized, bold word between inverted commas, “Truth-Dollars,” signifies that these dollars are not just ordinary dollars, but that they carry a special meaning. The final paragraph of the text, under the subheading “What you get for your dollar” explains it further:

One dollar from you pays for 100 words or more of hope and information to waiting millions behind the Iron Curtain. Your dollar may be the one that exposes a Soviet informer in Cracow, gives the lie to a Communist broadcast in Prague, saves the life of a patriot in Budapest. These are working dollars. These are Truth Dollars! (...) One dollar from you can help build the extra transmitters we need, send more messages instead of less, defeat the Kremlin in this battle for free men’s souls. Here is one battle that can be won by dollars. Dollars that may well be the salvation of us all. Could any dollar buy more? Send yours today – the Big Dollar to fight the Big Red Lie! This narrative asserts that dollars can buy hope, information and the truth. Dollars are viewed as active contributors in the fight against communism (“These are

⁸⁵¹ See footnote 15.

working dollars”). In one sentence they are even given active agency (“Your dollar may be the one that (...)”). A few vivid examples are given as to what a donated dollar could achieve.

The text starts by mentioning a potentially minor accomplishment (“Your dollar may be the one that exposes a Soviet informer in Cracow”) and ends with its attainability to crush an entire ideology (“One dollar from you (...) can defeat the Kremlin in this battle for free men’s souls”). Indeed, dollars can be the decisive factor in winning the Cold War (“Here is one battle that can be won by dollars”). They can be the “salvation” (from the evil of communism), a religious connotation similar to the ones in the earlier published advertisement. The rhetorical question near the end, “could any dollar buy more?” once more underscores the priority for American citizens to counter communism and to support “the people of the six captive countries.”

Their dollar could buy nothing more important. Besides the text in the main body, the advertisement depicts two boxed images with each an accompanying narrative. The bigger one to the right gives the viewer insight into “the Battleground for Peace.” It explains and illustrates which nations lay beyond the Iron Curtain.

The image shows two microphones (i.e. broadcasting organizations) transmitting messages to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. The microphone positioned at the western side of the Iron Curtain has “truth” written on it, while the microphone drawn on the eastern side has “lies” inscribed in it. It is not hard to infer that the “truth” microphone represents the United States, more specifically RFE, whereas the “lies” microphone denotes the Soviet Union. Two armed soldiers are also drawn on the eastern side, highlighting the captivity of the people behind the Iron Curtain, as opposed to the freedom these people would enjoy in the west. To this end, these people are referred to as “captive” and “freedom-loving.” The suggestion that they are longing for the freedom of the west is embodied by the depiction of a woman holding the hands of her two children: trapped behind the Iron Curtain, she faces west and presumably attempts to move to that side. At the very least she seems more inclined to listen to the “truth,” having her back turned to the Soviet “lies.”

The advertisement's other boxed image, the one to the left, is claimed to contain the following communist lie: "The American cannibals... want to exterminate whole human races, particularly those belonging to the Far East or South East Asian peoples..." This lie is ascribed to a Hungarian writer and was supposedly published in a Hungarian daily newspaper. Its message is enforced by a cartoon of Uncle Sam, who casually sits in a chair, and, with a grin on his face, watches a number of people being boiled to death in a big cooking pot. The advertisement urges the readers of this lie to get a \$1 bill out of their pocket and to physically cover it. As is noted: "This Communist lie is the actual size of a U.S. dollar bill." The text then dictates the reader to "tuck [the dollar] into an envelope with your name and address and send it to 'Crusade for Freedom.'" This little activity provided meaning to the concept of "Truth Dollars," by making a literal association between dollars and their ability to cover up lies. Donating dollars would support RFE in its efforts to broadcast the truth: "The truth about what is happening in a nearby village. The truth about their own townspeople. Truth which puts the finger on an informer. Truth behind Soviet lies. Truth about their own country—one thing their Soviet conquerors fear above all." The advertisement analyzed next employed the concept of "Truth Dollars" in similar manners.

Sure I want to fight Communism—but how?

In the top-half of this advertisement, dating to 1954-1955, a white, middle-aged man is depicted. He does not look into the camera directly, but seems to be contemplating: the hand under his chin, his slightly open mouth, and the wrinkles in his forehead highlight this. The viewer can discern that he is pondering the question written next to him. On the black background, the white letters stand out and grab the viewer's attention immediately: "Sure I want to fight Communism—but how?" The latter two words are printed in a larger font, giving more emphasis to these. It appears as if the man in the picture is responding to someone else's question ("Do you not want to fight Communism?"). We can infer from the way the man's answer is phrased that he is giving the only acceptable answer ("Sure I want to fight Communism"). One could imagine adding the words "who would not?" The man, who looks like an ordinary

American citizen, arguably represented the views of his fellow countrymen: everyone wanted to join the anti-communist effort and wished to fight the national enemy. This was particularly true in light of the ever-increasing threat of communist conspiracies within the US, an anxiety fueled by McCarthyism. The second part of the man's response ("but how?") likewise expressed common sentiments among the American population. As patriotic citizens, they wished to combat communism and assert their commitment to the nation, but they were unsure how to go about this.

RFE provides the answer in the bottom-half of the advertisement: "With 'Truth Dollars'—that's how!" "Truth Dollars" is between quotation marks, in capital letters and in a larger font than the rest of the sentence. Thus, this is the most important part of the answer; or in fact, this is the answer. "That's how!" is in italics and with an exclamation mark at the end, highlighting its unequivocal response to the man's question. The two sentences that follow directly underneath the main answer provide the essence of the advertisement: urging the reader to give "Truth Dollars" to fight communism. The text speaks directly to the reader ("*Your* 'Truth Dollars'"), communicating the idea that every individual can make a useful contribution to the fight against communism.⁸⁵² Indeed, every American has dollars: in the capitalist system, citizens have the freedom to make these dollars by working. Thus, the fruits of their labor can buy them "the truth." This idea is returned to in the final section.

A short text consisting of five paragraphs follows, providing an explanation on the workings of "Truth Dollars." The rhetoric is explicitly propagandistic and plays into the assumed responsibilities of American citizens, calling upon their patriotism. The whole family is urged to join the effort ("Send as many 'Truth Dollars' as you can (if possible, a dollar for each member of the family)"). The illustration to the right, of a raised fist clasp a (Truth) dollar, reiterates that communism can be fought with "Truth Dollars." In this case, fighting is not perceived in the conventional sense of man-to-man combat, but as a battle between ideologies, with the dollar as the choice of weapon in the west. Interestingly, this image of a raised fist is an appropriated communist symbol, implying that RFE and the US can defeat communism on their own terms, with "Truth Dollars."

⁸⁵² Emphasis added by author.

You mean I can fight Communism?

This advertisement was the female counterpart of the advertisement just discussed, also dating to 1954-1955. In the top-half of the advertisement, a white, middle-aged woman is depicted. She looks into the camera directly, with a surprised expression on her face. Her frowned eyebrows and somewhat dropped jaw bear testimony to her surprise. This emotion seems to be a reaction to the question written next to her. Similar to the previous advertisement, the white letters on the black background stand out and instantly draw the attention of the viewers to the headline: “You mean I can fight Communism?” “I” is printed in a larger font, underlined and in bold. Following up on the argument that the man represented the views of his fellow countrymen, the woman seemed to serve as the spokesperson for fellow American women. Like men, women wished to contribute to the fight against communism, but they did not realize they could provide any substantial help. This reflected the gender roles of the 1950s patriarchic society, in which women were commonly identified solely as housewives and mothers. The “fighting” was left to the men. Yet the Cold War was not an orthodox fight, as mentioned before: it was a symbolic fight and the advertisement conveys that women could join it as well.

The answer to the woman’s question in the bottom-half of the advertisement is straightforward: “Yes—for just one dollar...” “Yes” is in capital letters and in a larger font than the rest of the sentence, leaving no doubts about whether women could fight communism. “For just one dollar” is in italics and followed by an ellipsis. This highlights that supporting the campaign, and with it anti-communism, required a minor commitment. Women, generally seen as the ones making the purchasing decisions in the 1950s consumer society, would not need to alter their budget drastically. Each dollar, just “one for every member of your family,” would help fight communism. This reflected the incentive of the CFF, above all concerned with gaining moral support and less worried about the actual fund-raising, “even if each [Truth dollar] would be found

upon analysis to cost us [the NCFE] more than one dollar.”⁸⁵³ The rhetoric in the five short paragraphs, which constitute the main body of text in the advertisement, is nearly identical to its male counterpart. Likewise, it is propagandistic and appeals to the viewer’s patriotism.

Recurring Elements

The “Truth Dollars” advertisements share recurring elements. First, the dichotomies between the United States and the Soviet Union are striking. The US has the “truth,” the USSR has “lies;” the US is “good,” the USSR is “evil;” the US is the “free world,” the USSR is the “conquerors.” In much the same vein, the USSR is referred to as “The Communists,” “The Reds,” “The Kremlin,” and “Moscow.” The fight is always against one of these abstract entities: no mention is made of human beings. This objectification of the Soviet Union strengthened the Crusade’s efforts, as the American people felt greater justification for their fight against this grand system of oppression, rather than a direct fight against fellow human beings, who are being depicted as victims in the advertisements.

The idea of freedom is another prevalent theme in these advertisements and links in to the US-USSR dichotomy. The people living behind the Iron Curtain are referred to as “freedom-loving,” while in the current Soviet sphere of influence they are “captive,” “enslaved,” and “embattled.” The choice of words implies that all “70 million” Eastern Europeans are longing for (American) freedom. Freedom was one of the democratic core principles championed by the US. Of course, the very name of the campaign underscored its importance.

A second commonality between the advertisements is the focus on the American individual. Either the words “you,” “you, personally,” or “I” are emphasized. This fit in with the broader historical context, more elaborately outlined in the first section. Starting in the late 1940s, both governmental institutions and private organizations had

⁸⁵³ NCFE director Clinton DeWitt Poole wrote this in a letter to Allen Dulles on November 16, 1949. As quoted in Cummings, *Radio Free Europe's*, p. 14.

tried to “enlist civil society (...) in a defense of the American Way overseas.”⁸⁵⁴ However, this American Way required a domestic consensus first, for which the support of every American citizen was desired. This attempt to mobilize the US citizen was also one of the key goals of the Crusade. Their advertisements claim that one person can make a difference to 70 million people. In fact, “You run Radio Free Europe.” It is emphasized that “RFE is a public American enterprise” and that it is “supported by voluntary, cooperative action of millions of Americans.” This assurance must have appealed to those feeling impotent to alleviate the Cold War threats: they were now entrusted with the power for change.⁸⁵⁵

A third element shared by the three advertisements is their insistence on acting immediately. Short sentences dictate to “send yours [Truth Dollars] today” and to “take a \$1 bill out of your pocket right now.” The urgency of donating “Truth Dollars” is made explicit: “the need is now” and “do it now.”⁸⁵⁶ The viewers are warned that communism needs to be fought right away, before matters get out of hand. The 1952-1953 advertisement is most explicit in sketching the ensuing doom scenario if nothing is done: WWII. All advertisements play into the constant anxiety of American citizens over the Cold War turning into a hot war in the blink of an eye. Caution was always warranted in light of the ever-lurking communist threat.

At the same time, the viewers are rest assured that RFE is being successful in its efforts to combat communism—a fourth and final aspect each advertisement touches upon. In one of them, RFE attributes the following description to itself: “(...) the most successful project yet devised by western man to fan the flames of liberty and keep hope and courage strong in the captive countries.” A few lines later, it refers to itself as the “pipeline of freedom.” Clearly, RFE’s mission was in line with the national endeavor to spread American ideals. The advertisements proudly share the practices of RFE: broadcasting “day and night, seven days a week,” “more than 2,000 hours a week,” reaching “Poles, Czechoslovakians, Hungarians, Romanians and Bulgarians.” What is

⁸⁵⁴ Wall, *Inventing the "American Way,"* p. 242.

⁸⁵⁵ Other initiatives that were part of the Crusade for Freedom campaign centered around the individual in similar ways. For instance, the Freedom Scroll that each person could sign to express personal support.

⁸⁵⁶ Emphases added by author.

more, by italicizing certain words, RFE stresses that it is fighting communism behind the Iron Curtain, “right on its own battleground,” “in its own backyard,” and “on its own home grounds.”⁸⁵⁷ By donating money, the reader would be able to strike the enemy right at its heart. It is further noted that the Soviet Union has attempted to “jam” programs broadcasted by RFE, yet “so far without success.” It assures the superiority of RFE, of the United States, and of their American “truth” over the USSR and its lies.

Conclusion

Although the CFF was officially a fund-raising campaign, this was never its sole purpose. In the disrupted postwar society, its main objective was to mobilize American citizens in support of a domestic consensus on America’s core values. In other words, it “hoped to solidify the allegiance of these thirty-five million Americans to a particular vision of the American Way.”⁸⁵⁸ The US and RFE also attempted to carry their ideals abroad, especially to the countries behind the Iron Curtain. The CFF set out to enroll symbolic soldiers for this cause and to, during its 1953-1956 “Truth Dollars” campaigns, directly fight the communist threat with the weapon of capitalism. Interestingly, in opting for this focus on capitalism, the Ad Council championed both American-style capitalism and individualism, which they and the government had considered threatening in the late 1930s under liberal New Deal policies.⁸⁵⁹

The epitome of capitalism, the dollar, was linked to “truth,” which tied in with the American core values of democracy and freedom. The “Truth Dollars” advertisements, in both visuals and rhetoric, portrayed RFE and the US as the ones who had the true, objective story. Indeed, transmitting the truth was equal to transmitting information. As Joseph S. Nye wrote about Cold War politics: “there was a thin line between

⁸⁵⁷ As was already pointed out, the visuals of the advertisements in fig 2-3 reflected 1950s gender roles. It could be further suggested that the rhetoric in these advertisements exaggerated these gender roles. For instance, the advertisement with the man makes mention of a “backyard,” while the advertisement with the woman refers to “home grounds.” These symbolize the traditional inside/outside dichotomy, with the backyard being a distinctly male space and the home being a distinctly female space. Yet caution is warranted, as the female advertisement, at the end, also mentions “backyard”.

⁸⁵⁸ Wall, *Inventing the "American Way,"* p. 243.

⁸⁵⁹ Griffith, “The Selling of America,” p. 388.

information and propaganda.”⁸⁶⁰ During the Cold War, in the increasingly growing consumer society, it now seemed possible to buy information; to buy words of truth. However, these could only be bought by those who had dollars, thus by those who partook in capitalism. Being part of the capitalist system allowed one access to the truth, while being part of the communist, totalitarian system only exposed one to lies. Dollars were literally needed to cover up the lies, as one of the advertisements advocated for. This idea that the truth could be bought becomes all the more evident when we consider that the CIA covertly funded RFE. The CIA determined what truths were broadcasted, while trying to maintain the “illusion of objectivity.”⁸⁶¹

In conclusion, the “Truth Dollars” advertisements appealed to the civic responsibilities of American citizens to fight communism with the capitalist system in which they themselves were immersed. The power of capitalism, with the dollar as its symbol, would lead one to the truth. The truth, in turn, would combat communism. Both in their visuals and rhetoric, the advertisements conveyed the message that the American truth was the only truth, and a commodity readily available for purchase. These advertisements are prime examples of classic Cold War propaganda. They did not leave any room for misunderstandings: donating “Truth Dollars” was the indisputable answer to how each individual, and the American family in its entirety, could fight communism with capitalism.

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⁸⁶⁰ Nye, *Soft Power*, p. 103.

⁸⁶¹ Ibid.

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WORLD WAR III

How \$1⁰⁰ from you can help end it before it starts

There's an organization you may not have heard of which is concentrated on the single most important job in the world. *It's helping to keep World War III from happening. And it's doing so at the lowest possible cost.*

True, you may not have heard of it. But 70,000,000 people have. They hear about it every day.

They are the people of the six captive countries that stand between the free world and the Soviet Union.

These are the tyranny haters who can stop Communism dead in its tracks.

It's Radio Free Europe. Know what that means?

What keeps the spark of resistance alive among this embattled 70,000,000 is Radio Free Europe. It's the most successful project yet devised by western man to fan the flames of liberty and keep hope and courage strong in the captive countries.

From RFE come the programs that actually get through to these people when they close their blinds in Warsaw and Prague and Budapest. This is the *pipeline of freedom*. You can keep it working... for you!

Because Radio Free Europe broadcasts the *Truth*. The truth about what is happening in a nearby village. The truth about their own townspeople. Truth which puts the finger on an informer. Truth behind Soviet lies. Truth about their own country—one thing their Soviet conquerors fear above all.

You run Radio Free Europe

RFE is a public American enterprise. It is supported by private citizens like you—millions of them. It is the voice of freedom—Poles telling the truth to Poles, Czechs and Slovaks telling Czechoslovakians.

It is the most effective, the most efficient, the most economical way yet found to fight Soviet tyranny, right on its own battleground.

What you get for your dollar

One dollar from you pays for 100 words or more of hope and information to waiting millions behind the Iron Curtain. Your dollar may be the one that exposes a Soviet informer in Cracow, gives the lie to a Communist broadcast in Prague, saves the life of a patriot in Budapest. These are working dollars. These are Truth Dollars!

The best evidence of RFE's success is that the Communists are using every possible device to jam Radio Free Europe's 21 powerful transmitters to drown out the voice of freedom.

Don't let the Reds win this battle. One dollar from you can help build the extra transmitters we need, send more messages instead of less, defeat the Kremlin in this battle for free men's souls.

Here is one battle that can be won by dollars. Dollars that may well be the salvation of us all. Could any dollar buy more? Send yours today—the Big Dollar to fight the Big Lie!



HERE IS THE BATTLEGROUND OF PEACE

where your "Truth-Dollar" will go to work

The Iron Curtain is a strip of land 4 to 6 miles wide, composed of traps, alarm systems, electric barbed wire and mine zones. It's guarded by Communist soldiers with orders to shoot to kill.

Back of it lie six freedom-loving nations—Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania—with 70,000,000 people.

Their lives are controlled by the police state which takes orders direct from the Kremlin. They are bombarded with a ton-ton of lies in press and radio.

But Radio Free Europe broadcasts have come to be the most popular in these countries. 21 transmitters in Western Germany and Portugal broadcasting more than 2,000 hours a week.

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THIS COMMUNIST LIE IS ACTUAL SIZE OF U. S. DOLLAR BILL

"The American cannibals... want to exterminate whole human races, particularly those belonging to the Far East or South East Asian peoples..."

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Makes you mad, doesn't it—a lie like this? Yet it's typical of lies which are being fed every day to 70,000,000 freedom-loving, captive people back of the Iron Curtain.

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
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Your "Truth Dollars" hit the Kremlin where it hurts most—*behind the Iron Curtain*. Give "Truth Dollars" and get in the fight!

"Truth Dollars" send words of truth and hope to the 70 million freedom loving people behind the Iron Curtain.

These words broadcast over Radio Free Europe's 29 transmitters, reach Poles, Czechoslovaks, Hungarians, Romanians and Bulgarians. RFE is supported by voluntary, cooperative action of millions of Americans engaged in this fight of good against evil.

How do "Truth Dollars" fight Communism? By exposing Red lies . . . revealing news suppressed by Moscow and, by unmasking Communist collaborators. The broadcasts are by exiles in the native

tongues of the people to whom they are beamed.

Radio Free Europe is hurting Communism in its own backyard. We know by Red efforts to "jam" our programs (so far without success). To successfully continue these broadcasts, even more transmitters are needed.

Every dollar buys 100 words of truth. That's how hard "Truth Dollars" work. Keep the truth turned on. Your dollars will help 70 million people resist the Kremlin. Send as many "Truth Dollars" as you can (if possible, a dollar for each member of your family). The need is now.

**FIGHT
COMMUNISM**



"TRUTH DOLLARS"



Support Radio Free Europe

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Fig. 2: Hoover Archives, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Inc. Corporate Records, Box 2236, Folder 1.



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What better way for you *personally* to do something about Communism?

How Radio Free Europe works

RFE has 29 powerful transmitters this

side of the Iron Curtain. Day and night, seven days a week they reach the people of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. These broadcasts are by exiles in their native tongues.

The Communists use every means to drown out Radio Free Europe—every known device to jam RFE broadcasts, so far without success.

More transmitters needed now

More dollars are needed to get the truth to more people behind the Iron Curtain. Send in your “Truth Dollars” today—one for every member of your family—and fight Communism in its own backyard. Do it now.



**FIGHT
COMMUNISM**



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Send your “Truth Dollar” to **CRUSADE FOR FREEDOM** c/o your Postmaster

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Fig. 3: Hoover Archives, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Inc. Corporate Records, Box 2236, Folder 1.

The 1957 Moscow Youth Festival and the Hungarian delegation: Propaganda, Youth Organizations and the Cultural Cold War

Orsolya PÓSFAI

In the summer of 1957, the Sixth World Festival for Youth and Students was held in Moscow. In itself, the Festival did not hold much political or historical significance; however, it was a singular phenomenon during the Cold War: for a few days, the Iron Curtain separating East from West was lifted, and young people from around the world could catch a glimpse of what life was like on the other side.

The Cold War that erupted after the Second World War between the United States and the Soviet Union was not only a political and military confrontation – a cultural cold war unprecedented in history also developed between the two superpowers. Never before had cultural events been so important: concerts, literary events, exhibitions, scientific conferences and youth movements carried almost as much weight in the war as military operations. Both the US and the Soviet Union strived to propagate their own world view through culture, trying to convince the world of the superiority of one set of values. The armament race came hand in hand with a cultural race.⁸⁶²

After Stalin's death a period of reform called the 'thaw' (*otтеpel'*) began, triggered by Khrushchev's infamous Secret Speech, in which he denounced the cult of personality and the crimes committed by Stalin. This period of thaw allowed the Sixth World Youth Festival to be held in Moscow in 1957. The organization of the festival in Moscow was impossible until Stalin's death, when inviting tens of thousands of foreigners behind the iron curtain was unimaginable. However, after Stalin's death, Khrushchev was eager to establish friendlier ties with the West, and the Youth Festival presented itself as the perfect opportunity to prove the Soviet Union's peaceful intentions toward the West and

⁸⁶²David Caute, *The Dancer Defects: The Struggle for Cultural Supremacy during the Cold War*. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2005.

to further build “peaceful coexistence”. Even the festival’s slogan was more neutral than previous festivals’ had been: “For peace and friendship”. There were no pictures of political leaders at the festival either (in previous years, pictures of Lenin, Stalin and local communist leaders could be seen everywhere).⁸⁶³

The events of 1956, however, raised questions about the sincerity of these peaceful intentions in the eyes of the West as well as in some Communist countries. In June, 1956, workers in Poznan demanded an end to the Soviet domination of Poland, which resulted in relative success: the new Prime Minister, Vladislav Gomulka, promised that Poland would remain a loyal member of the Warsaw Pact and in return, greater freedom of action in Polish domestic affairs was guaranteed by Khrushchev. The Polish uprising was followed by the Hungarian revolution in October, which resulted in international outrage directed at the Soviet Union. These events occurred at a time when it was already too late to cancel the festival, and resulted in a frostier international climate and therefore had a negative impact on the festival itself. Despite these difficulties, the festival was held from the 28th of July till the 12th of August in Moscow with 34 000 participants from 131 countries, the largest festival in the history of the World Youth Festivals. The World Youth Festivals had been an effective tool of propaganda for Soviet culture since 1947, when the first festival was held in Prague with approximately 20 000 participants from Communist and non-Communist countries alike. The second festival was held in Budapest in 1949, the third in East Berlin in 1951, the fourth in Bucharest in 1953 and the fifth in Warsaw in 1955.⁸⁶⁴

The Festival Preparations

The final decision to hold the festival in Moscow came in 1954, when the Komsomol (the Soviet Communist Youth Association) General Secretary, Aleksandr Shelepin sent a letter to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Central Committee, suggesting that Moscow should host the next festival. His proposal wasn’t accepted

⁸⁶³ Pia Koivunen. “The 1957 Moscow Youth Festival: propagating a new, peaceful image of the Soviet Union.” In *Soviet State and Society under Nikita Khrushchev*, 46-65. Edited by Melanie Ilic and Jeremy Smith. New York: Routledge, 2009.

⁸⁶⁴ “The Vienna Youth Festival”, *Open Society Archives: Foreign Relations Series: East West*, 2. <http://fa.osaarchivum.org/background-reports?col=8&id=42475>.

immediately, and the fifth World Youth Festival was held in Warsaw in 1955. It was decided that the sixth festival would be held in Moscow, and in October 1955, a Soviet preparatory committee was set up.⁸⁶⁵ The festival itself was preceded by an extensive cleansing of Moscow; many buildings were renovated and new ones were built. Additionally, people who were found undesirable to the aesthetic of the city were relocated. Around 16 000 people were removed from Moscow and its surroundings: "Moscow city and its surrounding regions were cleared of hooligans, gypsies, prostitutes, waifs and thieves."⁸⁶⁶

War was waged against the so-called "stiliaga" as well. The stiliagi were young people, who dressed fashionably, listened to jazz and rock and roll, and gave each other American nicknames.⁸⁶⁷ Kristin Roth-Ey, in her article *Loose Girls on the Loose*, states that in the months preceding the festival, "civic police groups were mobilized to conduct anti-stilyaga dance raids and to rid Moscow of 'criminal elements' and 'loose women'."⁸⁶⁸ During the festival, Moscow transformed to welcome its guests and donned a holiday appearance: "The streets of Moscow were for the first time decked out in multicolored flags rather than the customary red one, and Pablo Picasso's doves of peace replaced the customary hammer and sickle as the symbol of the festival."⁸⁶⁹ Extensive propaganda preceded the festival, both in Soviet and Western media. After 1956, the Soviet Union viewed the festival as an opportunity to give Westerners the "correct" answers to their questions regarding Communist ideology, the freedom of the Soviet people and the intervention in Hungary. Before the festival Soviet youth were trained on how to answer these questions and how to be "ambassadors of Soviet culture".⁸⁷⁰ Western media was more concerned with whether or not their youth should

⁸⁶⁵ Koivunen, *The 1957 Moscow Youth Festival*.

⁸⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 53.

⁸⁶⁷ For 'stiliaga', see: H. Ragsdale and E. Zubkova, *Russia after the War: Hopes, Illusions and Disappointments, 1945-1957*. (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1998); H. Pilkington, *Russia's Youth and Its Culture: A Nation's Constructors and Constructed*. (New York: Routledge, 1994); G. Sherman, "Soviet Youth: Myth and Reality." *Daedalus*, 91.1 (1962): 216-237, and K. Weaver, *Bushels of Rubles: Soviet Youth in Transition*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1992.

⁸⁶⁸ Kristin Roth-Ey, "Loose Girls On The Loose: Sex, Propaganda and the 1957 Moscow Youth Festival." In *Women In The Khrushchev Era*, 75-95. Edited by Melanie Ilic, Susan E. Reid and Lynne Atwood. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan Ltd, 2004), p. 83.

⁸⁶⁹ Hugh Ragsdale and Elena Zubkova, *Russia after the War: Hopes, Illusions, and Disappointments, 1945-1957*. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1998, p. 200.

⁸⁷⁰ Koivunen, *The 1957 Moscow Youth Festival*, p. 48.

be attending the festival at all. The US State Department's official view for instance, was that no official American delegation should attend the festival. A group of about 160 Americans still attended the festival, although not in an official capacity.⁸⁷¹ In a series of letters to the editor of the Times, published between 1956 October 26th and November 1st, several readers stated their opinions on the question of whether an official delegation should represent Britain at the festival or not. The readers arguing against attending had reasons such as:

"It is the young people from developing countries who are the targets [of the festival] - and the task of persuading them that they are attending, not a Communist propaganda exercise, but a representative international gathering is aided considerably if there are non-Communists from such countries as our own present⁸⁷² [and] What we really want is freedom of travel for young people, so that they can make their own choice of where to go, whom to meet, or what to see. In present circumstances, under whatever auspices a youth festival is held, those attending from Communist countries will be those told, or authorized to do so: that is to say, at the worst they will be trained propagandists and at best those who are thought to be impermeable to western influences. There is in fact little point in meeting them."⁸⁷³

Positive opinions featured arguments such as: "It would be a pity if a large British delegation were to meet many Soviet citizens informally for the first time, and not be more effectively represented"⁸⁷⁴ and described personal experiences:

"At all events I suffered no ill effects from last year's visit to Warsaw [the Fifth World Youth Festival]. No attempt was made to change my political views. Then, as now, I supported Soviet policy when I thought it right. Then, as now, I condemned it when I thought it wrong. What I failed to find among my hosts was a Communist who was as horrified of the idea of a festival organized by Christians as Mr. Mayhew is on learning of one organized by Communists."⁸⁷⁵

From North America 337 people attended the festival, from Europe, a total of 25 808⁸⁷⁶, among them 1600 British.⁸⁷⁷ 76 % of the festival's attendants were European.

⁸⁷¹ Ibid., and Frederick C. Barghoorn, "Soviet Cultural Diplomacy since Stalin." *Russian Review*, 17.1 (1958), p. 41-55, 54-55.

⁸⁷² "World Festival of Youth." *Times*, November 1, 1956, p. 11.

⁸⁷³ "World Festival of Youth." *Times*, October 29, 1956, p. 9.

⁸⁷⁴ "World Festival of Youth." *Times*, November 1, 1956, p. 11.

⁸⁷⁵ "World Festival of Youth." *Times*, October 26, 1956, p. 11.

⁸⁷⁶ Koivunen, *The 1957 Moscow Youth Festival*, p. 51.

⁸⁷⁷ "Varied Reactions to Moscow Wooing of World Youth." *Times*, September 9, 1957, p. 9.

The Socialist Youth Movement and its impact on the World Youth Festivals

The World Youth Festivals were organized by the World Federation of Democratic Youth and the International Union of Students, both communist youth organizations, with help from the host country's youth organization. The festivals were among the most important propaganda events of the Soviet Union and its allies, meant to demonstrate the Soviet lifestyle and superior Soviet ideology to westerners. Their first and foremost purpose however, was to educate all socialist youth in Communist and Soviet ideology. In an article published in Komsomolskaya Pravda, on 14 August 1958, N. Mesyatsev wrote:

"The international festivals have become a remarkable tradition in the international youth movement. These meetings contribute to the consolidation of democratic forces of youth in capitalist and dependent colonial countries and to convince them that only by joint struggle is it possible to preserve peace on earth and to guarantee a better future for youth. With each new festival fresh millions of young men and women from all the continents of the globe flow into the ranks of the World Federation of Democratic Youth and the International Union of Students."⁸⁷⁸

Youth issues and education were a central part of communist ideology since its inception. As the ultimate goal of the world revolution was to establish a new, socialist society, providing youth with a socialist education - which would train them to become good socialists - was of utmost importance. Lenin himself said on the question of youth organizations:

"Organizations of youth [...] which openly declare that they are still learning, that their main task is to train party workers for the socialist parties [...] must be given every assistance. We must be patient with their faults and strive to correct them gradually, mainly by persuasion, and not by fighting them. The middle-aged and the aged do not know how to approach the youth, for the youth must of necessity advance to socialism in a different way, by other paths, in other forms, in other circumstances than their fathers."⁸⁷⁹

⁸⁷⁸ "The Vienna Youth Festival."

⁸⁷⁹ Leo Goretti and Matthew Worley, "Introduction: communist youth, communist generations: a reappraisal." *Twentieth Century Communism* 4 (2012): 5-13, 5.
http://www.lwbooks.co.uk/journals/twentiethcenturycommunism/pdfs/4goretti_worley.pdf.

The long and rich history of youth movements started at the end of the 19th century, mainly among socialist youth. Karl Liebknecht was among the first to realize the power that could be wielded through youth. He elaborated his views on the subject in his pamphlet "Militarism and Anti-Militarism". Liebknecht recognized that "in order to combat bourgeois influences over the youth, it was necessary to organize independent youth organizations. One could not simply urge the youth to vote for the Party and join it. One must allow the socialist youth to form their own organizations which they would run for themselves."⁸⁸⁰ Liebknecht organized the South German youth, who in turn called an international conference in Stuttgart in 1907, in order to unite the many separate national youth organizations. The conference's main accomplishment was establishing the International Union of Socialist Youth.

In 1915, an international conference was held in Bern. The conference sharply condemned the war, characterizing it as "one of banditry and the result of capitalist politics"⁸⁸¹. A new International Bureau was organized, with Willi Munzenburg as its Secretary. During the First World War, communication between the IUSY's separate fractions was broken and the union seemingly disintegrated under the pressure of war and radically differing opinions among its members. In November 1917, Willi Munzenburg was arrested. After Munzenburg was arrested, Trostel was elected as Secretary, and the German, Hungarian and Russian sectors of the International Union reestablished relations with each other. In August 1919, a new international conference was called in Vienna, where the Provisional Committee called a world conference, which was held on November 20, 1919, in Berlin. This conference was later called the first congress of the Young Communist International, where the Young Communist League was organized.

From its inception, the socialist youth movement had struggled with leftist parties for their independence, since the official political parties had a tendency of trying to control them from the top. At the second congress of the YCI in 1921 in Jena, Germany, this struggle was ultimately lost, since the Young Communist League officially

⁸⁸⁰ Shirley Waller, "History of the International Socialist Youth Movement to 1929." *The Young Socialist*. (New York, 1959), p. 3.

⁸⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

subordinated itself to the Communist Party. After the third Congress, held in 1922 in Moscow, the YCL began its degeneration, as it slowly became a factional pawn in the power conflicts of the Communist Party and lost all independence. However, the Communist Youth International remained active until 1943, alongside the Communist International (Comintern)⁸⁸².

In November, 1945, the World Federation of Democratic Youth was founded in London at a world youth congress as a general, worldwide youth organization. In August 1946, the International Union of Students (IUS) was founded in Prague at a world student congress. Strictly speaking, both organizations were left-wing establishments, but “attracted considerable non-Communist membership”⁸⁸³ in the beginning. These members soon left the groups, as Communist influence and agenda became more and more apparent. In 1948, the IUS “espoused the Communist cause and made no protest against victimization of non-Communist students in the ensuing period.”⁸⁸⁴

After both the WFDY and the IUS expelled Yugoslav members in 1950, most non-Communist members left the organizations and joined the World Assembly of Youth (WAY) and the Coordinating Secretariat of National Unions of Students (COSEC). After Stalin’s death in 1953, the WFDY and the IUS softened some of its anti-West rhetoric and showed some effort in neutralizing relations with non-Communist youth organizations. However, when the 1956 October revolution broke out in Budapest, where the headquarters of the WFDY were stationed, the Federation’s officers fled the city to Prague and remained silent on the question of the Soviet intervention.⁸⁸⁵

The Komsomol

The Soviet youth organization, the Komsomol (Komunisticheski Soiuz Molodezhi), played a significant part in organizing the Moscow Youth Festival. Vladimir Semichastniy, a prominent member of the Komsomol, who later became its General

⁸⁸² Goretti and Worley, *Introduction: communist youth, communist generations*, p. 5.

⁸⁸³ *The Vienna Youth Festival*, 17.

⁸⁸⁴ *Ibid.* 18.

⁸⁸⁵ *Ibid.* 17.

Secretary, wrote about the challenges of organizing the festival in his biography. He emphasized the importance of the organization's role, stating

“the Komsomol's independence and high responsibility really showed during the organization of the Festival of Students and Youth in Moscow in 1957. No governmental commissions for organizing the festival were formed – everything was decided by the Komsomol Central Committee. There was only the organizing committee headed by A. N. Shelepin, and all of the ministries we needed were at our disposal.”⁸⁸⁶

In Russia, the socialist youth movement started as early as the end of the 19th century – the beginning of the 20th century. During the revolutionary events of 1905-1907 and 1917, the youth movement played a significant part, but it wasn't institutionalized until October, 1918, when the Komsomol was founded. At this time, the organization had a strong political character supporting the Bolsheviks, even though its founding charter stated “the Union, as a spontaneous manifestation of youth, is a completely independent organization.”⁸⁸⁷ Kitty Weaver summarizes the main task of the Komsomol in *Bushels of Rubles: Soviet Youth in Transition*:

“What were the tasks of this youth league? Lenin himself gave the answer at the Third Congress of the Komsomol, in Moscow on October 2, 1920. The older generation, he said, had been brought up in a capitalist society and at most could only destroy the foundations of the old capitalist way of life. It was up to the youth to create a communist society. The task of the Komsomol could be summed up in a single word--learn. Learn what? How to teach communism.”⁸⁸⁸

After its establishment, the Komsomol continued its work aiding the Party, participating in nationwide educational and economic reforms (such as organizing the collectivization process and the prosecution of kulaks). After Lenin died in 1924, they changed their official name to the Russian Leninist Communist Youth League (Rossiyski Leninski Kommunisticheski Soyuz Molodezhi) and then in 1926 changed it to the All Union Leninist Communist Youth League (Vsesoyuzni Leninski Kommunisticheski Soyuz Molodezhi). The Komsomol was immensely popular; in 1925 alone, 769 000 young people joined its ranks.⁸⁸⁹ Its popularity and influence didn't serve it well during the

⁸⁸⁶ Vladimir Semichastnyi, *Bespokoinoye Serdtse*. (Moscow: Vagrius, 2002), p. 67.

⁸⁸⁷ V. K. Krivoruchenko and L. S. Tsbetlyuk, “Yunosheskoe dvizhenii Rossii.” http://www.zpu-journal.ru/e-zpu/2011/3/Krivoruchenko-Tsvetliuk_Juvenile-Movement/.

⁸⁸⁸ Kitty Weaver, *Bushels of Rubles: Soviet Youth in Transition*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1992, p. 32.

⁸⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 43.

Stalinist period, since Stalin persecuted many prominent members of the youth organization, accusing them of treason and obstruction of socialism. The trials against them were part of Stalin's radical "purges" or "cleansing" (in Russian "chistka") in the thirties. Most of the persecuted were eventually executed, among them the Komsomol First Secretary, Aleksandr Kosarev.⁸⁹⁰ Despite the wave of terror directed at the Komsomol, its popularity didn't waver, and in 1957, the number of its members was a total of 38 347 499.⁸⁹¹ It should be pointed out however, that even though joining the Komsomol was voluntary, those who did not join lost access to officially sponsored holidays and experienced difficulties in pursuing higher education.

The Hungarian Communist Youth Association (KISZ)

Among the most widely discussed topics before and during the Moscow Youth Festival was the question of the Hungarian revolution/counter-revolution. The Soviet intervention in November 1956 caused some Westerners to boycott the festival or to start intense debates on the matter at the festival. Even some Soviet youth were directly affected by the revolution, as evidenced by the reminiscences of Leonid Dobrokhoto, a participant of the festival:

"We didn't dare to be attached to the official delegation of Sverdlovsk. Our university bore on itself the mark of Cain following the 'rebellious' events of November 1956; while Soviet tanks roared in Budapest, we had a Komsomol meeting that lasted almost three days (sleep was evaded well into the night). Our senior colleagues in the fourth year demanded to be 'given freedom to think' and argued that the Komsomol was becoming obsolete and that wind no longer blew in the sails of the youth initiative, only 'weak vents at the top of the sails'. In the end, the most passionate lovers of free thinking had to pursue it outside the walls of the university."⁸⁹²

Members of the Hungarian delegation sent to the Moscow Youth Festival were selected by the Organizing Committee of the Communist Youth Association (KISZ). The KISZ was a relatively new organization, founded on March 11th, 1957, after the previous

⁸⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 49-50.

⁸⁹¹ "Komsomol Statistics." *Open Society Archives*, <http://fa.osaarchivum.org/background-reports?col=8&id=57287>.

⁸⁹² Leonid Dobrokhoto and Aleksandr Kozlov, "Deti festivalya." *Ogonek*. <http://www.ogoniok.com/archive/1997/4510/27-12-19/>.

youth organizations were disbanded following their involvement in the October revolution.

After the Second World War, Hungarian youth was eager to establish a new, democratic youth organization, and in 1944, the Hungarian Democratic Youth Organization was founded, mainly by students. The organization wasn't very successful, partly because the country wasn't used to the new system yet, but also because its leaders were not adequately prepared.⁸⁹³

On November 12th, 1945, a Student Parliament was organized in Balatonlelle, where the Association of Hungarian University and College Organizations (MEFESZ) was founded. The MEFESZ was more successful than its predecessor, but it was still only an organization for students. In March, 1946, the National Council of Hungarian Youth (MIOT) was established, which unified five different youth organizations, one of which was the MEFESZ. The five member organizations retained their organizational independence.⁸⁹⁴

In 1949-1950, the MIOT member organizations gradually lost their independence, until in June, 1950, a new, completely unified youth organization was established. The new organization was called the Association of Working Youth (DISZ), and followed the example of the new communist party, MDP and the Soviet youth organization, the Komsomol, in establishing a single party structure. By establishing a unified youth organization, a transmission was created between the Party and the Hungarian youth, and anyone who didn't support the Hungarian Worker's Party (MDP), was automatically excluded from the unity of the organization. Any political activity on their part was prevented as well.⁸⁹⁵

After Stalin's death, political discourse was renewed in Hungary, which was joined enthusiastically by Hungarian youth. So called professional debate circles sprung up among students, one of which was the Petőfi Circle, which was founded during the fall

⁸⁹³ Magdolna Micheller, *Egyetemisták és a hatalom. A magyar egyetemi hallgatók és a hatalom viszonya 1945-1957*. Szeged: JATEPress, 1992.

⁸⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁹⁵ Ibid.

of 1955. Within these circles it was customary to discuss contemporary political problems and offer up ideas on possible reforms.

The ever more lively political discourse among Hungarian youth eventually led to students of the Szeged University reestablishing the disbanded MEFESZ on October 16th, 1956, and issuing a list of requests to the state on October 22. Several other universities joined in signing the requests. There were 14 (in some versions 12 or 16) points on the list.

They demanded that Soviet-Hungarian relations become more balanced and be reduced to economic relations; they demanded that the current Hungarian leaders be replaced by others (Imre Nagy, János Kádár, Géza Losonczy, György Lukács); they demanded that national traditions be respected and asked for greater freedom in Hungary. There were also a few points concerning the problems of higher education. These requests were published and distributed as pamphlets, and on October 23d, a peaceful demonstration started in Budapest, which eventually erupted as a nationwide revolt.⁸⁹⁶

During the revolution, the DISZ gradually fell apart, and many of its former leaders joined the Soviet army upon their return to the city on November 4th. Many of the prominent representatives of the Petőfi Circle left the country, while others were captured and eventually faced trials. The MEFESZ continued its activity after the revolution, although in a reduced capacity, while several other youth organizations were established to fill the temporary void, such as the National Association of Unified Peasant Youth (EPOSZ).⁸⁹⁷

The KISZ was founded by the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (MSZMP) and its members were carefully selected. Some of its leaders were former members of previous youth organizations, people who had already proved their loyalty to the Party. Zoltán Komócsin was appointed president of the KISZ National Executive Committee.

⁸⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁹⁷ Ibid.

Komócsin was an alternating member of the Party Political Committee and had been a Party member since 1945.⁸⁹⁸

The official statement on the involvement of the Hungarian youth in the “counter-revolution” was that they had been misled by fake patriotic and socialist slogans, and that their only mistake was to have listened to the reactionaries and imperialists. They established the Communist Youth Association in the hopes that “it would learn from the mistakes of the Worker’s Youth Association and that it would serve the construction of socialist society and would fight for the goals of the Party among the youth and raise them in a Communist spirit”.⁸⁹⁹

After its formation it was more than a month before KISZ started its activity and, even then, the activities lacked a political character. The resistance among Hungarian youth to join the organization was obvious and according to a report on the situation, “young people only attend the dancing parties but avoid any meeting with a political character”.⁹⁰⁰ At the end of March KISZ had 30 000 members, at the end of June it had 120 000 members. The growth in numbers is impressive (before its disbandment, the DISZ had 800 000 members), however, the recruitment of new members still proved difficult for quite some time.⁹⁰¹

The Hungarian Delegation and the Moscow Festival

The members of the delegation were carefully selected by the Executive Committee of the Communist Youth Association, headed by Zoltán Komócsin. Organizational and financial questions concerning the Festival were raised at several of the MSZMP’s (Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party) Provisional Central Committee meetings in 1957. At first there was a possibility that the Komsomol would pay the registration fee for the

⁸⁹⁸ “The Hungarian Delegation and the Moscow Festival”, *Open Society Archives: Foreign Relations Series: East West*, 1. <http://fa.osaarchivum.org/background-reports?col=8&id=42401>.

⁸⁹⁹ Sándor Balogh, Magdolna Baráth and István Feitl, eds. *Az MSZMP ideiglenes vezető testületeinek jegyzőkönyvei III. kötet, 1957. április 5. - 1957. május 17.* (Budapest: Intera Rt, 1993), p. 56.

⁹⁰⁰ “Youth Organizations in Hungary”, *Open Society Archives: Country Series: Hungary*, 1. <http://fa.osaarchivum.org/background-reports?col=8&id=52903>.

⁹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

Hungarian delegation, taking into consideration the bad financial situation Hungary was in after the revolution.⁹⁰² However, this was not agreed upon in the end, and according to an interview conducted with Komócsin on July 9 in *Népszabadság*, the delegation was eventually financed mainly by contributions from society: from civil organizations and workers' unions.⁹⁰³ The presidency of the Hungarian National Free Unions' Association provided 2 million Forints to cover the costs of sending a delegation to the festival.⁹⁰⁴

Before the delegation left for Moscow, a storm of propaganda filled Hungarian newspapers, mostly attacking the "counter-revolution" and viciously criticizing Western perceptions of the country. The intense propaganda was most likely the product of two distinct issues: the prospect of facing thousands of westerners at the festival, and the publication of the UN special committee's evaluation on the Hungarian revolution in June. The evaluation was based on hundreds of interviews with Hungarians who had fled the country and stated that "what took place in Hungary in October and November 1956 was a spontaneous national uprising, due to long standing grievances which had caused resentment among the people".⁹⁰⁵ This statement was obviously very different than the official Party statement, which was:

"the Hungarian uprising was provoked by reactionary circles using the legitimate grievances of the Hungarian people to mislead them and secure their support for the return of capitalism to power. [...] reactionaries in Hungary were powerfully assisted by Western propaganda, agents and arms and by returning officers of the Horthy Army and Hungarian capitalist exiles."⁹⁰⁶

Several articles were published throughout June and July 1957 attacking western propaganda. One of these articles was published in *Népszabadság* on July 12, titled: "The Roman Radio's Boomerang." The article stated that a Roman radio station had announced that the KISZ only had about 2000 members, whereas the youth organization before the revolution, the DISZ, had 600 000 members. The author of the article

⁹⁰² Balogh, Barát, Feitl, eds., *Az MSZMP ideiglenes vezető testületeinek jegyzőkönyvei*, 268.

⁹⁰³ "A moszkvai találkozó nemcsak méreteiben, hanem bizonyos fokig tartalmában is különbözik az eddigi fesztiváloktól. Komócsin Zoltán nyilatkozata a Világifjúsági Találkozóról", *Népszabadság*, July 9, 1957.

⁹⁰⁴ Balogh, Barát, Feitl, eds., *Az MSZMP ideiglenes vezető testületeinek jegyzőkönyvei*, p. 267.

⁹⁰⁵ "Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary." *Open Society Archives*, 4. http://osaarchivum.org/images/stories/pdfs/hedervary/background/un_hung_res_summary.pdf

⁹⁰⁶ Ibid.

ridiculed this statement, saying that the KISZ has around 123 000 members, and will soon have even more. The article also discusses the possible reasoning behind the radio's lie:

“I wonder why they happened to publish this sadly completely false story right before the World Youth Festival? Let's try to unravel the Roman radio's logic and the inspiration behind it: they are trying to make it seem like the Hungarian delegation does not represent the entire Hungarian youth, only 2000 young Communists, and as if what they say is not what the Hungarian youth thinks, only what those 2000 think.”⁹⁰⁷

A similar article was published on July 27th, also in *Népszabadság*, titled: “Conspirators Wanted.” According to the article, a broadcaster of the Radio Free Europe expressed his thoughts about the festival thus:

“I have a strong feeling that many students in Moscow are eagerly awaiting the arrival of the Hungarian delegation and will ask Hungarian youth in a conspiring tone between themselves, huddled in secret corners: Tell us, what does freedom feel like, even if it only lasts for a short time?”

The writer of the article in *Népszabadság* answered this quote in a scathing manner, ridiculing the very notion of conspiring Hungarian youth:

“The Radio Free Europe is searching in vain for conspirators among the Hungarian youth currently in Moscow. However badly this may make the Radio Free Europe feel, we ‘regret’ to inform them that there isn't a single capitalist or kulak offspring amongst the World Youth Festival delegates (to whom capitalism really would have meant freedom).”⁹⁰⁸

As was previously discussed, the most important goal of the World Youth Festivals was to show Westerners and youth from colonial countries how wonderful Soviet life was. At the Sixth Festival, this goal was doubly important for the Hungarian delegation; it was absolutely necessary that Hungarians show the outside world that the counter-revolution had ended, and that their only aim was peace and friendship with foreigners. In his interview in *Népszabadság*, Komócsin stated:

“Besides having fun and establishing deeper ties of friendship, the delegation of Hungarian youth will also face important political tasks

⁹⁰⁷ “A római rádió bumerángja”, *Népszabadság*, July 26, 1957.

⁹⁰⁸ “Cinkosok kerestetnek.” *Népszabadság*, July 27, 1957.

[at the festival]. The socialist camp, but especially western capitalist countries and colonial and semi-colonial countries are very interested in the Hungarian situation, the Communist Youth Association and the Hungarian youth. Our delegation has to convey the opinion and will of the majority of Hungary's youth to our foreign friends, that our youth supports the cause of socialism and that we wish for peace and friendship with every nation's workers and young people."⁹⁰⁹

In a separate article, Komócsin writes:

"Members of our delegation will have to answer the many questions which the different countries' youth will undoubtedly pose us. The Hungarian young people will have to answer these questions, relying only upon the truth and their own, personal experiences and memories of what happened during the days of the counter-revolution. We have to solemnly face the very real fact that there will be young people who will be completely under the influence of imperialist propaganda, even amongst our friends. These people will have completely or partially false knowledge of these events. The Hungarian youth will have to stand their ground calmly and with patience, in the full knowledge of our truth. We have to accept the fact that sometimes, arguments will be unavoidable."⁹¹⁰

The Hungarian delegation had 1100 members: 211 were members of the culture group, 190 were professional sportsmen and women, 60 members were young worker and peasant sportsmen, 300 were workers, 100 peasants, and 55 were students and intellectuals. One fourth of the delegation was female. They left Budapest on July 23, after participating in an official ceremony, where György Marosán, the Deputy Secretary of the Central Committee held a speech, emphasizing the political importance of the Hungarian delegation and youth.⁹¹¹

The delegation carried with it extensive propaganda material, including three documents, titled: "Hungary after the Counter-Revolution" (on the consolidation of the Kádár regime), "Truth About Hungary in Pictures" (to prove the counter-revolutionary character of the October events), "Help Them to Return Home" (on the propagation of the repatriation of young Hungarians escaped to the West.)⁹¹², and a handbook, titled

⁹⁰⁹ „Komócsin Zoltán nyilatkozata a Világifjúsági Találkozóról.” *Népszabadság*.

⁹¹⁰ Zoltán Komócsin, "Ifjúsági Világtalálkozó." *Népszabadság*, July 21, 1957.

⁹¹¹ "Ünnepélyesen búcsúztatták a Nyugati pályaudvaron a VIT-re induló magyar küldöttséget." *Népszabadság*, July 24, 1957.

⁹¹² "The Hungarian Delegation and the Moscow Festival", 1. <http://fa.osaarchivum.org/background-reports?col=8&id=42401>.

“Let’s go to Moscow!” The handbook had chapters on the history of the Soviet Union and the World Youth Festivals, information on the nationalities participating in the festival, a Russian phrasebook, and a 50 page chapter titled: “What we need to say about October 23d and its antecedents”. The chapter describes precisely what the delegates were supposed to say about the counter-revolution and the treason of the ex Prime Minister, Imre Nagy.⁹¹³

The delegation arrived in Moscow on July 25th, and was greeted by a crowd of enthusiastic Muscovites. A Hungarian journalist reported from the scene in a slightly euphoric manner:

“The Kiev Station in Moscow is crowded, people are pushing to be the very first to shake the hands of an unknown young Hungarian or bestow flowers or a friendly embrace upon them. A forest of arms reaches towards the slow, tired passengers on the train as they are practically lifted to the ground. Come quickly lads, we have been waiting for you for days... Boys and girls, girls and boys place their arms around each other.”⁹¹⁴

The Hungarian delegation was very busy throughout the festival and attracted a large amount of interest – they even attended meetings they were not originally supposed to attend in order to ensure that the events of October 1956 were related properly. According to reports, the delegation was greeted by the second loudest ovation at the opening ceremony, bested only by the Egyptian delegation’s greeting.⁹¹⁵ The Hungarians met with 30 nations’ delegations, among them the Chinese, Danish, Korean, Swiss, Soviet, German, French, Syrian, Egyptian, Canadian, Italian, Polish, British delegations, and delegations from Luxembourg and the USA.⁹¹⁶ Most of these meetings were amiable with nothing out of the ordinary. The most frequent questions were on the topic of the revolution. An article published in *Magyar Ifjúság* on August 7, stated:

“Naturally the most frequently debated questions were on the counter-revolutionary events, but we can honestly say that on the whole we succeeded in clarifying them correctly... Western delegations put the questions in good faith but learn with the greatest consternation that the facts are flatly opposed to their information. They often said

⁹¹³ Pál Csillag and István Endrődi, eds. *Irány Moszkva! VIT küldöttek zsebkönyve*. Budapest: Móra Ferenc Könyvkiadó, 1957.

⁹¹⁴ “Megérkezett Moszkvába VIT küldöttségünk.” *Népszabadság*, July 26, 1957.

⁹¹⁵ “The Hungarian Delegation and the Moscow Festival”, 1.

⁹¹⁶ *Ibid.*

during the course of these debates that their lack of information is great and that their press is misleading them.”⁹¹⁷

However, the meetings with the Polish and American youth were somewhat more chaotic than the others, especially with the Americans. According to a radio broadcast, which aired on the Hungarian national radio (*Szülőföldünk Radio*) on August 7, 1957, the meeting between the American and the Hungarian delegations was surprisingly hostile compared to the overall amiable atmosphere of the festival.⁹¹⁸ The meeting began with the two delegations agreeing on a question and answer format, with the Americans posing the first questions. The very first question was about the revolution, to which the answer was that it was not a revolution, but a counter-revolution. Then, New York University professor Howard Trustmann, asked about the UNO committee report, and how it could “possibly be so wrong about the Hungarian events”.⁹¹⁹ To which a Hungarian delegate replied that “this was simply because the UN didn’t represent the Hungarian people.”⁹²⁰

The report stated that this response was greeted with laughter from the Hungarians. After about one and a half hours of questioning, it was the Hungarian delegation’s turn to question the Americans. They started by asking why the American government didn’t let those Hungarians who wanted to come home leave the US. The Americans replied that they weren’t detaining anyone from leaving the country. The next question was whether there were any workers in the American government, to which the answer was no. This question was followed up by whether there were any African American representatives in the government, to which the answer was also no (the Americans expressed shame over this). The Americans retaliated by saying that in the USA, nobody could be thrown into prison for political activity. The Hungarians, almost in unison, asked: what about the Communist leaders?⁹²¹ The report said that the argument between the two delegations was long and heated. Although by the end of the discussion

⁹¹⁷ Ibid., p. 2.

⁹¹⁸ “Mai híradónkban beszámolunk az amerikai és magyar fiatalok találkozásáról.” *Szülőföldünk Radio*, August 7, 1957.

⁹¹⁹ Ibid.

⁹²⁰ Ibid.

⁹²¹ Ibid.

the delegates agreed that an honest dialogue can serve friendship well, they probably didn't part on the friendliest of terms.⁹²²

The radio broadcast cited above is most likely an official interpretation of the events (since it aired on national radio) therefore, it is probably not a completely accurate account and should be read with some reservation. However, there are other, perhaps less biased accounts of the Hungarians' altercation with the American delegation, as well as of similar discussions with the British and Polish delegations.⁹²³ The Polish delegation would not accept the position the Hungarians took in saying that the October events were the actions of reactionaries and capitalists, and shouted at the Hungarians that it had been a revolution.⁹²⁴

It is interesting to note how differently the Polish delegation behaved at the festival after having experienced a similar situation the previous year as the Hungarians had. The Polish youth argued with many delegations who spouted Soviet propaganda, and according to Radio Warsaw, the "original ideological" approach of the Polish youth delegation to "certain questions" was "opening the eyes" of other delegations from the socialist camp.⁹²⁵ Of course, a main difference between the Polish and Hungarian delegation could have been the fact that revolutionary youth in Hungary had either left the country or had been imprisoned or executed, or had simply not been chosen to participate in the festival, whereas Polish youth had not been similarly prosecuted after the uprising of 1956.

All in all, judging by archival records and news articles of the time, the anticipation and interest in the Hungarian delegation was far greater than the actual effect the Hungarian youth had on the festival. The communist propaganda surrounding the delegation seemed effective at the festival; however, the "imperialist" version of events obviously had a much stronger hold on Western youth: in a report on the World Youth Festival

⁹²² Ibid.

⁹²³ Koivunen, *The 1957 Moscow Youth Festival*, and Paul Collins, "Polish Youth's Magnetism in Moscow." *Open Society Archives*. <http://fa.osaarchivum.org/background-reports?col=8&id=54364>.

⁹²⁴ Koivunen, *The 1957 Moscow Youth Festival*, p. 59.

⁹²⁵ Paul Collins, "Polish Youth's Magnetism in Moscow." *Open Society Archives*, p. 3.

held in 1959 in Vienna, a quote from an Icelandic student about the Moscow Festival stated:

“From the Russian point of view I am not sure the Festival was so great a success. The purpose of the festival had been first of all to give Russian youth the impression that Western youth stood by their side. Few things were discussed more than Hungary and the Russians were often able to hear versions other than they had read in their papers – which had stated that the inhabitants of Budapest had wept with gratitude for the intervention of the Red Army. For example, I was traveling in a railway car filled with English and Russians, and the English gave the Russians a complete account of the underlying causes of the Hungarian Revolution and its terrible conclusion. The Russians were obviously in an awkward position and did not even attempt to defend their government.”⁹²⁶

The Festival’s Effect

Judging by the accounts of participants of the festival, it seems that meeting Westerners for the first time in an informal setting had a much larger impact on Soviet youth, than meeting Soviets for the first time was for Westerners. In Moscow, the festival is still remembered today, and its fiftieth anniversary was officially celebrated.

There are several accounts of Soviet youth being amazed by how different Western youth were as opposed to what they had been told about the “imperialists”. Aleksandr Kozlov writes:

“For the citizens of Moscow, the real shock, in terms of what surprised them the most was what they saw and felt. It is now impossible to try to explain to the newer generations what the word foreigner meant at that time. The constant propaganda aimed at cultivating hate towards all things foreign led to the Soviet citizen feeling a mixture of fear and admiration upon hearing the word foreign. Tourists and businessmen had not yet come to the country, and diplomats and journalists seldom just appeared on the streets. So when we suddenly saw thousands of foreigners on the streets of Moscow, with whom we could talk, a feeling close to euphoria possessed us. The foreigners weren't like what we had expected. They were young people, and the strange thing was that they weren't like the usual caricaturist stereotype painted of them by politicians. [...] At the festival, we were introduced to an uncomplicated sporty-playboy youth fashion and with it to the idea of the existence of a new independent class in society - youth and teenagers. This Western influence that came to us caused great damage to the whole system of

⁹²⁶ “The Vienna Youth Festival”, p. 3.

communist education and made Komsomol ideologues start to reconsider their methods of work with young people."⁹²⁷

The festival was also considered by some a “sexual revolution”⁹²⁸. The most longstanding myth of the 1957 Youth Festival is that of the “*deti festivalya*”, or the “children of the festival”. According to this myth, nine months after the festival, a slew of biracial babies were born.⁹²⁹ Local youth and foreigners didn’t have a lot of opportunity to discuss serious topics with each other outside of the official programs. The *Times* reported that contacts with foreigners were strictly controlled by the government:

“The visitors themselves, while much occupied by the program, were allowed to move freely about Moscow, although some who tried to travel outside were stopped. According to persistent reports during the festival, instructions were issued to householders not to invite visitors into their homes but this [demand] was frequently ignored. The visitors therefore had many opportunities to meet non-Communist members of the public, but a number of them were affronted by the clarity efforts of the authorities to prevent this. Interpreters would prevent young Soviet citizens from getting into contact, and there were constant reports of police questioning persons who had spoken to visitors.”⁹³⁰

Despite these accounts, according to Kozlov, the festival’s participants still managed to establish contacts:

"Late in the evenings and at night, free communication began. Naturally, the authorities tried to establish control over contacts made, but controlling every contact was impossible. The weather was great and the crowds literally flooded main streets. [...] Disputes arose at every turn and on any topic, except, perhaps politics. People didn't discuss politics first of all because they were afraid, but most importantly because in its purest form it did not interest them. But every dispute had a political character, be it literature, painting, fashion, not to mention music, especially jazz."⁹³¹

The festival was the first time that Soviet youth had the opportunity to experience new music, fashion and art, and it had a profound effect on many of them. Elena Zubkova writes that:

⁹²⁷ Dobrokhotoy, Leonid and Kozlov, Aleksandr. “*Deti festivalya*.” *Ogonek*.
<http://www.ogoniok.com/archive/1997/4510/27-12-19/>.

⁹²⁸ Ibid.

⁹²⁹ Roth-Ey, *Loose Girls On The Loose*.

⁹³⁰ “Varied Reactions to Moscow Wooing of World Youth.” *Times*.

⁹³¹ Dobrokhotoy and Kozlov, *Deti festivalya*.

"Many participants in those events later assessed the Moscow festival as a kind of turning point in the development of their own view of the world. The contact with another culture, the very idea of a multiplicity of models of the world reflected in a variety of artistic styles, contrasted sharply with the customary monocultural thought and the oppressive monotony of official Soviet art. And if the political significance of the festival soon became the property of propaganda, the spirit of the occasion was long remembered, at least in Moscow."⁹³²

The effects of the 1957 Moscow Youth Festival were obviously very personal and subjective, and it had a profound effect on many young people, both Soviets and Westerners. The event later became symbolic of the cultural and political shift that occurred after Stalin's death in the USSR; however, it was only one event amongst the many that served the purpose of creating friendlier ties with the West and possibly ending the Cold War. As we now know, Khrushchev's thaw did not bring about the end of the Cold War, and the cultural events of the time were later relegated to personal memories and recollections. In one of those recollections, Leonid Dobrokhotov writes of the 1957 Moscow Youth Festival:

"We got lost in the sea of European jackets, Indian saris, Japanese kimonos, Mexican sombreros, Indonesian velvet caps, and the oddest of them all - Scottish kilts, baring the hairy legs of the descendants of Robin Hood. It seemed incredible that Moscow could accommodate so many people and emotions. [...] We experienced a diverse, multilingual world for the first time, and it held out its hand to us."⁹³³

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⁹³² Ragsdale and Zubkova, *Russia after the War*, p. 200.

⁹³³ Dobrokhotov and Kozlov, *Deti festivalya*.

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The Soviet Western, 1964–1982: Sovietising Hollywood

Christian AMOS

Introduction

“I saw the movie ‘The Magnificent Seven’. The artists involved in it acted well”, so said Nikita Khrushchev in an interview with an American journalist in July 1962.⁹³⁴ Khrushchev allowed the showing of the Magnificent Seven in that same year. It was among the best-selling movies of that year, spawning a popular fascination for the Western genre of cinema in the Soviet Union.⁹³⁵ However, the license for showing the movie was rescinded in 1963, 10 months before it was due to expire, despite its immense viewership of 63.7 million people, and without any explanation given.⁹³⁶ In the years that followed, Soviet filmmakers produced their own films to appeal to the popular fascination with the Western film. These films have been coined as ‘*isterns*’, Westerns set in a Soviet context – usually during the Russian Civil war, in the theatres of war in Ukraine or central Asia. These are ‘Westerns’ transplanted and adapted into a Soviet context.

The features of the Western are evident in these movies: the arid landscape, the strong and silent hero, a juxtaposition between good and evil, the horses, and many other stylistic features frequent in Westerns. Yet there is a clear ideological problem with the American Western, which established the American national myth of the rugged individualist. How could the Soviets deal with this problem, while maintaining this appealing Hollywood genre? This thesis will examine this example of cultural adaptation, an example of how the Soviets succeeded in absorbing a powerful Hollywood culture while ensuring it was ideologically acceptable. Throughout the 1970s, the Soviet take on the Western became a part of popular cinema. As Sergei Zhuk

⁹³⁴ “Я смотрел картину “Великолепная семерка”. Артисты, занятые в ней, прекрасно играют”

A. Kukarkin, ‘Iunost’ i Driakhlost’ Vesterna’, *Iskusstvo Kino*, 10 (1962), p. 140.

⁹³⁵ S. Zhuk, ‘Hollywood’s Insidious Charms: The Impact of American Cinema and Television on the Soviet Union during the Cold War’, *Cold War History*, 14/4 (2014), pp. 593–617.

⁹³⁶ F. Razzakov, *Gibel’ sovetskogo kino* (Moscow, 2008), p. 160.

puts it, “Soviet ideologists considered these Russian films to be an antidote to ‘the cowboy film mania’ among Soviet youth.”⁹³⁷ The Soviet Western, as a popular and ‘foreign’ genre, raises questions about the gap between cultural and political elites and viewers. In the 1970s, adventure, comedy, and musical films, though there are many fewer of them, outgrossed serious movies with contemporary settings by over 200 percent.⁹³⁸ The Soviet government viewed these films, overwhelmingly imported, as a way of compensating for a deficit in entertainment at the movies, but also simultaneously “represent a mass culture that, by Soviet standards, is far from ideal or not even quite healthy”.⁹³⁹ The influence of the *Magnificent Seven* was such that people began to learn by heart key phrases from the film, exchanged between Steve McQueen and Yul Brynner.⁹⁴⁰ An article in the August 1962 edition of the mass-produced popular glossy film magazine, *Sovetskyi Ekran*, condemned the violence of *The Magnificent Seven*, arguing that if we consider the educational role of a given film, in this instance “то молодежи он может принести больше вреда, чем пользы.”⁹⁴¹

The 1970s saw the growth of ‘American studies’ as a field of academic interest in the USSR. Interest even went as far as the publication of a comparative review, for *Iskusstvo Kino* in 1977, of the works of different Soviet ‘Americanists’. The writers exercises caution in talking about American culture, and two reasons are given for why studying and engaging with Hollywood is not inconsistent with Soviet values: “сегодня сфера кино - это одновременно и арена неослабевающей идеологической борьбы, и область расширяющихся культурных контактов.”⁹⁴² It is this uneasy relationship between an “arena of unrelenting ideological battle” and a “site of expanding cultural contacts” that nicely summarises the state of the cultural and political elite’s attitude towards American cinema in the 1970s. The popular appeal and success of these Soviet Westerns led to sections of the intelligentsia to rally against the influence of an alien,

⁹³⁷ Zhuk, ‘Hollywood’s Insidious Charms’, p. 605.

⁹³⁸ Ellen Propper Mickiewicz, *Media and the Russian Public* (1981), p. 74.

⁹³⁹ Ibid., p. 76.

⁹⁴⁰ R. Fedor, *Dos’e na zvezd: pravda, domysly, sensatsii. Kumiry vseh pokoleniy* (Moscow, 1998), p. 582.

⁹⁴¹ “then it can do more harm than good for young people”

Yelena Kartseva, ‘Mushketery S Kol’tami Za Poyasom’, *Sovetskyi Ekran*, 15 (1962.), p. 6.

⁹⁴² “The realm of cinema today – it is simultaneously both an arena of unrelenting ideological battle, and a site of expanding cultural contacts”

L Mel’vil’, ‘Amerikanskoe Kino - S Trekh Tochek Zreniia’, *Iskusstvo Kino*, 12 (1977), p. 75.

capitalist, American, genre on Soviet viewers. There have been some analyses that touch on the Soviet Western, but they have tended to either be descriptive or, if argument driven, then they have been selective in their treatment of the Western, only discussing the genre in passing or in reference to a single film. In grouping these films together, I am not suggesting that they are a clearly cohesive set without variation between them. Instead, the term ‘Soviet Western’ is used as a useful term for understanding the way in which the Hollywood genre of the Western and its stylistic and artistic components were adapted in the USSR. In this sense, this thesis does not claim to be comprehensive in its coverage of Soviet Westerns, but instead takes an analytical approach – studying certain critical examples as a way of studying films as cultural artefacts, evidence of contemporary social values and political anxieties.

There has been one work published that directly focuses on the Soviet Western, a Russian book called *Krasnyi Vestern* by Sergei Lavrentiev, and there has been no English language attempt to tackle the Soviet Western as a collection of films or as a genre. Lavrentiev’s is broadly descriptive and non-analytical, providing an importantly detailed look at Soviet Westerns, but not offering argumentation or linking in with broader historical and historiographical themes. Beumers, Mickiewicz, Zorkaya, among others, have looked at the role of film within Soviet society in the 1970s and, and have also alluded to Soviet Westerns. Analytical works that have looked at the Soviet Western have done so in passing, embedded briefly in broader analyses of American influence in Soviet Society (Kirstin Roth-Ey, Sergei Zhuk). Film historians such as Elena Prokurovka and David Bohllinger have made analytical contributions to the historiography by looking at individual films.

Yet no one has produced an analysis that looks at the grouping of these various films as ‘Soviet Westerns’, and addressed the glaring contradiction in the term ‘Soviet Western’. How could a genre, known for its pursuit of the individualist hero and its deep roots in American history and identity, be adapted to Soviet ideological norms? Moreover, how was the popular appeal of this American genre balanced with the party’s ideological concerns? Much work has been done in recent years on viewing the Western in an international context, showing how the Western has been successfully adapted in

different parts of the world. Bemünden and Seán Allan and John Sandford, Hans-Michael Bock have explored the East German Western, or *Indianerfilme*, an interpretation of the Western genre which spun Native American tribes as heroic in their struggle against the oppressive colonising onslaught of westward American expansion and extermination. These films were screened in the Soviet Union, but were not as popular as their Soviet or American counterparts.⁹⁴³ Anikó Imre has looked at Central and Eastern European Western films on television and in cinemas, and drawn some conclusions about the influence of American culture on the Eastern Bloc, but without looking at the Soviet Union.

Katerina Clark's work on the Soviet novel will also be incorporated as a way of understanding models of heroism in these films. Furthermore, the invaluable studies of J. Kitses, Robert Warshow, David Cook, Mary Hall, and Martin Winkler, on Hollywood and on the Western, are crucial to grounding any valuable study of the Soviet Western in its American scholarly origins. In particular Cook has written in detail on the 'modernist' or 'anti-Western', terms used to describe a variety of films from the 1960s to 1970s which implicitly critique traditional views on race and gender, as well as critique contemporary American politics and the conduct of Nixon in Vietnam and Watergate.⁹⁴⁴

Despite being overwhelmingly American in its setting and origin and cultural significance, the Western could be a powerful vehicle for the specific concerns and themes of different countries.⁹⁴⁵ The adaptation of the Western into a Soviet context, its 'sovietisation', and subsequent popularity, will be addressed by exploring a number of themes which maintained the features of Hollywood while introducing Soviet elements: models of heroism, nostalgia and the frontier myth, and ethnicity and race. It will be argued that while Soviets encountered problems in adaptation, and there were tensions between genre and ideology, that these films were remarkably successful in their viewership. The tension between Hollywood power (*Golivudskaya vlast'*) and Soviet

⁹⁴³ S. Lavrentiev, *Krasnyi Vestern* (Moscow, 2009), p. 235.

⁹⁴⁴ D. A. Cook, *Lost Illusions: American Cinema in the Shadow of Watergate and Vietnam, 1970-1979*, History of the American Cinema ; v. 9 (Berkeley; London, 2002), pp. 176-182.

⁹⁴⁵ E. Buscombe, 'Is the Western about American History?', in T. Klein, I. Ritzer, and P. W. Schulze (eds.), *Crossing Frontiers: Intercultural Perspectives on the Western* (2012), pp. 13-25.

power (*sovetskaya vlast'*) in the 1970s found a surprising coexistence in these films. The surprising adaptability of this American genre, the jewel of popular Hollywood cinema, to the context of a cultural and political rival, perhaps suggests something of the similarity between American and Soviet histories and values.

This will contribute to emerging literature on complex cultural exchange between East and West in the Cold War. Rana Mitter and Patrick Major edited an important set of essays on the cultural contacts across the Iron Curtain, stressing the need to look towards the peripheries and to de-Americanise the focus of cultural historical studies. They point to the relatively paucity of work written on post-war Soviet culture, and that frequently it appears “at best as an epilogue to high Stalinism”⁹⁴⁶. Their desire to see Cold War studies diversify, and for the distance of post-1989 to result in the de-centring of diplomacy and high-politics, is supported by this thesis.

Most of the materials used in this study are films. A selection of ‘core’ Soviet Westerns have been identified for study: *The Elusive Avengers* (Неуловимые Мстители 1966), *The White Sun of the Desert* (*Beloe solntse pustyni*, 1970), *The Seventh Bullet* (*Sed'maya pulya*, 1972), *At Home Among Strangers* (1974), *Tachanka from the South* (*Tachanka s yuga*, 1977), and *The Bodyguard* (*Telokhranitel'*, 1979). These films have been chosen because they reflect popular tastes and because they collectively cover the broad period of 1966-1979, the overwhelming majority of what has been termed the Era of Stagnation (1964-1982). Some important by virtue of their popularity, such as *The Elusive Avengers* or *The White Sun of the Desert*, and have had a cultural legacy throughout the Soviet Union and even in Russia today. Works such as *The Bodyguard* and *The Seventh Bullet*, Central Asian Soviet Westerns, show how the Western genre was adapted by Soviet filmmakers to appeal to Central Asian audiences. All of these films were, however, produced among a tightly-knit group of people trained in Moscow who went on to work for the various production companies of Mosfil'm, Leninfilm, Uzbekfilm, and others. The American influences of films such as *Magnificent Seven* (1960) *A Fistful of Dollars* (1966), and *Stagecoach* (1938) will also be addressed, but

⁹⁴⁶ P. Major and R. Mitter, *Across the Blocs: Exploring Comparative Cold War Cultural and Social History* (2004), pp. 1-23.

only as a means of explaining their Soviet counterparts. In addition to films, I have used *Iskusstvo Kino*, as the main intellectual film journal in the Soviet Union, offers the historian an insight into specific perceptions of Soviet Western films, and more generally to allusions to the Western made by Soviet film critics. *Sovetsky Ekran* was more directly concerned with influencing the interpretations of the general Soviet reader, and was a popular glossy bimonthly magazine. Both film publications offer us some insight into the tensions between popular and elite interpretations of film, especially over the role of Hollywood films. Additional insights into these films and American cultural influence have been found in *Pravda* and *Krokodil* (the long-running satirical magazine in the Soviet Union)

Models for heroism: Chapaev and Ford

One of the principal questions in both the Western and the Soviet interpretation of the Western, is the nature of protagonist – of the hero. The hero is central to the action and meaning of cinema, and protagonists are by their very nature at the forefront of the audience's attention. Given the importance of the hero to the adventure film more broadly, in the context of which the Western can be understood, it is important that we attempt to understand how heroes and heroism are constructed within these Soviet Westerns. An outline will be made of the models of heroism, Soviet and Hollywoodian, followed by an exploration of the evidence and applicability of those models within the Soviet Western.

Rugged individualism with frontier mentality are key to Hollywood models of heroism. The hero in the western is a stoic silent type, and a vigilante on the outside of the law and state.⁹⁴⁷ Stoicism, strength, and vigilantism are three of the most crucial aspects to the Western hero. Despite some debate over the nature of the centrality of the hero in the Western, the importance of the hero protagonist is undeniable.⁹⁴⁸ Robert Warshow, in his seminal essay on the hero in the Western, argued that the hero of the Western was

⁹⁴⁷ R. B. Pippin, 'What Is a Western? Politics and Self-Knowledge in John Ford's *The Searchers*', *Critical Inquiry*, 35/2 (2009), pp. 223–53.

⁹⁴⁸ J. Kitses, *Horizons West: Directing the Western from John Ford to Clint Eastwood*, New ed. (London, 2004).

melancholic, stoic, and reposed, because he realised the hardships of life but also acknowledged that being resolute and calm was the best of dealing with it.⁹⁴⁹ One way of looking at the importance of the hero is as the focal point of frontier oppositions, articulating a space between Law and the Other, the natural landscape and the community, and the body of the hero at its centre.⁹⁵⁰ The hero has a central visual and ideological place in the context of the Wild West, a strong vigilante hero imprinting order and justice over the lawless and impoverished natural landscape and community.⁹⁵¹ Westerns, from Ford to Eastwood, frequently feature heroes with near superhuman abilities.⁹⁵² For example, in the final gunfight in *Stagecoach* (1939); a hero can be accurate with a pistol (at a full gallop) at two hundred yards.⁹⁵³ Hollywood's Western hero embodies an American model of masculinity, imbued with male emotional repression and feats of physical strength.⁹⁵⁴ The heroism of the Western culminates in the imposition of order and vigilante justice on the 'Wild West' in all its perceived disorder and lawlessness.

The ideal hero for Soviet cinema was one who exhibited the traits of the ideal socialist, skilled and self-equipped for his mission and morally and politically devoted to Soviet values and loyalty to Soviet power (*Sovetskaya vlast*). The heroic devotion to Soviet values was a legacy of socialist realist influence. Socialist Realism refers to an idealised form of realism, a depiction not just of life as it is, but life as it should be. It focusses primarily on workers, farmers, class-conflict, and the realisation of class-consciousness and the victory of the proletariat. Ideology (*ideynost'*) and party mindedness (*partiinnost'*) are at the heart of socialist realism, a glorification of communist values through realistic imagery. In cinema, *Chapaev* (1934) featured the ideal socialist realist hero, whose movement from unconscious spontaneity, acting like a socialist without realising it, to full Soviet consciousness, served as a rallying point for Soviet

⁹⁴⁹ R. Warshow, J. Kitses and G. Rickman, 'The Westerner', in *The Western Reader* (New York, 1998), 35–47.

⁹⁵⁰ Kitses, *Horizons West*, p. 17–19.

⁹⁵¹ Ibid, p. 18.

⁹⁵² Pippin, 'What Is a Western?', p. 223.

⁹⁵³ Ibid., p. 226.

⁹⁵⁴ Dimitris Eleftheriotis, 'Questioning Totalities: Constructions of Masculinity in the Popular Greek Cinema of the 1960s', *Screen*, 36/3 (1995), pp. 233–242.

filmmakers in later years who bemoaned the loss of the ideal hero in Soviet film.⁹⁵⁵ In the early 1930s, in Soviet literature, there was a move towards a romanticised hero, with the rise of the *bogatyr*.⁹⁵⁶ The *bogatyr* referred to the mythical knight of the Russian oral epic. Clark writes that these heroes started to feature prominently in socialist realist prose at the time, and embodied qualities of “struggle, vigilance, heroic achievement, energy, and another cluster of qualities rather like the “true grit” of the American frontier”⁹⁵⁷. Furthermore, the notion of vigilantism or solitary action that is so associated with the American hero, can also be found in the manifestation of the *bogatyr*. These *bogatyry* were essentially ‘rebels’, directing their efforts against bureaucratic obstacles to the heroic physical achievements of the hero in service of their prince, Stalin.⁹⁵⁸ Furthermore, the hero’s innate mastery of the horse, Clark argues, was symbolic of his initial ‘spontaneity’ before realising how he could direct his natural skill and rebelliousness in the service of state (achieving consciousness). She suggests that the irony of the ‘freedom-loving’ and ‘daring’ hero-*bogatyr* and the authoritarian dogmatic society in which he operates is reconciled by his ritual role as the model son in service of the ‘father’, or Stalin.⁹⁵⁹

The Soviet Westerns of the 1960s and 1970s do not reveal a *bogatyr*-orientated concern with presenting the transformation from natural freedom-loving, rebellious spontaneity into skills in the service of the state. Film, as well as literature, after 1956 and beyond reflected more and more emotional development and humanisation of character.⁹⁶⁰ Soviet filmmakers still wanted to glorify the heroism of Soviet power, but were “no longer prepared to romanticise war and the suffering it brought.”⁹⁶¹ There is no transformation or taming of the hero’s natural spontaneity and their skills. The hero’s rebelliousness is not a notable feature (as it is for the 1930s era *bogatyr*), his vigilantism and solitariness is always grounded in the knowledge that he serves Soviet power, which is made evidently clear. A lack of concern for the transformation of spontaneity

⁹⁵⁵ M. Vlasov, ‘Geroi’, Kotorogo Trebuyet Vremya’, *Iskusstvo Kino*, 9 (1974), p. 10.

⁹⁵⁶ K. Clark, *The Soviet Novel: History as Ritual* (Chicago, 1981), p. 72.

⁹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 73.

⁹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 138-139.

⁹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 140.

⁹⁶⁰ A. Karaganov, *Sovetskoe Kino: Problemy I Poiski* (Moscow, 1977), p. 65.

⁹⁶¹ G. Roberts, ‘From Comrade to Comatose: Men and Masculinity in Soviet Cinema’, *Cinema and Ideology: Strathclyde Modern Language Studies*, New Series, 1 (1996), p. 75.

to consciousness not only reflects the changing strictures of socialist realism after 1953, but also reflects the impact of American models – whereby the hero's status is constant, without a pivotal realisation of ideological reasoning.⁹⁶² The individual is implicitly in service of the state, rather than explicitly achieving 'consciousness' in the style of the 1930s, in a way comparable to the absence of the hand of the state in the Western – where the Wild West manifests itself in the individual hero taking on the responsibilities of the state.

The role of the state is a way and its relationship with vigilante justice is a striking way in which a Hollywood model of individual heroism is 'sovietised'. These films feature the hero as a dispenser of justice within an uncertain and lawless time and place. The heroes utilise their personal resourcefulness and skill to rectify the moral injustices of gold being stolen (*At Home*), enemies escaping (*White Sun*), or bandits exploiting villagers (*Elusive Avengers*). The relationship between the state and the hero differs in Hollywood and Socialist realist models. The socialist realist model of the 1930s involved the hero acting unconsciously with socialist principles, before realising ideology and achieving consciousness.⁹⁶³ In contrast, this idea of character development is absent from the Soviet Western films of the 1960s and 1970s. In these films service to the state is an implicit part of heroism (as opposed to a heroic realisation of consciousness which we might expect) similar to the Hollywood Western's hero and his mission of helping bring about the imposition of the American state 'out West'.

The hero in the Soviet Western undergoes a journey or task in order to help defeat the enemy of Soviet power, summoning remarkable emotional strength and tactical thinking from a profound ideological belief in the righteousness of the Marxist-Leninist mission in service of the state. Yet this is not following realisation after a period of 'spontaneity' but a driving constant. In *Tachanka from the South*, the Red Army Officer Bardin and his assistant Shura are driven by a mission to infiltrate a White Army gang to help win the Civil War for the Bolsheviks. Bardin, a middle-aged man, and Shura, a young boy,

⁹⁶² C. M. Cook, 'The Hero and Villain Binary in the Western Film Genre' (MA. thesis in Media Studies, Massey University, 2012), p. 70.

⁹⁶³ K. Clark, *The Soviet Novel*, p. 86.

represent a broad social backing to the Reds in the civil war and the inclusiveness of their cause; ideological conviction reaches the young and the old.

Shilov in *At Home Among Strangers* is one such hero whose allegiance to the party and the ideology of the state is implicitly constant rather than realised after a period of spontaneity. The state stands behind Shilov's heroism, because he is an employee of the state as a member of the Cheka, but it is not the state which principally motivates his heroic actions. He must prove his innocence by recapturing the gold that has been stolen by a gang of bandits, acting out of a personal desire to redeem himself in the eyes of his friends. Shilov is reminiscent of the Western hero as in service of American values and westward expansion. In the classical Hollywood Western, the hero has no realisation of American values or initial stage of spontaneity that one could compare with the character development outlined in socialist realist novels, but is instead heroic partially because of his consistency.⁹⁶⁴ In some respects, Shilov's conception of the 'state' itself is that of his friends in the Cheka – a personal motivation and connection. Personal moral decisions also shape the American state-building orientated expansion west through the Western's hero, who seeks to use his immutable skill and sense of justice, as an individual, to help create America in the Wild West. In *The Elusive Avengers*, the main hero of the gang, the 'avengers' (*mstiteli*), Danko, acts in service of the Bolshevik state, but principally infiltrates the group of bandits because of a personal vendetta. His father – a Red agent – was tortured and executed by the warlord Lyuty. Personal vendetta, as well as the mutual bonds of friendship between the avengers, means this film presents a version of socialist heroism that allows for 'spontaneity-to-consciousness' to be superseded by a constant, personal commitment in the interests of the state for the hero. In an unexpected scene the film ends on a strongly rhetorical note – with the entry of the children, the 'avengers', into the Red Army. In a modification to the socialist realist formula of achieving consciousness, the 'avengers' are always conscious of their ideology, but are in this instance rewarded by the Red Army for how their small efforts contribute to the consolidation of state power.

In *White Sun*, the film is interspersed with Sukhov's flashbacks to images of his wife surrounded by the greenery of his hometown. From the start of the film this image is

⁹⁶⁴ C. M. Cook, 'The Hero and Villain Binary', p. 70

displayed, as a way of grounding Sukhov's mission in the personal desire to see his wife. Furthermore, the film was to include more scenes flashing back to Sukhov's wife, including nudity, but the censors forced Motyl to cut them.⁹⁶⁵ In the same way as Hollywood's depiction of heroic expansion westwards did not involve any sudden epiphany of the hero, Sukhov in *White Sun* serves the interests of the state but undergoes no character development in the way that Chapaev does, who undergoes the epiphany of attaining consciousness.

The relationship between gender relations and heroes in Soviet Westerns reveals how, although American and Soviet society in the 1960s and 1970s differed in the official values ascribed for gender relations, the forces of male patronisation were strikingly similar. In the USSR there was an official enunciation of the virtues of equality enshrined in the revolution, that women had equal rights to men and that the revolution had liberated women by providing them with equal pay, abortion rights, and legal protection. In spite of repressive measures introduced in the 1930s under Stalin, improvements were made in the 1960s. There were measures which provided surprisingly legal recourse for women, with new laws in 1965 and 1968 which kept the Soviet Union at the forefront of divorce rights for women.⁹⁶⁶ In the USA, equality for women was also something constitutionally enshrined and socially popular, but with a greater emphasis on traditional family roles. Yet, while these values underpinning notions of gender relations may differ, the fact of patriarchy did not. Hollywood and Soviet cinema, both adopted a paternalistic attitude in their presentation of women and their relationship to male heroes.

In John Ford's *The Searchers* (1956), the heroes Ethan and Martin go on a hunt to find Ethan's niece, Debbie, who's been abducted by a gang of Comanche native Americans. Finding Debbie, Ethan tries to kill her after she says that she would rather stay with the Comanche. In a similar way, the hero of *White Sun*, Sukhov, rescues the veiled multiple wives of Abdullah. Yet, adapting the rescue motif to a Soviet context, the hero in this instance explains to the wives the ideological and social revolution at hand: "Товарищи

⁹⁶⁵ L. Menashe, *Moscow Believes in Tears: Russians and Their Movies* (Washington, DC, 2010), p. 75.

⁹⁶⁶ B. E. Clements, *A History of Women in Russia* (Bloomington, 2012), pp. 258-61.

женщины. Революция освободила вас. У вас не теперь хозяина, не господина”.⁹⁶⁷

In Ford's example, the underlying motivation for Ethan's actions is one of ethnic and familial pride, a concern for white America; in Motyl's example, Sukhov is acting out of an ideological support for women's equality. Yet both have the same underlying male patronisation of women, who are deprived of the choice of their own actions, so as to serve the social-political values motivating male heroic missions. In *The Elusive Avengers*, one of the gang of protagonists is a young girl Ksanka. She is characterised as meek and traditional, even when around the other avengers. Ksanka actively use her own meekness and innocence to spring a trap on the bandits at a tavern. While on some level the message is that Bolshevik heroes can utilise existing gender roles in heroic ways, the very use of the conservative gender role suggests that the female heroes were still limited in their agency. Keosayan did not write a character who radically fought on the same terms as men as a Bolshevik revolutionary, subverting gender roles, but one who found her traditional gender role to be a revolutionary asset in and of itself. The agency of women is an aspect of the Hollywood Western which was hardly challenged by several so-called 'anti-Westerns' of the late 1960s and 1970s which had heterodox approaches to race and violence to the traditional classic Westerns of John Ford and his contemporaries.⁹⁶⁸ The Western heroes on the screen for American and Soviet viewers in the 1960s and 1970 were, in both cases, supportive of traditional gender roles which had women as governed by paternalistic heroism, and which restricted the idea that women could have agency unless acting with the humility, modesty, and deference of traditional gender relations (such as Ksanka).

A common feature of the Western is that of the hero as the conquer of nature. Stagecoach is a classic example of the journey made through harsh conditions to an ultimate destination which resolves the action of the film.⁹⁶⁹ This journey is in many respects a taming of nature, the physical victory over the harsh environment in which the quest is situated. These themes are deployed by Soviet filmmakers in their own

⁹⁶⁷ *Beloe Solntse Pustyni*, dir. Vladimir Motyl (Film, 1970, DVD, 2003), 27:02-27:10.

“Comrade women. The revolution has liberated you. Now you have no owner, no master.”

⁹⁶⁸ D. Graham, ‘The Women of “High Noon”: A Revisionist View’, *Rocky Mountain Review of Language and Literature*, 34/4 (1980), p. 243.

⁹⁶⁹ M. M. Winkler, ‘Classical Mythology and the Western Film’, *Comparative Literature Studies*, 22/4 (1985), p. 524.

Westerns; the actions of these their are framed partly in the context of their conquering of nature. The journey across the landscape is not just a pragmatic one, it is the crucial way in which the hero achieves conquest “by labor, persistence, violence, and technology of an extraordinarily hostile, inhospitable natural world”.⁹⁷⁰ In *At Home Among Strangers*, Shilov has to undergo an arduous journey from Moscow to the distant steppe and forests of Siberia to try and retrieve the stolen gold. He travels on horseback into the wilderness to pursue on foot the thieves of the gold. The film features a chase along river rapids, in a culmination of the journey into the wilderness. Shilov’s success is shown in of his ability to defeat Brylov and Sarychev, but also his ability to transverse the rapids and rocks that stand as nature’s obstacle against him. Similarly, Sukhov in *White Sun* defines his heroism through battling against the hostility of his environment. In the opening titles sequence, the camera pans multiple shots of Sukhov walking across the desert at different angles and distances, accompanied by a tentative marching-style timpani beat. Sukhov has to travel over sand and sea in order to capture the rebel warlord, Abdullah. In the films *Dzhura* (1964) and *The Bodyguard*, the films centre around the heroes conquering the elements and travelling across the mountains of central Asia, protecting certain individuals, and only achieving their goals thanks to a mixture of their heroic sherpa-like skills and their ideological strength and commitment to Soviet power (*Sovetskaya vlast’*). The hero’s success, framed by harsh landscapes, is a crucial way in which the hardiness of the Western hero was incorporated into the territorial and physical mission of the Soviet hero in the Civil War era and early 1920s in these films.

The cowboy hero was a powerful symbol of the American other – a visual reminder of difference in values and cultural practice. In 1968, the Soviet satirical magazine, *Krokodil*, published a piece on how the actor Ronald Reagan had just become Governor of California. The writer used a metaphor of ‘cowboy Reagan’ riding off into the distance to cynically characterise the blurred line between a career in Hollywood and politics as a continuation of cronyism and lawlessness, “Наконец, Рейган — ковбой в политике.”⁹⁷¹ Despite the potency of this metaphor and the significance of the

⁹⁷⁰ Pippin, ‘What Is a Western?’, p. 228.

⁹⁷¹ “Finally, Reagan is a cowboy in politics.”

‘American cowboy’ as part of the lawlessness and chaos of American politics, Soviet filmmakers adapted these Hollywood heroes into a new context. The *bogatyr* hero of the 1920s to 1940s offered a domestic Soviet model for which the Hollywood hero could be adapted to, but yet it was not. The *bogatyr* as a hero involved a focus on the taming of youthful rebellion and achievement of consciousness, but no such transformation occurs in the Soviet Western. The influence of the Western in Soviet cinema’s heroes, on a basic level, was the influence of a genre and set of images and themes from Hollywood. On top of that, Soviet models framed the hero’s interactions with: gender roles, the state, and nature. What is revealing is that the Western, for heroes, could be interpreted and adapted into a Soviet context because it ultimately had much in common with Soviet values of heroism.

Nostalgia and memory: the frontier

The utilisation of nostalgia under Brezhnev acted as a counterpoint to the policies of Brezhnev’s government in the Era of Stagnation.⁹⁷² The clampdowns and censorship of the 1960s gave way in the 1970s to exile and house-arrests, with prominent writers Solzhenitsyn, Brodsky, and other intellectuals, being forced to leave the USSR. *Samizdat*, underground illegal writings became more commonplace. As Beumers writes, “feelings of despair often characterize the films of the 1970s.”⁹⁷³ Films on contemporary themes in the 1970s frequently explored themes of disillusionment, social inertia, corruption, and stifling bureaucracy.⁹⁷⁴ In America too, film historians have pointed to the rise of ‘anti-Westerns’ in retaliation to the conservative backlash of Richard Nixon’s government following the radicalism of 1968, with prolonged conduct in the Vietnam War, the May 1970 Kent Shootings, and the Watergate Scandal in 1972: all contributed to an atmosphere of distrust and disconnection.⁹⁷⁵ The films revealed an underlying parallel between the horrors of the past in the Wild West and of state mandated violence and war in the early 1970s. A critical part of the Hollywood Western as a genre is its

V. Seregin, ‘Roni Strelyaet S Bedra’, *Krokodil*, 14 (1968), p. 4.

⁹⁷² Roberts, ‘From Comrade to Comatose’, p. 77.

⁹⁷³ B. Beumers, ‘The Stagnation: Mainstream and Auteur Cinema (1967-1982)’, in *A History of Russian Cinema*, (Oxford ; New York, 2009), p. 149.

⁹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 146-150.

⁹⁷⁵ Cook, *Lost Illusions*, p. 177.

setting, the late nineteenth century American west, the 'Wild West'. Corkin suggests that "the western has the mythic power to define the past not simply as a body of material and ideological events that are recognizable and subject to analysis but as a triumphal moment when a compendium of quintessentially American traditions took hold"⁹⁷⁶. The Wild West is a frontier, on the very brink of American territorial control, but one representing a better future for those who seek it. In this sense, the Wild West is as much a temporal frontier, of a bygone era, as it is a geographical one. This notion of the temporal frontier, the cusp of historical development, can be applied to the Soviet Western. Most of these films are set in the Russian Civil War, the defining moment for the birth of the Soviet Union.

The glorification of America's past was, at the same time, critiqued and complicated by several aforementioned 'anti-Westerns' whereby a "historically realistic depiction of the harshness of Western life" was depicted – in films such as *Monte Walsh* (1970), *Zandy's Bride* (1974), and *The Outlaw – Josey Wales* (1976).⁹⁷⁷ This is not to say that the classic Western glorification of the frontier and westward expansion was not present in 1970s Hollywood; John Wayne's own production company, Ratjac, created four such films for Warner Brothers, among many others.⁹⁷⁸ Soviet Westerns could have used these new anti-Western models which demystified the past and showed the reality of historic suffering and harshness, but instead focussed on traditional nostalgic Western representations of the frontier past.⁹⁷⁹

By the 1960s and 1970s the struggles for the development of communism's future were happening in the corridors of power in Moscow. Filmmakers reflect on a heroic past space, lost to urbanisation and bureaucratisation. The focus on nostalgia in cinema is evidenced from movie attendance and sales; Soviet films that dealt with contemporary themes were the most highly recommended by the authorities and the most frequently produced, but also among the least profitable films. These films averaged a mere 9.5

⁹⁷⁶ S. Corkin, *Cowboys As Cold Warriors: The Western And US History* (Philadelphia, 2004), p. 21.

⁹⁷⁷ Cook, *Lost Illusions*, p. 178.

⁹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 179.

⁹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

and 12 million viewers.⁹⁸⁰ To put this into context, *The Elusive Avengers* drew in a staggering 54.5 million viewers, *White Sun* 34.5 million viewers, and *At Home Among Strangers* saw 23.7 million.⁹⁸¹ Films of any historical theme made up on average 53% (1967-1969).⁹⁸² Katerina Clark and Kathleen Parthé have both looked at the advent of Village Prose literature in the 1960s and '70s, which drew on a nostalgia for a village culture lost to industrial development.

The Civil War landscape of the Soviet Western reflected a nostalgia for the loss of daring and heroism in the wilderness. Landscape is crucial to the Western in terms of its articulation of 'the frontier', the frontier between the past and present, between civilisation and wilderness, between stability and disorder.⁹⁸³ The battle for communism was no longer one of bureaucracy not train robberies, horses, and guns, and Soviet filmmakers wanted to use the Western to recapture that exciting and revolutionary stage of the battle. The American Western is used as a vehicle for nostalgia by Soviet filmmakers because the backdrop of wilderness and the fact of being set in a 'bygone era', allow these films to utilise long standing narratives of heroism and Soviet glory though the lens of adventure and fantastical action.

In *White Sun*, the barren desert of central Asia is used to create a environment distinctly alien to the majority of Soviet viewers. The desert, a near ubiquitous setting for Hollywood Westerns, is here consciously employed to draw a parallel for a Soviet context.⁹⁸⁴ The cinematography uses the sparsity of the desert background to draw the viewer's eye towards the foreground, with the frequent recurrence of the protagonists, and their horses, as the centre of the camera's attention. The old clay-bricked buildings, the inhabitants of the desert in traditional dress, and the half-a-century old Civil War uniforms, evoke a bygone era situated in the desert. Motyl constructs a place of mission and destiny, in which the future of Soviet society is the sole concern in the bleak context

⁹⁸⁰ Mickiewicz, *Media and the Russian Public*, p. 74.

⁹⁸¹ S. Zemlianukhin and M. Segida, *Domashnyaya sinemateka: otechestvennoe kino 1918-1996* (Moscow, 1996), p. 283, p. 34, p. 395.

⁹⁸² Mickiewicz, *Media and the Russian Public*, pp. 75-76.

⁹⁸³ J. Kitses, *Horizons West*, p. 18.

⁹⁸⁴ V. Bohlinger, "'The East Is a Delicate Matter'" *White Sun Of the Desert and the Soviet Western*, in Cynthia J. Miller and A. Bowdoin Van Riper (eds), *International Westerns: Re-Locating the Frontier* (Lanham, 2014), pp. 381-382.

of the desert. The only purpose for Sukhov's mission in the desert, to fight for the survival of the new Bolshevik state, is emphasised by nostalgic glimpses into Sukhov's lushly green hometown – with his wife at the centre of his flashbacks. These flashbacks further emphasise the distance between the desert of central Asia, as the place for the chapter of the Civil War in Soviet history, and the greenery of European Russia which both precedes and follows the Civil War desert in Sukhov's life. Sukhov cannot return to his beautiful and fertile home until his mission in the barren and alien desert of the Civil War is finished.

The wilderness is used to great effect in *At Home Among Strangers*. The film is set in the Siberian forests and steppe, and used to create a sense of distance and particularity from the urban political elites in Moscow. Shilov's mission is one which requires him to go beyond the bounds of city life, and to pursue the danger and adventure of fighting by himself in the 'wild east' of immediate post Civil War era Siberia. The start of the film is a sequence in which an old carriage is loaded up and sent down a hill crashing into the distance by a group of the future Chekists, including Shilov, in their youth. This black-and-white sequence, accompanied by a mournful ballad composed by Eduard Artemyev, consciously symbolises the destruction of the past and joint creation of the future by the combined act of pushing the carriage down the hill.⁹⁸⁵ The opening sequence's song is interspersed with the cry of 'ravenstvo' (equality), 'bratstvo' (brotherhood), 'mir, mir' (peace, peace), and 'pobeda' (victory). Revolutionary cries to action are used to further embed the film in a sentimental and emotionally charged interpretation of the past. Furthermore, contemporaries of Mikhalkov recognised the use of nostalgia, with E. Stishova writing in 1977 that the carriage is first and foremost a deliberate echo of John Ford's *Stagecoach*.⁹⁸⁶ He argues that Mikhalkov's film is an experiment with the classic Western, a genre which "еще слишком хорошо помнит свое прошлое", so that the film is able to talk about "нашем прошлом, которое мы

⁹⁸⁵ E. Prokhorova, 'Svoi Sredi Chuzhikh, Chuzhoi Sredi Svoikh / At Home among Strangers, a Stranger at Home', in B. Beumers (ed), *The Cinema of Russia and the Former Soviet Union* (London, 2007), p. 175.

⁹⁸⁶ E. Stishova, 'Snimaetsia Kino', *Iskusstvo Kino*, 3 (1977), p. 100.

тоже не забываем.”⁹⁸⁷ In another scene, Shilov looks on through a window at a motorcar, and it brings back memories of his youth and the same barn where he and his friends destroyed the carriage, and the flashback ends with a sustained picture of the rolling hills. The bureaucracy of the office of the Cheka is tragically distant from the romanticised revolutionary-era activity.⁹⁸⁸ The motorcar symbolises that move from the Civil War era of personal courage and physical exertion in the establishment of Soviet power, to the comfortable but unromantic time of the post Civil War maintenance of Soviet power. While commenting on the post Civil War era, Mikhalkov's film, *At Home Among Strangers*, also makes sense within the context of the Brezhnevian era of stagnation's refocus on the past in public discourse, on an 'ominous present'.⁹⁸⁹ “The Revolutionary dream is thus future-in-the-past, to which characters have access only through their memory.”⁹⁹⁰ Moreover, *The Elusive Avengers* was directly influenced by Hollywood in its use of the wildness and its relation to a nostalgic view of past adventure. The film romanticises the wide open steppe, and draws on the youth and vitality of the burgeoning Soviet state during the civil war with its young daring protagonists (the avengers) moving across that



Figure 1. [title sequences – top: *Fistful of Dollars*; bottom: *The Elusive Avengers*]

steppe, in ways that echo the Western. A common feature of the Western, notably in *Stagecoach* (1939) and *My Darling Clementine* (1946), is the wide angle shot of the hero riding off into the sunset. *The Elusive Avengers* opens with the striking silhouettes of the four avengers on horseback, riding towards the viewer, against a backdrop of an enormous glowing red sunset. The image clearly situates the film within the nostalgia of the Western genre. Furthermore, the rousing folk music in place of dialogue as well as

⁹⁸⁷ “Эксперимент Н. Михалкова с классическим вестерном показал, что этот жанр еще слишком хорошо помнит свое прошлое, чтобы по-новому рассказать о нашем прошлом, которое мы тоже не забываем.”

“N. Mikhalkov's experiment with the classic Western has shown that this genre still remembers its past all too well, so as to tell afresh our own past – which we also have not forgotten.”
Ibid., p. 101.

⁹⁸⁸ E. Prokhorova, ‘Svoi Sredi Chuzhikh’, p. 177.

⁹⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 178.

⁹⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 179.

the visually striking contrast between the red sunset and black characters in silhouette is strongly evocative of Sergio Leone's *Fistful of Dollars* (1964), released two years before *The Elusive Avengers*.⁹⁹¹ Although Leone's film was not publicly screened in the Soviet Union until the 1980s, directors and studios had access to foreign films for private screenings for the purposes of studying American culture and significant works of cinema from around the world.⁹⁹² By consciously borrowing from the Western genre, situating the heroes, the avengers, within this stark wilderness nostalgically draws the entire focus of the viewer on the simplicity and concentration on the glory of the Civil War age.

Although mostly achieved visually, nostalgia also is present in the music of these films through the use of ballads. In *White Sun*, Motyl uses a ballad written by the famous artist, Bulat Okudzhav. The ballad, "Vashe blagorodie, gospozha razluka", is sung by by Pasha Vereshchagin, a former Russian customs officer lamenting the home and life that he used to know before the chaos of war and revolution. Vereshchagin's homesickness is transferred to Sukhov who is sitting outside the house, listening.⁹⁹³

Sukhov's nostalgic longing for his home and his wife is linked to the Vereshchagin's longing for a lost world and his long-suffering wife through the opening lines of both verses. The first verse's "госпожа Разлука" (Lady Separation), referring to Sukhov's situation, is linked to the next verse's "госпожа Удача" (Lady Happy Fortune), referring to Vereshchagin's.⁹⁹⁴ Bulat Okudzhava, who provided the lyrics and music for *White Sun*, also did so for *Belorusskiy Vokzal* (*Belorussian Station*, 1970), a film about the disillusionment of veterans twenty five years after the end of the war.⁹⁹⁵ The ballad in *White Sun* is used to rouse feelings of nostalgia for a time long past by 1970.

⁹⁹¹ [Figure 1.]

⁹⁹² D. C. Gillespie, "The Italians Are Coming!" Italy and the "Other" in Soviet Cinema', in S. C. Hutchings (ed), *Russia and Its Other(s) on Film: Screening Intercultural Dialogue* (Basingstoke; New York, 2008), p. 50.

⁹⁹³ D. C. Gillespie, 'The Sounds of Music: Soundtrack and Song in Soviet Film', *Slavic Review*, 62/3 (2003), p. 477.

⁹⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 478.

While the nostalgia elicited in *White Sun* is a private one, shared between Vereshchagin and Sukhov, the nostalgia of the ballad in *The Elusive Avengers* is a public affair. A travelling opera company perform for the last time to the village, they perform a song about tragedy and romance, ‘The Romance of Belorussian Dzhusi’. The song evokes a fleeting romance, with the repetition of ‘ноч прошла, ночь прошла’ to emphasises how time has past.⁹⁹⁶ The dancing villagers and the spectacle of performance evokes nostalgia for the past but in a way that evokes the loss of the traditional Russian village in the push for industrialisation and collectivisation. The late 1960s and 1970s saw increasing popularity of Village Prose, reflecting a keen self-awareness of the loss of pastoral settings and lifestyles and a nostalgia for what had been lost.⁹⁹⁷

In contrast, *At Home Among Strangers* and *Tachanka from the South*, nostalgic ballads reflect the loss of a mythic revolutionary zeal of the Civil War. In *At Home* the opening montage sequence is accompanied by a soulful ballad written by Mikhalkov’s mother. The song links memory of the past with aspiration for the future. This scene conveys the lost optimism and vitality of the Revolutionary era:

В грядущий мир
Он придёт,
Придёт для всех людей!⁹⁹⁸

The “грядущий мир” was never realised; the following scene shows how the romantic fervour of the revolution turned into a less youthful and more serious situation, with the authoritative sounding of a grandfather clock in an office environment abruptly coming after the end of the song. Similarly, in *Tachanka from the South*, a central ballad song is repeated throughout the film, culminating in a final shoot-out accompanied by the song before the credits role. The words of the song evoke the nostalgic passing of time

⁹⁹⁶ *Neulovimiye Mstiteli*, dir. Edmond Keosayan (Film, 1966), 15:29-15:34

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3V0g1gM2P6o>.

⁹⁹⁷ K. F. Parthé, *Russian Village Prose: The Radiant Past* (1992).

⁹⁹⁸ *Svoi Sredi Chuzhikh, Chuzhoi Sredi Svoikh*, dir. Nikita Mikhalkov (Film, 1974, DVD, 2011), 04:09-04:21.

“In the world which is to come
It will arrive,
It will arrive for all the people!”

“Летела в седле молодая эпоха”, but particularly the line “Дожить до бессмертья недаром мечталось”, which imbues the song with the importance of dreaming for a better revolutionary future and the heroic sacrifice.⁹⁹⁹ If the Western locates the Wild West within a visual and auditory landscape of old-world charm and excitement, then the Soviet Western seeks to achieve the same things but in the context of the Civil War. The use of the ballad is poignant in these films for trying to evoke a bygone era of past nostalgia and glory.

The success of the Western genre in the Soviet context related to the ways in which the genre could use the past. In the Soviet Union the very use of a genre that utilised the past facilitated the implicit criticism of the present, whereas in America the development of the ‘anti-Western’ involved the use of the Western genre’s past-setting to make modern-day criticisms of Nixon’s government and political conspiracy in the wake of Watergate.¹⁰⁰⁰ Soviet filmmakers could shape the Western’s use of nostalgia to fit with a state endorsed emphasis on past Soviet victories. Sovietisation could, if not override Americanness, at least contribute alternate currents of thought for viewers of these films. Drawing on the past may have demonstrated correct Soviet values to viewers, and even roused party and ideological pride, but it ultimately did so using history.

Ethnicity and ideology “Allah sent me a friend, and I wanted to kill him!”

Soviet authorities’ tolerance for the Western genre can partly be explained as an attempt to condemn American values through depicting the wild west as a scene of colonial, racist atrocity.¹⁰⁰¹ When John Ford’s *Stagecoach* (1939) was released in the Soviet Union as a ‘trophy-film’ after 1945, it was prefaced with a warning to audiences that it was “an epic about the struggle of Indians against White imperialists on the American frontier”: a concern with race was a traditional part of anti-American propaganda in the

⁹⁹⁹ “A young (new) epoch has flown into the saddle
[It was] dreamed to live as long as eternity [lit. ‘immortality’], not in vain.”

‘Tachanka — Tachanka. Pesnya iz fil’m’a “Tachanka s yuga”’ <https://www.pesni-film.ru/muzyka/tachanka-tachanka-pesnya-iz-filma-tachanka-s-yuga.html> (13 January 2017)

¹⁰⁰⁰ Cook, *Lost Illusions*, p. 177-8.

¹⁰⁰¹ S. Lavrentiev, *Krasnyi Vestern* (Moscow, 2009), p. 81.

Soviet Union.¹⁰⁰² East German *osterns* portrayed the Native Americans as the positive protagonists, the ‘good guys’, and the American colonisers as the evil invaders.¹⁰⁰³ Moreover, Soviet film critics were keen to point out Hollywood’s failings in the representation of race.¹⁰⁰⁴ To understand the role of ethnicity in Soviet Westerns, a brief explanation will be made of the Hollywood and Soviet views on ethnic difference.

Soviet ideas of ethnicity underwent significant change. In the 1920s, a multi-ethnic project was envisioned in the creation of the Soviet Union – that nationalisms were secondary to the creation of a communist utopia, before which bourgeois nationalism would dissipate. In the 1930s, however, Stalin initiated a programme, which actively sought to minimise the role of national identities within a broader Soviet identity. Terry Martin has argued that, for the cultures and peoples of the constituent republics (e.g. Uzbek, Ukrainian, Armenian, etc.), there was minimal threat of forced assimilation, but instead that the Soviet state valued the voluntary absorption of Russian culture and language by these constituent identities.¹⁰⁰⁵ Soviet ideas of ethnicity rested around an official rejection of nationalism as a dangerous and bourgeois concept, while promoting an ideologically based Soviet identity – which rested on political and social convictions rather than blood or language. Francine Hirsch rejects comparisons between Nazi and Soviet ethnic and racial policies, claiming that the Soviet nationalities policy in the 1930s was one principally invested in protecting against perceived ‘enemy nations’ rather than ‘enemy races’.¹⁰⁰⁶ Soviet political theory held that Russians were the most developed, and they would lead other peoples, with their own special but compatible cultures, along the path of development so they ultimately would be as modern as the Russian people. While not explicitly to do with ethnic difference, but rather cultural

¹⁰⁰² Zhuk, ‘Hollywood’s Insidious Charms’, p. 595.

¹⁰⁰³ G. Gemünden, ‘Between Karl May and Karl Marx: The DEFA Indianerfilme (1965-1983)’, *New German Critique*, 82 (2001), pp. 25–38.

¹⁰⁰⁴ Однако создается впечатление, будто все это тщательно просеивается Голливудом сквозь некое идеологическое "сито", а на экранах Голливуда негритянская проблема по-прежнему выдерживается в более или менее "легальных" тонах.

“However, the impression is created, as though everything is carefully screened out by Hollywood through some sort of ideological “sieve”, while on the screens of Hollywood the negro problem as usual is dealt with in more or less “legal” tones”

L. Mel’vil’, ‘Amerikanskoe Kino - S Trekh Tochek Zreniia’, *Iskusstvo Kino*, 12 (1977), p. 79.

¹⁰⁰⁵ T. D. Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939* (2001), pp. 460-462.

¹⁰⁰⁶ F. Hirsch, ‘Race without the Practice of Racial Politics’, *Slavic Review*, 61/1 (2002), pp. 30–43.

difference, in practice it meant the encouragement of the adoption of the Russian language and Russian culture as an enhancement to native cultures. Furthermore, the relationship between national difference within the USSR and levels of development led to the thinking that the peoples of central Asia were less politically and culturally developed than those of the western USSR. In this thinking, the potential arose in Soviet film and television for the characterisation of ethnic and cultural difference as under-development, even as far as permitting racist depictions of difference that dehumanised Central Asians.

In the Hollywood Western, a central theme is that of 'degenerate barbarism' as the enemy of rising civilisation out in the West, and that the ultimate exemplification of that barbarism is the non-white Native-American tribalism – the personification of unmastered nature.¹⁰⁰⁷ Sturges' presentation in *The Magnificent Seven* is a development of this, imposing the superiority of the white man as coloniser and civiliser. His picture presents enlightened white men carrying out their duty to bury the dead: the white saviour complex. Produced during the height of the Civil Rights movement, in 1960, the film starts with a scene in which the white protagonists (Steve McQueen and Yul Brynner) take up the task of burying a native American whom the latino townspeople refuse to bury on racial grounds. As an important founding film for the birth of the Soviet Western, *The Magnificent Seven's* attempt at dealing with racial equality made it less of a target for derision by Soviet authorities seeking to bolster anti-American propaganda, and was even viewed in a positive light. A reviewer in 1962 in *Iskusstvo Kino* writes that "срывает покровы идеализации и ложной романтики, которыми десятилетиями прикрывалась идейная порочность традиционного для Голливуда вестерна."¹⁰⁰⁸ *The Magnificent Seven* was admired by Soviet critics for its honesty, partially in terms of its depiction of American race relations. In this sense, Sturges' work offered a positive encouragement, through exploring racial politics, for Soviet filmmakers to incorporate the themes and tropes of the genre into their work without appearing overtly American. Race in the Western genre had typically been a way in

¹⁰⁰⁷ Pippin, 'What Is a Western?', pp. 227.

¹⁰⁰⁸ "It tears down the facade of idealisation and false romanticism, with which the idealised depravity of the traditional Hollywood Western was covered up with for decades" Kukarkin, 'Iunost' i Driakhlost' Vesterna', p. 140.

which the mastery of nature extended to the ‘civilising’ of other peoples. In the late 1960s and 1970s, the so-called Revisionist Western “elicits a response in the shape of generic interventions that seek to interrogate and critically to re- shape the Western in new directions.”¹⁰⁰⁹ *Tell Them Willie Boy Is Here* (1969), *Little Big Man* (1970), *Soldier Blue* (1970), are three such films which sympathetically portray Native Americans as victims.¹⁰¹⁰ Each generation of Western films produced claims to have successfully addressed issues of race and produced a new progressive type of Western.¹⁰¹¹ Yet these films still patronise and ‘whitewash’ the issues of representation of race, the crucial point being that of the ‘white-saviour’ – that the “Indian depends for authoritative representation on white discourse.”¹⁰¹²

This issue of dependence on the ‘white saviour’ and white discourse is present in the Soviet Western, but within the context of ‘levels of development’ – which is how Soviet officials viewed ethnicity, as a hierarchy of nations, with political consciousness being linked to cultural practices and language.¹⁰¹³ Edmond Keosayan’s *The Elusive Avengers* features Yasha, a character of Roma ethnicity. Yasha is, on one level, emblematic of racial equality – a token minority within an all white case of heroes. Yet his ethnicity is presented as an impediment to his heroic Soviet credentials. When at the end of the film, the ‘avengers’ are rewarded by a Red Army general and given positions in the red army, Yasha is given a new Soviet name as ‘Yakov Tsigankov’ (Tsigankov derived from the Russian word for gypsy). His Roma identity, as just ‘Yasha’, is insufficient for the Red Army – and part of his commitment towards the revolutionary cause is the Russification of his name. In the original *Little Red Devils* (*Krasnyie d’yavolyata*, 1923), which was remade into *The Elusive Avengers*, the character of Yasha was a black circus performer called Tom. The replacement of a black character with a gypsy one is emblematic of how ethnicity is important to Soviet filmmakers and studios primarily within a Soviet context. Tom, as a black character, demonstrates the way in which

¹⁰⁰⁹ B. Langford, ‘Revisiting the “Revisionist” Western’, *Film & History: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Film and Television Studies*, 33/2 (2003), pp. 28.

¹⁰¹⁰ Ibid., p. 33.

¹⁰¹¹ M. K. Hall, ‘Now You Are a Killer of White Men: J. Jarmusch’s *Dead Man* and Traditions of Revisionism in the Western’, *Journal of Film and Video* (2001), p. 3.

¹⁰¹² Ibid.

¹⁰¹³ Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire*, p. 20, p. 84, p. 125.

soviet filmmakers in the 1920s were interested in presenting examples of ethnic difference from throughout the world, not just the Soviet Union, reflective of the international focus of Soviet politics before the change to Socialism in One Country in 1924. The issue of ethnicity in 1966 was not one of showing an international egalitarianism of different peoples, but rather to show the multiplicity of equal races within the Soviet Union – with the use of a Roma boy.¹⁰¹⁴ The white-saviour complex, so frequent in the depictions of race or ethnicity in Hollywood Westerns, is clearly also seen in the racist notion that Roma need to be Russified to achieve higher levels of development.

In *At Home*, ethnicity also relates to Soviet ideas of levels of development, although in this instance the white saviour complex manifests itself in visually shocking racism towards the ‘uncivilised’ Asian Tartar man. In the film, the Muslim Tartar bandit, Kayum, is discovered by Shilov to have stolen the gold which was destined for the new revolutionary government in Moscow. Kayum is presented as an unintelligent, childlike, treacherous, and at times even animalistic – speaking with agitated frenzy and moving with bent back and limbs. Kayum has to be ‘educated’ by Shilov about the values of communism. Rather than being presented as willfully ignorant and evil, Kayum is presented as simply too uneducated and perhaps unintelligent to comprehend Marxist-Leninist logic. Soviet ideology argued that ethnic difference was important insofar as it related to how developed, politically, different *narodi* (nations) were. This presentation of the non-white character of Kayum is as physically different, sub-human, and in need of the white Bolshevik man to educate him. The notion that ‘cultural backwardness’ can be remedied by a Russian speaking Soviet officer’s rhetoric is connected to the legacy of Russification of the 1930s.¹⁰¹⁵ The notion that ‘Russianness’, as opposed to Tartar or any non-white and non Russian speaking identity, is connected to forces of civilisation in the character of Kayum – whose poor Russian is linked to cultural backwardness. In a scene in the corn-fields, Shilov transfixes Kayum with a simple magic trick. Kayum is held in rapture by superstition and an ‘uncivilised’ belief in magic, contrasting with the hard realism and pragmatism of the Cheka officer Shilov. The white saviour complex is

¹⁰¹⁴ Lavrentiev, *Krasnyi Vestern*, p. 109-10.

¹⁰¹⁵ Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire*.

given a patriarchal dimension in *White Sun of the Desert*. The hero, Sukhov, presents his mission as not just of the immediate liberation of the wives of Abdullah – but the general liberation of all women from traditional moral conservatism and restrictive religious practice. The women are presented as a naive and even idiotic, when in one scene to avoid being seen without wearing the traditional *hijab* and violating their modesty, they frantically pull their garments up over their heads – ironically revealing their underwear in the process.¹⁰¹⁶ Cultural differences are seen by Sukhov not as a permanent difference between Russian Bolsheviks and Central Asian Muslims, but as a challenge to be overcome, which he, as the culturally and politically enlightened white Soviet man, is bound to achieve.



Figure 2. [Abdullah's wives pull their garments over their faces], *White Sun of the Desert*

In this sense, all these Soviet films claim to present an enlightened view of revolutionary values regarding race and gender and difference in a way that is similar to the Western, with a white saviour 'liberating' what are perceived as backward and morally inferior cultures. The Soviet emancipatory project, while arguing that ethnic difference is not important, in the notion of levels of development, ultimately argued for the voluntary sovietisation of different groups. This involved more than the absorption of political ideology, but the assimilation of cultural and religious practice in an attempt imitate the white man from Moscow. In the vein of classic Hollywood Westerns, and even 'Anti-Westerns', the Soviet presentation of ethnicity in their Westerns was inherently a patronising one. These films reflect an imbedded hypocrisy on the part of Soviet filmmakers and authorities, who sought to criticise the racism of American society, while implicitly constructing Soviet ideals out of ethnically and culturally Russian models.

¹⁰¹⁶ [Figure 2.]

Soviet Westerns made and set in Central Asia demonstrate how Central Asian filmmakers absorbed the hierarchies of development which valued Russianness as a core component of a Soviet identity superior to ethnic identities of being Uzbek, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, etc. This is not to say that Soviet identity was a form of Russian nationalism – Soviet leaders were fearful of the threat from Russian nationalism as a reactionary ideology – but that within a Soviet identity the Russian language and cultural attributes were desired. The connection is made in these films between cultural and ethnic pride and a lack of development among Soviet nations. The principal Central Asian Soviet film studios, Uzbekfil'm, Kazakhfil'm, Kyrgyzfil'm, and Tajikfil'm, all produced an array of Civil War era adventure movies in the 1970s,¹⁰¹⁷ which Birgit Beumers directly attributes to the popularity of *White Sun*, released in 1970.¹⁰¹⁸ Critically, these films differ from the films produced by Mosfil'm and other Russian-based studios in their portrayal of non-Russians; the 'unruly natives' were telling stories about their own revolutionary past.¹⁰¹⁹ They present anti-Soviet nationalists as unheroic and bad role models, too connected to tradition and religion.

In line with Soviet hierarchies of development, a positive-Bolshevik model for the Central Asian man forms a contrast to a negative model of ethnic and cultural pride embodied by the nationalists or Basmachi separatists. Such a contrast is perhaps best viewed through the lens of Franz Fanon's *Black Skin, White Masks*, wherein Fanon argued that colonised peoples self-colonised with the whiteness of their coloniser and denied their own ethnic and cultural heritage.¹⁰²⁰ It is this internalisation of the Soviet idea of hierarchies of development among different Soviet nations, and the rejection of ethnic and cultural identity in favour of a Soviet one (albeit one that incorporates selective elements of Central Asian culture), that is central to these films. Two films will be looked at as case-studies, emblematic of wider trends within Central Asian cinema: *The Seventh Bullet* (1972), and *The Bodyguard* (1979). Both films are from Uzbekfil'm and directed by the acclaimed Ali Khamraev. Studying the films of Khamraev is significant to the study of

¹⁰¹⁷ M. Rouland, G. Abikeyeva and B. Beumers, eds., *Cinema in Central Asia: Rewriting Cultural Histories* (London; New York, 2011), pp. 18-21.

¹⁰¹⁸ Ibid., p. 20.

¹⁰¹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰²⁰ F. Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, trans. R. Philcox, Revised edition (New York; Berkeley, 2007).

Central Asian cinema, by virtue of his sheer popularity and influence throughout the region.¹⁰²¹ In the interests of widening scope, examples will also be drawn in from other Central Asian Soviet Westerns.

In *The Seventh Bullet*, the hero, Maksumov, is presented as the same sort of ‘civilising force’ that we find in the Western – the hero imbued with a foreign ideology conquering the wildness and unruliness of natives in distant desert lands. Although he is ethnically Uzbek he exhibits no signs of being Uzbek other than his skin, and fully inhabits the role of an officer in the Red Army – on a civilising mission to subdue his own, less politically and culturally developed, people. His mission is to go on a journey across the desert and try to win back his men, who have switched allegiance to the anti-Bolshevik Basmachi warlord, Khairulla. The enemy, Khairulla, is portrayed a backwards embodiment of Uzbek identity; undoubtedly connected to the ethnic and cultural roots of the nation, but morally and politically bankrupt because of it, attempting to flee to Britain with his two wives at the last moment rather than fight. The hero, Maksumov, serves as a positive Soviet role model of Central Asian identity as a counterpoint to the failings of the traditionalist and ethnically and culturally arrogant Khairulla. He manages to persuade his men that their futures are better under his personal command and in the service of the Soviet state. As a group of 20 or so Uzbek men, their anxieties over who to fight for are representative of the wider anxieties of Uzbek society during the Civil War – whether to fight for the communist forces or the Islamist, nationalist Basmachi forces. Ultimately, Maksumov’s victory in managing to persuade his men to recommit themselves to the communist cause under his leadership is a way of showing to audiences the positive role that non-white Soviet citizens could have within the Soviet state.

Khamraev dismisses an ethnic or cultural conception of Uzbek identity in his presentation of the native villagers he encounters on his journey. Ismail almost kills Maksumov in a rage, before realising Maksumov was not the person who stole his horse and killed his brother. Discovering that it was actually the Basmachi warlord, Khairulla, who killed his brother, positions Ismail as a friend and ally of Maksumov. The next

¹⁰²¹ Rouland, Abikeyeva and Beumers, *Cinema in Central Asia*.

morning Ismail laughs and jokes with Maksumov about his past ignorance and antagonism. He reveals the Soviet- Central Asian integration process underlying the ambition in the Central Asian Western, “Аллах послал мне друга, а я хотел его убить! [laughter from both]”.¹⁰²² Allah, in this presentation, looks favourably on identifying with the communists. The rage and irrationality of the Uzbek villager is presented as having to be soothed by Maksumov’s rational communist ideals, and in doing so he turns the villager into an anti-Basmachi ally. In this way, the Red Army officer, with this superior western ideology, is capable of convincing a villager to turn his back on the traditional and anti-Soviet ethno-religious identity promoted by the Basmachi.

Whereas in *The Seventh Bullet* criticisms of native levels of cultural and political development are explored through moral and personal failings, in *The Bodyguard*, traditional cultural practices are explicitly ridiculed. The film centres on Sultan Nazar, a Basmachi enemy who has been captured, and his transit with Bolshevik guards across the steppe and mountains.



Figure 3. [Saifulo in ridiculed traditional costume], *The Bodyguard*

At one point, Saifulo, Nazar’s slave, dresses up in the ostentatious military uniform of his grandfather,¹⁰²³ he shouts that “мужества и храбрость моих предков вселяется в меня!”.¹⁰²⁴ Saifulo is shown to be foolish in his belief that pretentious dress can give the courage and strength that the Bolsheviks find in their common belief in Marxism-Leninism. The culture of the Basmachi is presented as antiquated and alien to Soviet-Uzbek values. An alternative is created by Khamraev in the form of the all Uzbek Bolshevik forces in the film, led by the hero Mirzo. When the new Basmachi chief,

¹⁰²² “Allah sent me a friend, and I wanted to kill him!”

Sed'maya Pulya, dir. Ali Khamraev (Film, 1972, DVD, 2008) 42:24-42:28.

¹⁰²³ [Figure 3.]

¹⁰²⁴ “The courage and bravery of my ancestors takes root in me!”

Telokhranitel', dir. Ali Khamraev (Film, 1979), 31:30,

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gvI9MuUQ5So> (14 February 2017).

Fottabek, captures the convoy, he arranges to marry his wife in an elaborate traditional ceremony. A traditional slapstick farce is performed for the couple. The Basmachi company are blissfully ignorant that the performers are allies of Mirzo, and use the performance as a distraction – while a young boy severs the ropes of the awning covering the Basmachi. The cultural practices of the traditional Basmachi are reduced to an emblematic farce performance, where their engrossment in their native forms of entertainment lead to their ambush. This contrasts sharply with the presentation of tradition in the next scene, where an old man, Nazarat, laments his lack of land because of local Basmachi tyranny. Mirzo responds to his socio-economic issue, land reform being one of the Bolshevik tenants of winning peasant support during the Civil War, by saying that he will manage to force the Basmachi to give the old man some land and that he should take his word as “слово горца”.¹⁰²⁵

In a similar way to Khamraev’s invocation of ‘Allah sending a friend’ in the form of the Soviet officer Maksumov in *Seventh Bullet*, the use of “слово горца” here is a way of appealing to a form of coexistence between a selective interpretation of Central Asian culture on the one hand, and the heroism of communist heroes and their missions on the other. Suimenkul Chokmorov, who played Maksumov, also played a revolutionary captain in *The Red Poppy Seeds at Isk-Uslk*, a Krygzfil’m production, in which the revolutionary Red Army protagonist attempts to sabotage a gang attempting to smuggle opium.

The film presents the smugglers as more invested in their Central Asian heritage, and that their cultural self-indulgence is linked to their lack of Soviet moral and political values – additionally the film ties itself in with orientalist notions of opium as a part of eastern decadence and moral corruption. These Central Asian films, in the manner of the Western,¹⁰²⁶ focus on the racial conflict of the frontier, presenting developed civilisation as the Soviet imposed force of modernity emanating from the west.

¹⁰²⁵ “The word of a mountain dweller”

Telokhranitel, 1:03:30.

¹⁰²⁶ Pippin, ‘What Is a Western?’, pp. 230.

The Western, so concerned with the imposition of white male order over the wilderness and ‘uncivilised peoples’ is not dissimilar from Soviet cinema’s promotion of Bolshevik values as a necessary step for the improvement of ‘less developed’ peoples of Central Asia. Both American and Soviet views on the historic imposition of their states and ideologies over peoples who drastically differed, ethnically and religious, are linked to conceptions of development and civilisation. The American and Soviet projects of state building in far and ‘exotic’ lands, and the domination of their peoples, were forms of colonialism masked as modernisation.

Conclusion

The Soviet project involved the mission to capture the hearts and minds of citizens, to try and create the *novyi sovietskyi chelovek* (New Soviet Person).¹⁰²⁷ The creation of a new kind of person, an active citizen invested in Soviet values on an emotional and intellectual level was one of the core goals behind the official cultural policies of the state. The Soviet Western in the 1960s and 1970s was on such attempt to help create citizens through cultural output, requiring a balance between entertainment and ideology. These films are emblematic of more than the influence of the USA on Soviet culture, but actively demonstrates the way that *genre* could be used as a new way for ideology to coexist with entertainment. In many respects, the surprising similarities between American and Soviet influences on the Soviet Western, demonstrate to us that cinema – and in particular genre cinema – could offer more than just culturally specific expressions. Even if the Western was a genre which was always “quintessentially American”,¹⁰²⁸ it was also able to adapted into a Soviet context and still be popular.

One of the problems with Socialist Realism, raised by Katerina Clark, is how to create a work that adheres fully to ideological demands without being boring and unreadable.¹⁰²⁹ In some respect, the fact that these Soviet Westerns could be enjoyed is reflective of the fact that the ideological demands on artists after 1953 were fewer, and more freedom was given. Even under Brezhnev, there was no return to the absolute strictness of

¹⁰²⁷ M. Geller, *Cogs in the Soviet Wheel: The Formation of Soviet Man* (London, 1988), p. 28.

¹⁰²⁸ Gemünden, ‘Between Karl May and Karl Marx’, p. 251.

¹⁰²⁹ Clark, *The Soviet Novel*, pp. 3-27.

Stalinist cultural policy. The fact that these films were Westerns and were successfully sovietised and made popular suggests that cultural policy under Brezhnev had some successes in balancing ideology with popularity. Yet the irony is that while these films appeared to Soviet authorities to be adhering sufficiently to Soviet views on ethnicity, nostalgia, and heroism, they were doing so in a way that actually illuminated some of the underlying similarities between American and Soviet culture and society.

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Spies, Stars, and Stripes: How the 1960s Cold War Made Russians Likeable in *Star Trek* and *The Man from UNCLE*

Thalia ERTMAN

Introduction

“To be different is not necessarily to be wrong or ugly,” is one of the central themes of *Star Trek* according to its creator Gene Roddenberry.¹⁰³⁰ This is, in fact, a central theme for the 1960s in the United States. While the decade that proceeded had been one of conformity and fear of being targeted as a suspected communist, the 1960s saw the rise of counterculture and protest movements. Popular culture in the mid-1960s reflected these changes in popular consciousness, as well as changes in political relations with the Soviet Union in the midst of the Cold War. Two 1960s television shows, *Star Trek* and *The Man from UNCLE* each represented genres particularly indicative of Cold War preoccupations. Science fiction dealt with space travel and nuclear fear, but was also able to make social commentary from its setting in the future or in galaxies far away. Espionage shows fed on public imaginings of spies, while also commenting on growing international. Additionally, both of these show featured a popular Russian character. Pavel Chekov and Illya Kuryakin were appealing, especially to young female fans, and they were also likeable Russian characters, which had certainly not been present in 1950s popular culture. These popular Russian characters were possible because of a combination of the political thaw in Cold War tensions, which made Russians less of a threat, and the counterculture movement in the United States, which made rebelling and disagreeing with authority the norm. Additionally, their portrayal and character traits speak to popular opinions at the time, as well as the greater public consciousness in the United States in the 1960s.

¹⁰³⁰ Attributed to Gene Roddenberry, creator of *Star Trek*.

Television and the birth of the American mass culture

Television has become paramount to American culture since its introduction in the mid-twentieth century. Not only did television introduce a new form of popular culture and leisure in the 1950s, it also “became the window in which most Americans began to look at and understand their lives, their culture and the world.”¹⁰³¹ Because of its multitude of genres and the fact that it usually found such a prominent place in the home, television pervaded many Americans’ lives across class, gender, and racial lines, solidifying a larger American culture as opposed to the regional differences that had been common before. In the 1950s, the percentage of American households with televisions rose from approximately nine to 90.¹⁰³² The pervasiveness of television made it more influential, in many ways, than film, radio, or the written word.¹⁰³³ As a result, television became the vehicle of mass culture in the United States.

Television was also a medium of the Cold War. Television’s birth at the start of the Cold War created “a temporal bond that suggests a codependent relationship.”¹⁰³⁴ From television’s inception the medium was connected to the ups and downs of the global ideological conflict, meaning it had to adapt to changing attitudes, both official and popular. Because of the ubiquity of television, it was beholden to the will of its viewers and was forced to be adaptable to changing social currents. Thus, television is a useful medium through which to study social and cultural trends of the Cold War.

This adaptability allows scholars to periodize television in a similar way that Hollywood is periodized. The role of American television during the Cold War is not something many scholars have specifically engaged with.¹⁰³⁵ As a result, this paper will consult the

¹⁰³¹ Jerry Carrier, “Television,” *Tapestry: The History and Consequences of America’s Culture* (New York: Algora Publishing, 2014), 147.

¹⁰³² Tony Shaw and Denise J. Youngblood, *Cinematic Cold War: The American and Soviet Struggle for Hearts and Minds* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2010), 227, n2.

¹⁰³³ Thomas Doherty, *Cold War, Cool Medium: Television, McCarthyism, and American Culture*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2003, p. 2.

¹⁰³⁴ Doherty, *Cold War, Cool Medium*, 2.

¹⁰³⁵ There are some works, but very few that deal with narrative television on the whole, throughout the Cold War. For works on Cold War television see: Nancy Bernhard, *U.S. Television News and Cold War Propaganda, 1947-1960* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Doherty, *Cold War, Cool Medium*; Michael Curtin, *Redeeming the Wasteland: Television Documentary and Cold War Politics* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1995); and Daniel Hallin, *The “Uncensored” War: The Media and Vietnam*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989.

periodization of Shaw and Youngblood in *Cinematic Cold War*. While this periodization refers to Hollywood films, the larger social and cultural trends it reflects are useful in the examination of Cold War television. The first era Shaw and Youngblood outline lasted from 1947-1953, during which “Hollywood followed rather than led political and public opinion.”¹⁰³⁶ The next era, from 1953-1962, saw “the beginnings of negotiated dissent on the screen in the United States.”¹⁰³⁷ The third era is the longest of the eras, lasting from 1962-1980, and it saw not only rising dissent in the spirit of counterculture, but also the introduction of new, young filmmakers.¹⁰³⁸ The penultimate period lasted from 1980-1986 and reflects the shift back towards the political right under Ronald Reagan.¹⁰³⁹ Finally, the period that lasted from 1986-1990 highlighted the victorious furor that enveloped the country at the end of the Cold War.¹⁰⁴⁰ The period that this paper mostly delves into is the third, which reflects the social and cultural changes caused by the Civil Rights movement, counterculture, and the Vietnam War. While television was still a relatively new medium in this era, these events affected both creators and viewers, causing the rising popularity of shows that pushed back against the conformity of the 1950s, even if they did so indirectly.

While television traversed many genres, the two genres that most reflect Cold War themes are science fiction (sci-fi) and spy shows (spy-fi). *Star Trek* (1966-1969) and *The Man from UNCLE* (1964-1968) each fall into one of these generic categories, making them excellent signifiers of broader Cold War tropes. Both of these genres had long lives before the Cold War, but the midcentury conflict forever shaped and changed them. While sci-fi became simultaneously an updated version of the western as well as a vehicle through which to explore modernism, spy-fi grappled with the globalizing world and the shifting image of espionage. Each of these genres reflected Cold War themes in different ways and were also forced to adapt in the climate of counterculture. These two shows offer a new perspective on the cultural Cold War, as well as a renewed understanding of the broader cultural climate.

¹⁰³⁶ Shaw and Youngblood, *Cinematic Cold War*, 19.

¹⁰³⁷ Ibid., 25.

¹⁰³⁸ Ibid., 29.

¹⁰³⁹ Ibid., 32.

¹⁰⁴⁰ Ibid., 35.

Star trek and sci-fi

Star Trek is a science fiction television show that takes place in the 23rd century and is about the crew of the *USS Enterprise*. The *Enterprise* is a starship that is part of Starfleet, the military organization of the United Federation of Planets (The Federation). *Star Trek* relies heavily on allegory, using the future as a metaphor to talk about the present.¹⁰⁴¹ Thus, The Federation, which is a collection of diverse worlds that respect, tolerate, and celebrate their differences, represents an “idealized version of the United States.”¹⁰⁴² The lines that open every episode of the show describe the basic premise rather aptly:

Space, the final frontier. These are the voyages of the starship Enterprise. Its 5-year mission: to explore strange new worlds, to seek out new life and new civilizations, to boldly go where no man has gone before.¹⁰⁴³

The crew is also tasked with following the “Prime Directive,” which prohibits them from interfering with the internal developments of alien civilizations. Nicholas Evan Sarantakes argues that this principle was largely anti-colonialist in nature, acknowledging “the limits to power, even American power.”¹⁰⁴⁴ The prime directive as it played out in the show was actually more complicated than that. Often times, the actions of the crew reflect a principle closer to the Wilsonian impulse to remake the rest of the world in United States’ image.

Additionally, the very nature of the mission “to explore strange new worlds” could also be neocolonialist. The creators of the show were largely motivated by the ideals of democracy, freedom, and morality,¹⁰⁴⁵ making it possible to see The Federation as a

¹⁰⁴¹ Steven D. Stark, “The *Star Trek* Galaxy and Its Glimpse of TV’s Future,” *Glued to the Set: The 60 Television Shows and Events That Made Us Who We Are Today* (New York: The Free Press, 1997), 260.

¹⁰⁴² Nicholas Evan Sarantakes, “Cold War Pop Culture and the Image of U.S. Foreign Policy: The Perspective of the Original *Star Trek* Series,” *Journal of Cold War Studies* 7, N° 4 (Fall 2005): 78, doi:10.1162/1520397055012488.

¹⁰⁴³ In the future shows, like *Star Trek: The Next Generation*, the line is changed to be “... to boldly go where no *one* has gone before.” “*Star Trek* (1966-1969) Quotes,” *The Internet Movie Database (IMDb)*, accessed 8 May 2016, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0060028/trivia?tab=qt&ref_=tt_trv_qu.

¹⁰⁴⁴ Sarantakes, “Cold War Pop Culture,” p. 81.

¹⁰⁴⁵ This view is reflected in many works that discuss the production process and the creators of *Star Trek*. See: Michèle Barrett and Duncan Barrett, *Star Trek: The Human Frontier*, New York: Routledge, 2001; Susan R. Gibberman, *Star Trek: An Annotated Guide to Resources on the Development, the Phenomenon, the People, the Television Series, the Films, the Novels and the Recordings*, Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc., 1991); Chris Gregory, *Star Trek: Parallel Narratives* (London: MacMillan Press Ltd.,

neocolonial power, much like the United States in the Cold War, attempting to make the universe a better place by making sure every civilization is on the path towards liberal democracy. Initially, *Star Trek* was not incredibly popular, although it would grow to carve out a distinct presence in American popular culture. It was cancelled after three seasons because of low ratings. However, the few fans that the show did have were very enthusiastic. In particular, the show appealed to “highly literate” people because of its philosophical themes.¹⁰⁴⁶ Furthermore, through Sarantakes’ use of extensive archival material detailing the creative process of the show, it is clear that the creators, especially Gene Roddenberry, were eager to engage with current events and geopolitical concerns.¹⁰⁴⁷

The combination of philosophical themes, conversations about morality, and the allegorical nature in which the show tackled larger political events made it very appealing to a specific group of people. However, because it did not have wider success, NBC eventually cancelled the show. Soon after its cancellation, several stations picked *Star Trek* up for syndication, showing reruns of its three seasons. It was in syndication that *Star Trek* became widely popular, soon rising to be one of the most successful syndicated shows.¹⁰⁴⁸ This popularity and the resulting other additions to the Original Series led *Star Trek* to become a popular culture mainstay in the United States. As H. Bruce Franklin asserts, “by 1992 *Star Trek* had become its own cultural industry.”¹⁰⁴⁹

One of the reasons *Star Trek* became so popular in syndication was because of its reputation for being diverse and progressive. The allegorical nature of *Star Trek* allowed the story of a starship in the 23rd century to stand in for contemporary America.¹⁰⁵⁰ Many episodes centered on plots that dealt specifically with events viewers would have read about in their newspapers. In particular, both Sarantakes and Franklin draw

2000; Roberta Pearson and Máire Messenger Davies, *Star Trek and American Television*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014; Sarantakes, “Cold War Pop Culture.”

¹⁰⁴⁶ Gene Roddenberry, the show’s creator, said the show received fanmail from graduate students at Harvard and from astrophysicists. Pearson and Davies, *Star Trek and American Television*, 43.

¹⁰⁴⁷ Sarantakes, “Cold War Pop Culture.”

¹⁰⁴⁸ Pearson and Davies, *Star Trek and American Television*, p. 46-48.

¹⁰⁴⁹ H. Bruce Franklin, *Vietnam and Other American Fantasies* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2000), p. 133.

¹⁰⁵⁰ Franklin, *Vietnam and Other American Fantasies*, 131-150; Sarantakes, “Cold War Pop Culture.”

attention to how the show dealt with the Vietnam War.¹⁰⁵¹ While the show's creators initially felt obligated to justify the messy but necessary action in Vietnam, as the war dragged on, they produced episodes, like "The Omega Glory" which were almost explicitly against United States involvement in Vietnam.¹⁰⁵² This political commentary on the Vietnam War was one of many such ways *Star Trek*'s creators asserted the show as a liberal, anti-colonialist project.

Aside from political liberalism, the show was also known for being relatively diverse and forward thinking, especially for its time. *Star Trek* had a "liberal-humanist intent," which involved unity across class, gender, national and racial lines as well as overcoming the "primitive past."¹⁰⁵³ *Star Trek* featured a black woman (Nichelle Nichols, playing Lieutenant Uhura) and an Asian man (George Takei, playing Lieutenant Sulu) in the core crew of the *Enterprise*. Additionally, *Star Trek* is credited as being the first television show to have a scripted interracial kiss (between Captain Kirk and Lieutenant Uhura).¹⁰⁵⁴

While the diversity of the cast certainly "made a progressive statement on race and gender relations that few in the late 1960s would have missed,"¹⁰⁵⁵ the race relations that were depicted in the show were still complicated. Much like the purported anti-colonialist sentiment behind the Prime Directive, sometimes the attempts to be progressive and diverse could backfire on themselves. However, through its futuristic setting, *Star Trek* and its creators were able to advocate for a future in which equality had been achieved, even if their own personal view of what that equality looked like was sometimes colored by internalized prejudices. In fact, diversity and progressive

¹⁰⁵¹ While most networks would not allow specific references to the Vietnam War for fear of provoking unnecessary controversy, *Star Trek* could deal with the war because of its futuristic setting. Sarantakes, "Cold War Pop Culture," 90. Additionally, several members of the creative team behind *Star Trek*, including show creator Gene Roddenberry, signed a petition in 1968 that stated "We oppose the participation of the United States in the war in Vietnam," making their political position even clearer than it was through the allegorical episodes of the show. Franklin, *Vietnam and Other American Fantasies*, p. 146.

¹⁰⁵² Franklin, *Vietnam and Other American Fantasies*, 131-150; Sarantakes, "Cold War Pop Culture," p. 90-97.

¹⁰⁵³ Daniel Bernardi, *Star Trek and History: Race-ing Toward a White Future* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1998), p. 28.

¹⁰⁵⁴ Mike O'Connor, "Liberals in Space: The 1960s Politics of *Star Trek*," *The Sixties* 5, No. 2 (2012): p. 192.

¹⁰⁵⁵ O'Connor, "Liberals in Space," p. 191.

thinking were in many ways a staple of the greater sci-fi genre. Robert Bloch, in a 1957 lecture, declared that during the Cold War “science fiction became the vehicle for social criticism.”¹⁰⁵⁶ Many science fiction writers agreed that the moment the United States dropped atomic bomb, science fiction became a respectable genre.¹⁰⁵⁷ While science fiction as a genre has existed for several hundred years,¹⁰⁵⁸ the modern conception of sci-fi was born in the Cold War. Nuclear fear and space travel were two major Cold War themes that influenced this new form of sci-fi.

Pessimism and dystopian themes were prevalent because of the nuclear fear, but the real possibility of space travel caused the genre to take on tropes of a different generic form – the western. Typically western themes like exploration, conquest, and survival dominated science fiction stories during the Cold War. Science fiction became an updated form of the western.¹⁰⁵⁹ One of the fairly obvious connections between these two genres is the theme of conquering a “frontier.” While the frontier in the western is the American West, in sci-fi it is space. The idea of manifest destiny and conquering the American frontier is engrained in conceptions of American identity.¹⁰⁶⁰ Thus, by positing space as the new frontier, or the “final frontier,” science fiction was able to rely not only on western generic tropes, but also on a part of the broader American story. *Star Trek* is the epitome of Cold War science fiction because of its social commentary and its excitement about expanding in the new frontier of space. The other major Cold

¹⁰⁵⁶ Quoted in David Seed, *American Science Fiction and the Cold War: Literature and Film* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999), p. 9.

¹⁰⁵⁷ Seed, *American Science Fiction and the Cold War*, p. 8.

¹⁰⁵⁸ The exact origins of the science fiction genre are widely debated. There are two general camps. One camp identifies the genre’s roots in fantastical tales from around 2000 BCE. The other camp claims that science fiction only became possible after the scientific revolution, placing its origins somewhere between the 17th-19th centuries.

¹⁰⁵⁹ One of the central sources that discusses how themes of the American West pervade science fiction stories is: Carl Abbott, *Frontiers Past and Future: Science Fiction and the American West*, Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006.

¹⁰⁶⁰ Frederick Jackson Turner’s “Frontier Thesis” situates the concept of expanding into the frontier of the American West as central to American identity. He ends this essay with the claim that a new frontier must be found now that the west has been won in order to preserve American identity. Henry Luce, in his “American Century” essay, follows Turner’s line of thought and claims that the new frontier in the 1930s is the rest of the world, which American can become a great power of. These are just two examples of the centrality of the frontier conception in the imaginings of American identity and American history. Frederick Jackson Turner, “The Significance of the Frontier in American History,” *Rereading Frederick Jackson Turner: “The Significance of the Frontier in American History,” and Other Essays* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998). Henry R. Luce, “The American Century,” *The Ambiguous Legacy: U.S. Foreign Relations in the “American Century,”* ed. Michael J. Hogan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 11-29.

War theme that science fiction perpetrated was that of modernism. By the 1950s modernism had become a part of American mainstream culture.¹⁰⁶¹ During the Cold War, what had once been a rebellious concept became the American symbol of freedom and the superiority of capitalism over communism. In many ways, Cold War science fiction relied on this mainstream conception of modernism, as well as on the emphasis it placed on technology. In the midst of the space race, a genre like science fiction was very appealing.

In this era, whoever had the most technology and whoever could prove they were the most modern could also prove that their ideological system was better. Additionally, the spaceships and alien civilizations of sci-fi largely followed simplistic, modernist design.¹⁰⁶² These themes were present in American Cold War architecture, especially in embassies as a tool of soft power to prove American modernity and freedom of thought.¹⁰⁶³ Modernism and futurism collided in Cold War sci-fi, making it a genre that held promises of what the future could be if the American way championed over the Soviet way.

The man from UNCLE and spy-fi

The Man from UNCLE was one of the first spy television shows of the 1960s, inaugurating a genre that would become ubiquitous during the Cold War. 1965-1966 was the “Year of the Spy” on network television, with eight espionage shows airing across the networks.¹⁰⁶⁴ *UNCLE*, which had its first season in 1964, is largely credited with being the show that brought espionage to TV. The show is about an American from the CIA and a Soviet from the KGB who work for the United Network Command for Law and Enforcement, a fictional international spy organization. In the spirit of the semi-documentaries of the 1950s, which would often thank law enforcement agencies

¹⁰⁶¹ Greg Barnhisel, *Cold War Modernists: Art, Literature, and American Cultural Diplomacy*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2015.

¹⁰⁶² For more on Cold War design see: Greg Castillo, *Cold War on the Home Front: The Soft Power of Midcentury Design*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010.

¹⁰⁶³ For more on modernist architecture during the Cold War see: Jane C. Loeffler, *The Architecture of Diplomacy: Building America's Embassies*, New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1998.

¹⁰⁶⁴ Rick Worland, “The Man From U.N.C.L.E. and TV Espionage in the 1960s. (cover Story),” *Journal of Popular Film & Television* 21, N° 4 (Winter 1994): 150.

for their help in the creation of the show, *The Man from UNCLE* would end each episode with a thank you message to UNCLE, blurring the line between fact and fiction.¹⁰⁶⁵ The *James Bond* series also had a major influence on *UNCLE*. *Dr. No*, the first Bond film, came out in 1962, building on the popularity of Ian Fleming's novels. Fleming himself was actually consulted in the creation of the show and is credited with creating and naming one of the show's main characters, Napoleon Solo, who is very much like James Bond.¹⁰⁶⁶ Originally, the show was just supposed to focus on Solo as the main character, but then a Russian agent in one episode, Illya Kuryakin, was so popular with fans that the two were paired up as partners. The interactions between the two characters, each from opposing sides of the Cold War conflict, became one of the defining features of the show.

Napoleon and Illya's relationship seems very progressive for a spy show made during the Cold War. While they sometimes have disagreements that are rooted in their differing ideologies, they always remain civil. In fact, the trust and friendship that forms between the CIA agent and the KGB agent certainly seems to run contrary to Cold War tropes. UNCLE was not a specifically American institution. It was international and made up of agents of all nationalities. UNCLE's lack of allegiance to any particular nationality is reflected in their enemy organization, THRUSH. But, where UNCLE was committed to the cause of international peace and stability, THRUSH acted completely in its own interest, driven by greed and lust for power. Despite its lack of allegiance to any particular country, THRUSH is described as believing in a natural order that consists of masters and slaves, which sounds suspiciously like the early American Cold War rhetoric about the Soviet Union.¹⁰⁶⁷ Thus, in some ways, the evil organization is still aligned with the Soviet Union, even if not directly. Additionally, *The Man from UNCLE* used consumerism to reinvent the spy genre, further idealizing American capitalism. Unlike the "unstylish" and "empiricist" ideological policing in 1950s spy

¹⁰⁶⁵ The message read "We wish to thank the United Network Command for Law and Enforcement without whose assistance this program would not be possible." This message was confusing enough to viewers that J. Edgar Hoover, the head of the FBI, received letters from people who wished to join U.N.C.L.E. Wesley Britton, *Beyond Bond: Spies in Fiction and Film* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2005), p. 117.

¹⁰⁶⁶ Worland, "The Man From U.N.C.L.E. and TV Espionage in the 1960s," p. 154.

¹⁰⁶⁷ Kackman, *Citizen Spy*, p. 83-84.

shows, *UNCLE* “focused instead on a hip, modern look that privileges individuation and commodity fun over group identity and uniformity.”¹⁰⁶⁸ However, this consumerism was also used for parody, which was this show’s essential characteristic.

The Man from UNCLE was very popular while it was on air, a part of which is credited to the two main characters, but also to the satiric tone of the show. *UNCLE* departed from the spy-fi of the 1950s in its more complex worldview and its refusal to play directly in the Cold War trope of United States good, Soviet Union bad. However, the crucial difference between the spy shows of the 1950s and those of the 1960s was their satiric depiction of the Cold War conflict. This parody can be seen in the mock thank you message at the end of each episode and in the banter between Napoleon and Illya.

While many credit *UNCLE* with being at the forefront of this satirical trend, it was a theme that permeated the whole spy-fi genre in the 1960s. In the espionage dramas of the 1950s the agent models “appropriate” American citizenship and more broadly represents the United States in his missions.¹⁰⁶⁹ While *UNCLE* does revisit the authoritative 1950s model, it “reconfigures the agent’s relationship to the state as an implausible farce,” meaning that by the mid-1960s, the notion that the spy was an “uncompromising symbol of American moral leadership” began to fall apart.¹⁰⁷⁰

This spoofing of a previously serious genre was a direct result of the growing disillusionment that accompanied the counterculture movement of the 1960s. Spy shows that represented the moral goodness and rightness of the state were no longer popular or necessary. Instead, the 1960s saw shows that poked fun at the infallibility of the American government, but still showed that the American way was ultimately the best.

Spy-fi changed from the dramatic nationalist project of the 1950s to the more comical international parody of the 1960s. While *The Man from UNCLE* was at the helm of this change, it was certainly not the only spy show of the 1960s to take on this more satirical

¹⁰⁶⁸ Toby Miller, *Spyscreen: Espionage on Film and TV from the 1930s to the 1960s*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 106.

¹⁰⁶⁹ Kackman, *Citizen Spy*, p. xix.

¹⁰⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, xxi.

tone. Shows like *Get Smart*, *I Spy*, and *The Avengers* relied on *UNCLE*'s popularity and built upon its themes. However, despite a generic history, by the 1960s, "espionage emerged not so much as a genre unto itself, but rather as an inversion of other, more established generic narrative forms."¹⁰⁷¹ Spy-fi had to learn how to grow and change with the shifting cultural and political environment of the United States in the 1960s, which saw the Soviet Union as less of a threat thanks to greater "thaw" Nikita Khrushchev brought on and which also saw less respect for the U.S. government and the "American way" due to the Civil Rights movement and the Vietnam War. Thus, the satirical spy shows of the mid 1960s are examples of the growing pains of the greater genre, and can explain why these shows did not have particularly long lasting popular culture lives.

One of the generic tropes of spy-fi that developed in the 1960s and helped to form the modern imagining of the genre, however, was the idea of international and world travel. Klaus Dodds discusses the geopolitics of James Bond based on the locations the fictional agent travels to, but his arguments can be expanded to the greater espionage genre.¹⁰⁷² Dodds argues that scholars can learn about popular conceptions of geopolitics at a certain historical moment by looking at the role and significance of places and their inhabitants in popular culture. This idea is certainly reflected in many spy shows of the 1960s. Many episodes are set in exotic locations. The people in these locations are represented in a certain way – often in a racist or patronizing way – while the Western agents come in and save the day. However, the international travel of spy-fi also hints at a broader popular conception of a globalized world. Espionage shows portray a world that is connected enough that agents have no problem traveling all over the globe. Additionally, international organizations dominate the spy shows of the 1960s and international cooperation is often necessary to defeat the villains. This is one of the most important contributions of 1960s spy shows. The geopolitics of travel and the notion of a connected world were particularly important popular notions during the Cold War.

¹⁰⁷¹ Kackman, *Citizen Spy*, xxii.

¹⁰⁷² Klaus Dodds, "Screening Geopolitics: James Bond and the Early Cold War Films (1962–1967)," *Geopolitics* 10, N° 2 (Summer 2005): 266–89.

Diverse russians: Pavel Chekov and Illya Kuryakin

In the 1950s, as Cold War tensions solidified into what many considered a new world order, official propaganda in the United States was extremely anti-Soviet and anti-Russian. American popular culture also reflected this sentiment, further encouraging hostility and dehumanization of the new enemy.¹⁰⁷³ Popular culture played an important role in “solidifying and perpetuating negative images that developed between 1945 and 1950” and that presented Russians as the primary enemy of the United States.¹⁰⁷⁴ Russians were portrayed as degenerate and sneaky in some instances;¹⁰⁷⁵ in other cases they were dealt with “in the allegorical guise of alien invaders” in order to further dehumanize them.¹⁰⁷⁶ Popular culture held that Russians were ignorant and less educated, but it also portrayed the fear of the seduction of communism through sexually alluring characters.¹⁰⁷⁷ Overall, in the 1950s, Russian characters were not to be trusted and were often dehumanized. However, by the mid-1960s, two network television shows, *Star Trek* and *The Man from UNCLE* had exceptionally popular Russian characters, marking what appears to be a drastic change from the inhuman Russian characters of the 1950s.

In order to investigate how this change occurred, we can look to the greater geopolitical and cultural context of the era. In 1953, Joseph Stalin died and in 1956 the new Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev denounced Stalin and his policies. This led to what historians call “the thaw” in Cold War tensions, which lasts roughly from 1956-1968. Khrushchev visited the United States and Vice President Richard Nixon visited the Soviet Union in 1959. Additionally, with the election of President John F. Kennedy and his somewhat amenable relationships with Khrushchev, the thaw did create a Cold War environment that was significantly less chilly than during Stalin’s time. Even through the crises of the early 1960s and Khrushchev’s ouster from the Soviet Politburo,

¹⁰⁷³ Harlow Robinson, *Russians in Hollywood, Hollywood’s Russians: Biography of an Image*, Hanover: University Press of New England, 2007, p.149.

¹⁰⁷⁴ One of the reasons Hollywood was so anti-communist and, therefore, anti-Russian during the 1950s was the House Un-American Activities Committee hearings and the Hollywood Blacklist. These targeted filmmakers, accused them of communist leanings, and destroyed their careers. Thus, many in Hollywood felt it necessarily to be obviously anti-communist. Robinson, *Russians in Hollywood*, 149-152.

¹⁰⁷⁵ Madison, *Anti-Foreign Imagery*, p. 167.

¹⁰⁷⁶ Robinson, *Russians in Hollywood*, p. 168.

¹⁰⁷⁷ Cyndy Hendershot, *Anti-Communism and Popular Culture in Mid-Century America*, Jefferson, NC: McFarlands & Company, Inc., 2003, p. 13-14.

relations were able to stay relatively stable. Aside from this greater thaw culture in the 1960s, cultural changes also occurred within the United States. Counterculture and protest movements began to take over the compulsory conformity and anti-communism of the 1950s, creating a space for dissenting voices. Both the Civil Rights Movement and the Vietnam War were major causes for unrest. People began to disagree with U.S. political policy and to mistrust, even resent the government. This translated into a larger mistrust and resentment of authority and societal norms. These sentiments are part of what made popular Russian characters possible in the mid-1960s.

The combination of the thaw and counterculture created an environment in which American television creators could make likeable, even good, Russian characters and in which American television viewers were more able to like and identify with those Russian characters. This was true of various forms of popular culture, not just television. Hollywood in particular changed its attitude both because the larger political climate and because of large structural shifts within Hollywood that did away with the old studio system and brought in younger filmmakers.¹⁰⁷⁸ This broader sentiment made it possible for shows like *Star Trek* to provide social commentary on the Vietnam War and shows like *The Man from UNCLE* to present a multinational spy organization as the arbiter of good. Additionally, both of these shows featured Russian main characters. Pavel Chekov is the navigator of the starship *Enterprise* in *Star Trek* and Illya Kuryakin is half of the main spy partnership in *The Man from UNCLE*. While they both still fall into certain stereotypes of Russian characters, the fact that they are presented as firmly on the side of good is an important development in 1960s popular culture. Additionally, both of these characters had wide and avid fanbases, showing that viewers were also ready to like Russian characters.

Gene Roddenberry, the creator of *Star Trek*, added the character of Pavel Chekov to the crew of the *USS Enterprise* in the show's second season, which ran from 1967-1968. Claiming that Chekov's addition was to emphasize the theme of "living together or dying together," Roddenberry introduced viewers to the young Russian ensign.¹⁰⁷⁹

¹⁰⁷⁸ Shaw and Youngblood, *Cinematic Cold War*, p. 28-29.

¹⁰⁷⁹ Gibberman, *Star Trek*, p. 61.

However, there were other reasons to add a character like Chekov. Being a younger character, he was certainly meant to appeal to younger female fans. His “Beatle cut” hairstyle made Walter Koenig, the actor who portrayed Chekov, look like Davy Jones, the lead singer of the band The Monkees.¹⁰⁸⁰ Additionally, Roddenberry has cited a *Pravda* article that complained about there being no Russians aboard the *Enterprise* as part of the impetus behind Chekov’s introduction. Chekov’s addition stresses that “by the twenty-third century the cold war is long gone,”¹⁰⁸¹ yet another instance in which the sci-fi genre allows for poignant social commentary. Chekov did appeal to a lot of young female fans, bringing in a teen audience who loved this character and who helped elevate him to series regular status. Here is an example of a Russian character who is no longer portrayed as evil or inhuman as he might have been in the 1950s. Instead, he is not only one of the main crewmembers, but also very popular in the fan community. Part of his popularity was due to the way the character was presented, almost in spite of his Russian-ness.

Pavel Andreievich Chekov joins the crew of the *Enterprise* when he is in his early twenties. He is portrayed as at once young and naïve, but also as an extremely smart and capable graduate of Starfleet Academy. His youth and exuberance certainly were part of what made him appealing to teenage viewers, who felt they had much more in common with him than with the older members of the crew. Additionally, Chekov is very proud of his Russian heritage, reminding viewers time and again where he is from, if Koenig’s strong Russian accent had not already tipped them off. Chekov’s naivety and his Russian heritage became defining features of his character. Across many different episodes, Chekov claims that some of the most famous inventions and stories in the world originated in Russia. In the episode “Who Mourns for Adonais,” Chekov claims that the English story about the Cheshire Cat is actually a Russian story about a disappearing cat from Minsk.¹⁰⁸² He also claimed that the Garden of Eden was located just outside Moscow in the episode “The Apple.”¹⁰⁸³ Such misconceptions and

¹⁰⁸⁰ Gregory, *Star Trek*, p. 31.

¹⁰⁸¹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸² “Who Mourns for Adonais,” *Star Trek*, videotape, directed by Marc Daniels (1967; Hollywood, CA: Paramount Studios videotape).

¹⁰⁸³ “The Apple,” *Star Trek*, videotape, directed by Joseph Pevney (1967; Hollywood, CA: Paramount Studios videotape).

“Russian-isms” are often played off for humor in the show, but they also make Russians in general seem uneducated, ignorant, and overly proud. If Chekov, someone who is so smart and well educated because of Starfleet Academy, still thinks that Russia is responsible for all of these things, then there is something wrong with the way Russians look at history. This could be a strategy to make Chekov a non-threatening character. If most Russian characters in film and television over the past decade had been inhuman and evil, presenting a Russian character who is naïve and silly would seem a good antidote to preconceived notions. However, this also plays into an older stereotype of Russian characters and communist characters as ignorant. In the mid-1950s, most Americans believed that “less educated and working-class people were more likely to be communists than the better-educated and white-collar people.”¹⁰⁸⁴ Thus, even though Chekov was created to be likeable, the creators still relied on certain tropes associated with Russians and communists. However, the fact that his Russian origins were never seen as a sign of evil or bad intentions was certainly indicative of a change in perceptions of Russians in the 1960s.

The Man from UNCLE was originally supposed to focus on CIA agent Napoleon Solo and his exploits working for the international UNCLE agency. However, Illya Kuryakin, a KGB agent who was originally a side character, unexpectedly seized the imaginations of viewers and “soon became the major icon of the program.”¹⁰⁸⁵

Kuryakin, played by Scottish actor David McCallum, became very popular amongst young female fans, much like Pavel Chekov. Another similarity Kuryakin had to Chekov was his comparison to a pop music star. McCallum’s good looks and the enigmatic persona he created for Illya Kuryakin earned him nicknames like “the blonde Beatle” or “the fifth Beatle,” comparing the hysteria surrounding him to the hysteria surrounding the British pop group.¹⁰⁸⁶ Kuryakin’s appeal “suggests popular renegotiations of previously rigid positions and assumptions with regard to orthodox

¹⁰⁸⁴ Survey quoted in: Hendershot, *Anti-Communism and Popular Culture*, p. 13.

¹⁰⁸⁵ Worland, “The Man From U.N.C.L.E. and TV Espionage in the 1960s,” p. 155.

¹⁰⁸⁶ Thomas M. Barrett, “The Undefined Agent, Illya Kuryakin: Making the Russian (in)Visible in the Man from U.N.C.L.E.,” in: edited by Michele Brittany, Robert G. Weiner and Trevor Sewell, 103-120: McFarland, 2014.

Cold War ideology.”¹⁰⁸⁷ And while the reception to his character was very similar to the reception of Chekov in *Star Trek*, the characters themselves were very different. Illya Kuryakin’s appeal lay in his mysterious and elusive air. McCallum’s approach to the character was to build a persona based on ambiguity and enigma in which he would often hide rather than reveal aspects of the agent’s backstory and personality. What is known about him is that he is a Soviet citizen of good standing rather than a defector. In the episode “The Neptune Affair” he even appears in the uniform of the Soviet Navy, suggesting a history in the military.¹⁰⁸⁸ Kuryakin’s mysterious and exotic character plays on many tropes of Russian characters from before the Cold War, like the brooding heroes of Dostoevsky’s novels. This “sexy and enigmatic” Russian spy soon became a heartthrob character, appealing to many female viewers.¹⁰⁸⁹

Additionally, Kuryakin was a good foil for his American partner, Napoleon Solo. While Solo’s outgoing, risk-taking personality is more like James Bond, Kuryakin is more intellectual, pessimistic, practical, and intense. This trope of the sexy and mysterious Russian is not a new one, and in fact was present in anti-communist popular culture of the 1950s. However, in those cases, it was often a sexy Russian woman who was trying to seduce a man to the side of communism.¹⁰⁹⁰ Kuryakin’s sex appeal can be seen as building upon that particular Russian character trope. In addition, his mysteriousness exoticizes him, which may have fed into viewers seeing him as not quite human. However, his heartthrob status also made him someone that women could desire and who men could want to be like. While he was not harmless the way Chekov was, he certainly was a far cry from the Russian and communist characters of the 1950s who were often portrayed as grotesque or evil.

The characters of Pavel Chekov in *Star Trek* and Illya Kuryakin in *The Man from UNCLE* are both Russians in mid-1960s television shows. They both appeal to young women because of the parallels drawn between them and pop stars and they both manage to overcome the negative stereotypes of Russian characters that ran rampant in

¹⁰⁸⁷ Worland, “The Man From U.N.C.L.E. and TV Espionage in the 1960s,” p.155.

¹⁰⁸⁸ “The Neptune Affair,” *The Man from U.N.C.L.E.*, videotape, directed by Vincent McEveety (1964; Hollywood CA).

¹⁰⁸⁹ Worland, “The Man From U.N.C.L.E. and TV Espionage in the 1960s,” p. 155.

¹⁰⁹⁰ Hendershot, *Anti-Communism and Popular Culture*, p. 14.

1950s popular culture. However, there is where their similarities end. Chekov is innocent and naïve, and therefore harmless, but Kuryakin is mysterious, exotic, and a deadly secret agent. Chekov's eagerness and youthfulness are played for laughs, while Kuryakin's taciturn character balances out his more excitable partner. This variety in popular Russian characters of the mid-1960s also says something interesting about the perceptions of Russians at that time. While these Russian characters can be diverse, if we compare the two major American characters from each of their shows, we find them to be eerily similar. Captain Jim Kirk from *Star Trek* and Napoleon Solo from *The Man from U.N.C.L.E.* are both somewhat reckless risk-takers whose optimism and charm get them through most tough situations. This trope of the American male hero is nothing new. The lone American leader with the burden of morality is a trope that is very entangled with American notions of masculinity.¹⁰⁹¹ While Russian characters grow and change in the 1960s, American characters stay relatively consistent. This can be broadened into the concept that American identity is constant during the Cold War because the United States was never in the wrong. The Soviets, on the other hand, have begun to realize the error of their ways and are changing, hence the greater thaw atmosphere and the more likeable portrayal of Russian characters.

The other interesting thing to note about both Pavel Chekov and Illya Kuryakin is that they were made popular largely by young female fans. Certainly both were loved for their sex appeal, but there is also something interesting about the intensity of their female fandoms. Female fans of science fiction and espionage shows in the 1960s would not have had many female characters to idolize and look up to. In *Star Trek* there was Uhura and *The Girl from UNCLE* ended up being a spinoff show starring a female lead. However, the people having the adventures and making the decisions were largely men. Additionally, the popular culture craze that surrounded musicians at the time, like the Beatles, certainly had an influence on young girls' infatuation with Chekov, Kuryakin, and other male characters. Women, as they were becoming more liberated from the gender expectations of the 1950s, might have felt that liking a Russian character was a small rebellion. Further, while men might have been threatened by

¹⁰⁹¹ Kenneth Mackinnon, *Representing Men: Maleness and Masculinity in the Media*, London: Arnold, 2003.

appealing and masculine Russian characters, women might not have been as threatened. The gendered aspect of these characters and their fans is certainly something that deserves further insight and research.

Conclusion

The memory of these two shows is still present in contemporary popular culture, just as the memory of the Cold War is. Both *Star Trek* and *The Man from UNCLE* have had modern reboots through film franchises in the twenty-first century. Both certainly pay homage to their origins, but they have also been updated. The nostalgia for the Cold War is still very much present in the United States today, and part of it can be seen in the revival of these Cold War shows. In terms of legacy, *Star Trek* and *UNCLE* switched places. While in the 1960s *Star Trek* had a core group of enthusiastic fans but was cancelled due to low viewership, *UNCLE* is cited as one of the most popular shows of the 1960s. However, in terms of legacy and influence in American popular culture, *Star Trek* is much more prominent and well known. In fact, until the release of the updated *Man from UNCLE* film, the fandom was relatively small and niche, with many people not really knowing anything about the show. This is indicative of the adaptability of the sci-fi genre, while spy-fi has in many ways struggled to stay relevant in the post Cold War world.

In the 1960s, however, the sci-fi and spy-fi genres were both particularly representative of Cold War themes and concerns. Sci-fi was an update on the western, while also dealing with nuclear fears and space travel. Espionage shows played on popular conceptions of spies and spoke to the growing connectedness of the globe. Within each of these genres, two representative television shows each featured a Russian character who was made popular by female fans. *Star Trek*'s Pavel Chekov and *The Man from UNCLE*'s Illya Kuryakin are both evidence that the changing geopolitical and cultural climate of 1960s America was changing the way people thought. These Russian characters were stunning departures from the Russian characters of 1950s popular culture. Instead of being evil, ugly, and stupid, Chekov and Kuryakin were likeable, relatable, and fought for the side of good, alongside Americans. The existence and

popularity of these two Russian characters in two shows that epitomize Cold War themes indicates a change in popular consciousness. Because of the greater thaw in political relations between the Soviet Union and the United States and because of the growing counterculture movement, these characters were not only possible to create, they were also possible to love.

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Chapter 6: Post Cold War dilemmas: transitions, realignments and new agendas

Mind the gap: Rebuilding the U.S. - Russian Space Bridge in the Post-Cold War Era¹⁰⁹²

Tinatin JAPARIDZE

“The enormous positive effect of [...] unofficial [citizen] diplomacy was demonstrated by famous Pozner-Donahue Space Bridges. Today, it remains the most efficient protective measure against returning to the Cold War mentality.”¹⁰⁹³



Oleg Burmistrov, Deputy Chief of Mission,
Embassy of the Russian Federation to the United States

Introduction: Return to Winter?

With Russian-American tensions escalating on the geopolitical scene, we are once again in dire need of regaining a basic understanding of the “other” by means of rebuilding the communication bridge that no longer connects the two former superpowers. A quarter of a century after the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union, a

¹⁰⁹² Photo material used in this research paper is a courtesy of Vladimir Pozner’s official website, <http://pozneronline.ru/category/video/staryj-televizor/telemosty/> Accessed on May 8, 2016.

¹⁰⁹³ Oleg Burmistrov, “U.S. and Russian Officials Stress the Importance of Citizen Diplomacy,” *Eurasia Foundation*, November 20, 2012, Web. Accessed on May 7, 2016.

cultural void persists. Although in the past several years, specifically since Vladimir Putin's re-election for the third term followed by the Ukraine Crisis and the annexation of Crimea, scholars on both sides have resumed debates on whether the turbulent U.S.-Russia relations are entering a new phase of a new Cold War. "U.S.-Russian relations are worse today than they have been in twenty years. The relationship includes almost as many serious conflicts as it did during the Cold War,"¹⁰⁹⁴ writes Stephen F. Cohen. Jack Matlock, the former United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union, disagrees. "We are not in the midst of a new Cold War, though both countries exhibit destructive hangovers of outmoded attitudes." Stressing the need for solutions, he continues, "[T]he problems will only get worse if there is no cooperation."¹⁰⁹⁵ Thus the need for communicative diplomacy grows.

Indeed, a "winter" has settled in. Vladimir Pozner, a Paris-born, New York-bred Russian journalist and TV personality, observes that today's turbulent relations between the two countries signals a return to a cold war winter, largely due to geopolitical and media-driven misinformation on both sides. Miscommunication and misunderstandings stemming from them, Pozner argues, are at the root of Russia's troubles with the U.S.: "I think the relationship is more dangerous than it was back then," he says. While during the cold war there was a "mutual fear" and "respect" between the two superpowers, at present, the relationship is largely based on "mutual scorn and contempt, with the U.S. having many more important priorities in the world than Russia," such as the Middle East and the global problem of terrorism. Pozner laments, "The gorilla [U.S.] is no longer afraid, nor does the gorilla respect the chimp [Russia], which makes the chimp extremely angry. And anger can lead to actions that are unpredictable, spontaneous, based on emotions rather than on serious thought." But ultimately, actions rather than mere emotions are causing a deeper split between the gorilla and the chimp, whereby anger leads to arguments, which in turn results in prolonged periods of sulking at best and severe political conflicts at worst.

¹⁰⁹⁴ Stephen F. Cohen, "The missing debate." *The Nation*, May 1, 2008. Web. Accessed on April 3, 2016.

¹⁰⁹⁵ Jack Matlock, "This Is Not a New Cold War." *Perspectives on Peace and Security*. Carnegie Organization, August 29, 2015. Web. Accessed on May 7, 2016.

Jim and Sally Meet Ivan and Anya

On January 16, 1984, President Ronald Reagan, who had memorably described the Soviet Union as the “Evil Empire,”¹⁰⁹⁶ addressed the American people with his policy of “credible deterrence and peaceful competition”¹⁰⁹⁷ to avoid a possible nuclear war with its Cold War opponent. He concluded by stressing the need to establish a common ground between the U.S. and the Soviets that would be portrayed through a hypothetical set of couples—Ivan and Anya and Jim and Sally. The American president wondered if the married couple would feel divided by the differences stemming from their “respective governments,” or manage to build a bridge through common interests and similarities against all odds: “[W]ould they find themselves comparing notes about their children and what each other did for a living?”¹⁰⁹⁸ President Reagan asked. “Above all,” he concluded hopefully, “they would have proven that people don't make wars.”¹⁰⁹⁹

Not coincidentally, Reagan's call for engagement with the communist country signaled America's newfound interest in reaching an accord with Moscow through a combination of “citizen diplomacy”¹¹⁰⁰ and the Soviet Union's foreign policy of “New Thinking” under the incoming pro-Western leader, Mikhail Gorbachev. Unlike his predecessors, Gorbachev held a deeply rooted “aversion” towards “use of force,”¹¹⁰¹ focusing instead on developing “approaches” that could end the “vicious [...] U.S.-Soviet rivalry.”¹¹⁰²

¹⁰⁹⁶ President Ronald Reagan, “President Reagan's ‘Evil Empire’ Speech to the National Association of Evangelicals,” *Making the History of 1989*, Item #64, <https://chnm.gmu.edu/1989/items/show/64> Accessed on May 7, 2016.

¹⁰⁹⁷ “Soviet-American Relations,” *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, vol. 20 (January, 1984): 41.

¹⁰⁹⁸ “Soviet-American Relations.”

¹⁰⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰⁰ The U.S. Center for Citizen Diplomacy defines “citizen diplomacy” as, “the engagement of individual citizens in programs and activities primarily in the voluntary, private sector that increase cross-cultural understanding and knowledge between people from different cultures and countries, leading to a greater mutual respect.” For more on citizen diplomacy, see: Ann Olsen, “Citizen Diplomacy: Building a Nation of Global Citizen Diplomats.” *Public Diplomacy Magazine*, February 8, 2012. Web. Accessed on May 8, 2016.

¹¹⁰¹ Vladislav Zubok, *A Failed Empire: the Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 319.

¹¹⁰² Ibid., 285.

Citizen Diplomacy and *Space Bridges*

Along with Gorbachev's policies of "New Thinking"¹¹⁰³ and *glasnost*¹¹⁰⁴ came a revised modus vivendi for the Cold War enemies. With a shift in geopolitical and socioeconomic climates, the renewed possibility of a rapprochement between the two rivals beyond politics started to infiltrate the Communist Party rhetoric



and consequently the Soviet psyche.¹¹⁰⁵ As the ban on "American viewpoints" was gradually being lifted, state-controlled communication services began to engage with the medium in hopes of "depriving foreign communicators of their assumed impact."¹¹⁰⁶ Indeed, foreign policy discourse gained sudden popularity on Soviet television with *Space Bridges: A Citizens' Summit*.

At the launch of the *glasnost*' campaign, celebrated Soviet journalist, Vladimir Pozner, was invited to co-host the series, *Space Bridges: A Citizens' Summit*¹¹⁰⁷ with his American counterpart, Phil Donahue. The choice of Donahue was not accidental, as he had been one of the pioneers of modern daytime talk-show format, placing particular emphasis on audience participation with a live "cross-talk" centered on prevalent social

¹¹⁰³ Gorbachev's "New Thinking," according to David Holloway, offered a new approach to international relations, whereby "human interests take precedence over the interests of any particular class; the world is becoming increasingly interdependent; there can be no victors in a nuclear war; security has to be based increasingly on political rather than military instruments; and security must be mutual, especially in the context of U.S.-Soviet relations." David Holloway, "Gorbachev's New Thinking," *Foreign Affairs* (Winter 1989): 66-81.

¹¹⁰⁴ Glasnost' ["Russian: openness"]: Soviet policy of open discussion of political and social issues. It was instituted by Mikhail Gorbachev in the late 1980s and began the democratization of the Soviet Union. Ultimately, fundamental changes to the political structure of the Soviet Union occurred: the power of the Communist Party was reduced, and multicandidate elections took place. Glasnost also permitted criticism of government officials and allowed the media freer dissemination of news and information. Encyclopædia Britannica Online, s. v. "glasnost," <http://www.britannica.com/topic/glasnost>. Web. Accessed on May 8, 2016.

¹¹⁰⁵ Tony Shaw and Denise J. Youngblood, *Cinematic Cold War: The American and Soviet Struggle for Hearts and Minds* (Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2010), 35, 171.

¹¹⁰⁶ Richard Gunter and Anthony Mughan, *Democracy and the Media: A Comparative Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 96.

¹¹⁰⁷ In American broadcasts [on CNBC], the *Space Bridges* were named *Citizens' Summits*. "Ordinary people debate on U.S.-Soviet TV link." *New York Times*, December 30, 1985. Web. Accessed on May 7, 2016.

issues.¹¹⁰⁸ Following his return to the USSR, Pozner was serving under the auspices of the Soviet state-controlled Gosteleradio¹¹⁰⁹, and was therefore the perfect candidate as a cultural “bridge” uniting the Soviet Union and the West. As one viewer would observe three decades later, “[Pozner] looked and behaved like an American and spoke Russian with an accent,” and so initially “some assumed he was an American who knew Russian and was sent to host the show from the U.S.” Yet the viewer added, “But suddenly he started to defend the Soviet system.”¹¹¹⁰ This immediately contradicted his Westernized image, conversely making him more “palatable” for internal Soviet consumption. The *Space Bridges* became an instant hit on Soviet television. “It was like a bomb exploding or [simultaneous] thunder and lightning out of a blue sky,” Pozner recalled years later.¹¹¹¹ However, unlike Soviet Russia where the viewership exceeded 180 million, few U.S. television companies showed interest in purchasing the program that attracted eight million across the country—just a fraction of Soviet ratings.¹¹¹²

While not always successful, the audiences on both sides of the “Iron Curtain” were encouraged to engage in a live “cross-talk,” conceived as a soft-power tool to break the ice and thus break down “cold war suspicions.”¹¹¹³ In the opening remarks of the very first *Space Bridge* broadcast in 1985, Donahue warned the studio audience in Leningrad (now St. Petersburg) about an innate “skepticism” harbored towards the Soviet people on the American side. Yet, he added, this would only be the case among the unenlightened. Although the unedited version of the broadcast that included limited opposition and “clashes” between the two opponents, they “virtually disappeared” in the final cut. Yet certain exchanges remained sharp, including those voiced by Donahue who was visibly more “dramatic” and “adversarial”¹¹¹⁴ than the average “Jim and Sally” in the studio.

¹¹⁰⁸ “Phil Donahue Biography,” *The Biography.com* website, *A&E Television Networks*, Web. Accessed on May 7, 2016.

¹¹⁰⁹ The governing body in charge of both Soviet television and radio broadcasting.

¹¹¹⁰ Oleg Sokolov, “The Pozner Paradox, Part I,” *YouTube*, June 15, 2013. Web. Accessed on May 7, 2016.

¹¹¹¹ John Thornhill, “Vladimir Pozner: the ‘face’ of Russia,” *Financial Times*, July 10, 2015. Web. Accessed on March 17, 2016.

¹¹¹² Vladimir Pozner, *Parting with Illusions* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1990).

¹¹¹³ “Ordinary people debate on U.S.-Soviet TV link,” *New York Times*, December 30, 1985.

¹¹¹⁴ Ellen P. Mickiewicz, *Split Signals: Television and Politics in the Soviet Union*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 47.

Stereotypes Playing in Mono

In “Identity and the Cold War,” Robert Jervis links identities to “stereotypes” that stem from “over-generalizations.”¹¹¹⁵ Understanding the “other” without trying to change the opponent’s consciousness, Michel Foucault observes, is problematic as it is not about “changing people’s consciousness—or what’s in their heads—but [instead it is about] the political, economic, institutional regime of the production of truth.”¹¹¹⁶ The assumptions and stereotypical images of the “other” are, often times, a direct (and inaccurate) by-product of the political climate orchestrated by the authorities and cultivated by their talking-heads. Jervis attributes stereotypical characteristics, including popular keywords such as “democracy,” “voluntarism,” and “individualism,” to the typical American identity that stems from a deeply rooted sense of *exceptionalism*.¹¹¹⁷ As for the principle Cold War-era characteristics, in turn, attributed to the Soviet identity from the other side, American diplomat, Cold Warrior and Russia expert, George Kennan in his milestone “The X Article” (formally known as “The Sources of Soviet Conduct”), suggests that these overgeneralizations are rooted in the “innate antagonism between Capitalism and Socialism.”¹¹¹⁸

These generalizations persisted through the Reagan era. “There was skepticism [about Russia] then, but there was also an immense curiosity towards Russia and the Russian people more specifically,”¹¹¹⁹ reminisces Sergei Zhuk, a Ukrainian-born American scholar who specializes in the social, cultural, and intellectual history of the USSR. This skepticism, Zhuk argues, was ignited by both curiosity and deeply rooted suspicion of Soviet “aliens” seen as “different species” altogether. In the live feed from the Soviet Union, Donahue proclaimed, “Not a few Americans believe that you are not really able to speak from your soul for fear of reprisal from Soviet Government authority” He continued, “There are even some people in this country who feel that you will all serve as mouthpieces for the official party line because to do otherwise might earn you a visit

¹¹¹⁵ Robert Jervis, “Identity and the Cold War.” In: Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, eds., *The Cambridge History of the Cold War* (The Cambridge History of the Cold War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 22-43.

¹¹¹⁶ Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972–1977* (London: Harvester Press, 1980), 133.

¹¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 23.

¹¹¹⁸ George Kennan, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct.” *Foreign Affairs* 26, N° 2 (1947): 566-82.

¹¹¹⁹ Sergei Zhuk, interview by author, April 12, 2016.

to a psychiatric hospital or perhaps a prison.”¹¹²⁰ The stereotype of a typical Soviet man or woman as a “mouthpiece” of the KGB machine was still vibrant in the American imagination, and to this day remains a constant stereotypical characteristic of a true “Russian” in the American consciousness. Both the “American” and “Russian” had enduring Cold War stereotypes.

Indeed, from the 1940s the father of Cold War containment constructed these stereotypes that helped form the nucleus of foreign policy. Kennan’s prognosis about the intricacies of dealing with the Russians—an issue that remains problematic in the U.S.-Russian relations—can be partially attributed to a severe lack of insight into the Russian psyche and Soviet mentality in general, primarily stemming from stereotypical cultural, sociological and geopolitical observations made from the outside looking in. After all, the American observer perceives himself to be the Chosen One, whose mission as a proud citizen of the country waving a flag of exceptionalism is to convert the “other” to the universal answer that lies in Capitalism. This perception was further reiterated by Kennan in his speech on “Russia and the United States” delivered at the Annual Student-Faculty Banquet of the Russian Institute at Columbia University on May 27, 1950:

“[T]his heightened concern with the question of who among us is and who is not ‘a communist’ rests of course on the feeling that present with us in this world is something dreadful and unspeakable [...], incurable and incorrigible, which is not only hostile to us but is hopelessly committed to that hostility. [...] But if these assumptions [...] are dangerous to our understanding of the communist movement itself, how much more so [are they dangerous] when it comes to our understanding of the Russian people. [...] For experiences of the Russian people [...] will be found [...] to have considerable relevance to the things which we in this country are now experiencing, and are yet to experience.”¹¹²¹

The internal contradiction lies in both Kennan’s Columbia address and the iconic “The Sources of Soviet Conduct”¹¹²² where he uses the terms “Russian” and “Soviet” interchangeably, thus ignoring the various ethnic layers embedded in the

¹¹²⁰ John Corry, “TV: A Soviet-Donahue ‘Summit,’” *New York Times*, January 4, 1986. Web. Accessed on April 24, 2016.

¹¹²¹ George Kennan, “Russia and the United States,” speech delivered at the Annual Student-Faculty Banquet, Russian Institute, Columbia University, New York, May 27, 1950. Print.

¹¹²² Kennan, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct.”

overgeneralized understanding of who is, in fact, a “Soviet” man. Literary icon and Soviet historian, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, believes these seemingly unintentional tendencies to be highly dangerous. “‘Russia’ is to the Soviet Union as a man is to the disease afflicting him,” he writes. “We do not, after all, confuse a man with his illness; we do not refer to him by the name of that illness and curse him for it.”¹¹²³

Additionally, Solzhenitsyn draws specific attention to the common faux pas of the West that “assume[s] an indissoluble link between the universal disease of Communism and the country where it first seized control.”¹¹²⁴ In today’s geopolitical world, the West continues to assume an indissoluble link between the Soviet disease of Communism and post-Soviet society of Putin’s Russia.

Kennan’s early Cold War trope lasted through the 1980s, to the chagrin of both television newsmen. In *Space Bridges*, Phil Donahue, on his part, highlighted the presence of this Soviet “disease of communism” in the Western media. “Much of the reporting about your country in the West does have a Western spin,” he stated. He noted that an average American viewer does not get “as much varied information about you as we should.”¹¹²⁵ Donahue’s Soviet counterpart, Vladimir Pozner, in his impeccable *Amerikanskiy Angliiskiy*¹¹²⁶ remarked: “We are in fact different [and] [u]nderstanding this is the first step [forward].”¹¹²⁷

[American] Women to [Soviet] Women

One year after its premiere, *Space Bridges* facilitated first-ever live television contact between American and Soviet women in Boston and Leningrad, entitled “Women to Women.” In June of 1986, two hundred American and two hundred Soviet women gathered in television studios in their respective countries and communicated through an

¹¹²³ Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, “Misconceptions about Russia Are a Threat to America,” *Foreign Affairs* 58 (Spring 1980): 797-834.

¹¹²⁴ Solzhenitsyn, “Misconceptions about Russia Are a Threat to America.”

¹¹²⁵ Corry, “TV: A Soviet-Donahue ‘Summit.’”

¹¹²⁶ Russian: American English

¹¹²⁷ “Ordinary people debate on U.S.-Soviet TV link,” *New York Times*, December 30, 1985. Web. Accessed on March 25, 2016.

interactive video exchange. Yet, even more, significant was the platform that facilitated an unprecedented woman-to-woman discussion during the time when there were hardly any other opportunities for a similar interaction.¹¹²⁸ One of the participants on the American side asked her Soviet counterpart, “May we see what’s in your purses?”

Donahue reminisced years later, “[T]hey all opened their purses and there were the same things [inside]. [We were] beginning to see ourselves in others.” He added, however, that he was surprised to learn that “the Russian people were more curious about Americans than we were about them.”¹¹²⁹ The satellite cross-talk involved controversial and provocative issues affecting the Soviets—all the more so than the American side, thus “transforming the Soviet public’s image of itself.”¹¹³⁰

Though not fully reciprocated on both sides, curiosity about the Cold War opponent was a step towards mutual understanding. It had the potential to culminate in an idealistically tilted “peaceful coexistence” beyond meticulously-crafted political statements that could rarely be applied to the real world inhabited by real people, not just cleverly scripted talking-heads on political programs.

Soft power practiced through citizen diplomacy shaped social and psychological factors that accelerated internal changes within the Soviet society. But as with all forms of power, soft power¹¹³¹ undoubtedly has its limits and ramifications. The cultural products conceived and constructed to facilitate contact and create a common ground for communication between the Soviets and the Americans during the Cold War period appear to have vanished with the dissolution of the former perception of the “other” as the “enemy.”

¹¹²⁸ Alexander Gasyuk, “Phil Donahue: ‘We reached out instead of lashed out,’” *Russia Beyond the Headlines*, Web. December 6, 2012. Web. Accessed on March 24, 2016.

¹¹²⁹ Gasyuk, “Phil Donahue: ‘We reached out instead of lashed out.’”

¹¹³⁰ Philip Seib, *Toward a New Public Diplomacy: Redirecting U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan Series, 2009), p. 70.

¹¹³¹ Joseph Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), p. 15-16.

Missing Piece of the Puzzle

Today, we witness the rebirth “us” vs. “them” narratives in both U.S. and post-Soviet Russian media and cultural products of the post-Cold War era. Amid the void of communication, the very lack of soft-power facilitators such as *Space Bridges: A Citizens’ Summit* between the two opponents across the geopolitical spectrum may be the partial cause of skepticism and stereotypes that inevitably stem from overgeneralizations.¹¹³² The result is a reemergence of “in-group/out-group” clusters that have resurfaced in modern mass media, along with debates about the return to “winter.” While in his 1987 interview with Richard Heffner on *The Open Mind*, Vladimir Pozner noted that “the number of Soviet people hearing Americans [on radio and television] is probably greater than the number of Americans hearing Soviets.”¹¹³³ This is no longer the case in Putin’s Russia. “We have a very strange situation in today’s geopolitical world,” says Sergei Zhuk. “Americans are ready [for dialogue] whereas Russians, this time around, are not.”¹¹³⁴

The producers of the original *Space Bridge* series were criticized in a Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) report for their “incomplete” theory, which assumed that “all that is needed to improve [tumultuous] international relations” is for nations to simply become friendly.¹¹³⁵ Instead of merely applauding the “desire” for friendship among peoples, the CSCE report underlined the overriding importance of true “mutual understanding” that can only be achieved by engaging in “honest dialogue” on dividing issues and inviting well-informed representatives to participate in discussions beyond generic nods of friendliness. Although hardly perfect and clearly limited in its abilities, returning to the very basics of citizen diplomacy is a vital piece that is missing from the complex puzzle of diplomacy. “It would be just one of the platforms for resuming communication, but the *Space Bridges* could serve as a crucial symbolic element for creating a common bond,” says Sergei Zhuk, “not only among

¹¹³² Jervis, “Identity and the Cold War.”

¹¹³³ Vladimir Pozner, “The Pozner Paradox, Part I,” *YouTube*, aired in 1987, June 15, 2013. Web. Accessed on May 7, 2016.

¹¹³⁴ Zhuk, interview by author.

¹¹³⁵ “Joint Statement Protesting the Audience Selection for the Phil Donahue ‘Citizens’ Summit’ Show,” *Soviet Exchanges Citizens’ Summit, 1985-1986, Publicity*, CSCE Report, December 27, 1985, Hoover Institution, Stanford, California, 94305-6010-USA.

Americans and Russians, but also involving all of the former Soviet states and representatives of different religious faiths and backgrounds.” Indeed, a collective bond—though temporary in its previous incarnation—has likely vanished in transition, along with a mutual understanding that has, yet again, been lost in translation.

In the closing remarks of the first *Space Bridge* between Leningrad and Seattle, Phil Donahue asked his Soviet counterpart to share his honest feelings about the dialogue that had just taken place between the two rivaling nations. “I don’t want to sound flippant,” Pozner started, “but in the musical *My Fair Lady* there is a refrain when Higgins is amazed at Eliza and says, ‘Why can’t a woman be more like a man?’ [...] Sometimes we are asking each other why aren’t we more like each other, why don’t you act the same way as we do?” He went on, “Today, I think that if we’ve at least understood this on both sides—that we are, in fact, different, that each of us has his own viewpoints and it is worth something, this will be a first step—be it a trembling one—towards understanding.”¹¹³⁶

Communism has fallen, the Iron Curtain has been successfully demolished, ideological contradictions can no longer be blamed for positive intent lost in translation and transition, but the misunderstandings persist. The reluctance to understand—let alone accept—the other side of the argument continues to dominate U.S.-Russian relations in the new post-Cold War world. In Vladimir Pozner’s words, it is only after we agree to *try* to understand the opponent that we can wholeheartedly claim that we are “no longer afraid of each other,” devoid of all forms of paranoia, and are able to finally engage in “normal conversation.”¹¹³⁷ Alas, for the time being, the prolonged state of post-winter coolness continues to permeate the hearts and minds of citizens on either side of the former Iron Curtain. In light of the increasingly strenuous relations between the two global actors, it is time for *Space Bridges 2016* as a vital communication platform that has the potential to help resume dialogue to start rebuilding the human-to-human bridge through citizen diplomacy beyond politics.

¹¹³⁶ Vladimir Pozner, “Spacebridge - “Citizens Summit” – Leningrad-Seattle – 1985,” *YouTube*, aired in 1985, April 12, 2013. Web. Accessed on June 10, 2016.

¹¹³⁷ Pozner, “Spacebridge - “Citizens Summit” – Leningrad-Seattle – 1985.”

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Hybrid Regimes: Stuck in Transition or Fully-Fledged Regimes? A comparative study with special reference to Russia and Iran

Matteo DE SIMONE

Introduction

Over the last two decades, an unprecedented trend toward democratization has taken place all across the globe. In a relatively short time span, military dictatorships and authoritarian regimes have collapsed in Latin America, Southern Europe, sub-Saharan Africa and the former Communist bloc. Nearly the totality of the new regimes adopted the institutional formulas of western democracies, with multiparty elections being the trademark. Unfortunately, the ensuing democratic optimism over a possible “end of history”,¹¹³⁸ brought about by the seemingly unchallenged supremacy of liberal democracy, was soon thwarted by the empirical observation of a much different reality. In fact, only some of the countries that embarked on a transition away from authoritarianism consolidated into stable liberal democracies. The majority of them did not follow suit and as of today, not only are these regimes not democratic, but they are no longer even “in transition” to democracy. Nor did they remain purely authoritarian (with some notable exceptions, such as China): most of them truly underwent a regime change, whose trajectory, did not lead them to liberal democracy, but rather to mixed forms of political configurations in which formal democratic institutions coexist with substantial authoritarian practices.¹¹³⁹

Comparative democratization studies only recently started to take seriously the theoretical empirical and normative problems raised by the proliferation of hybrid

¹¹³⁸ Francis Fukuyama. *The End Of History And The Last Man*. New York: Free Press. 1992.

¹¹³⁹ Larry Diamond. 2002. “Thinking About Hybrid Regimes.” *Journal of Democracy* 13 (2): 21-35.

Andreas Schedler (ed.), 2006. *Electoral Authoritarianism. The Dynamics of Unfree Competition*. London: Lynne Rienner.

Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way. 2010. *Competitive Authoritarianism. Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

political regimes. More particularly, the literature that has emerged since the early 2000s has focused on the question of how to conceptualize these regimes: are they stuck in a transitional “limbo” or have they rather consolidated their political systems, albeit not in the way hoped for by the democracy-promoters? And what consequences does this have for the stability of the regime? The present paper tries to address these questions by reviewing the existing literature and attempting a classification. It will further formulate a theory with regard to the role of contestation as a pivotal concept for the regime’s stability. The analysis will be concluded with the introduction of two case studies: Russia and Iran.

The transition paradigm and the illusion of dynamicity

Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, in their seminal work in 1986, were already warning about the uncertain outcome of transition, which could easily lead to hybrid forms that they labeled as *democradura* and *dictablanda*.¹¹⁴⁰ Yet much of the transition literature that followed has been flawed by a “democratization bias,” whereby regimes breaking away from authoritarianism were seen as necessarily heading towards democracy. As a consequence, their political situation is analyzed in terms of their movement toward or away from it.¹¹⁴¹ This bias has led analysts to overstretch the concepts of “transition” and “consolidation,” encompassing cases where no real move towards democracy can be observed, such as in Russia, Congo or Cambodia. Indeed, adjectives such as “flawed,” “protracted,” “unfinished” or “stuck” transitions reveal the inadequacy of this interpretative lens. Through the empirical test, only a minority of the so-called “third wave countries” became fully-fledged democracies, while the majority entered the grey zone of hybrid regimes. Expectations about their democratic consolidation, which seem to be implied in the terminology of the “transition paradigm” appear to be mere wishful thinking, as “the assumption that hybrid regimes are (or should be) moving in a democratic direction lacks empirical foundation”.¹¹⁴²

¹¹⁴⁰ Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter. 1986. *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, p. 9.

¹¹⁴¹ Thomas Carothers, 2002. “The End of the Transition Paradigm.” *Journal of Democracy* 13(1): 5- 21.

¹¹⁴² Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way. 2010. *Competitive Authoritarianism. Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War*. New York: Cambridge University Press, p. 4.

This “dynamicity illusion” is dictated by the erroneous belief that the way from authoritarianism to democracy is a linear, mono-dimensional path. The variety of outcomes witnessed in the last two decades, however, have sufficiently demonstrated that most of the current hybrid regimes constitute “alternative directions, not way stations to liberal democracy”.¹¹⁴³ It is therefore not a mere matter of “moving forward,” or “backward”. Still, Larry Diamond, in one of his contributions on democratic consolidation, seems to maintain that this is the case when arguing that “if the shallow, troubled, and recently established democracies of the world do not move forward [...] they are likely to move backward”.¹¹⁴⁴ Yet the persistence of some hybrid regimes for nearly two decades has shown that they can have some stability as they are, reaching a “dysfunctional equilibrium”¹¹⁴⁵ which may be long-lasting. Hybrid regimes are here to stay.

Another crucial flaw highlighted by Carothers is the excessive reliance on electoral processes as “generators” of democracy. As mentioned above, most hybrid regimes, even those with the strongest authoritarian flavor, possess some formal characteristics of democratic elections. Elections, in fact, “are a necessary but not sufficient characteristic of democracy”.¹¹⁴⁶ First of all, in order to be meaningful, elections need to be free and fair: competition for public office must be real and there must be a reasonable level of “uncertainty of outcome”.¹¹⁴⁷ This means that the number of candidates must exceed the number of posts, that they must exhibit significantly different programmatic positions, and that no arbitrary disqualifications shall be posited by electoral rules. The voting process shall be secret, transparent and free, without pressures on voters nor relevant frauds. Regimes that do not fulfill these criteria, regardless of the formal setup of multiparty elections that they may display, violate the minimal democratic “rules of the game” to such an extent that defining them as democracies, no matter how “flawed,” “virtual” or “unconsolidated,” is plainly misleading.

¹¹⁴³ Carothers. *Op. cit.*, p. 14

¹¹⁴⁴ Larry Diamond. 1999. *Developing Democracy. Toward Consolidation*. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, p. 64.

¹¹⁴⁵ Carothers. *Op. cit.*, p. 13.

¹¹⁴⁶ Schedler, “Elections Without Democracy. The Menu of Manipulation”, *Op. cit.*, p. 37.

¹¹⁴⁷ Adam Przeworski. 1991. *Democracy and the market: Political and economic reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Free and fair elections, however, are not sufficient, as some cases like Mexico, Moldova, Venezuela, Honduras, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Nepal, Bangladesh and others seem to show. As highlighted by Larry Diamond, the debate on hybrid regimes brings back to the table the never-completely-settled debate about what democracy actually is.¹¹⁴⁸ By looking at these countries' political systems, we can spot the pitfalls of a minimalist, procedural, "Schumpeterian" definition of democracy that only focuses on the electoral process. For a democracy to be liberal, in fact, the protection of civil liberties, fundamental rights, media pluralism and the rule of law are of vital importance. Focusing on the electoral processes alone, without adopting a broader definition of democracy, results in an inflated use of the democratic label which, although not totally misplaced, still misleadingly puts liberal and illiberal democracies on an equal foot.

A matter of kind or degree?

Defining univocally regime types is highly controversial since, to a certain extent, all regimes are hybrid and boundaries "are idealizations that admit varying degrees of realization in actual political practice".¹¹⁴⁹ This is precisely what Robert Dahl implied when he introduced the distinction between democracy as an "ideal-type" and its real existing approximation, the "polyarchy".¹¹⁵⁰ Hence, hybrid regimes constitute a heterogeneous category that can be conceptualized by referring to the similarities with the closer extreme ideal types (democracy or authoritarianism), without for this renouncing to its conceptual independence, nor its multi-dimensionality. Hybrid regime "is not an exceptional category ... it is a state of normality for many societies".¹¹⁵¹

One common characteristic of virtually all these regimes is that they try to portray themselves as democratic. International pressure has played a large role in establishing democracy as the only legitimate game in town. Yet if more regimes than ever before are shaping themselves into the form of democracy, most of them fail to meet the

¹¹⁴⁸ Diamond, "Thinking About Hybrid Regimes", op. cit.

¹¹⁴⁹ Schedler, "Elections Without Democracy. The Menu of Manipulation", op. cit., p. 38.

¹¹⁵⁰ Robert Dahl .1971. *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

¹¹⁵¹ Carothers, "The End of the Transition Paradigm", op. cit., p. 18.

substantive test. Following Linz's early mapping of regime types (published originally in 1975), where he makes a reference to "pseudo-multiparty systems",¹¹⁵² we can generally label these regimes as *pseudodemocratic*, "in that the existence of formally democratic political institutions, such as multiparty electoral competition, masks (often, in part, to legitimate) the reality of authoritarian domination"¹¹⁵³. This dissonance posits the following question: are the differences between these mixed forms of regime and liberal democracies a matter of degree or kind? Are they simply less democratic, or something completely different?

An attempted classification

The ambiguous, shaky nature of hybrid regimes has favored the proliferation of labels and categories among scholars of democratization. Semi-democracy, delegative, electoral or limited democracy, competitive, electoral, soft or liberalized authoritarianism, together with Freedom House's "partly free" are just some examples. Yet not all of these regimes share the same features, and a rough classification is both possible and necessary. Schedler divides hybrid regimes into defective democracies, new authoritarianisms and hybrid regimes *strictosensu*.¹¹⁵⁴

Although this latter category seems to be merely residual, the division between what we may call "democracies with adjectives"¹¹⁵⁵ and new authoritarianisms is helpful. Under the former label, we can put those regimes that fulfill the minimum requirement for electoral democracies, namely free and fair elections, but lack essential attributes of liberal democracies. The adjective usually refers to the particular flaw, such as delegative,¹¹⁵⁶ illiberal,¹¹⁵⁷ or clientelist.¹¹⁵⁸ To this category belong also O'Donnell and

¹¹⁵² Juan J. Linz. *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000, p. 60.

¹¹⁵³ Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset, (eds.) 1989. *Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, p. xviii

¹¹⁵⁴ Schedler, *Electoral Authoritarianism*, *op. cit.*

¹¹⁵⁵ David Collier and Steven Levitsky. 1997. "Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research." *World Politics* 49(3): pp. 430-451.

¹¹⁵⁶ Guillermo O'Donnell. "Delegative Democracy." *Journal of Democracy* 5 (1): 1994, pp. 55-69.

¹¹⁵⁷ Fareed Zakaria. *The future of democracy: Illiberal democracy at home and abroad*. New York: WW Norton, 2003.

¹¹⁵⁸ Herbert Kitschelt. "Linkages between citizens and politicians in democratic polities." *Comparative Political Studies* 33(6-7), 2000, pp. 845-879.

Schmitter's *democradura*,¹¹⁵⁹ as well as Carothers' "feckless pluralism".¹¹⁶⁰ In spite of these shortcomings, these regimes can still be defined as electoral democracies, and the distance from their liberal counterparts is in fact a matter of degree in terms of Quality of Democracy.

A different case is that of "new authoritarianisms", where the democratic façade is a mere deception. This category encompasses disguised dictatorships,¹¹⁶¹ *dictablandas*¹¹⁶², dominant-power politics,¹¹⁶³ competitive authoritarianisms¹¹⁶⁴ and electoral authoritarianisms.¹¹⁶⁵ These regimes "play the game of multiparty elections by holding regular elections for the chief executive and a national legislative assembly. Yet they violate the liberal-democratic principles of freedom and fairness so profoundly and systematically that they render elections instruments of authoritarian rule rather than 'instruments of democracy'".¹¹⁶⁶ They are nevertheless markedly different from the classic authoritarianism, where "no viable channels exist for opposition to contest legally for executive power",¹¹⁶⁷ such as in Saudi Arabia, China or the former Soviet Union. On the contrary, here elections take place with some minimal degree of contestation and some limited forms of pluralism. Unlike classic oligarchic regimes, they endorse universal suffrage and mass participation, and unlike monarchies, the head of state or government (or both) are subject to electoral confirmation. "Rather than 'partial,' 'incomplete' or 'unconsolidated' democracies, these cases should be conceptualized for what they are: a distinct, nondemocratic regime type".¹¹⁶⁸

Among the most successful typologies for this latter category there are Schedler's "electoral authoritarianism" and Levitsky and Way's "competitive authoritarianisms". These concepts are utterly similar and can be employed almost interchangeably,

¹¹⁵⁹ O'Donnell and Schmitter. *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*, op. cit.

¹¹⁶⁰ Carothers, op. cit.

¹¹⁶¹ Paul Brooker, 2000. *Non-democratic Regimes: Theory, Government and Politics*. St. Martin's Press

¹¹⁶² O'Donnell and Schmitter. *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*, op. cit.

¹¹⁶³ Carothers, op. cit.

¹¹⁶⁴ Levitsky and Way, op. cit.

¹¹⁶⁵ Schedler. *Electoral Authoritarianism. The Dynamics of Unfree Competition*, op. cit.

¹¹⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 3.

¹¹⁶⁷ Levitsky and Way, op. cit., p. 7.

¹¹⁶⁸ Lewitsky and Way, op. cit., p. 4.

although a difference in degree does exist in terms of level of contestation. As detected by Diamond, in competitive authoritarian regimes authoritarian rulers are insecure, while in “hegemonic” electoral regimes they are invincible. The following pages will be dedicated to the analysis of “electoral authoritarianisms,” whereby Schedler’s term is used as a general category for those authoritarian regimes in which elections present some form of contestation of any degree.

The gown does not make the friar

One thing is to draw theoretic typologies; another is to empirically categorize political regimes. For electoral authoritarianisms, scholarly consensus is usually difficult to reach, given the dissonance between the declared and the actual nature of the regime. They promulgate constitutions, organize elections, set up parliaments, courts, local governments and supervisory authorities. They even allow private media and some degree of civic society organisms. None of these institutions, however, are designed to serve as counterbalancing mechanisms to governmental power. Although they portray a liberal-democratic landscape, their contribution to the rule of law and accountability (both vertical and horizontal) is fictive.

While outspoken supporters will praise their political system as “democratic,” or at least as “in transition to democracy,” or even pursuing “its own form of democracy,” the reality, especially as seen from the point of view of the opposition, may be extremely different. The incumbent rulers may even be so skilled in their manipulation of the channels of access to power that the illusion of a multiparty system may be even credible and subject to only minor criticism. In this case, the continuous defeat and marginalization of the opposition forces is usually justified as an exogenous consequence of the opposition’s incapacity or the genuine preference of the population for the incumbent party. Of course, it may well be the case that the opposition is actually ravaged by internal strife, organizational weakness and an incapacity to reach the wider electorate, but this condition of inferiority in this sort of regime has to be seen rather as a *consequence*, and not as a *cause* of the opposition’s exclusion from political power. In fact, in order to present themselves as committed to multipartism,

oppositional forces are usually granted some representation in the legislative arena, although their participation in decision-making is usually voided by the solid majority of the ruling party or by the marginalization of the legislative organ, as such in favor of the strong role of the executive. It is then clear to what extent “the main methodological difficulty in identifying electoral authoritarian regimes lies in the obstacles that they establish to the *visibility* of their manipulative practices”,¹¹⁶⁹ thus compelling the analysis to operate a distinction between form and substance, between institutional approach and more actor-based ones, such as resource mobilization, power networks, political culture and informal practices.

Another difficulty is dictated by the imperfect information we possess on citizens’ opinion formation. Authoritarian practices, in fact, affect not only the way in which citizens’ preferences are expressed (through manipulation of elections, unfair electoral laws, gerrymandering, exclusion of some parties from entering the competition, etc.) but also the way in which opinions are *formed* (through control of the media, monopoly of economic resources, patronage networks and pork-barrel spending, etc.). In this context, even a methodology based on opinion-surveys would not shed light on the dilemma as to what extent citizens’ preferences are formed independently from the authoritarian context. Levitsky and Way, for instance, argue that in a “competitive authoritarian” regime, voting results are manipulated but not subject to massive fraud, therefore making the act of voting not completely useless¹¹⁷⁰. If this is the case, electoral manipulation – although existent – would then amount only to a small share of the overall cast votes. For a relatively small percentage of votes to successfully determine the electoral outcome and a sufficient margin to secure the lead to the regime, the electoral outcome must be already sufficiently skewed in favor of the incumbent (or at least not excessively unfavorable to it) prior to the manipulation. This is compatible with the idea that the regime’s electoral manipulation starts already at the moment of opinion creation, and not simply at the time of voting.

¹¹⁶⁹ Schedler, *Electoral Authoritarianism. The Dynamics of Unfree Competition*, op. cit., p. 7.

¹¹⁷⁰ Levitsky and Way, op. cit., p. 8.

Contestation

From a historical perspective, the authoritarian use of elections is nothing new.¹¹⁷¹ Elections were and are performed even in obvious authoritarian regimes, such as in the former communist regimes of Eastern Europe, most of the former military juntas in Latin America, Belarus, Turkmenistan, China, North Korea, Congo, Sudan and more recently in Syria, Myanmar, and others. Yet their degree of contestation is equal to zero, as the control of public authority over the result is nearly complete. In electoral authoritarian regimes, however, “official election results are the combined outcome of two unknown and unobservable variables – popular preferences and authoritarian manipulation”.¹¹⁷² “Competition is thus real but unfair”.¹¹⁷³

Manipulation of elections can take many forms, including discriminatory rules, control over the media and financing sources, restriction to public meetings and demonstrations, corruption and patronage, establishment of mock parties and formal and informal pressure on voters, until outright repression, coercion and electoral fraud. Elections represent therefore a central arena of struggle, but it is not their final outcome that is at stake, but rather the process, which takes the form of “fluid, adaptive, contested games whose basic rules players try to redefine as they play the game itself”.¹¹⁷⁴

Albeit unfair, the intent of authoritarian leaders in allowing electoral competition is to obtain popular (and external) legitimation for the regime, reinforcing the validity of its claims to power by creating a fictional national unity. “Their dream is to reap the fruits of electoral legitimacy without running the risks of democratic uncertainty”¹¹⁷⁵. However, elections are an ambivalent tool: the more the regime is hybrid, the more they assume importance as a “critical juncture” in the regimes’ dynamic of stability and change. If they can demonstrate the popularity of the authoritarian rulers, they at the same time create an opportunity structure for opposition forces to present alternative views and unmask the democratic façade of the political process.

¹¹⁷¹ Diamond, “Thinking About Hybrid Regimes”, op. cit., p. 22; Schedler, *Electoral Authoritarianism. The Dynamics of Unfree Competition*, op. cit., p. 1.

¹¹⁷² Ibid. p. 1-2.

¹¹⁷³ Levitsky and Way, op. cit., p. 5.

¹¹⁷⁴ Schedler, *Electoral Authoritarianism. The Dynamics of Unfree Competition*, op. cit., p. 12.

¹¹⁷⁵ Schedler, “Elections Without Democracy. The Menu of Manipulation”, op. cit., p. 37.

The “dysfunctional equilibrium” of electoral authoritarian regimes can hence be broken, since these regimes, no matter how deeply institutionalized, never fully consolidate. It is their very nature, characterized by a mismatch between norms and behavior (both necessary for consolidation to happen, according to Diamond),¹¹⁷⁶ that prevents it. Elections can therefore also work as a destabilizing element if the authoritarian polity becomes too “competitive.” In this situation, the regime has two options: counterattack and increase repressive measures or work to gain real consensus. Although this usually takes the tone of reckless populism and remains highly skewed in terms of advantaged over the opponents, it is still a step into the antechamber of democracy.

Case studies

The two cases, Russia and Iran, are both situated on the rather “authoritarian edge” of hybrid regimes. Although Russia’s hybrid nature is relatively undisputed,¹¹⁷⁷ the literature is more reticent on Iran. Levitsky and Way exclude the Islamic Republic from their analysis of “competitive authoritarian” regimes, since they consider the Iranian case to fall under a different type of hybrid regime type, namely “tutelary regime,” a polity where “elections are competitive but the power of elected governments is constrained by nonelected religious ... authorities”.¹¹⁷⁸ However, this classification is based on the forms of exercise of power rather on the mechanisms of access to it. While the two dimensions cross-influence each other, it is to be stressed that the defining characteristics, alongside which electoral or competitive authoritarian regimes are defined, pertains chiefly to the processes of access to power (electoral, multiparty façade). If it is true that in Iran the religious “supreme leader” acts as a non-elected tutelary power, then it can hardly be claimed on the other hand that electoral competition for offices is genuine. Electoral manipulation, repression of opposition and freedom of expression, as well as candidates vetting, contribute to the balance of the

¹¹⁷⁶ Diamond. 1999. *Developing Democracy. Toward Consolidation*, op. cit.

¹¹⁷⁷ Richard Sakwa. 2010. “The Dual State in Russia.” *Post-Soviet Affairs* 26 (3): 185-206; Levitsky and Way. *Competitive Authoritarianism. Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War*, op. cit.; Schedler. *Electoral Authoritarianism. The Dynamics of Unfree Competition*, op. cit.; Diamond, Larry. 2002. “Thinking About Hybrid Regimes”, op. cit.; Liliia Fedorovna Shevtsova, and Mark H. Eckert. 2001. “Russia’s hybrid regime.” *Journal of Democracy* 12 (4), pp. 65-70.

¹¹⁷⁸ Levitsky and Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism. Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War*, p. 14.

electoral process tilting in favor of the incumbent executive. Taking this crucial element as our case selection criteria, it becomes clear that the Iranian case is well-suited for comparison with Russia.

Russia

Russia was considered for a long time to be a “country in transition”, and sometimes it still is.¹¹⁷⁹ It has however become clear, especially since the 2012 elections that “reinstated” Vladimir Putin as president of the Federation that Russia is not heading towards liberal democracy. On the contrary, its transition had led to an electoral authoritarian regime, which found its ideological formulation (or rather justification) in Vladislav Surkov’s idea of “sovereign democracy” (*суверенная демократия*). With this catchphrase, the Kremlin intends to make the point that the Russian Federation is indeed a democracy, just not a liberal, western one. In reaction to what it perceives as intrusive western (especially American) pressure, and in line with its anti-unipolar foreign policy, Russian leaders are eager to reaffirm their autonomy in handling the country’s political course, both at the level of principles and in political practice. This “sovereignty” translates into an exclusive and all-encompassing right of the government to supervise the definition of its institutional forms and political procedures, a monopoly over collective memory, political decisions, economic priorities and a strong grip over civil society, deemed necessary in order to ensure stability and, through national cohesion, strength. In a society where – after the chaotic years of Yeltsin’s presidency – order and stability are perceived as far more important principles than democracy, a strong leader and a strong state still remain the main legitimizing elements of Putinism and his preservation of a centralized, hierarchic and personalized institutional setting¹¹⁸⁰.

The concept of “sovereign democracy” betrays the hybrid nature of the Russian regime, as well as its ambivalent relation with the west, primarily with the European Union. In its external relations, Russia punctually subscribes to the declarations of the Council of Europe and sees the west as one of its main points of cultural references. At the same

¹¹⁷⁹ For instance, McFaul (1999) talks about a “protracted transition”.

¹¹⁸⁰ Paolo Calzini. 2007. “Democrazia e sovranità nella Russia di Putin.” *Relazioni Internazionali* 66, pp. 66-75.

time, the contacts with the west are relegated to economic-technological issues, while maintaining the defensive on political-ideological ones. On the domestic front, if, on the one hand, Russia formally upholds the general principles of democracy, on the other hand the notions of “national interest” and “sovereignty” sanction their negation.

The Russian 1993 constitution is, after all, a fundamentally liberal document, proclaiming civil rights and freedoms as well as democratic representative institutions—the internet is not censored, freedom of movement across the borders is granted and numerous political parties exist. But as the theory on electoral authoritarianisms predicts, these guarantees turn out to be voided by what Sakwa calls “para-constitutional behavior”,¹¹⁸¹ where strict constitutional conservatism is coupled with the practice of bending and adapting the rules to the political end. In Russia this was pursued through the logic of a “power vertical,” namely the creation of agencies accountable to the executive power replacing the intermediary autonomous bodies. A gulf has opened between state and society, whereby the constitutional institutions supposed to fill this gap have either been disempowered or coopted and corrupted from above. Not casually, when Sakwa postulates a Russian “dual state,” divided between a formal-constitutional and an administrative-informal one, he replicates precisely that sort of dualism between form and substance that is the hallmark of hybrid regimes.

This trend is especially visible in the “arena of contestation”¹¹⁸² most crucial for electoral authoritarian regimes, that is to say the elections. It has become almost a truism that “in Russian elections, it is the outcome that is certain, while the electoral rules are protean and constantly rewritten to effect the desired result.”¹¹⁸³ It is true that Russia has a number of political parties and that the 2012 elections took place in a context of mass mobilization in the main urban centers, against electoral frauds and for a “Russia without Putin,” but this did not prevent the expected result from materializing. The mixed use of repression, cooptation, vote-falsification, nationalist rhetoric, control over the media, state finances and local administrative elites, along with a strong

¹¹⁸¹ Sakwa. “The Dual State in Russia”, op. cit.

¹¹⁸² Levitsky and Way. *Competitive Authoritarianism. Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War*, op. cit.

¹¹⁸³ Ivan Krastev and Stephen Holmes. 2012. “Putinism Under Siege. An Autopsy of Managed Democracy.” *Journal of Democracy* 23 (3): pp. 33-45.

campaign against independent civil society organizations (and especially those receiving funding from abroad, portrayed as Trojan horses of the countries' opponents) has once again managed to have Putin reinstated in the Kremlin, after the symbolic intermezzo of Medvedev.

As Krastev and Holmes have argued, Russia's rigged elections are not just a decorative façade.¹¹⁸⁴ Their role is not to select the country's leadership, but they are a complete fabrication either. Many observers contend that even without electoral manipulation, Putin would have obtained a sufficient majority both in 2000 and 2004 (and arguably also in 2012), although less pronounced.¹¹⁸⁵ If, then, the manipulation at the level of opinion formation would have been sufficient, why hold stage rigged elections? Krastev and Holmes have a point when they suggest that these serve "to construct and drive home, on a regular basis, the 'no alternative' rationale for Putin's rule".¹¹⁸⁶ Rather than a risk for the perpetuation of the elite's power, then, elections serve the role of consolidating it by displaying national cohesion, which is instrumental to the stability that a strong determined leader can offer. Their "free and fair" nature is, after all, of secondary importance. "The regime's need to simulate some sort of coherent Russian nationhood has therefore been infinitely greater and much more urgent than its need to imitate an imported model of democracy".¹¹⁸⁷ Elections are also an effective instrument to discipline regional elites, which, being directly dependent upon the President, can be easily replaced in the case of unsatisfactory results.¹¹⁸⁸

Iran

Similarly to Russia, the Iranian Islamic Republic can be seen as the result of a "failed revolution." Although differently from the former Soviet Republic, whose revolution had been rather "passive," the Iranian regime emerged from a strongly domestic and popular movement, initially a great degree of legitimacy. This important feature has been crucial for providing the necessary political and cultural capital to the idea of

¹¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 35.

¹¹⁸⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 38.

¹¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

Islamic revolution and the ensuing establishment of a semi-theocratic regime. However, the forces that united to overthrow the Shah were not composed only of religious factions opposed to his pro-western attitude, but also of democratic, socialist and secular forces who advocated a democratization of the institutions and popular participation. Although the instauration of the Islamic Republic by the Ayatollah Khomeini marked the success of the first over the second, still this mix of ideological sources of inspiration that composed the revolution have materialized in the fundamentally hybrid nature of the Iranian regime.

Iran presents “a strange combination of remarkably competitive elections and harsh repression”¹¹⁸⁹ operating at two levels: the superior level is the one of the tutelary power of the clerical-led Guardian Council, which enjoys considerable executive power and, most importantly, the faculty to discretionarily vet candidates to presidency. The second, inferior level is represented by the executive itself, which since the 2005 election of Ahmadinejad as president has greatly increased the deployment of the state’s repressive apparatus against oppositional voices. This dual-tier system limits the prerogatives of the president while it multiplies, while simultaneously limiting the possible sources of repression. This duality of power has created a sort of inconsistency in the system which allowed, in 1997, the election of the reformist leader Mohammad Khatami to the presidency, and which later, in May 2011, caused the outbreak of an internal power-struggle between President Ahmadinejad and the Supreme Leader, threatening the President himself with impeachment. This multiplicity of authorities dominating Iran’s political life represent well how the competitive side of an authoritarian regime can develop, not only from the existence of contested elections (which Iran possesses), but also from the inbuilt ‘dissonances’ which, instead of pointing to a coherent system, represent “the deliberate and uneasy linking of competing notions of political community”.¹¹⁹⁰

¹¹⁸⁹ Marc F. Plattner and Larry Diamond. 2000. “Is Iran Democratizing?” *Journal of Democracy* 11 (4): p. 107.

¹¹⁹⁰ Daniel Brumberg. 2000. “Is Iran Democratizing? A Comparativist's Perspective.” *Journal of Democracy* 11 (4), p. 130.

From this point of view, the strange combination of repression and competitive elections does not seem to result from what Brumberg calls a “survival strategy” of the Iranian conservative clerical elites meant to lend legitimacy to the system.¹¹⁹¹ Instead, it seems to be rather a contingent result stemming from the built-in loopholes in the constitutional system which, in spite of its closed design where the final authority resides in the religious leaders, is unable to contain the potentially reformist drives that elections and parties convey. Elections in fact represent one of the few channels to express preferences independently from the ruling clerics. It is of significance, however, that the conservative judiciary in 2000 closed more than 100 reformist newspapers and jailed hundreds of liberal journalists and activists¹¹⁹² and the Guardian Council barred from participation most of the reformist candidates in order to favor the victory of the conservative mayor of Tehran, Ahmadinejad. This type of incident occurred again in 2009, when the Council authorized only 3 of 475 proposed candidates,¹¹⁹³ yet did not prevent the popular Mir Hussein Mousavi from emerging as a credible challenger to Ahmadinejad, who had to resort to massive repression against a resurging civil society to confirm his hold on power.

Conclusions

The Iranian case demonstrates even more clearly than the Russian one that, as argued in the theoretical part, elections may represent a threat for leaders in electoral authoritarian regimes. This is especially the case in regimes where apparent stability in reality hides a latent, non-consolidated regime characterized by internal power struggles and where opposition leaders represent a credible alternative. In order to maintain a “dysfunctional equilibrium,” the regime must therefore increase its dose of repression and control. More regime opening implies often a stronger burden for the state, to keep it under control. The existence of some degree of media freedom, for example, implies the necessity to constantly repress it.¹¹⁹⁴ This tendency towards a more accentuated

¹¹⁹¹ Ibid.

¹¹⁹² Freedom House. 2012. “Iran.” *Freedom in the World 2012*. Available at <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/iran>.

¹¹⁹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁹⁴ Levitsky and Way, op. cit.

authoritarianism is visible also in Russia¹¹⁹⁵ as the result of the increasing challenges coming from civil society activism against Putin's regime. However, the deeper sedimentation of the system and the absence of viable opposition leaders reduce the risks of the regime's order being challenged.

Hybrid regimes and electoral authoritarian regimes in particular, do possess their own *modus vivendi* and can be enduring if they manage to maintain the suboptimal equilibrium that represents one of their main features. As the Russian and the Iranian cases show, elections can be both a source of empowerment and a threat. While in Russia they are functional to consolidate the idea of national unity and the supremacy of the incumbent over all other opponents and *apparatchiks*, in Iran – where they are arguably more free and fair – they represent a channel of “voice” outside the hegemonic powers, which exposes the deep division of the society. The apparent internal contradictions of hybrid regimes, then, represent a threat only if coupled with other, structural pitfalls and/or agency-based “strengths” (or weaknesses, from the regime's point of view), such as an active civil society and oppositional parties capable of aggregating consensus. At this point, the only way to survive without further opening to real contestation is an increase in repression, a strategy that, while effective in the short run, may prove counter-productive in the long run.

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¹¹⁹⁵ Calzini, op. cit.

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Getting Our Money's Worth: The Impact of US Aid on Democratization in Ukraine

Thomas Alexander GILLIS

Since the collapse of the USSR, the United States pushed to democratize the former Soviet sphere of influence. Continuing North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) expansion and the enlargement of the European Union (EU) have smashed the formerly impenetrable Iron Curtain, pushing Russia's area of control further and further back. Over the last decade and continuing to today, Ukraine, the cradle of Russian civilization, has become the most vital and revealing arena for these powers to compete, both symbolically and pragmatically. With the Orange Revolution in 2004 and the surge of protests towards the end of 2013, it became apparent that Ukraine has a realistic chance at reforming into a functional democracy. The most powerful weapon each player possesses in this conflict is the mercenary incentive of financial aid. However, a key question remains: what is the most effective target of foreign aid funding in the struggle to democratize this former socialist republic?

In order to properly assess the success and shortcomings of democratization efforts in Ukraine, it is first necessary to determine the goals of the United States. The main question that must be answered is whether the United States has been more interested in fostering a real shift towards democracy or merely establishing another friendly government in the former territory of its archrival. To explain this, I have employed the "realist-normative power" model that Chiara Ruffa presents on EU policies toward Lebanon¹¹⁹⁶, as well as David Hyde-Price's neorealist model of analysis.¹¹⁹⁷ In this

¹¹⁹⁶ Chiara Ruffa, "Realist-Normative Power Europe? Explaining EU Policies Toward Lebanon from an IR Perspective," *Comparative European Politics* 9, N° 4 (2011) www.palgrave-journals.com/cep/journal/v9/n4/full/cep201117a.html, accessed May 3, 2013, p. 562.

¹¹⁹⁷ Adrian Hyde-Price, "Normative Power Europe: A Realist Critique," *Journal of European Public Policy* 13, N° 2 (2006), <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13501760500451634> (accessed April 3, 2013).

case, Ruffa frames the EU's policies as both a symptom of its normative goals and its realist predisposition towards protecting itself and expanding its own power.

These objectives apply equally well in the US-Ukrainian case. Despite lofty words about the importance of human rights and democracy, aid patterns suggest the United States acted opportunistically, using financial incentives in an attempt to foster closer ties and friendly relations with the Ukrainian government, particularly capitalizing on the initial success of the Orange Revolution in 2004. Regardless of the true intent, the correlation between aid patterns and the timeline of Ukrainian political events suggests that the goals of both democratization and power maximization are best achieved by using the same tool: foreign aid given to with the intent to strengthen civil society.

This normative-realist approach provides a number of advantages over better established frameworks in International Relations Theory. Normative-realism bridges the incomplete analysis offered by structural realist and liberal theory on their own. This article will consider US aid to Ukraine as a product of these goals. Hyde-Price's approach helps move beyond the "explicitly normative" "liberal-idealist" view that is unable to objectively examine the power-seeking strategies that come with the promotion of "normative" goals.¹¹⁹⁸ This approach is crucial to explaining why Western aid fluctuated and shifted recipients at key political junctures throughout Ukraine's existence as a sovereign state, leading to the results that will be the ultimate focus of this research.

The analysis will be broken into two distinct periods: the era between gaining independence and the Orange Revolution, and the era including the Orange Revolution and continuing to the present. The Orange Revolution marks a change in the relationship Ukraine had with these the US power which correlates to change in the aid pattern. Although it is impossible to draw a causal conclusion from this data alone, establishing a correlation provides meaningful evidence of a link between aid to civil society organizations and steps towards democratization, as well as a framework that can be used to test other cases.

¹¹⁹⁸ Ibid., 218.

Pre-Revolutionary Era

After gaining its independence in 1991, Ukraine struggled with the transition to a free market economy and privatization throughout the 1990s. The economy was characterized by hyperinflation, poverty, and high disparities in per capita income. Estimates place the per capita GDP of Ukrainians at just \$1,307 USD as of 1991.¹¹⁹⁹ The national economy contracted annually since independence until 1996, anywhere from 9.7-22.7%.¹²⁰⁰ Rampant corruption and the rapidly growing shadow economy negatively colored Western perceptions of the Ukrainian domestic situation.¹²⁰¹

In addition to the economic volatility, Ukraine's political orientation towards Russia or the West was an issue that went largely unresolved in the 1990s. Although Ukrainians displayed a strong will to "preserve the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics as a renewed federation of equal sovereign republics" at an overwhelmingly high 83.5% in 1991, Russia remained in a weakened position throughout the 1990's, rendering it unable to exercise its historical influence in the region.¹²⁰²

The United States government was the largest bilateral donor of economic assistance to Ukraine from 1992-2010.¹²⁰³ Fortunately for this study, the US also provided some of the most detailed qualitative data on this assistance, although changes in account/funding categorization do render a comparison of the 1990s to the 2000s slightly problematic. This aid flow seemed to correlate with the maintenance of a steady political relationship with the United States and Ukraine's consistently poor economy. The one notable fluctuation in US aid in the period coincided with the only major political dispute.¹²⁰⁴

¹¹⁹⁹ Pekka Sutela, "The Underachiever: Ukraine's Economy Since 1991," *Carnegie Endowment for Global Peace*, <http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/03/09/underachiever-ukraine-s-economy-since-1991#> (accessed May 5, 2013).

¹²⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹²⁰¹ Ibid.

¹²⁰² "Referendum on the Preservation of the USSR," *RIA Novosti*, <http://en.rian.ru/infographics/20110313/162959645.html> (accessed May 2, 2013).

¹²⁰³ Natalia Shapovalova, "Assessing Democracy Assistance: Ukraine," *Fride: A European Think Tank for Global Action*, www.fride.org/descarga/IP_WMD_Ucrania_ENG_jul10.pdf (accessed April 26, 2013): 3.

¹²⁰⁴ Gillis, Thomas Alexander, "Foreign Aid and Democratization: The Impact of Western Assistance on the Orange Revolution" (master's thesis, Central European University, 2013), 47, 54.

The pillar upon which US-Ukrainian relations were built in the 1990s was the FREEDOM (Freedom for Russia and Emerging [Eurasian] Democracies and Open Markets) Support Act (FSA). This legislation established in 1992, was the mechanism with which the US approached Ukraine and the other former-Soviet republics during the transition period.¹²⁰⁵ In the case of Ukraine, USAID reports on total economic assistance¹²⁰⁶ showed a spike from .65 million USD in 1992 to 198.85 million USD in 1993, an increase of over 30,000%.¹²⁰⁷

Ukraine received large sums from the fund for USAID assistance grants (1994-1998) and then from the fund for the assistance for the independent states of the former Soviet Union (1999-2006), operating under the FSA.¹²⁰⁸ The FSA's heavy emphasis on "Economy and Society" is quite evident, comprising 59.5% of in 1994 and 46.1% in 1999. The heavily weighted emphasis on economic assistance began to change drastically in the 2000s. From 2001 onward, USAID Economic Analysis Data Service (EADs) makes available its expenditures by sector and implementing partner type. Although data from 2001-2003 will not reflect trends in the 1990s, these years can help establish a basis of comparison for the revolutionary and post-revolutionary period from 2004-2011. The pre-revolution era's aid scheme can be characterized by its emphasis on economic stimulation over politicized democracy promotion. There is also a marked lack of aid flowing directly to non-US governmental recipients, i.e. the Ukrainian government.

Donor Motivation and Effectiveness

US aid to Ukraine in the period directly following independence was a reflection of the US's neorealist agenda, as outlined by Hyde Price. Because of its proximity, historical connection, and entrenched social as well as political relationship with Russia, Ukraine is a priority for any international actor at odds with Russia. Aid is one facet through

¹²⁰⁵ George H.W. Bush, "Statement on Signing the FREEDOM Support Act." The American Presidency Project, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=21658 (accessed May 3, 2013).

¹²⁰⁶ This assistance includes both loans and grants.

¹²⁰⁷ USAID, "Ukraine," U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants (Greenbook), (accessed May 13, 2013). http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/query/do?_program=/eads/gbk/tablesByCountry&ocode=4UKR

¹²⁰⁸ Ibid.

which the United States attempts to gain a competitive edge against Russia, utilizing aid in effort to secure influence in Ukraine, thereby maximizing its power in the region. Of course, funding the development of a free market economy and promoting democracy, rule of law, and civil society are normative endeavors. Though the promotion of these goals is seen as being to the benefit of Ukraine's population, they also serve to align Ukraine ideologically and politically with the United States

This particular period, between independence and the Orange Revolution, featured a greater emphasis on Ukraine's market economy. This matter got the most attention in this financially struggling nation because it was a particularly pressing issue, the amelioration of which the US assumed would bring natural strides in progress with regard to humanitarian and democratic issues.

However, US aid must be viewed as politically motivated and not strictly an effort to improve the lives of Ukrainians by spreading democratic ideals. If the latter were true, explaining the surge in aid around elections would be difficult. Presidential election years have higher funding than either the preceding or the following year and parliamentary election years show more mild spikes in funding. This trend holds true not only for the pre-revolutionary period, but for Ukraine's entire existence as a sovereign state. Peaks in aid were seen in 1994, 1999, 2004-2005, and 2010, all years in which presidential elections were to be held.¹²⁰⁹ This suggests that aid, though not necessarily geared toward campaigns, governmental parties, or other political groups, is designed to have an impact on the elections.

As Copsey noted, there was often a pro-Western and a pro-Russian candidate. By bolstering efforts in general for election years, the US's aid patterns could be seen as trying to influence the elections and maximize its political influence over the Ukrainian state.¹²¹⁰ However, if this is either the direct intent or indirect intent of this pattern, its effectiveness is dubious. Although the Orange Revolution did not break out until the

¹²⁰⁹ Gillis, "Foreign Aid and Democratization: The Impact of Western Assistance on the Orange Revolution",

¹²¹⁰ Nathaniel Copsey, "Ukraine," In *The Colour Revolutions in the Former Soviet Republics: Successes and Failures*, London: Routledge, 2010: 35.

elections at the end of 2004, I have chosen to include it in my analysis of aid in the Orange Revolution and the post-revolution era because it is distinct from the previous period in that 2004 would be a critical election year.¹²¹¹ Outraged by the reported electoral fraud, Ukraine's domestic situation turned its attention towards the opposition, headed by Viktor Yushchenko, and civil society development.

Although it has been suggested that the West's role is frequently "overestimated," the pivotal role played by the OSCE, a multilateral governmental organization, should not go unmentioned.¹²¹² It is also pertinent to justify claiming the OSCE as a representative of the West. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's (OSCE) election monitoring results that indicated fraud in favor of Viktor Yanukovich were the only truly causal contribution of the West. The "neutral and disinterested" party's findings were taken seriously and led to outrage among Ukrainians and the international community alike.¹²¹³ Foreign powers of the West demanded that the OSCE's findings be addressed. For example, the European Parliament went so far as to pass a resolution calling for another election.¹²¹⁴

Different funds for democracy promotion experienced differing patterns. In the midst of the Orange Revolution, democracy promotion funds of USAID were at a record high in 2005 at 58 million USD, nearly a 170% increase from the previous year.¹²¹⁵ Increased funding for democracy assistance came from the NED as well as from the Millennium Challenge Corporation from 2006/2007 onward. There were also high expenditures in 2005 for NGOs, both non-US and US, although such support would ultimately decline in the period between 2004-2007.¹²¹⁶ The higher levels of funding for democracy aid in 2004-2005, such as increased funds for non-governmental organizations (NGOs) via the

¹²¹¹ Taras Kuzio, "Regime Type And Politics In Ukraine Under Kuchma," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 38, N° 2 (2005), <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2005.03.007> (accessed April 28, 2013): 170.

¹²¹² Copsey, "Ukraine," In *The Colour Revolutions in the Former Soviet Republics: Successes and Failures*, 35.

¹²¹³ Ibid., 37.

¹²¹⁴ Theodor Tudoroiu, "Rose, Orange, And Tulip: The Failed Post-Soviet Revolutions," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 40, N° 3 (2007), accessed April 3, 2013: 329, <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0967067X07000323>.

¹²¹⁵ Shapovalova, "Assessing Democracy Assistance: Ukraine," 3.

¹²¹⁶ Ibid.

NED coincide with their role in mobilizing protestors and supporting the massive protests.¹²¹⁷ Civil society groups supported by the US were generally politically aligned groups and, especially in this period, are often focused on “voter education and mobilisation.”¹²¹⁸

Thus, although US efforts to support civil society dropped off during this period, there was significant funding in the critical years of 2004-2005 during which money was provided towards organizations supporting the political changes brought about by the Orange Revolution. From 2004 to 2005, US aid increased overall, but “Governance and Civil Society” expenditures rose nearly 10 million dollars.¹²¹⁹ Another trend that emerged from 2004-2010 was increased aid given to the government. Between 2004 and 2007, there was 70% less funding being awarded to all non-state actors, while the government sector received 59% more.¹²²⁰ Although higher totals persisted for the US government itself as an implementing agency, rates also dramatically increased for aid granted to the Ukrainian government. This was presumably a symptom of the US government’s faith in the Yushchenko administration to successfully promote democratization efforts.

In comparison to the period before the revolution, some significant changes in aid patterns can be observed from 2004-2011. Most significantly, general rates of aid decreased, democracy assistance received more funding, and there was an increase in assistance given to governmental sectors. This was a clear break from patterns that characterize the previous era. The outbreak of the Orange Revolution and Yushchenko eventually taking office indicated that US aid efforts helped move the situation in a favorable direction from a Western perspective. However, the US was criticized for its sudden drop-offs in democracy assistance through the promotion of civil society and its persistent contributions to the Ukrainian government under Yushchenko.¹²²¹ This evidence supported the claim that the US “viewed the new leadership and the primary

¹²¹⁷ Gillis, op. cit.

¹²¹⁸ Shapovalova, op. cit., p. 3.

¹²¹⁹ Gillis, op. cit.

¹²²⁰ Shapovalova, op. cit., p. 3

¹²²¹ Ibid.

engine of democracy.”¹²²² The positive result of the electoral revolution, which was the focus of much aid, led the US to support Yushchenko’s government directly. This premature faith caused assistance to channel into a government whose “democratic credentials and desire to quickly consolidate democratic gains...were never challenged.”¹²²³

This government and the years after the Orange Revolution did not bring long-lasting, full-fledged democratic change to Ukraine. Certain practices, such as a minor development of civil society infrastructure and slightly freer media, can be seen as enduring products of the revolution.¹²²⁴ However, Ukraine remains, simply, “a more complex semidemocracy” that saw limited progress in the Yushchenko years as a result of the lackluster performance of his administration.¹²²⁵ In some ways, the funding provided to the Ukrainian government was wasted. For example, The Millennium Challenge Corporation funding which totaled \$64.58 million between 2006 and 2010 was largely awarded to the Ukrainian government. Meanwhile, Freedom House’s democracy ratings chart gives Ukraine an unfavorable score of 5.75 for that period, only to have it drop to 6.00 in 2010.¹²²⁶ However, in the past few years, both aid trends and rhetoric reflect a resurgence of support for civil society efforts in Ukraine. Perhaps due to the failure of the Orange Revolution to produce any lasting figures of political change, the US found that CSOs offered the only opportunity to spur the democratization process. Ukraine began receiving assistance from the Economic Support Fund, a program of the US Department of State, in 2013.¹²²⁷ During this year, the US gave Ukraine \$53.957 million USD, a significant portion of which was spent on improving governance and strengthening civil society.¹²²⁸

¹²²² Lincoln Abraham Mitchell, *The Color Revolutions*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012, p. 175.

¹²²³ Ibid., 167.

¹²²⁴ Ibid., 184.

¹²²⁵ Ibid., 181.

¹²²⁶ Gillis, op. cit.

¹²²⁷ "Foreign Operations Assistance Fact Sheet, June 2013: Ukraine," US Department of State, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/213201.pdf> accessed December 26, 2013.

¹²²⁸ Steven Woehrel, "Ukraine: Current Issues and U.S. Policy," Federation of American Scientists, <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33460.pdf> .Accessed December 17, 2013.

If the US was seeking to promote a more rapid democratization process, inter-governmental aid proved to be a poor decision. Neorealism, however, does not limit us to this interpretation. The aid may have been “misguided” as Mitchell claims because the quantity that was issued to its recipient did not result in major progress.¹²²⁹ Alternatively, the aid may have been issued in order to spur political stability and promote an amicable relationship between the two governments, after the turbulence of the Kuchma years. Although not the most effective in promoting liberal ideals, these aid trends did coincide with a years of stable, friendly, secure relations between Ukraine and the US. The data supports the proposition that excessive aid to the government and little aid to civil society contributed to the stagnation of democratization processes in Ukraine. This leads to the ultimate conclusion that the development of civil society is a useful process to the development of democracy, particularly when new governments cannot be expected to initiate or implement democratic reform.

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¹²²⁹ Mitchell, *The Color Revolutions*, 181.

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Hungarian Neighborhood Policy towards Romania from 1989

Virág ZSÁR

Introduction

In this essay I would like to introduce Hungary's neighborhood policy towards Romania since 1989. 1989 was a watershed regarding the relations between the two countries even though it is also important to get an overview of the most important features of the precedents. We can speak about "real" neighborhood policy just after the transition. I would also like to present its main objectives, as well as hindrances that have occurred over the last 20 years.

Furthermore, this essay summarizes the necessity of neighborhood policy during the Euro-Atlantic integration process. The case of Hungarian minorities will also be discussed, as when dealing with neighborhood policy we cannot pass over the question of their situation.

Additionally, I will try to underline those events, which have had a determinant and main role in the process of composing a neighborhood policy. Of course, this essay cannot specify each of them and would be a topic of a future study. Similarly, the role played by Hungarian political organizations and/or parties in neighboring policy will only be referred to and not explained in details due to the limits of the essay.

Definitions

When we use the term of *neighborhood policy* we talk about the relations of the country concerned towards its neighbors. It is generally an important part of foreign policy; due to geography each country has land and/or maritime neighbors therefore they have to define their relations to their neighbors. We can speak about good neighborhood policy in that case when the parties can handle the common issues successfully. It does not

mean that there are no problematic questions at all, rather that there is a common interest to solve these issues. Good neighborhood policy can be institutionalized, for instance, in case of Romania and Hungary, the Basic Treaty envisioned the functioning of joint committees on issues of common interests (environment, minority protection, etc.)

In case of Hungary, the issue of neighborhood policy is inseparable from minority policy and regional cooperation.¹²³⁰ Both of them have to rely on humaneness and stability. *Minority policy* is an instrument of the government to deal with the issue of different minorities within the borders of Hungary as well as to handle the questions related to the Hungarian minorities beyond the borders.

Regional policy became more important after the change of regime in 1989-90. Prior to the change of regime, within the Warsaw Pact and Comecon,¹²³¹ Moscow sought to prevent any intra bloc horizontal regional cooperation having learnt from the case of Yugoslavia when regional initiatives of Tito resulted in deviation from the one centered communist regime.¹²³² As a result, there was no possibility for the East Central European countries to form a regional coalition without the participation of the Soviet Union.¹²³³ After the transition, regional cooperation has become more relevant and could intensify the neighborhood policy. As we will see, EU membership offers, and in some cases, necessitates the maintenance of regional policy.¹²³⁴ The term of '*nation policy*' is a particular expression in this region. It refers to one part of the minority policy; nation policy deals with the national interests of Hungarians inside and outside

¹²³⁰ Zsolt Németh, "Status Law, Nation Policy, Neighborhood Policy". *Foreign Policy Review*, Vol. 1, N° 2 (2002), 8.

¹²³¹ Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, also referred as CMEA was the economic organization of countries of the Eastern bloc under Soviet leadership.

¹²³² László Kiss J, "The Restatement of Hungarian Foreign Policy-from Kádárism to EU Membership". *Foreign Policy Review*, Vol. 3, N° 1 (2004), 40.

¹²³³ László Kiss J, "Magyarország szomszédsági kapcsolatainak jövője." [The Future of Hungary's Neighbourhood Policy], http://www.grotius.hu/doc/pub/FJFDTM/kiss_j_l%C3%A1szl%C3%B3_magyarország_szomsz%C3%A9ds%C3%A1gi_kapcsolatok.pdf, 2-3.

¹²³⁴ Within the enlarged European Union of 27 Member States, territorial cooperation programmes and macro regional strategies provide opportunities to countries lying in certain geographically defined regions within Europe. On the other hand, EU decision-making sometimes presses the set up of regional coalitions of certain Member States to defend their interests, e.g. in case of European Neighborhood Policy, etc.

Hungary.¹²³⁵ In this sense, there is a debate between state interest and national interest. State interest implies the interests of Hungarian citizens within the borders of Hungary while national interest includes additionally the interests of Hungarian minorities beyond the borders. Nation policy generally links the question of identity and the conditions essential for maintaining the identity and does not treat the concept of nation as belonging to borders and territories.

Nation policy can only be realized by an effective neighborhood policy.¹²³⁶ However, this principle has been treated by Hungarian governments in a different manner: whereas the socialist-liberal coalitions have attributed more significance to the improvement of neighborhood policy with a special regard to economic and commercial relations including the communities of the Hungarian minorities; right-wing governments have made the issue of Hungarian minorities beyond the borders as a precondition of good neighborly relations emphasizing the must to preserve the Hungarian culture and communities.¹²³⁷ Since nation policy is a constitutional responsibility of Hungary, for the Hungarian public the issue of Hungarian minority living beyond the borders, especially in Romania,¹²³⁸ is a crucial point. Therefore, the question of nation policy cannot be ignored when we analyze neighborhood policy.

Late Kádár era: The end of the eighties

Antecedents

Since communist policy neglected the issue of nationalism it did not deal with the problem of national minorities on the surface. After the World War II, countries in the Eastern bloc regarded the question of minorities automatically resolved based on the

¹²³⁵ Zoltán Kántor, "Status Laws and 'Nation Policy': theoretical aspects". In Kántor, Zoltán, Majtényi, Balázs, Ieda, Osamu, and Halász, Iván (eds.): *The Hungarian Status Law: Nation Building and/or Minority Protection*. (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, 2004), p. 105.

¹²³⁶ J. Kiss, *Magyarország szomszédsági kapcsolatainak jövője*, p. 5.

¹²³⁷ J. Kiss, "The Restatement of Hungarian Foreign Policy", (2004), p. 65.

¹²³⁸ Romania is the home of the greatest community of Hungarian minorities living beyond the borders. According to the census of 1990, 1,603,923 persons declared themselves Hungarian in Romania; in 2002 1,414,718; and in 2012 1,238,000. Vide http://kitekinto.hu/karpat-medence/2012/02/09/mit_mondanak_a_szamok_a_romaniai_magyarokrol/#.Uz6qPKh_uO7.

principle of internationalism.¹²³⁹ However, recent researches point out that before its dissolution, the Comintern, then Stalin itself, encouraged communist parties to take the national issue at the centre of the politics to increase their popularity.¹²⁴⁰ In this context, internationalism referred to the unity of the communist bloc under Soviet leadership; whereas each communist party in Eastern Europe created the notion of ‘socialist patriotism’.¹²⁴¹

First, this kind of internationalism benefited indeed national minorities. In Romania, the Hungarian Autonomic Territory was set up in 1952 under Soviet pressure led by ethnic Hungarian communists. The autonomous region had a population of more than half a million Hungarians whose rights could have been protected in a more efficient way;¹²⁴² in contrast to the rest of the Hungarian minority (around 1.5 million) living in Transylvania, outside the autonomous region, whose assimilation proceeded continuously.

In the meantime, Hungary, following the World War II, declared the policy of “new beginning” referring to the reconciliation with her neighbors; and accepting the borders.¹²⁴³ During the communist era, de-nationalization in Hungary was more intense than in other countries of the bloc.¹²⁴⁴ For quite a long time, the issue of Hungarian minorities targeted by assimilation policies of neighboring countries was not put on the table of the Hungarian leadership.

¹²³⁹ Sándor Bárdi, “The History of Relations between Hungarian Governments and Ethnic Hungarians Living Beyond the Borders of Hungary”. In Kántor, Zoltán, Majtényi, Balázs, Ieda, Osamu, and Halász, Iván (eds.): *The Hungarian Status Law: Nation Building and/or Minority Protection*. (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, 2004), p. 62.

¹²⁴⁰ As a result, communist parties only opposed the nationalism of aristocrats and emperors, whereas they took over national symbols and regarded national heroes fighting against emperors or aristocrats as their forefathers. Vide Mevius, Martin, “A kommunizmus és a nacionalizmus viszonyának újraértékelése”. [The Re-evaluation of the Relationship between Communism and Nationalism] *Regio*, Vol. 21, N° 2 (2010), p. 21.

¹²⁴¹ Ibid., p. 29.

¹²⁴² Vassals Petnis, “Ethnic relations in Romania – The prospects for a new accommodation”. In Tarrósy, István and Susan Milford (eds.), *Regime Change and Transitions across the Danubian Region: 1989-2009*. (Pécs: IDResearch Ltd. and Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe (IDM), 2009), p. 95.

¹²⁴³ Ibid., p. 212.

¹²⁴⁴ This can be regarded on the one hand as a result of the fact that following WWII less than 0.2% of the population belonged to any of the minority groups. On the other hand, the communist leadership was opposed to the national “irredentism” of Hungary’s pre-war government. Kiss J., “The Restatement of Hungarian Foreign Policy”, (2004), p. 40.

The issue of nationalism, national state building became more important when communist leaders had to legitimize their power: following industrialization and urbanization in the countries concerned, competition for better-paying jobs and privileges intensified. For the management of the deriving social tensions, parochial nationalism proved to be a useful means in multiethnic societies.¹²⁴⁵ In most cases this resulted in the oppression of minorities.

Consequently, minorities under communist leadership including Romania had to face double oppression: their assimilation was continuously on the agenda, whereas their political rights, as in case of the majority of the population, were also denied.¹²⁴⁶ Additionally, oppression of Churches by communist dictatorships also affected minorities badly since it also endangered the preservation of their culture. However, the quasi freezing of this issue did not solve the problem at all, but rather prolonged it. Meanwhile, a greater emphasis on Romanian nationalism gradually superseded proletarian internationalism within the Romanian Communist Party. Nicolae Ceausescu, the Romanian party leader consolidated this approach to legitimize his power. As a result, the situation of Hungarians living in Romania became gradually worse. After Ceausescu came into power in 1965 he dissolved the Hungarian Autonomic Territory in the frame of administrative reorganization of the country.¹²⁴⁷

Then in 1972 Ceausescu announced the national homogenization program. Officially the program aimed at a reinforced industrialization of the country and rationalization of its resources; however, in fact, it resulted in an ethnic cleansing including the selling of Jews and Germans to their kin-states, as well as the colonization of Transylvania by the settlement of Romanian inhabitants to change its ethnic composition.¹²⁴⁸ Its aim was the total elimination of minorities in Romania and the establishment of the unitary Romanian state.

¹²⁴⁵ Michail A. Molchanov, "Post-communism Nationalism as a Power of Resource: a Russia-Ukraine Comparison". *Nationalities Papers*, vol. 28, N° 2 (2000), p. 264.

¹²⁴⁶ Géza Jeszzenszky, *Post-communist Europe and its national/ethnic problems*. Budapest: Kairosz Kiadó, 2009, p. 173.

¹²⁴⁷ The autonomous region as such was deprived from its autonomy basically from its establishment. But its space for maneuvering was decreasing from 1956 gradually due to the sympathy movements of Hungarian minorities with the Hungarian revolution.

¹²⁴⁸ Jeszzenszky, *Post-communist Europe*, (2009), pp. 345-346.

It lasted till 1966/68 that the leaders of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (HSWP) put on the table the issue of minorities. The ideology of dual loyalty (to the kin-state and the state of citizenship) and the bridge role of minorities (providing a space for dialogue between countries) were formulated.¹²⁴⁹ Nevertheless, the first steps taken by the Hungarian government were rather negligible therefore they had to face a certain degree of criticism from the society having not dealt with this particular problem. The relationship between Hungary and Romania became tenser partly because of the actions of the Ceausescu regime. Since bilateral negotiations were unsuccessful, the aim of Hungarian foreign policy was to "achieve the international denunciation of the Romanian policy in international forums directly"¹²⁵⁰. The main argument was the issue of human rights, which was reasonable as the Hungarian government was the main promoter of the Helsinki process within the Eastern bloc.

Since Hungary met the demands of Western powers in the field of issues covering the so-called "third basket",¹²⁵¹ Kádár, the leader of the country delivered his speech at the final meeting in Helsinki highlighting that Hungary has no problems with its neighbors and propagated the importance of the "third basket". The protection of national minorities, especially thereof Hungarian minorities living in neighboring countries, including Romania was not explicitly mentioned. Nevertheless, Hungary had the legal basis to compel Romania on the treatment of Hungarian minorities at international fora. Although it corresponded to the expectations of Western countries in that time, nothing happened concerning the situation of Hungarians in Romania. In 1977 at the meetings taken place in Debrecen (Hungary) and in Oradea (Romania), Kádár and Ceausescu had agreed on several issues; although the bridge role of minorities were built into the text of the agreement, Romania regarded the issue of national minorities as an internal affair which cannot be the subject of a bilateral agreement.¹²⁵²

¹²⁴⁹ Nándor Bárdi, "The History of Relations between Hungarian Governments and Ethnic Hungarians Living Beyond the Borders of Hungary". In Kántor, Zoltán, Majtényi, Balázs, Ieda, Osamu, and Halász, Iván (eds.): *The Hungarian Status Law: Nation Building and/or Minority Protection*. (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, 2004), p. 62.

¹²⁵⁰ Csaba Békés, "Back to Europe – The international background of the political transition in Hungary, 1988-1990". In Bozóki, András (ed.), *The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy*. (Budapest – New York: CEU Press, 2002), p. 30.

¹²⁵¹ Article 7 of Helsinki Accords, "the respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms".

¹²⁵² Békés, "Back to Europe", (2002), p. 31.

In March 1987 at the Vienna follow-up meeting of the Conference on European Security and Cooperation, Hungary forthrightly expressed its desire for the denunciation of Romania by supporting the Canadian proposal, which targeted the extension of the rights of minorities in Europe.¹²⁵³ Nevertheless, the HSWP could never exploit the opportunity provided by the protection of minorities for its own legitimization purposes; it was rather the formulating opposition that could capitalize the issue.

‘Systematization’ and its consequences

In the beginning of 1988 Ceausescu announced the so-called ‘systematization’ program referring to his urban planning program. Formally, its aim was the enforcement of urbanization through the demolition of villages in the countryside and reconstruction of villages to industrial centers. However, since it resulted in the destruction of historical buildings, including churches, monasteries, theaters belonging mainly to the historical minorities of the country, the Federal Republic of Germany and Hungary harshly protested against the program claiming that its goal was the final elimination of minorities. These operations resulted in a huge number of Romanian emigrants, which motivated both the Hungarian government and the Hungarian public to do something.¹²⁵⁴ The most enormous public protest was held at the Heroes Square in Budapest.

In consequence of the Soviet pressure and initiative, a meeting of secretary generals of the two countries was held in Arad on 28 August 1988. Ceausescu did not want to make any compromises, what is more, offered two days to the Hungarian party to accept his conditions. The meeting was unsuccessful aggravating the problems further.¹²⁵⁵ In July 1989, in parallel with the session of the Political Consultative Body of the Warsaw Pact in Bucharest, the Hungarian politicians (chairman of the HSWP Rezső Nyers, Prime Minister Miklós Németh and Foreign Minister Gyula Horn) had an ‘unofficial meeting’ with Ceausescu on the invitation of the Romanian leader. Again, in line with the Soviet

¹²⁵³ Ibid.

¹²⁵⁴ In March 1989 Hungary ratified the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees; she was the first in the Eastern bloc.

¹²⁵⁵ Békés, “Back to Europe”, 2002, 31.

pressure, the Hungarian politicians accepted the invitation. That time Hungarians leaders had a more powerful negotiating position by envisioning asking for an international supervision of Hungarian minorities. Consequently, on this occasion they were those who imposed the conditions of the possible agreement:

“the Romanian Side should cease its discrimination against the Hungarian minority as well as the propaganda and the military threats against Hungary, it should abort the fulfillment of the systematization project in the regions inhabited by Hungarians, it should allow Hungarian cultural products into the country, and it should stop the humiliating harassment of masses of Hungarian tourists at the Hungarian-Romanian border. In addition, Gyula Horn indicated that if necessary, Hungary would propose international supervision of the situation of the national minorities and the systematization plan.”¹²⁵⁶

Although the participants agreed on further negotiations, the events of the transition in Romania did not allow them to materialize. Right after the ‘1989 episode,’ the germs of cooperation evolved: border control was normalized, new border crossing points were established, and the armies had common actions, although these were diametrically opposed to the official relations.¹²⁵⁷

New direction of Hungarian Foreign Policy (1990-1996)

After the peaceful change of regime, the Antall-government (1990-1993) replaced the sovereignty of the country. Furthermore, it declared the principles of the Hungarian Foreign Policy. Since then the targets have not changed significantly, but different governments gave different interpretations for them. The main principles or the so-called triad are as follows: political, economic and military integration into the West; the policy of good neighborly and regional cooperation; and the protection of Hungarian minority rights.¹²⁵⁸ However, balance among the three pillars of the foreign policy varied from one government to the other; whereas right wing (so-called conservative)

¹²⁵⁶ Ibid., 32.

¹²⁵⁷ Levente Salat, “A román-magyar kapcsolatok alakulásának kilátásai és a francia-német megbékélési modell”. In Salat, Levente and Enache, Smaranda (eds.), *A román-magyar kapcsolatok és a francia-német megbékélési model*. Cluj: Centrul De Resurse Pentru Diversitate Etnoculturala, 2004, p. 548.

¹²⁵⁸ J. Kiss, “The Restatement of Hungarian Foreign Policy”, (2004), 64; Ferenc Gazdag “From Alliance to Alliance: Hungary’s Path from the Warsaw Pact to NATO”. *Foreign Policy Review*, vol. 2, N° 1 (2004), 160.; Pál Dunay “Hungarian Foreign Policy in the Era of Transition (1990-2004)”. *Foreign Policy Review*, vol. 3, N° 1 (2004), p. 200.

governments put more emphasize on nation policy instead of neighborhood policy; left wing (socialist-liberal) governments stressed the importance of neighborhood policy and favored less the protection of minority rights of Hungarian communities living beyond the border

All beginnings are difficult

At the very start, the establishment of positive Hungarian Romanian relations faced several obstacles. For the Antall-government, a precondition for the establishment of good neighborly relations was the proper treatment of Hungarian minorities within the countries concerned, including Romania. On the other hand, it must be admitted that the Euro-Atlantic integration was considered to be the most important priority for the East Central European countries (even for Romania, following 1992), which meant that other problems like neighborhood policy, minority rights, etc. had only second-rank importance. Consequently, the development of the neighborhood policy was mainly the answer for an external need from the point of view of Hungary's neighbors, including Romania.

International pressure

For Western countries the preservation of stability was regarded as one of the most important goal in East Central Europe. Due to the limited knowledge of Western countries on the region, ethnic conflicts in the Balkans and the Soviet Union anticipated the fear of similar conflicts in East Central Europe. During the Yugoslav wars Hungary undertook several efforts in order to prove its capacity for maintaining peaceful and effective relations with her neighbors. Though the Antall-government had neither intention nor capacities to change the borders, their strong insistence to minority rights increased concerns in the West.¹²⁵⁹

In 1993 at the European Council Meeting in Copenhagen the French Prime Minister Balladur initiated the preparation of a pact "directed towards assuring the application of

¹²⁵⁹ Dunay, "Hungarian Foreign Policy in the Era of Transition", (2004), p. 201.

the principles agreed by the European countries with regard to respect of borders and rights of minorities”¹²⁶⁰. It was accepted as the “European Union in favor of a Pact on Stability in Europe”. Its aim was to dispose the countries to regularize their neighborly relationships in the form of bilateral agreements, which would contain guarantees on the inviolability of borders and minority rights. The pact was inaugurated in 1994 and accepted in 1995. It represented a huge development even though the Declaration was not legally binding which proved to be an enormous defect. Although it contained the list of requirements of good neighborliness, cooperation agreements and arrangements, there is no sanction for the violation of the prescription. The so-called Copenhagen criteria¹²⁶¹ also defined the eligibility of a country for EU accession. Their importance derives from the fact that they emphasize the protection of minority rights as well.

Hungary and Romania perceived the need for the settlement of their relations in an agreement, but the negotiations were moving on quite slowly. Ion Iliescu, the leader of the National Salvation Front (NSF) was elected as president of Romania in 1990. Iliescu’s policy was determined by the slow and gradual reform in all spheres from the economy to foreign policy.

In the beginning of the presidency he did not commit himself and his country to Western integration or comfort Hungary with the requested minority policy. It was only after the 1992 elections that he took up a more West-oriented policy.¹²⁶² Meanwhile, the situation worsened due to the fact that extreme nationalists became the members of the Romanian government who rejected any compromise.¹²⁶³

¹²⁶⁰ “European Council in Copenhagen, 21-22 June 1993, Presidency Conclusions”, 8. Pact on Stability in Europe, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/72921.pdf, 16.

¹²⁶¹ The following requirements are listed among the political conditions: stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities. Vide Accession Criteria (Copenhagen Criteria), http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/accession_criteria_copenhagen_en.htm

¹²⁶² Nikolaus El Papakostas, *Romanian Foreign Policy post Euro-Atlantic Accession: So Far So Good*. Institute of International Economic Relations, 2009, <http://idec.gr/iier/new/PAPAKOSTAS%20REPORT-%20ROMANIA%20-%20FINAL-%2013-5-2009.pdf>, 8.

¹²⁶³ Following the 1992 elections in Romania, the Democratic National Salvation Front formed the government with the Romanian National Unity Party (PUNR), the Greater Romania Party (GRP) and the Socialist Workers’ Party.

Turnaround in neighborhood policy

In 1994 after the parliamentary elections in Hungary a socialist-liberal government (1994-98) was formed. Gyula Horn became the Prime Minister. It resulted in a turnaround of Hungarian neighborhood policy because the government declared that minority policy was only one element of its neighborhood policy.¹²⁶⁴ However, it was difficult to reach a real breakthrough even with this approach. The merit of the Horn-government is that it managed to reach an agreement with Romania though it was partly the result of the international situation.

On 5 August 1995 Romanian President Ion Iliescu delivered a speech in which he proposed a solution for the problems between Hungary and Romania based on historical reconciliation patterned on the Franco-German model.¹²⁶⁵ This proposal failed again, on the one hand, because Romanians did not want to accept the so-called Recommendation 1201 (1993) of the Council of Europe on minority rights.¹²⁶⁶

On the other hand, several articles of the Constitution of Romania hindered the compromise, as they declared the unity of the Romanian nation without any respect of the minority communities.¹²⁶⁷ Additionally, the Hungarian part aimed to follow the South Tirol model instead of the above-mentioned Franco-German model.¹²⁶⁸ Several high-level meetings took place between the leaders of the two countries.

¹²⁶⁴ As regards the support of Hungarian communities beyond the borders, instead of charity shaped support, the Horn-government aimed to reinforce the economic infrastructure of the support for the respective communities. The failure of this policy resulted in the fact that the right-wing parties could blame the social-liberal government for abandoning the minority groups beyond the borders.

¹²⁶⁵ Iván Gyurcsik, "Basic treaties, minority issues and the enlargement of the European Union". In György Lengyel and Zsolt Rostoványi (eds.), *The small transformation – Society, Economy and Politics in Hungary and the New European Architecture*. Budapest: Akadémia Kiadó, 1998, p. 543.

¹²⁶⁶ Romanian politicians opposed the Recommendation since it consisted of certain articles giving the scope for local or regional autonomy, according to their understanding. Vide Recommendation 1201 (1993) of Council of Europe, <http://www.forost.ungarisches-institut.de/pdf/19930201-1.pdf>

¹²⁶⁷ Though the Constitution of Romania approved in 1991 granted the right to 'preserve, develop and express their ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious identities (Article 6.1), the subsequent articles (Article 6.2 and 16.1) excluded any positive discrimination on the basis of ethnic affiliation which is in contrast to international law. Similarly, the right to education on mother tongue was tolerated, whereas the only language enjoying official status was Romanian according to Article 13. Vide Petsinis, "Ethnic relations in Romania", (2009), p. 94.

¹²⁶⁸ The major difference between the two models is the question of autonomy: the former does imply an importantly broad autonomy for minorities, whereas the latter does not deal with it.

Most issues in the frame of neighborhood policy could be settled easily, except for the question of minorities: the Hungarian part insisted on the necessity of the accepting Recommendation 1201, whereas the Romanian part rejected any reference to providing possible autonomy for Hungarian minorities. Notwithstanding the necessity of an agreement was urgent for both countries since the NATO Foreign Ministers' Summit was to be held in December 1996 and would name the states invited to the organization. Both countries believed that in case of having solved the problems they would be able to join. Nevertheless, many political actors opposed to the conclusion of the treaty both in Hungary and in Romania by rejecting the compromise on both sides, and also because of the upcoming elections in Romania.

Signing the Basic Treaty

For that very reason on 13-14 August 1996 the announcement of an agreement was a real surprise. The Basic Treaty between Hungary and Romania on Good Neighborly Relations and Friendly Cooperation¹²⁶⁹ was signed on 16 September 1996. It contained mutual recognition of borders; furthermore, Hungary explicitly renounced all territorial claims on Transylvania.¹²⁷⁰ At the same time, Romania reiterated its respect for the rights of its minorities and bound herself to meet EU standards.

The parties agreed on mutual support of their Euro-Atlantic integration process. The two countries decided to develop their economic and trade cooperation and relations.¹²⁷¹ Other forms of cooperation were also objectives of the treaty, e.g. in the field of science and technology; Danubian shipping; culture and education; preservation of cultural heritage; health care; mass media; and regional level cooperation as well. In Article 14 they insisted upon the elimination of xenophobia and the establishment of tolerance and

¹²⁶⁹ Vide <http://gyula.mae.ro/index.php?lang=en&id=50107>

¹²⁷⁰ During the negotiation of the Basic Treaty the proper treatment of Hungarian minorities became linked to the preservation of the regional status quo. This was basically a gesture towards the Romanian part, since Hungarian government following the transition had never had any territorial claims towards the neighboring countries since WWII. Vide Kiss J., "The Restatement of Hungarian Foreign Policy", (2004), p. 68.

¹²⁷¹ In Article 8 the parties admitted that they would „pay particular attention to the cooperation in the coordinated, international standard-conform development of their national and interconnected infrastructures, including their energy systems, transport and telecommunication networks.” This aim gained importance after the EU-accession.

understanding between citizens. In addition, as a real breakthrough, the Recommendation 1201 was accepted by Romania as a legal obligation. The Treaty contained the rights of minorities, in addition to the means of implementation of these rights. Although collective rights of minorities including the concept of autonomy were rejected, the Treaty represents a milestone in Hungarian-Romanian relations.

Despite of the fact that an intergovernmental expert commission was charged with the monitoring of the implementation of the Treaty, the control mechanism of the agreement became weak. After that the situation of minorities has improved less than expected, but otherwise the relations between the two countries began to develop.

Launching of deeper cooperation (1996–2004)

In November, 1996 presidential and parliamentary elections were held in Romania. Subsequently, the Democratic Convention was elected as the majority in the legislature, and it contained the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (DAHR), the party of Hungarian minorities. In the next few years, neighborhood relations developed immensely since the presence of DAHR in the government put real pressure on the executive branch.

A more emphasized nation policy: Status Law

In 1998 the Hungarian parliamentary elections resulted in the establishment of a conservative government (1998-2002). Viktor Orbán became the Hungarian Prime Minister. Regarding neighborhood policy, the results of the elections implied that the executive branch would begin to put more emphasis on nation policy patterned by the Antall-government. The international circumstances were positive: Hungary was on its way to NATO and EU accession. Moreover, according to the Basic Treaty Romania was not only neutralized,¹²⁷² but there were also good relations between the Heads of Governments of the two countries. As a result, the government maintained more proactiveness in neighborhood policy.

¹²⁷² Dunay, "Hungarian Foreign Policy in the Era of Transition", p. 203.

The Orbán-government decided to institutionalize the Hungarian-Hungarian relationship¹²⁷³ as they wanted to grant more support to the Hungarians living beyond the borders. In consequence, they prepared the so-called Status law. Its aim was to give support on the field to education, science or culture to the members of Hungarian communities living beyond the borders. Additionally, it provided recourse of health care insurance, as well as financial support for the families if their children went to a Hungarian educational institution. Also, it offered easier access to the Hungarian labor market.¹²⁷⁴

As regards its legal aspects, the two main characteristic of the so-called Status Law was that it offered privileges to foreign citizens on the basis of ethnicity on the one hand; on the other hand, it provided a new narrative to the Hungarian nation concept by extending the scope of the nation from the citizens of the country to the whole Hungarian cultural community living in the Carpathian Basin.¹²⁷⁵ This modern approach of the nation was hard to be accepted either by the European or international organizations at that time.¹²⁷⁶

The Law on Hungarians Living in Neighboring Countries was prepared and accepted without any consultation or agreement with neighboring countries, including Romania. Since the law had extra-territorial applicability, the lack of consultation complicated Hungary's relations with its neighbors. The Hungarian government's wrong-headed communication was also demonstrated by the inaccurate translation of the law. Subsequently, international discourse on the Status Law denounced Hungary mainly due to the extra-territorial feature of the law without looking at its initial aims. Investigation of the European Parliament led by MEP Eric Jürgens declared the law extra-territorial and discriminative in his report due to the fact that the definition of the

¹²⁷³ Hungarian-Hungarian relationship refers to the connection between Hungary, as kin-state, and Hungarian communities living beyond the border.

¹²⁷⁴ Károly Szilágyi, (2001), "A státustörvény", *Jogi fórum*, last modified May 28, 2001, <http://www.jogiforum.hu/publikaciok/92>

¹²⁷⁵ George Schöpflin, "Citizenship and Ethnicity: The Hungarian Status Law". In Zoltán Kántor, Balázs Majtényi, Osamu Ieda, and Iván Halász (eds.): *The Hungarian Status Law: Nation Building and/or Minority Protection*. (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, 2004), p. 94.

¹²⁷⁶ Bárdi, "The History of Relations between Hungarian Governments and Ethnic Hungarians", 2004, p. 83.

nation was considered too broad which could have endangered the status quo of the actual borders.¹²⁷⁷ Similarly, the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities underlined in his statement that the protection of minority rights belonged to the state on whose territory national minorities are living.¹²⁷⁸ By doing so, he disregarded the point of the Hungarian government which insisted on the fact the Hungarian minorities living in neighboring countries, including Romania, did not enjoy the same range of rights to secure their cultural reproduction as the majority does.¹²⁷⁹

Meanwhile, the report of the Venice Commission recognized the right of the kin-state to support co-nationals living in another state including the provision of benefits in the field of education and culture to the minority. However, economic benefits provided by the law were not acknowledged by the Commission.¹²⁸⁰ Regardless, the law was accepted with a 92.4 % majority, which is not common in the Hungarian legislation.¹²⁸¹

Special agreement with Romania

During the preparation of the law, Romania and Slovakia declared that the country of citizenship had the main responsibility for its citizen.¹²⁸² Romanian leaders were the first to reject the implementation of the act in the territory of Romania.¹²⁸³ After a long process of negotiations in December 2001, the Agreement on Understanding was signed by the two Prime Ministers (Orbán and Nastase).

The so-called Memorandum reflected most of the concerns raised by international institutions. It contained three main parts: firstly, the Parties insisted on the enhancement of mutual support during the Euro-Atlantic integration; the second part dealt with the question of the law concerned; and thirdly, they agreed on further

¹²⁷⁷ Zoltán Kántor, "Status Laws and 'Nation Policy'", 2004, 117.

¹²⁷⁸ Judit Tóth, "Connections of Kin minorities to the Kin-state in the extended Schengen zone". *European Journal of Migration and Law*, N° 5, 2003, p. 221.

¹²⁷⁹ Schöpflin, "Citizenship and Ethnicity", 2004, p. 94.

¹²⁸⁰ Kántor, "Status Laws and 'Nation Policy'", 2004, p. 114.

¹²⁸¹ N° LXII Act of 2001. The adoption of the law of such a great majority can be considered mainly to a tactical choice of the then opposition preparing for the upcoming elections in 2002.

¹²⁸² Németh, "Status Law, Nation Policy, Neighborhood Policy", p. 12.

¹²⁸³ Tóth, "Connections of Kin minorities to the Kin-state", 2003, p. 221.

development of Hungarian Romanian relations. The Parties accepted the above mentioned proposals of the Venice Commission word by word to withhold the possibility of any kind of illegal regulation. Over and above, they decided that preferences on employment would be available for every Romanian citizen, not only for Hungarian minorities.¹²⁸⁴ Also, importantly, the issue of certificates for benefits could only be done by Hungarian authorities instead of Hungarian associations functioning in the territory of Romania. Last but not least, the agreement envisioned the launch of further negotiations on the situation of Romanians living in Hungary and Hungarian living in Romania to preserve their cultural identity.¹²⁸⁵

The Parties discussed opportunities for trade and investment as well. Moreover, they agreed on the necessity of general, bilateral top-level meetings. Since then, the Hungarian Romanian relationships have changed for the better, although there are still some crucial points, such as the official use of Hungarian language at local and regional authorities, the fact that Romania is still considered as a unitary state, etc. This agreement improved Romanian Hungarian relations ostensibly, which was a prerequisite to ensure stability in East Central Europe.

Redefinition of neighborhood policy to meet EU criteria

From 2002 Hungary had a socialist-liberal government meaning that the focus from nation policy turned to the neighborhood policy.¹²⁸⁶ There was a big challenge for the governments of East Central Europe to form their policies to meet the EU requirements. This was the same in case of neighborhood and minority policy. The oncoming EU accession provided extra benefits for the neighborly states, which meant more possibilities for the cooperation. In 2003 the government announced the necessity of modification to the Status Law causing violent protests from the side of the ex-governmental parties. Even so, the government submitted and passed the amendment of the law and made an agreement with Romania according to the modifications. The

¹²⁸⁴ “Megállapodás született a státusztörvényről”, *Jogi fórum*, <http://www.jogiforum.hu/hirek/3109>

¹²⁸⁵ Tóth, “Connections of Kin minorities to the Kin-state”, 2003, p. 223.

¹²⁸⁶ As for the Hungarian minorities are concerned, the politics changed towards them: social-economic-cultural relationships got more support while the unity of Hungarian nation got less support from the side of government.

agreement focused on two main issues. First, the use of the term ‘nation’ was modified; instead of referring to the unity of the Hungarian nation within and beyond the borders of the country, it described the subject of the law as “Hungarians living in neighboring countries in their home-state”. Second, the law formulated the relation of Hungarian minorities to the kin-state through the share of the Hungarian culture.¹²⁸⁷ The aim was to urge Hungarian minorities to stay in their homeland where they were going to be supported to preserve their culture, national identity through the above described benefits provided by the Hungarian government.¹²⁸⁸

Relations within the European Union

The European Union has had several opportunities for the development and improvement of cooperation between Hungary and its neighboring countries, including Romania. Several joint programmes were launched to enhance regional cross-border cooperation. The fact that Hungary joined the European Union in 2004 and Romania just 3 years later was a bit problematic, because some envisaged a new iron curtain due to (1) the strict control of EU borders and visa requirements and (2) different benefits and rights of EU citizens and citizens of a non-Member States. Fortunately, it did not materialize even though Hungary’s membership in the Schengen zone complicated the relations: relations between bordering villages, free movement of workers and goods can be realized only through border control points whose number is still limited; whereas historical ties between bordering settlements are still separated from each other.

Question of minorities

The hope that the EU would solve the question of minority rights was unsubstantiated since within the framework of European institutions there is no single uniform system regarding their situation. Countries who want to join the European Union have to meet the above-mentioned Copenhagen Criteria. Many accused the socialist-liberal government because during accession negotiations Romania was not forced to guarantee

¹²⁸⁷ Kántor, “Status Laws and ‘Nation Policy’”, (2004), p. 118.

¹²⁸⁸ “Aláírták a kedvezménytörvény módosítását”, Jogi fórum, <http://www.jogiforum.hu/hirek/9270>

wider rights for minorities based on the criteria. Furthermore, during the elaboration of the Constitutional Treaty there was also a possibility to enforce the protection of minority rights including collective rights, which was not exploited by the Hungarian government.¹²⁸⁹ Nevertheless, since the accession of Hungary and then of Romania, it became clear that Member States, following the fulfillment of Copenhagen criteria are not called to account for respecting them. However, it shall be admitted that after the 2004 and 2007 enlargement of the European Union, another forum became an instrument for the law enforcement of minority rights. The European Parliament offers the opportunity for the deputies to fight for minority rights, e.g. either within the committees or intergroups such as the ‘Traditional minorities, national communities and languages’ or through non-legislative reports. On the other hand, European institutions have the additional advantage to offer a platform for closer cooperation among the members from different nations.

So far the European Union aims to be the community of communities, though this feature can have different understanding for the Member States. Many perceived the EU accession as an opportunity for a virtual re-unification of the Hungarian nation through the realization of the four freedoms¹²⁹⁰ of the EU within Member States: Hungarians living beyond the borders (in Slovakia and Romania) were guaranteed the rights of EU citizens throughout the Community, but at first place, in Hungary. Following this, in 2007 the nation policy was reformed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Its main objective was to meet the EU requirements and to enforce closer cooperation with neighboring countries and organizations within the EU in order to enforce the regional development policy.¹²⁹¹

¹²⁸⁹ After the French and Danish referenda rejecting the Constitutional Treaty, during the elaboration of the quasi successor of the Constitutional Treaty, minority rights were dropped out from the text, so the Treaty of Lisbon does not include them anymore. Additionally, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union did not become part of the Treaty; consequently it is not legally binding.

¹²⁹⁰ The so-called four freedoms of the EU refer to the free movement of goods, services, labour force, and capital.

¹²⁹¹ This kind of nation policy had a huge problem, which is the determined and expressed actions for the situation of minorities. Regarding Romania it did not result in major problems, but Slovakia exploited this approached and violated the rights of Hungarian minorities several times.

Recognition and realization common interests

The so-called Europeanization of foreign policies of both countries by adapting European politics has considerable effects on neighboring policy; the way of resolving problems, continuous dialogue on various political issues, etc. contribute to an enhanced level of political relations between the two countries. However, what is even more important, that Romania and Hungary belong to the same group of countries (which can be called as EU-12 or new Member States) representing the same interests at EU-level negotiations, i.e. either in the field of cohesion or agricultural policy, etc. As a result, bilateral dialogue can hardly be stuck by certain debates especially in the field of minority policy. The recognition of the necessity and the perspectives of neighborhood cooperation facilitated the further deepening of relations along common objectives and interests. Since 2005, there are annual meetings of the ministers of foreign affairs of Romania and Hungary.

Additionally, Hungary and Romania jointly asked for EU support for several projects; for instance, for the construction of a motorway which was to connect Budapest and Bucharest through Transylvania. Since 2007, Romania and Hungary have harmonized their National Development Strategies, which was necessary for the better exploitation of EU resources. There are also many lower level initiatives, which are supported by the government. The Hungary-Romania Cross-Border Co-operation Programme can also be highlighted. Its aim on the one hand is to improve the key conditions of joint, sustainable development of the cooperation area; on the other hand, to strengthen the social and economic cohesion of the border area.¹²⁹² Hence, there are other common issues like environmental protection, energy supply, gas pipeline links (e.g. the Nabucco project) and transport networks (e.g. the construction of a Vienna-Budapest-Bucharest express rail line) which encourage cooperation. The role of non-government organizations is improving and NGOs are gaining greater importance in the formation and realization of neighborhood policy. Multinational companies, research institutes and Churches can add surplus to the intensification of Hungarian-Romanian relations. Within the Union, regarding the enlargement strategy, Hungary and Romania have

¹²⁹² Vide the official site of Hungarian-Romanian Cross-Border Cooperation Programme: http://huro-cbc.eu/en/objectives_and_priorities

common interests in Balkan policy. Romania, due to its geographical position, formulated its foreign policy in a way to enhance its interest in the Black Sea region on the one hand; on the other hand, in the Balkans, as well, as in the Danube Region. In relation to the latter, Hungary also considers the relations with Western Balkan and Danube countries of utmost importance.

High-level meetings among Serbia, Hungary and Romania took place to discuss issues of common interest, such as transport, energy, and environment. The support of the EU accession of Serbia was put also on the table.¹²⁹³ Furthermore, the elaboration of the European Danube Strategy which is supposed approximate the countries concerned is of mutual interest.¹²⁹⁴ Accordingly, following the example of the Baltic Sea Strategy, countries along the Danube aims to set up a macro regional strategy including topics of common interests, such as environmental, transport, energy, education and science to address them in a more tailor-made approach with the better use of EU funds. Although the Romanian parties have lost their radical nationalist views and propaganda in the last decade, opposition to the national and Europeanist forces still exist at a certain extent, which can hinder sometimes the efforts of neighborhood policy. Additionally, the question of minority rights is still used by certain political parties as a source of propaganda. Meanwhile in Hungary the change of discourse of governments influence the intensity of both neighboring and minority policy.

Summary

We can summarize that Hungarian - Romanian relations have improved significantly in the past decade. Especially since 1996 the Romanian government made huge efforts to get closer to the Euro-Atlantic integration, which resulted in improving her

¹²⁹³ “Magyar-román-szerb külügyminiszteri találkozó”, [Meeting of Hungarian-Romanian-Serbian Foreign Ministers], *Kitekintő*, http://kitekinto.hu/karpat-medence/2009/07/20/magyar-roman-szerb_kulugyminiszteri_talalkozo

¹²⁹⁴ The so-called Danube Strategy through the Ulm process got impetus in 2008 by two remarkable events: firstly, Peter Straub President of the Council of Baden Württemberg proposed the establishment of the Commission of the Danube Regions within the framework of the Council of Regions. Secondly, the EU support for the Danube Region was initiated by Austria and Romania, which was endorsed by the EU Commissioner responsible for Regional Policy, Danuta Hübner. The adoption of the Ulm declaration in the same year has to be spelled out as well.

neighborhood relations. Although Hungarian government generally changed the priorities of neighborhood policy according to their own perceptions, they never rejected its necessity and importance. Regarding minority rights, the situation of Hungarian minorities in Romania improved significantly compared to thereof in the beginning of the 1990s, even though there are still some incomplete problems, i.e. the autonomy, use of national language, local and regional administrative borders, etc.. Although the EU accession did not solve the problem of minority rights, it has provided wider opportunities for further cooperation which are supposed to be exploited successfully in the near future.

This positive process shows that neighborhood policy works in East Central Europe but depends on mutual willingness and actions. Achievements in this field are strongly dependent on the actual governing powers. The reason behind is many-folded: first, Hungary had to overcome the so-called Trianon syndrome and explicitly recognize regional *status quo*. Second, both countries had to commit themselves to Western integration which was not totally evident in case of Romania in the beginning of the 90s. Nevertheless, the Euro-Atlantic integration processes demanded the efficient consolidation of neighboring relations between Hungary and Romania which was also time-consuming and required compromises on both sides.

In contrast to the Hungarian expectations, the European Union prescribes to pursue of a consistent and advanced minority policy and provides only limited opportunities to enforce minority rights as such. Nevertheless, common interests in this framework and the room for continuous dialogue contribute to a more successful neighborhood policy which does not ignore minority policy.

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The Independence of Estonia and the Russian-Speaking Minority

Roland PAPP

This paper will discuss the ethnic situation in Estonia during the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic and the early years of the Estonian Republic after the collapse of the Soviet Union. During the second half of the 20th century, following a few decades of independence, the Baltic States became part of the Soviet Union, including the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic (ESSR). In the years of the first Estonian Republic, the vast majority of its inhabitants were ethnic Estonians. Due to Soviet national policies and migration by the end of the 1980s, only 61.5% of the inhabitants were ethnic Estonian.¹²⁹⁵ The issue of nationality became the main point of contention during the years following independence, and it has continued to be one of the largest problems for the new Estonian Republic.

The Republic of Estonia first became an independent state in 1920 after the Tartu Treaty. This state had more territory than modern Estonia. Estonia possessed lands that extended in the northeast close to the city of Narva and in the southeast to the city of Põlva. These regions contained a significant population of ethnic Russians. In 1945, these territories were annexed to the Russian RRS. Ethnic Russians had also lived on the bank of Lake Peipus for centuries and smaller groups in other regions of Estonia. These populations were not homogenous groups. The majority of them lived in rural areas (71%), but a strong Russian-speaking elite also existed.¹²⁹⁶ In the entirety of the pre-war state, approximately 12% of the population was non-Estonian, but Estonia was still considered to be a nation-state. The largest minority was Russian, but the Swedes, with a population around 7000 in 1934, and Germans, with a population around 6000,

¹²⁹⁵ Andrus Park, Ethnicity and Independence: The case of Estonia in Comparative Perspective, *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 46, N° 1, 1994, pp. 69-87.

¹²⁹⁶ András Bereczki, *Az észt állam és az orosz kisebbség*, Limes, 2011/3. pp. 55-70.

held an important role in society as well.¹²⁹⁷ According to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the Baltic States became part of the ‘Soviet sphere of interests’ and the Soviet Union first occupied Estonia in 1940. During the Second World War, Estonia was also occupied by Nazi Germany from 1941 to 1944, and in 1944, the second Soviet occupation began. During these years, thousands of Estonians emigrated or were either imprisoned or killed. Several thousand Estonians served in both armies.

In the first years after the war, the Soviets had several means of taking control over society. The destruction of the local elites was one such example. The exact number of deported, imprisoned and killed people is still unknown. The Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic had both a government and a separate Communist Party. The real power was in Moscow, and at the local level, Russians or Estonians from Russia controlled everything. They were considered more reliable than the previous Estonian elite.

The nominated leaders had to be loyal to the Kremlin Party leaders, as this was their most important task. For example, the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Estonia between 1950- 1978, Johannes Käbin, was an ethnic Estonian, but he had lived previously in the Soviet Union and could not speak Estonian well. He came to Tallinn from Moscow, and he became the ‘voice of Moscow’ under Stalin, Khrushchev, and into the Brezhnev era.

The first time the ESSR had a leader who had lived his whole life in Estonia was 1988 during *perestroika* when Gorbachev appointed Vaino Väljas as the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Estonia. Between Käbin and Väljas the First Secretary was Karl Vaino, an ethnic Estonian, who was born in Tomsk, Russian SSR, and whom as a true “internationalist”, could speak only Russian.

During the war, there were large population losses in Estonia. In order to rejuvenate the area, thousands of people moved to Estonia from other republics of the Soviet Union. By 1959, 25% of the population were non-Estonians. From the nearly 300.000, 240.000

¹²⁹⁷ Marika Kirch-Aksel Kirch. Ethnic Relations: Estonians and Non-Estonians, *Nationalities Papers*, Vol. 23, N° 1, 1995.

were ethnic Russians. Alongside the other historically present minorities (Germans, Latvians, and Finns), a significant group of Ukrainians and Belarusians emerged.¹²⁹⁸ The title of my paper is phrased as the Russian-speaking minority, rather than the Russian minority. This is because ethnic Russians were not the only people who spoke Russian in everyday life. The Ukrainian and Belarusian immigrants also mainly used the “internationalists language”.

Since education was in Russian or in Estonian, in one generation, these minorities changed their language. Immigrants who arrived to the ESSR mostly moved to cities. Their first “task” was to become the elite of the new Soviet power as previously mentioned. Not only were the First Secretaries Russian-speakers, but the majority of the Party organization’s leaders were also immigrants. During this time, there were huge industrial constructions, and the new “colonists” were the workforce for the new factories and other facilities.

Another large group of inhabitants were soldiers and leaders of the Soviet army. While it is still unknown exactly how many soldiers served in the territory of ESSR, it was definitely a large number. The geopolitical location of Estonia also demanded a strong naval presence. Though troops lived separately from society, the military leaders held influence in several cities. Of course, the Red Army had only one official language, Russian. The millions of young soldiers also played an important role maintaining cohesion of the USSR after their years of service.

This Russian-speaking group was supposed to be the new “Soviet nation”, the leaders of the communist Soviet Union. This population was seen as being the majority and were the only major “Soviet nation” that held power in every state and city of the Soviet Empire. The Party always emphasized the role of these people in the cohesion of the Soviet Union. They could move anywhere within it and usually were given better opportunities than native populations. They were never forced to learn other languages. Most of the Russian-speaking people in the ESSR even had Soviet identities.¹²⁹⁹

¹²⁹⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹⁹ Sirje Sinilind. *Malomkövek közt*, AB Független Kiadó, Budapest, 1988.

The standard of living was better in the ESSR than in other parts of the USSR, and the immigrants received better, newly constructed apartments in the cities as well. According to a survey taken in 1959, 81% of Russians lived in an apartment with all amenities, in comparison to only 54.5% of Estonians.¹³⁰⁰ 86% of Russians lived in towns and cities. They only resided in certain regions, mainly in the industrial regions of Northeast Estonia (Ida-Virumaa).

In the cities of Ida-Viru County, there were huge construction projects during the Soviet era because of the oil shale industry. Kohtla-Järve, Sillmäe and Narva became Russian-speaking cities, though it should be noted that Narva, a border city, had an important Russian minority even in the pre-war period.¹³⁰¹ Today, as the third largest city in Estonia, Narva still has a large Russian-speaking majority.

Tallinn, the capital of the ESSR, became a Russian-speaking city according to Soviet policies. Until the collapse of the Soviet Union, the rate of ethnic Russians in the capital was growing constantly, and by 1989, nearly 50% of the population was part of the Russian-speaking community. In other cities and villages, the proportions were different. In rural areas of the ESSR, Russian speakers were still a small minority.

The immigrants of Estonia were a diverse group. Most of them were workers in various industries. They were essentially migrant workers who had come to Estonia for a few years to make up the workforce. The Russian-speaking minority who lived in bigger cities did not need to learn Estonian and could function using only Russian. Though a large percentage lived in the same place for decades, most did not learn Estonian.

The Estonians were not forced to learn Russian, but for several jobs, knowing Russian was a necessity. By the end of the 1980s, an odd situation emerged in which more people spoke Russian than Estonian. In 1993, 83% of the inhabitants spoke Russian fluently while only 77% could speak Estonian. In Soviet propaganda and in the Soviet Constitution, the right to use languages was declared, and everybody had the right to

¹³⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹³⁰¹ Berezki, op. cit.

primary education in their mother tongue. However, this right was never actualized for millions of Soviet citizens. There was no official language in the USSR, though Russian had a special role as the “language, which helps the communication among the nations of Soviet Union”. In reality, the Party made conscious efforts to assimilate the other ethnic groups of the USSR. The party saw emphasis on the importance of any other language as nationalism, which jeopardized communist ideals. The effects of Soviet policies were only the facilitation of the “natural process” according to propaganda. Russification reached millions of Soviet citizens in every corner of the empire. In the economy, public administration and science, Russian was the most important language. Because centralization of all of the important decisions in Moscow, the use of Russian was inevitable. Therefore, Russian became the *de facto* official language.

In the Soviet Union Republics, each Republic’s native language was declared the official language, so in the Estonian SSR the official language was Estonian. However, in different republics, the same legal status had very different meanings. What soon occurred was division in the use of languages. The majority of Estonians felt that the Estonian language was in danger. One important linguistic division was that knowledge of Russian was required for high positions. Estonian was excluded from city life and was on the precipice of becoming a rural language as it was until the mid-16th century. In the functions of the languages, a process took place in the USSR. In public places and special environments, such as transportation, post, and administration, Russian became the first language and there was a real risk of the diminution of Estonian to it being only used in the private sphere.¹³⁰²

Over the years of *glasnost* and *perestroika*, the Estonian nation began to question the Soviet past. Public opinion came to view Estonia’s incorporation into the Soviet Union as military occupation. Initially, the goal was to see the ESSR continue its existence in a federal Soviet Union. However, this changed over the course of a few years, and the will was formed to achieve full sovereignty and an independent Estonian Republic. In the Gorbachev era, the Russian-speaking population (including ethnic Russians and other Russified Slavic groups) did not share any common ground or goals with the

¹³⁰² Sinilind, op. cit.

Estonians. One reason for this was the lack of a locally integrated *intelligentsia*. The elite of the ESSR had far more in common with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and leaders in Moscow than with ethnic Estonians. The transition of power was peaceful in Estonia. The period beginning in 1988 was named the “Singing Revolution”. The biggest protests in the late 1980s were huge concerts like the Tallinn Song Festival Ground (Lauluväljak) where hundreds of thousands Estonians gathered.

In Estonia, song festivals were significant traditions since the 19th century, and formed an important part of their national identity. The biggest event of the Singing Revolution was the “Baltic chain”. On August 23, 1989, also the 50th anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, approximately two million people joined together to make a human chain 600 km long from Vilnius to Tallinn. The stages of transition in the three Baltic States paralleled each other. While in the Caucasus region, ethnic conflicts caused violence, the most brutal event in the Baltic States was in Vilnius when in 1991, Soviet tanks attacked unarmed protesters, killing 14 people. It was not until the end of the 1980s that ethnic Estonians held important positions in politics. Newly formed political organizations such as the Popular Front of Estonia, the Congress of Estonia, etc. were predominantly ethnic Estonian. However, each of these groups had a small proportion of non-Estonian members. In May 1990, 96% of ethnic Estonians and 26% of non-Estonians supported independence from the Soviet Union.

However, a group of “internationalists” continued to fight against “nationalist Estonians” and supported the continued unity of the empire. This group, Interfront, was unsurprisingly controlled by Moscow. They drew support from a vocal section of Russian workers in Estonia who were worried about losing their privileges in a new regime. Unlike ethnic Estonians, non-Estonians did not have a shared identity or history except for perhaps victory in World War II, which to the local population signified the beginning of the occupation. The status of Estonia depended on Moscow and the situation in the Soviet Union. A day after a coup in Moscow against Gorbachev, Estonia declared its independence. Finally, Estonia became an independent state again on 20 August 1991. The division in nationality continued to be significant following the independence of Estonia. At the time, the status of the Russian-speaking minority going

forward was not clear. The majority of Russians did not want to leave their home in Estonia. The party elite left the country, but most of the 'ordinary' people stayed (even though in the early 1990s, there were special funds to help Russian families move back to the Russian Federation).

The Russian-speaking minority did not have special representation in the democratic transition. Though in 1990 and 1991, a large proportion supported democratization, there were no special Russian-speaking parties. The most popular politicians among Russian speakers were ethnic Estonians. It would be relevant to note that Edgar Savisaar, a reform communist in the late 1980s, became the first Prime Minister of the Republic of Estonia (1991-1992). Today, he is the mayor of Tallinn and the leader of the Centrum Party, which is the most popular party among Russian speakers.

This minority group, around one-third of the population, had special needs, but without real representation, there was no one to act on their behalf. As a result, it was a shock when they suddenly became the minority in a small independent state after being part of the majority in a huge empire. Initially, most of Russian speakers did not have citizenship either. Not every person within the new Republic of Estonia was granted Estonian citizenship.

According to the nationality law, only those who lived in the jurisdiction before 1940 and their descendants automatically became Estonian citizens. People who either did not wish to take up the new citizenship or could not pass the exams required became non-citizens, otherwise known as aliens. These people could apply for Russian citizenship, but the majority did not do so.

This issue has continued to be one of the most difficult issues for the state. However, there has been significant progress in integration over the last 21 years. In 1992, 32% of inhabitants did not have Estonian citizenship. European integration was one of the main goals for the new state, but the issue of non-citizens was a major obstacle to this goal.

As the Estonian government made several steps towards the integration of Russian speakers, there were positive outcomes. The amount of non-citizens became recorded data. In 2011, only 7% of the population did not have citizenship, and around 9% of these non-citizens were the citizens of a different state. This 7% includes approximately 90, 000 inhabitants, and it seems this will not decrease as most do not want to apply for citizenship either.

In conclusion, in the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic, the local ethnic Estonian majority was only a minority in the whole empire. Due to Soviet policies and migration, a significant proportion of the population of the territory was non-Estonian, mostly ethnic Russians. This issue became visible in the transition years, as Estonians were demanding their own rights. Non-Estonians were not a homogenous group, but a significant number of them took part in the Singing Revolution that paved the way for the newly independent Republic of Estonia, where this particular issue has persisted over the last two decades.

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Darwinian Superpower: “Can the Chinese Communist Party Adapt to the Pressures of China’s Domestic Reforms?”

Jonathon Mark WOODRUFF

Introduction

Susan Shirk declares that China’s contemporary one-party state is a “brittle, authoritarian regime that fears its own citizens”.¹³⁰³ David Shambaugh goes as far as to proclaim that Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders are “haunted by fears that their days are numbered”.¹³⁰⁴ Declarations by both domestic and foreign observers affirming that the CCP is on the verge of imminent collapse are not a unique phenomenon, but a consistent feature of the PRC’s history since 1949. John Fewsmith reminds scholars that often in the ‘China field’, predictions of the imminent collapse of the CCP have been wrong in the past, and any fatalist predictions concerning the future of the CCP, are far from axiomatic.¹³⁰⁵ In contrast to these pessimistic depictions, this essay favours a cautiously optimistic approach as demonstrated by Andrew Nathan, who describes the CCP as an example of ‘authoritarian resilience’, and argues that the CCP’s adaptations have enabled it to survive and consolidate its power.¹³⁰⁶

The unprecedented unravelling of socialist hegemony in Central and Eastern Europe during the revolutions of 1989 and the end of the Soviet Union in 1991 led some scholars to mark the death of Marxism-Leninism as a serious political force in both ideological and practical terms¹³⁰⁷. However, in wake of the devastating events of the June 1989 Tiananmen Square incident, the CCP has demonstrated a remarkable resilience to the titanic pressures of the ‘Third Wave of Democratisation’, which saw 75% of the world’s existing communist regimes swept away by the ‘Leninist Mass

¹³⁰³ Susan Shirk, ‘China, Fragile Superpower’, 2008, p. 5.

¹³⁰⁴ David Shambaugh, ‘China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation’, 2008, p. 25.

¹³⁰⁵ John Fewsmith, ‘Since Tiananmen’, 2008, p. 3.

¹³⁰⁶ A. Nathan, ‘Authoritarian Resilience’, *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 14, N° 1, January 2003, p. 6.

¹³⁰⁷ A. Linklater, ‘Marx and Marxism’, (eds) Burchill, Scott, and Linklater, Andrew, ‘Theories of International Relations’, 2009, p. 112.

Extinction' of 1989-91.¹³⁰⁸ The CCP can be best understood through Nicholas Bequelin's eloquent characterization of it as the "first Darwinian Leninist Party in history".¹³⁰⁹ The CCP has both "atrophied and adapted",¹³¹⁰ developing a strategy of co-naturalizing any potential opposition, namely the growing middle-classes, in order to maintain its primacy.¹³¹¹

However as a result of this policy, the CCP runs the risk of ideological dilution, perhaps outright dissolution, and may cease to function as a coherent and viable organization.¹³¹² This gamble will demand further long-term reform to balance between further economic liberalization and tight political control, while filling the ideological vacuum that the atrophy of communism has left in its wake.¹³¹³ Yet, as this essay will contend, this will most likely be on the CCP's own terms and tailored to their political advantage.

Since the beginning of reform in 1978, the PRC has enjoyed an era of unrivalled domestic economic achievement, with an average of 9% growth over the past 25 years (nearer 10% over the last 15 years), per capita incomes that have increased six times and 400 million people lifted out of poverty.¹³¹⁴ China's phenomenal ascendancy onto the international arena has reaped both material and political dividends for the CCP, allowing nationalism to fill the ideological void that threatens to undermine the very existence of the CCP in the post-Maoist era.

However, the combined forces of globalisation and domestic economic industrialization have lifted the lid of a Pandora's Box of powerful challenges that threaten to undermine the legitimacy of the CCP and stability of the PRC.¹³¹⁵ Internally, prosperity has led to increasing levels of corruption, inequality and higher levels of aspiration, which could

¹³⁰⁸ Richard Baum, 'Political Implications of China's Information Revolution: the Media, the Minders, and Their Message', in Li, Cheng, (Eds) 'China's Political Landscape, Prospect for Democracy' (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2008), p. 181.

¹³⁰⁹ N. Bequelin, 'The Limits of the Party's Adaptation', *The East Asian Economic Review*, 2009.

¹³¹⁰ D. Shambaugh, 'China's Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation', 2008, p. 15.

¹³¹¹ S.P. Huntington, 'Third Wave of Democratization', 1991, p. 68.

¹³¹² MacFarquhar, 'Debate #1: Is Communist Party Rule Sustainable in China? Remarks by Roderick MacFarquhar, Harvard University,' October 2006.

¹³¹³ R. E. Gamer, 'Understanding Contemporary China', 2003, p. 85.

¹³¹⁴ Will Hutton, 'The Writing on the Wall, China and the West in the 21st Century', 2007, p. 118.

¹³¹⁵ Kenneth Lieberthal, 'Governing China, from Revolution Through Reform', 2004, p. 137.

deliver a fatal blow to the legitimacy of the CCP regime.¹³¹⁶ Externally, and linked to domestic reform, in an era of increasing globalisation, China's domestic prosperity is vulnerable to the flux of global economic markets. Nationalism has proved potentially in conflict with peaceful development. Worse still, the political asymmetry in Sino-Western ideological relations has given rise to fears among leftists in the CCP that U.S. economic leverage will lead to a peaceful evolution, which will result in increasingly forceful domestic demands for Western-democratisation that could spell the end of Leninist democratic centralism (min zhu ji zhong zhi) in China.¹³¹⁷ This essay will aim to demonstrate that the CCP has not only largely adapted successfully to meet the challenges of these demands, but that long term political reform may not necessarily lead to a loss of hegemony for the CCP.¹³¹⁸

Structure

As an ancient Chinese proverb proclaims, "the beginning of wisdom is calling things by their right name".¹³¹⁹ For the purpose of this essay, we shall define successful adaptation, in terms of the CCP being able through the development of various strategies to evolve to meet the needs of the Chinese state, in order to secure its monopoly rule.¹³²⁰ Due to the vast and complex nature of the reforms and due to word limitation, this essay will focus primarily on economic reform since many scholars consider this to be the primary pillar upon which the CCP has balanced its rule.

Furthermore, considering that economic reform has amplified the demand for and shaped the dynamics of potential political reform pressuring the CCP to make the Party more accountable, the implications of possible political reform must also be examined. With reference to comparative political theories and specific schools of Chinese

¹³¹⁶ Michel Oksenberg, 'The Nature of Chinese Politics, from Mao to Jiang', Unger, Jonathon (eds), 2002, p.204.

¹³¹⁷ Wu Xinbo, 'China, Security Practice of a modernizing and Ascending Power' Part II. *The Major Powers*, Chapter 3, in 'Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences', (eds). Alagappa, 1998, p. 113.

¹³¹⁸ Suisheng Zhao, 'Debating Political Reform in China, Rule of Law vs. Democratization', 2006, p. 50.

¹³¹⁹ William Tow and Taylor, Brendan, 'What is Asian security architecture?', 2010, p. 95.

¹³²⁰ Andre Laliberte and Lantaigne, Marc (eds), 'The Issue of Challenges to the Legitimacy of CCP Rule', 2007, p.6.

political analysis, this essay will be carefully structured for clarity. Initially, we will consider the nature of the domestic reform in the PRC which began primarily in 1978 under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping and developed further under the successive leadership of the CCP.

Next, an overview of key reforms will lead us to consider the burgeoning social, economic, and political pressures that the CCP faces in the 21st Century. These have culminated in the cynicism of scholars such as Shirk, who claim that in the face of such challenges, the CCP's grip on power is inherently unstable and unsustainable.¹³²¹ Finally, we will consider how the CCP's innovative strategies of pre-emptive reform and adaptation provide a bridge for both the CCP and the Chinese state to embark on an era of greater economic freedoms and potential political reform with distinct Chinese characteristics. This will allow the CCP both to successfully surmount the challenges presented by reform and avoid the apocalyptic fate predicted by critics. Along with concluding thoughts, contrasting scholarly opinions surrounding the topics of adaptation and regime survival must also be analyzed.

The Nature of Reform – ‘Opening Pandora’s Box’

For the purposes of this essay, we will focus upon the post-Maoist reform era, which began under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping in 1978 and then develop under the successive leadership of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao respectively. First, we will consider Mao's legacy and the need for pragmatic reform for the CCP to have survived. Second, we will consider Deng Xiaoping's moves towards pragmatic economic development in contrast to Maoist utopianism. Then we will consider the variety of reform undertaken on economic policy. After that, we will consider challenges presented to reform between 1985 and 1991. Finally, we will briefly consider the lessons learned from Tiananmen and external events (primarily the revolutions of 1989 and 1991) by the CCP and the future of reform within the CCP.

¹³²¹ S. L. Shirk, ‘China: Fragile Superpower’, 2008, p. 4
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Mao's Legacy: Atrophy and Crisis

Chairman Mao Zedong's first revolution (1949-76) left a legacy of crises that directly threatened the legitimacy of the CCP. The PRC was left politically, economically and socially exhausted by the instability created by the Cultural Revolution (CR) of 1966 to 1976.¹³²² The Party, which was the direct target of Mao's campaigns in the 1970's against revisionism, was left devastated, atrophied and at the mercy of factionalism.¹³²³

As Hobsbawm surmises, this period of economic woe, political instability, and what he terms Mao's socialist utopianism. "Red was not necessarily more important than being expert, but it was its alternative, revolutionary fervor alone could bring revolutionary success".¹³²⁴ With the death of Mao, his successor Hua Guofeng, whom scholars argue derived his legitimacy entirely from Mao's personality cult, offered only a continuation of Maoist idealism. This is evidenced through his proclamation of the "two whatevers" (liang ge fan shi), meaning adherence to whatever Mao did and whatever Mao said, and his "Ten Year Plan", a Maoist vision with little concession to Chinese reality.¹³²⁵

Deng Xiaoping: 'Pragmatic Reform to uphold Socialism with Chinese characteristics'

Edward Friedman highlights the most significant legacy of the Mao era for reform. While the USSR's entrenched and corrupt Brezhnev-era Communist Party successfully resisted Gorbachev's economic reforms from 1988-1991, the CCP was so devastated by the Mao years that they largely accepted Deng's reforms.¹³²⁶ This was evident by the popular support for Deng and the PLA's engineered downfall of the Gang of Four in mid-October 1976.¹³²⁷ Following his third and final rehabilitation in 1978, Deng Xiaoping then moved to marginalize Hua Guofeng and reclaimed his vice-chairmanship of the CCP. Deng directly challenged the 'whateverist' line by augmenting the Maoist

¹³²² John Farndon, 'China Rises', 2007, pp. 18-19.

¹³²³ Kenneth Lieberthal, 'Governing China, from Revolution Through Reform', 2004, p. 125.

¹³²⁴ Eric Hobsbawm, 'Age of Extremes', (1998), Chapter 16, 'End of Socialism', p. 467.

¹³²⁵ Zhang Lijia, and Macleod, Culm, 'China Remembers', 1999, p. 174.

¹³²⁶ Edward Friedman, 'Debating Political Reform in China', Zhao, Suisheng (eds), 2006, p. 101.

¹³²⁷ Kishore Mahbubani, 'Understanding China', *Foreign Affairs*, 2005, p. 53.

motto “Seek truth from facts” to add “Practice is the Sole Criterion of Truth”.¹³²⁸ Deng advocated building “socialism with Chinese characteristics”,¹³²⁹ including the Four Modernizations (agriculture, industry, science and technology, defense).

While appreciating the necessary and innovative nature of these reforms for CCP rejuvenation and survival, Minxin Pei is careful to remind scholars that Deng Xiaoping was no counter-revolutionary but a true believer in the Communist ideology that the PRC was founded upon. Reform was undertaken cautiously; ‘crossing the river by feeling the stones’ (mo zhe shi tou guo he) characterized the more conservative aspect of the Dengist era.¹³³⁰ Deng was careful to reaffirm the Four Cardinal Principles of the CCP: the socialist road, dictatorship of the proletariat, the ideological dominance of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, and most importantly, the inviolable paramount leadership of the Party. Political reform was not on the agenda, illustrated by the closing of the democracy wall in 1978 and the imprisonment of the human rights activist Wei Jingsheng.¹³³¹

The Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee in 1978 signaled a decisive change in the balance of forces within the CCP. Tacit support was given to modernizing factions within the CCP,¹³³² which oversaw the prioritization of economic modernization in all party work, and the role of market forces in the economy were boldly increased in stark contrast to the strictly planned-economy of the Maoist-era.¹³³³ Deng allowed the creation of small private plots and private markets in which farmers could sell grain that was surplus to their quota. This experimentation was an important precursory image of the reforms that were to come. After this initial experimentation confined to the rural interior, Deng began reform in the cities.¹³³⁴ Factory managers

¹³²⁸ Richard Baum, ‘Burying Mao, Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping’, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 4.

¹³²⁹ Deng Xiaoping, ‘Opening Speech at the Twelfth National Congress of the Communist Party of China’, September 1st, 1982.

¹³³⁰ Minxin Pei, ‘From Mao to Deng: China’s Reform Experience Revisited: Has Autocracy Triumphed?’ 2009.

¹³³¹ Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard, ‘The Democracy Movement in China, 1978-1979: Opposition Movements, Wall Poster Campaigns, and Underground Journals’, 1981, p. 748.

¹³³² Michael Schoenhals, ‘The 1978 Truth Criterion Controversy’. *The China Quarterly*, 126, 1991, p. 265.

¹³³³ Tony Saich, ‘Governance and Politics of China’, 2004, p. 59.

¹³³⁴ S. Shirk, ‘China: Fragile Superpower’, p. 18.

were extended a greater role in the strategic planning of the day-to-day running of their businesses and proletarian workers were offered incentives to boost their productivity.¹³³⁵ Under the direction of Deng, the PRC opened up gradually to the international economy through the creation of Special Economic Zones in July 1979 on the Southern Coast. Advantageous tax breaks among other incentive packages offered by Beijing were designed to allure foreign investors to acquire desperately needed hard capital, meaning business experience and technology.¹³³⁶ Initially, places on the coast sought to capitalize on nearby trade-partners including Hong Kong in order to exploit their experience, trade and the Chinese business diaspora working in these thriving commercial environments.¹³³⁷

Reform Reveals Underlying Challenges to the CCP: Ebbs and Flows

As Hutton admonishes us, reform has charted a relatively gradual and erratic path, with the numerous ideational and economic challenges presented by reform led to Chinese policymakers oscillating between *fang* (opening up) and *shou* (tightening) as they moved forward at each stage of reform in response to the ‘ebbs and flows’ of political confidence and attempts to balance the factionalism among reformers and conservatives.¹³³⁸

The period between 1985 and 1992 proved particularly challenging for reformists in the PRC. China was beset by economic crises: the lifting of price control, the incentive system and an overheating economy resulted in an inflation spike in 1985 (inflation was viewed an evil thought to have been banished from China since the founding of the PRC. This threatened to wipe out savings and shrink wages, and worse still, the CCP was embroiled in numerous corruption scandals, blamed by reactionary elements on the ‘corrupting effect of bourgeoisie liberalism’.¹³³⁹

¹³³⁵ Qiren Zhou, ‘The Unfolding of Deng’s Drama’, *China Center for Economic Research*, 2009, p. 8-9.

¹³³⁶ R. Mitter, ‘Modern China: A Very Short Introduction’, 2008, p109.

¹³³⁷ David M. Lampton, ‘The Three Faces of Chinese Power, Might, Money and Minds’, 2008, p. 162.

¹³³⁸ Will Hutton, ‘The Writing on the Wall, China and the West in the 21st Century’, 2007, p, 97.

¹³³⁹ Zhang Lijia and Macleod, Culm, ‘China Remembers’, 1999, p. 177.

However, the greatest challenge were the events leading up to the Tiananmen Square incident on June 4th 1989. As Shambaugh surmises, “not since the Cultural Revolution had the CCP come so close to collapse”.¹³⁴⁰ The demonstrations initially started peacefully, but the protests quickly became more virulent. The crowds began to directly challenge the regime, and the Democracy Goddess, a statue built to imitate the iconic Statue of Liberty, cast an shadow over Mao’s portrait.¹³⁴¹ It became clear that the students wanted something that the CCP had refused to concede, glasnost (political liberalization), to accompany Deng’s perestroika. Tyson argues that many young and middle-aged Chinese thinkers were raised not as obedient Confucian servants of the state, but as Maoist rebels. Moreover, their rejection of Maoism left them “thirsting for a new way to make sense of the world”. Many young people looked to Western alternatives and began agitating for democratic reforms.¹³⁴² Deng was a reformer, but Deng was no Gorbachev. After much deliberation, the decision to deploy hard power to bolster CCP hegemony was made by the Party’s old guard. CCP Conservatives imposed Martial Law on the 20th May, considering the demonstrations a fight for the life or death for the CCP.¹³⁴³ Hobsbawm, in agreement, asserts that the June 4th “Tiananmen Massacre”, left the regime free to continue the policy of successful economic liberalization without “immediate political problems”.¹³⁴⁴

Only the dismissal of Zhao Ziyang as General Secretary and three years of conservative ascendancy allowed incremental economic reform to continue.¹³⁴⁵ Deng’s “Southern Tour” (nanxun), in 1992 offered the PRC a glimpse of Shenzhen, the exemplar of the “glorious decade” of the 1990’s,¹³⁴⁶ where economic growth (over 50% each year for a decade) resulted by 1991 in the economy reaching \$3.5 billion. This proved vital in silencing anti-reformist reactionary critics within the Party.¹³⁴⁷ The realization that economic reform had to continue now seemed apothegmatic, and it was under Jiang

¹³⁴⁰ David Shambaugh, ‘China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation’, 2008, p. 42.

¹³⁴¹ Tsao Tsing-yuan, Wasserstrom, Jeffrey N. and J. Perry, Elizabeth, (eds), “The Birth of the Goddess of Democracy” from Popular Protest and Political Culture in Modern China,’ 1994, p. 140.

¹³⁴² Zhang Weiguo, “Touching the Scales of the Dragon’s Throat”, *The Dissident*”, Chapter 8, In Tyson, Anne, and Tyson, James, ‘Chinese Awakenings, life stories from unofficial China’, 1995, p. 243.

¹³⁴³ Zang Liang (eds), ‘The Tiananmen papers’, (New York: Public Affairs U.S., 2002), p.423.

¹³⁴⁴ Eric Hobsbawm, ‘The Age of Extremes: The short Twentieth Century – 1914-1991’, 1998, p. 487.

¹³⁴⁵ T. Saich, ‘Governance and politics of China’, 2004, p. 69.

¹³⁴⁶ A. Laliberte, Lanteigne, M. ‘The Chinese Party State in the 21st Century’, 2007, p. 10.

¹³⁴⁷ John Farndon, ‘China Rises’, 2008, p. 23.

Zemin (1993-2003) that China continued deepening reform.¹³⁴⁸ The 1998, NPC meeting saw a nationwide grain market established, an overhaul of the PRC's investment system and the marketization of housing. China's economic achievements were so successful that the PRC was granted membership in the WTO in 2001. China's level of foreign trade increased twenty-five times between 1978-2001, when just 23 years earlier, the PRC was largely isolated from the world economy.¹³⁴⁹

The Demonstration Effect: The Internal and Comparative Lessons Learned by the CCP

Crucially, the CCP prevailed where the communist regimes of Central and Eastern Europe, and even the Soviet Union had unraveled.¹³⁵⁰ John Wong analyzes the factors that explain the ability of the CCP to retain power in China, while considering the varying opinions on the validity and importance of each factor. Wong believes the most significant lesson learned by the CCP was that the validity of incremental reform was necessary to avoiding the drastic changes (*jubian*), which some scholars blame on the "Big-Bang" approach adopted in Eastern Europe, where both major economic and political reform took place side-by-side.¹³⁵¹ Shambaugh characterizes the CCP's reactions to lessons learnt from the downfall of communist-party states in Eastern Europe and the USSR as a process of "selectively borrowing, adapting and grafting them to indigenous Chinese institutions", becoming a hybrid, composed of "bits and pieces of a wide variety of systems".¹³⁵²

The CCP has taken to heart not only the lessons of 1989 and 1991, but has drawn from the successes and failures of political models from East Asian autocracies and even European Social Democratic Parties. These lessons include placing considerable emphasis on expanding the economy, improving the standard of living, embracing globalization, targeting Party corruption, utilizing nationalist symbols, and courting the business classes. It also maintained tight control over security services, the media, and

¹³⁴⁸ Benjamin Yang, 'Deng: A Political Biography', (Armonk, New York, M. E. Sharpe, 1998), p. 257.

¹³⁴⁹ J. Wu, 'Understanding and Interpreting Chinese Economic Reform', 2005, p. 315.

¹³⁵⁰ David Shambaugh, in 'China's Changing Political Landscape', Li, Cheng (eds), 2008, p. 293.

¹³⁵¹ John Wong, in Gamet, Robert E. (eds), 'Understanding Contemporary China', 2003, p. 126-7.

¹³⁵² Shambaugh, 'Learning From Abroad', in Li, Cheng (eds) 2008, p. 296.

was flexible with its ideology, expanding party membership to co-naturalize opposition and reinvigorating local party cells and committees.¹³⁵³ Post-Tiananmen, the CCP projects itself as a Hobbesian vanguard of the nation (*wen ding ya dao yi qie*). They play on Chinese fear of a return to the chaos of the “Century of Humiliation” before the CCP’s rule, while undertaking pre-emptive adaptive strategies combining eudemonic soft power and a Leninist tightening of political control through coercion and co-option.¹³⁵⁴

However, despite the astounding achievements of the CCP during the reformist era, the Party still sits atop a Pandora’s Box of economic, socio-economic and ideological challenges that “no other country has faced on such a scale in history”.¹³⁵⁵ The post-Dengist CCP in particular suffers from a dilution of its legitimacy and a struggle to maintain both relevance and primacy in a radically altered China. The question remains if “Market-Stalinism” will be a short-lived, contradictory, and ultimately transitory phenomenon,¹³⁵⁶ or if China’s success is guaranteed only with a strong party-state at the helm of power? The challenges arising as a consequence of three decades of reform and their implications for the CCP will be outlined in the next chapter.

The Challenges of Reform: The Writing on the Wall?

The challenges of reform have significantly threatened to undermine the stability of the PRC and have threatened the CCP’s ability to maintain control.¹³⁵⁷ As a result of growing inequality, unemployment, and corruption, there have been widespread protests, particularly in the impoverished interior. For example, in October 2004, some 60,000 peasants in Hanyuan County clashed with police, condemning the actions of

¹³⁵³ F. Bergsten, ‘China’s Rise: Challenges and Opportunities’, 2008, p. 98.

¹³⁵⁴ Shaun Breslin, ‘Democratising One Party Rule? Political Reform, Nationalism and Legitimacy in the People’s Republic of China’, Fride Working Paper 67, September 2008, p. 28.

¹³⁵⁵ David M. Lampton, ‘The Three Faces of Chinese Power, Might, Money and Minds’, 2008, p.219.

¹³⁵⁶ Michael Cox, in Baylis, John and Smith, Steve (eds), ‘The Globalisation of World Politics’, 2001, p. 126.

¹³⁵⁷ Bruce J. Dickinson, ‘Dilemmas of Party Adaptation: The CCP’s Strategies For Survival’, in Gries, P. and Rosen, S., (eds), ‘State and Society in 21st Century China’, 2004, p. 141.

corrupt local officials.¹³⁵⁸ We will now consider the array of challenges presented by reform to CCP legitimacy and monopolistic rule that have arisen largely as a result of economic reform in the following manner. First, we will consider the problems presented by growing inequality and a weak social welfare system. Next, we will consider the problem of the extensive corruption of Party cadres. Finally, we will analyze the impact of heightened aspirations leading to a demand for greater political openness and accountability of the Party to a wider array of domestic actors and the resulting schisms within the Party itself.

Inequality and Inequity: The Collapse of the “Iron Rice Bowl”

Lampton aptly summarizes the rapidly increasing socio-economic polarization prevalent in the PRC. He says that inequality has not meant that large groups of citizens are becoming absolutely worse off, but that most “boats in China have been rising, some just rising faster than others”.¹³⁵⁹ The statistics illustrate this crisis, with the most prosperous 20% of the population retaining 46.6% of China’s wealth, while the poorest 20% of China’s population retain only 4.7%.¹³⁶⁰ As urban income grows at almost twice the rate of rural incomes, the CCP grows anxious about the destabilization this encourages.

Rising unemployment levels and the collapse of the “Iron Rice Bowl” (tiefanwan) exacerbate the problem of inequality. The loss of housing and social welfare coincides with the increasingly transparent opulence of cadres, who enjoy a standard of living far beyond a civil servants’ salary.¹³⁶¹ In many instances, the government is no longer willing to support State Owned Enterprises (SOE’s) that are not competitive, and staggering numbers were closed from 1995 to 2001, leaving 65 million workers unemployed.¹³⁶² Solinger even claims that in 1999, the real unemployment figure could

¹³⁵⁸ Willy Wo-Lap Lam, ‘Chinese Politics in the Hu Jintao Era, New Leaders, New Challenges’, 2006, p. 90.

¹³⁵⁹ D. M. Lampton, ‘The Three Faces of Chinese Power’, p.219.

¹³⁶⁰ Robert Mitter, p., ‘Modern China’, 2008, p. 85.

¹³⁶¹ A. Laliberte, M. Lanteigne, ‘The Chinese Party State in the 21st Century’, 2007, p. 17.

¹³⁶² S. L. Shirk, ‘China: Fragile Superpower’, 2008, p. 29.

have been as high as 100 million.¹³⁶³ Eminent PRC scholars Zhou Tianyong and Zhou Ruijin have proposed a policy comparable to Western trickle down economics in which the PRC should take advantage of the economic windfalls that globalization has created. This allows China to aggregate wealth rapidly, pooled largely in the coastal SEZs (areas of intense FDI investment since the 1978 era) and to then focus on equity and redistribution to the relatively impoverished interior later on.¹³⁶⁴ Liu Guoguang in contrast claims that placing greater emphasis upon equality and equity can only combat the proliferation of protests and civil unrest that threaten national security.¹³⁶⁵ Furthermore, the recent economic recession has led to sharp criticism of this economic theory in the West, and it remains doubtful that it can underpin the CCP's adaptive developmental model in the long-term.¹³⁶⁶

Corruption: The Fabian Epidemic?

Despite the creation of a Ministry of Supervision and Discipline Inspection Commissions, endemic structural corruption, a problem associated with the fallibility of the danwei system, has only intensified due to the gray areas of "primitive capitalism". Moreover, ineffective rule of law governing the norms of the fledgling economy and a drastically diminished sense of ideological fervor,¹³⁶⁷ has led to estimates that corruption accounted for 14.9% of GDP between 1999-2001.¹³⁶⁸ Wedeman argues that during the 1990s, corruption underwent a qualitative change as the increasingly high-stakes involved have led to a proliferation of high-profile cases. These high profile cases in particular act as a catalyst, generating political cynicism and malaise among even CCP cadres.¹³⁶⁹ Gavin Read's recent fieldwork on the opaque business community of Guangdong province considers further the extent to which Chinese firms are beholden to the pervasive culture of guan xi, frequently vying for opportunities brought through

¹³⁶³ D. J. Solinger, 'The New Crowd of the Dispossessed: The Shift of the Urban Proletariat from Master to Mendicant', in Gries and Rosen, *State and Society*, p. 50.

¹³⁶⁴ Lampton, 'The Three Faces of Chinese Power,' 2008, p. 220.

¹³⁶⁵ Liu Guoguang, in *Ibid.*, p. 220.

¹³⁶⁶ Michael S. Derby, 'Trickle-Down Economics Fails to Deliver as Promised', *Wall Street Journal*, June 2009.

¹³⁶⁷ Lieberthal, 'Governing China', p. 198.

¹³⁶⁸ Willy Wo-Lap Lam, 'Chinese Politics in the Hu Jintao Era', p. 144.

¹³⁶⁹ A. Wedeman, 'The Intensification of Corruption in China,' *The China Quarterly* 180, 2004, p. 895.

bribing corrupt officials rather than focusing on increasing professionalism or adhering to open, market-based competition. This suggests that without sufficient rule of law, well-connected CCP officials will retain nearly all the keys to China's economic rise, making the temptation of corruption a consistent reality and placing a crippling burden on the expansion of the economy.¹³⁷⁰ Richard Levy expands on the impact of corruption in Henan and Guangdong province, claiming that increasingly corrupt entrepreneurs and party officials are acting to exclude the rural poor from political participation through vote-buying, which threatens to induce governmental stagnation and the alienation of the CCP from rural society.¹³⁷¹

Crucially, the intensification of corruption directly conflicts with the CCP's constitution article 3-(3), calling for Party officials to act selflessly on behalf of the PRC, "being the first to bear hardships and the last to enjoy comforts, working selflessly for the public interests".¹³⁷² Corruption in reform-era China therefore, in a fashion comparable to the corruption and political stagnation of the Brezhnev-era USSR, threatens to undermine the moral and ideological salience of the CCP as a governing organization.¹³⁷³

Higher Aspirations: The Rise of the Middle Class

Most significantly, economic liberalization has led to the rise of a prominent middle-strata (Zhongchan Jeiji) of Chinese society. Estimates as to the size of this socio-economic group vary from 20 to more than 300 million.¹³⁷⁴ This group has received implicit legitimization since Jiang Zemin's July 2001 "Three Represents Speech" ("Sange Daibiao"), inducting business people and entrepreneurs into the Party.¹³⁷⁵ China's 4th generation leaders are betting their rule on the development of a stable middle class that they presume will be patient and productive, economically and

¹³⁷⁰ Reid Gavin C., and Xu, Zhibin, 'Entrepreneurial Orientation, Intangible Assets and firm Growth: the Impact of 'Spirit and Material' on the Growth of Chinese Private firms', 2009, p. 39.

¹³⁷¹ R. Levy, 'Village elections and anti-corruption: Henan and Guangdong provinces' in 'Grassroots Reform in Contemporary China', Elizabeth j. Perry (eds.), 2007, p. 47.

¹³⁷² CCP, 'Constitution of the CCP, Amended and adopted at the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China on October 21, 2007', Chapter 1, Membership. Article 3-3.

¹³⁷³ T. Saich, 'Governance and Politics of China', p. 27.

¹³⁷⁴ Lieberthal, 'Governing China', 2004, p. 295.

¹³⁷⁵ D. L. Shambaugh, 'China's Communist Party: atrophy and adaptation', 2008, p. 150.

socially active, but not politically aggressive like in Singapore. However, it is a gamble they may lose.¹³⁷⁶ Huntington, while recognizing that no isolated factor can fully explain the process of democratization, explains that in accordance with modernization theory, a strong-middle class is a strong indicator of a move towards democratic rule, threatening the one-party regime in the PRC.¹³⁷⁷ This could pose a serious political challenge to the CCP's political monopoly. Co-option may prove to alienate not just the impoverished majority of Chinese who are denied equivalent means of political representation, but worse still, may cause intra-party splits which could undermine the CCP's historical mission as vanguard of the proletariat.¹³⁷⁸

Furthermore, hardliners on the Party's "New Left" (xinzuo pai) are increasingly cautious of the growing political influence of the middle-class and the motives of Western investors and domestic entrepreneurs, arguing that peaceful evolution constitutes a significant threat to the CCP's continued survival.¹³⁷⁹ Kelle Tsai disagrees with this pessimistic interpretation and argues that adaptive informal institutions will render the middle-class unlikely to demand regime change in China.¹³⁸⁰ Crucially, the CCP leadership is paranoid that the multitude of disaffected groups arising as a result of these problems like the unemployed urban workers, impoverished rural farmers and an increasingly independent middle class will co-ordinate nation-wide protests towards the regime itself. Two imperial dynasties succumbed to the chaos caused by similar revolutionary movements (indeed one of which led the CCP to power in 1949).¹³⁸¹ The most significant strategies developed by the CCP to ensure its maintenance of power, followed by an overview of scholarly debate on their effectiveness and concluding thoughts, will follow in the next section.

¹³⁷⁶ Lampton, 'The Three Faces of Chinese Power', p. 230.

¹³⁷⁷ Samuel Huntington, P., 'The Third Wave', 1993, p. 37.

¹³⁷⁸ D. Goodman, 'The New Rich in China, Future Rulers, Present Lives', New York: Routledge 2008, p. 40.

¹³⁷⁹ R. Ong, 'Peaceful Evolution', 'Regime Change' and China's Political Security', *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 16, N° 53, Nov. 2007, p. 727.

¹³⁸⁰ K. S. Tsai, 'Capitalism Without Democracy, the Politics of Private Sector Development in China', 2007.

¹³⁸¹ S. Shirk, 'China: Fragile Superpower', p. 7.

‘Will the Party be Unable to Adapt Successfully to the Pressures of Domestic Reform?’

In the post-Tiananmen era and following the recognition of the domestic pressures emerging in the 1990's, Deng's eudemonic development strategy, which largely disregarded the social and political consequences of economic reform, has been augmented by both Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao's leadership. In recognition of the socio-political pressures that aggregate from below as a result of economic growth and wealth accumulation,¹³⁸² the CCP leadership has sought adaptive strategies to supplement the CCP's legitimacy beyond that of continued economic growth and coercion. Shirk identifies the main adaptive strategies of the CCP: firstly, the policy of co-option and corporatism, and secondly, the CCP's attempt at ideological rejuvenation through appeals to populism and greater party accountability to stave off governmental stagnation and most crucially, the CCP's retention of and strengthening of coercive capabilities.¹³⁸³

Corporatism and co-option:

Dickinson argues that Jiang Zemin's pragmatic policy of corporatism and co-option, underpins the observation that in the 1990's, the PRC was evolving towards a more advanced state and that societal dynamism was creating new domestic pressures that needed to be confronted by the CCP.¹³⁸⁴ As Tyson affirms, since the early 1980's, China's market-oriented economic reforms have offered youths broad-opportunities outside the state-run planned economic system to create private businesses.¹³⁸⁵ Continuing marketization and the opening up of China has acted as a socio-economic catalyst for those who increasingly seek social and material advancement without necessarily submitting to joining the CCP, which leaves the Party increasingly vulnerable to ossification.¹³⁸⁶ Jiang Zemin's Three Represents Theory, arguably his

¹³⁸² D. Shambaugh, 'Deng Xiaoping, the Politician,' *The China Quarterly*, 135, (September 1993), p. 490.

¹³⁸³ S. Shirk, 'China, Fragile Superpower', 2008, pp. 66-69.

¹³⁸⁴ Dickinson, 'Dilemmas of Party Adaptation', p. 145.

¹³⁸⁵ J. Tyson, and A. Tyson, 'Chinese Awakenings', 1995, p. 263.

¹³⁸⁶ H. Sato, 'The Changing Structure of the Chinese Communist Party Membership in Urban China, 1988-2002, *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 17, N° 57 (November 2008), pp. 653-67.

most important contribution to the CCP's adaptation,¹³⁸⁷ aims to broaden the Party mandate, from a concept of class struggle that focuses solely on poor peasants and the urban proletariat to include the safeguarding of the PRC's advanced productive forces (first represent), namely entrepreneurs and intellectuals from the private sector.¹³⁸⁸

The Three Represents were added to the constitutional amendments in March 2004, despite sharp criticism from the old guard and New Left factions within the Party.¹³⁸⁹ However, the tactics appear to have worked well with the Organization Department announcing that college students entering the Party in 2005 increased by 7340,000, a rate of expansion twice that of overall party growth.¹³⁹⁰ This bolsters the importance of the Party's patronage system by incorporating individuals into the party who could have otherwise become independent opposition, while simultaneously allowing the CCP to overcome the indifference of the entrepreneurs and to maintain its finger on the pulse of the social-strata driving China's phenomenal economic growth. Yet the Party's ideological cohesion is undermined by this change in Party composition. There is strong evidence to suggest that membership has been declining amongst those traditionally regarded as the revolutionary backbone with poorer peasants, workers and soldiers dropping from 83% of the party in 1956 to 45% in 2002.¹³⁹¹

Populism: Ideological Rejuvenation and Party Accountability

Since assuming power in 2003, the Hu-Wen administration has sought to tackle the waning ideational power of the Communist ideology due to co-option and market reform by outlining the Theory of Harmonious Society (hexie shehui) at the 2005 National People's Congress.¹³⁹² Increasing Party accountability is key to the Hu-Wen administration's concept of a harmonious socialist society, and a prime strategy is the

¹³⁸⁷ J. Fewsmith, 'Since Tiananmen', p. 269.

¹³⁸⁸ G. Yang, 'China in the Twenty-First Century Challenges and Opportunities S. Hua; S. Guo (eds), p.120.

¹³⁸⁹ T. Saich, 'Governance and Politics of China', p. 85.

¹³⁹⁰ Lampton, 'Three Faces of Chinese Power', p. 230.

¹³⁹¹ Dickinson, 'Dilemmas of Party Adaptation', p. 142.

¹³⁹² H. Holbig, 'Remaking the CCP's Ideology: Determinants, Progress, and Limits under Hu Jintao', *Journal Of Current Chinese Affairs*, 38(3), 35-6, 2009, p. 36.

extensive targeting of corruption in order to stave off mass political cynicism.¹³⁹³ The Jiang government saw the arrest of former Beijing Mayor Chen Xitong in 1998 and the decimation of the Yuanhua smuggling ring in Fujian in 2001.¹³⁹⁴ Yet the Hu-Wen administration saw an increase in the prosecution of prominent corrupt officials. In 2005, 1,932 officials were convicted of corruption, including six at ministerial level.¹³⁹⁵

Hu Jintao's promotion of the Party's school system has further augmented China's ailing socialist ideology. With a national network of approximately 2,700 schools that provide mid-career training for Party and state cadres, they act as an effective mechanism for indoctrination, not only of these actors, but increasingly of entrepreneurs and military personnel, fostering a tight ideological grip over the driving forces of economic growth and coercion.¹³⁹⁶ Crucially, intra-party democracy offers the CCP a bridge to expand accountability and transparency within the CCP, while refraining from a rapid adoption of Western democratic models.

The CCP has experimented with direct elections of village and township government committees, including contests between multiple CCP candidates and even a limited number of non-CCP members. It is estimated that around 20% of village committees now hold multicandidate elections and 70% of village governments are now contested this way.¹³⁹⁷ This largely successful Party-strengthening strategy was institutionalized in the 1998 Organic Law, yet confined to the rural interior.¹³⁹⁸ The limited expansion of intra-party democracy is an attractive option as it encourages skilled graduates and managers eager to acquire political representation to offer their skills to the CCP, creating corporatism on the CCP's terms.¹³⁹⁹

¹³⁹³ D. R. Ewing, Hu Jintao: 'The Making of a Chinese Secretary' *The China Quarterly*, 2003, p. 19.

¹³⁹⁴ R. P. Peerenboom, 'China modernizes: threat to the West or model for the rest?', p. 246.

¹³⁹⁵ Shirk, 'Fragile Superpower', p. 32.

¹³⁹⁶ D. Shambaugh, 'Training China's Political Elite', p. 827.

¹³⁹⁷ D. Shambaugh, 'China's Communist Party', p. 139.

¹³⁹⁸ K. O'Brien, and Li Lianjiang, 'Accommodating One Party Democracy in a One-Party State: Introducing Village Elections in China', *The China quarterly*, N° 162, (June 2002), Cambridge University Press.

¹³⁹⁹ Jae Cheol Kim, 'From the Fringe to the Center: The Political Emergence of Private Entrepreneurs in China', *Issues and Studies* 41, (September 2005), pp. 113 – 43.

Hu Jintao has further expanded the concept of inner-party democracy (*dangnei minzhu*) in a paper published in October 2005 to foster horizontal consultation and debate within a vertical system.¹⁴⁰⁰ Yet, the popular election of China's top leadership, a cornerstone of Western democracy, is strictly prohibited. This marks Hu's refusal to introduce Western multi-party politics to the PRC, believing there is nothing intrinsically fallible with the CCP's core ideology, and that through limited intra-system political reform and adherence to scientific socialism, the CCP will perpetuate its mandate to rule.¹⁴⁰¹

Significantly, even if the CCP cannot avoid incremental steps towards multi-party elections in the long-term while avoiding intra-party splits and successfully addresses socio-economic demands, the experiences of Taiwan's KMT and Japan's Liberal Democratic Party suggest that the CCP, emerging as a Social Democratic Party, will be able to maintain its political hegemony in society for a considerable time frame. Using this window of opportunity to fill the organizational space in society and retain control of key constituencies will bestow the CCP with an advantage over fledgling political groups.¹⁴⁰² The agglomeration of these policies allows CCP to avoid the fate of the CPSU. By allowing limited space for civil actors to vent their frustrations and avoiding top-heavy reform, "all this will enable the CCP to remain a ruling, *Marxist* party".¹⁴⁰³

Strengthening Coercion: "Qiang Gan Zi Li Mian Chu Zheng Quan!"

Crucially, alongside deepening reform, the CCP has not only retained an iron grip over their coercive capabilities in accordance with the infamous Maoism, "Power grows out of the barrel of a gun", but has strengthened the mechanisms of hard power ensure the survival of the regime.¹⁴⁰⁴ The CCP has evolved a policy of selective repression, in contrast to the indiscriminate mass terror of the Mao years, tailoring advances in technology to its advantage by subtly targeting the proliferation of any extensive

¹⁴⁰⁰ CCP, 'Building of democracy in China VIII. Democratic Rule by the CCP', White Paper, October 2005.

¹⁴⁰¹ W. Wo-Lap Lam, 'Chinese Politics in the Hu Jintao Era', p. 35.

¹⁴⁰² Yun-Han Chu, 'Taiwan and China's Democratic Future: Can the Tail Wag the Dog?' in Li, Cheng (eds) 'China's Changing Political Landscape.' 2008, p. 320.

¹⁴⁰³ Hu Jintao, 'Full Text of Hu Jintao's Report at the 17th Party Congress', 31/10/2007

¹⁴⁰⁴ V. Shue, 'Legitimacy in Crises', in Gries and Rosen (eds), 2005, p. 25.

networks of independent, *civil society* actors suspected of opposing the regime.¹⁴⁰⁵ Examples include the suppression of the China Democracy Party in 1998 and the infamous repression of the Falun Gong.¹⁴⁰⁶ The CCP has responded to the Internet boom in the PRC with an estimated 384 million users by tightening control over the media. In tandem with the creation of the Golden Shield Project and the Great Firewall in 1998, the Ministry of Information in October 2000 declared the illegality of any site deemed subversive.¹⁴⁰⁷

Regardless of the relatively permeable information flows, which resulted in the exposure of the SARs cover up by CCP officials in 2003, the CCP seems likely to retain a monopoly over political discourse at least for the foreseeable future.¹⁴⁰⁸ Furthermore, the swift deposition and humiliating televised execution of Romania's communist dictator Nicolae Ceaușescu in December 1989, orchestrated by a disaffected military that sided with protestors, was a potent lesson for the CCP, particularly in light of the June 4th incident which severely tested PLA-CCP relations.

Hu Jintao, despite his obvious lack of military credentials in comparison to Mao or even Deng (not a “long marcher”), has been careful to build up connections between the CCP and the People's Liberation Army (PLA), appointing the children of the revolutionary leadership to key positions in the PLA to shore up their commitment to the Party.¹⁴⁰⁹ Both Jiang and Hu since the early 1990's have addressed the budgetary neglect of the military, a result of Deng's primary focus on stimulating economic growth before Tiananmen.¹⁴¹⁰ Lieberthal highlights the coercive deficiencies, namely the shortage of well-trained police, which the CCP has attempted to overcome in recent years.¹⁴¹¹

¹⁴⁰⁵ M. Pei, 'China's Trapped Transition, the Limits of Developmental Autocracy', Cambridge MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2006) p. 81.

¹⁴⁰⁶ A. Nathan, 'Authoritarian Resilience'

¹⁴⁰⁷ R. Mitter, 'Modern China: A Very Short Introduction', p. 89.

¹⁴⁰⁸ T. Saich, 'Politics and Governance of China', p. 341.

¹⁴⁰⁹ W. Hutton, 'The Writing on the Wall', 2007, p. 141.

¹⁴¹⁰ D. Shambaugh, 'Modernizing China's Military: Progress, Problems and Prospects', (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), p. 191.

¹⁴¹¹ K. Lieberthal, 'Governing China', p. 203.

The 14.7% increase in the official 2006 PLA budget for example, was according to Shirk, directed not only at augmenting the People's Armed Police Force (Wu Jing), but also at ensuring the PLA remains loyal to the CCP and Hu Jintao personally.¹⁴¹² Crucially, Mulvenon argues that it remains likely that the PLA would act decisively to quell a major political crisis similar to Tiananmen due to two strategies adopted by the CCP since the 1990's. Normatively, the CCP has portrayed the PLA as the muscular embodiment of the PRC's nationalism, giving them a considerable face after the humiliation of June 4th. Instrumentally, the CCP has been careful to make it clear that their fates are intertwined. The CCP relies on the PLA for domestic survival, but the PLA recognizes that under any other political system, they would not enjoy such a degree of bureaucratic autonomy and power.¹⁴¹³ Through these coercive forces, the CCP can effectively decapitate any groups that may develop into the organizational basis for larger scale collective action.¹⁴¹⁴

Conclusion: Analyzing the Scholarly Debate

The magnitude to which the aforementioned adaptations have empowered the CCP to survive and rejuvenate is intensely debated by scholars. Whilst they predominantly agree that the CCP is a vulnerable institution, and that further political reform is evidently required in order to reverse the process of atrophy, they tend to dispute the success of existing reforms and the intensity of the CCP's predicament.¹⁴¹⁵ Certain optimistic scholars such as Yun-Han-Chu contest that the CCP is more likely to follow the East Asian Model of development as opposed to that of Eastern Europe or the USSR, arguing that the balance of strengths and weaknesses of the CCP are comparable to that of the KMT in the late 1970's and early 1980's Taiwan, and that the regime's strengths far-outweigh its weaknesses.¹⁴¹⁶ Fewsmith suggests that despite the pressures of domestic reform, existing Leninist institutions in China remain strong and that the intra-party debate at the 2002 CCP Congress was directed at developing mechanisms to

¹⁴¹² S. Shirk, 'Fragile Superpower', p. 73.

¹⁴¹³ James Mulvenon, 'Civil-Military Relations', in *China's Changing Political Landscape*, p. 276.

¹⁴¹⁴ Vivienne Shue, 'Legitimacy in Crises', in Gries and Rosen, 2005, p. 25.

¹⁴¹⁵ David Shambaugh, 'China's Communist Party', p. 38.

¹⁴¹⁶ Yun-Han Chu, 'Taiwan and China's Democratic Future: Can the Tail Wag the Dog?' in *China's Changing Political Landscape*, pp. 319-320.

make government more responsive to the demands of local society without threatening the ruling status of the Party'. There are strong indications he believes in a revolutionary party (gemingdang) evolving successfully into a ruling party (zhizhengdang).¹⁴¹⁷ Presenting a contrastingly pessimistic depiction of the Party's future, MacFarquhar contends that the expansion of party membership to include entrepreneurs and graduates, although allowing the Party to grow to around 73 million members, entails a devastating corrosion of the CCP's ideological mandate. The CCP, he believes, has ceased to represent an ideologically coherent organization and instead is analogous to a socio-political club where membership is drawn not from ideological persuasion, but because it is beneficial for Party members' careers.¹⁴¹⁸ Minxin Pei, while refraining from predicting imminent regime collapse, still underscores the likelihood of a continued governance crisis and political stagnation.¹⁴¹⁹ Shambaugh aptly refrains from zero-sum predictions, arguing that not all regimes facing acute domestic pressures suffer eruptions or implosions; rather, many simply react in an ad hoc fashion to the pressures of domestic reform.

Yet the CCP has been remarkably proactive, adapting to retain power, and this adaptive strategy can stabilize, and even reverse, atrophy.¹⁴²⁰ Weiss eloquently augments the debate, explaining that most states possess the ability to adapt. However, the inability of scholars to immediately identify these capabilities may lead to their mistaken assumption that the state is in decline.¹⁴²¹ Adhering to the Weiss' contribution, this essay identified some crucial factors that may sway the balance of atrophy and adaptation in favour of the CCP's survival. Firstly, there is an absence of any coherent, independent and organized competition or civil society directed against the CCP, with even China's democratic parties contingent on the volition of the CCP.¹⁴²² Furthermore, there is no apparent vanguard of democratic forces, the middle class has exhibited little signs of organized dissent and the tens of thousands of grassroots protests have not been

¹⁴¹⁷ J. Fewsmith, 'What Kind of Party is this?', Paper Presented at the 58th *Annual Meeting of the Association for Asian Studies*, San Francisco, April 2006, p. 12.

¹⁴¹⁸ MacFarquhar, Debate #1: 'Is Communist Party Rule Sustainable in China?'

¹⁴¹⁹ Minxin Pei, 'China's Governance Crisis', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 85, N° 5, 2002, p. 109.

¹⁴²⁰ D. Shambaugh, 'China's Communist Party', 2008, pp. 39-40.

¹⁴²¹ L. Weiss, 'The Myth of the Powerless State', Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999, p. 10-11, cited in Laliberte, A., Lantaigne, M. (eds.), 'The Chinese Party State in the 21st Century', 2007, p. 6.

¹⁴²² J. Farndon, 'China Rises', 2008, p. 50.

unified or aimed at the central Party. In summation, “the notion that such expressions of one-issue discontent will form the basis for call for a multiparty system seems fanciful”.¹⁴²³ On the contrary, the new rich (xinrui) seem more concerned with protecting their wealth from the rural poor than “sharing political power with their fellow citizens”.¹⁴²⁴ Additionally, as long as the CCP retains its monopoly on coercive power, no matter how despotic it becomes, it can remain in power for a significant period of time.¹⁴²⁵ Most crucially, despite previous fears that the recession would cause the patronage system, which arguably underwrites CCP rule, to dissipate, allowing endemic factionalism to surface,¹⁴²⁶ The PRC has bucked the trend of the devastating global recession by implementing a rapid \$586 billion stimulus package, resulting in an average 8.7% growth in 2008. This reached as high as 10.7% in the final quarter of 2009, leaving the West trailing behind.¹⁴²⁷

With China’s economy emerging from the global recession intact, the current situation appears fortuitous. These factors underpin the window of opportunity, which scholars have earmarked as a crossroads for the CCP in the second decade of the 21st Century. Securing the party-state regime for the short-medium term will permit the CCP to evolve on its own terms, either retaining a monopoly on power indefinitely and favouring the intra-party democracy model (dangnei minzhu,) or more likely in the long-term, competing in multi-party elections as a Social Democratic Party, when it feels confident of victory. This transition will be a difficult process, and relies on the choices and innovation of China’s 5th generation leaders. Crucial political reform (or an absence thereof) will most likely come from the top and is dependant on sustaining fragile economic stability, but there is hope. Today’s China is full of sharp and open minds, there is still everything to play for.¹⁴²⁸

¹⁴²³ Jonathan Fenby, ‘The Party Adapts to Stay on Top’, *Far Eastern Economic Review*, May, 2009.

¹⁴²⁴ F. Wang, and Y. Deng, (eds), ‘China Rising, Power and Motivation in Chinese Foreign Policy’, 2005, p.35.

¹⁴²⁵ D. Shambaugh, ‘China’s Communist Party’, p. 40.

¹⁴²⁶ Pei, Minxin, ‘Will the Chinese Communist Party Survive the Crisis,’ *Foreign Affairs*, (March 2009).

¹⁴²⁷ Coonan, C., ‘China bucks global recession with Over 8% Growth Last Year’, *Irish Times*, (January 2010).

¹⁴²⁸ Garton-Ash, Timothy, ‘China Arrives as a World Power Today, and we Should Welcome it’, *The Guardian*, April 2009.

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Unlocking the environmental debate in the post-Cold War Era: the case of global governance of ocean acidification

Gáspár BÉKÉS

Humanity has always strained the Earth's resources to some extent, not just in recent centuries. The extinction of the Mammoths,¹⁴²⁹ the traces of lead in the Greenland ice from the times of the Roman Empire¹⁴³⁰ are examples that mankind has had a transboundary and global impact on its environment.

Humankind however has developed even more significantly and exponentially in the last two centuries. The Industrial and the Medical Revolution raised the consumption of the citizens in two dimensions: population boomed and the per capita consumption increased, and these put a heavy burden on the Earth's seemingly endless resources. The effects of using more and more natural resources, such as fossil fuels can already be felt. Since these effects know no boundaries, they are global problems without a doubt. Nevertheless, the ever-growing danger was neglected in the international field until the 20th century. Although, humanity has had an impact on its environment throughout history, the general acknowledgment of this by scientists and the society is fairly recent. Acting effectively upon these revelations is still lacking. A historical perspective helps us to contextualize why the recognition of the issue is still disproportionately low among scientists, policymakers and members of the public alike. It also presents how environmental protection changed over the decades.

Protection of the environment has existed for centuries in some shape or form. However, since cause-causality links were seldom established between pollution and

¹⁴²⁹ D. Burney & T. Flannery. "Fifty millennia of catastrophic extinctions after human contact". *Trends in Ecology & Evolution*, 20 (7), 2005, pp. 395–401.

¹⁴³⁰ S. Hong, J. P. Candelone, C. C. Patterson & C. F. Boutron. "Greenland Ice Evidence of Hemispheric Lead Pollution Two Millennia Ago by Greek and Roman Civilizations". *Science*, 265 (5180), 1994, pp. 1841–1843.

health effects due to the lack of scientific knowledge, there were scarce regulations and local measures. One rare exemption for recognition was an article from 1896, which highlighted the possibility that CO₂ is absorbed by the atmosphere and induces changes in the climate.¹⁴³¹ Generally, the first national environmental regulations came into effect in the second half of the 19th century, such as the Alkali Act of 1863 in England.¹⁴³² The first international agreements on the environment were signed on narrow topics with a direct economic incentive, such as the Fur Seal Treaty of 1911.¹⁴³³ Progress was slow, both in the theory and practice of International Relations, with significant progress occurring only after the Cold War.

International Relations (IR) itself became an academic discipline only in 1919 with the founding of the first professorship, the Woodrow Wilson Chair at Aberystwyth, University of Wales. Some of the IR's subfields, such as environmental protection has yet to fully develop and incorporate the key principles of the discipline, such as multidisciplinary. Treaties predominantly addressed conservation issues rather than transboundary pollution. It was not until the second half of the 20th century that international treaties emerged dealing with broader issues. From the beginning of the Cold War there were several scientists on the Soviet side as well. They predicted new phases of the Scientific Technological Revolution, when the main issue would be to heal the damages caused by the previous phases.¹⁴³⁴ Nevertheless, environmental protection was mostly neglected up until the nineteen-seventies. In the first half of the Cold War period, however, many believed a nuclear war was imminent and would wipe out the human race anyways. Most of the resources by the two superpowers and their spheres of influence were focused on the political mechanisms of the competing camps. This was reflected in the International Relations discipline as well. Peaceful coexistence, the new doctrine emerging in the 1950s, were spreading very slowly towards such topics as global health or environment. In the era of the Cold War, the

¹⁴³¹ S. Arrhenius, "On the Influence of Carbonic Acid in the Air upon the Temperature of the Ground". *Philosophical Magazine and Journal of Science*, 5 (41), 1896, pp. 237-276.

¹⁴³² Christman, B. A brief history of environmental law in the UK. *Environmental Scientist*, 22 (4), 2013, pp. 4-8.

¹⁴³³ USA, Great Britain, Japan, Russia. (1911). Fur Seal Treaty. Washington.

¹⁴³⁴ M. Kalmár, Történelmi galaxisok vonzásában. Magyarország és a szovjetrendszer, 1945-1990, Budapest, Osiris, 2014, pp. 356-261.

focus was on nuclear pollution at first. Consequently, one of the first treaties was the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water of 1963.¹⁴³⁵ By the 1970s, the fields of cooperation between the two superpowers widened, and the importance of the matter became clear for both sides. In this framework, the Hungarian government proposed several steps to tackle environmental problems.¹⁴³⁶ In 1972, the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) was established, which is the world's most important environmental organization.¹⁴³⁷

Connected to the establishment was the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes or Other Matter in 1972.¹⁴³⁸ This is the first treaty that is relevant to connecting land-based factors to ocean-based ones, although it made no mention of CO₂ from atmospheric sources. In 1982, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea was signed, which addressed marine pollution from different sources.¹⁴³⁹

Later on, the 1986 Chernobyl accident further highlighted the importance of international standards and safeguards, and several related treaties conventions were signed. At the end of the decade, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change was established by the World Meteorological Organization and UNEP in 1988. This is a scientific body that assesses the findings of various scholars on climate change, and enables the UN and the world to formulate an effective response to the challenge.¹⁴⁴⁰

After the Cold War the (now less divided) wider international scientific community started to identify the key problems and solutions. Social sciences were lagging behind even more, especially the relatively new discipline of international relations. Its

¹⁴³⁵ USA, USSR. (1963). Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water. Moscow.

¹⁴³⁶ Kalmár, op. cit., 356-261.

¹⁴³⁷ Encyclopædia Britannica Online. 2016, 03 05. Environmental Law. Retrieved 05 04, 2016, from <http://www.britannica.com/topic/environmental-law>

¹⁴³⁸ Inter-Governmental Conference on the Convention on the Dumping of Wastes at Sea. 1972. Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter. London.

¹⁴³⁹ United Nations. (1982). United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Montego Bay.

¹⁴⁴⁰ IPCC Secretariat. 2013, 08 30. [ipcc.ch](http://www.ipcc.ch). Retrieved 04 05, 2016, from https://www.ipcc.ch/news_and_events/docs/factsheets/FS_what_ipcc.pdf

environmental subfield started to develop when the international community first addressed international challenges to environmental protection, most notably the depleting ozone layer, at the 1988 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer and climate change, at the conference of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), organized in 1992.

Land-based factors

The 1990s were the starting point to address harmful anthropogenic CO₂ emissions, the key factor in ocean acidification. These emissions were addressed by the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development. However, the conclusion of this conference did not include binding targets, but its result is the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).¹⁴⁴¹ The UNFCCC's goal is to "stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system"; also it organizes yearly Conferences of Parties (COP), to discuss findings and agendas.¹⁴⁴² Binding targets were finally established by the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC of 1992, entering into force in 2005.¹⁴⁴³ Since entry into force was delayed, and no substantial reduction of global emissions was achieved, the protocol was ultimately unsuccessful. Most recently a different instrument under the UNFCCC was established, the Paris Agreement, which contains self-established targets.

Thanks to the aforementioned process of organizing an effective informational response to climate change, by now most of the world has realized that the main causes for climate change are Greenhouse Gas Emissions. There are several initiatives to battle the GHG emissions, regionally and globally as well. Countries are mostly focused on halting climate change, to protect their terrestrial environment. It is important to see what incentives countries may have to enact in order to reduce emissions, and what fault lines there are. As for drawbacks, scientists can say that the biggest problem of the

¹⁴⁴¹ UNCED secretariat. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development. Rio de Janeiro, 1992.

¹⁴⁴² United Nations. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. 1992.

¹⁴⁴³ UNFCCC. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Kyoto, 1997.

future is the reduction of greenhouse gases of developing countries. Although environmentally-friendly technologies exist and are cheaper than before, they are still not always a viable alternative to polluting (or) fossil-fuel based ones. In addition, developing countries say that they have to go through the same phases of development as developed ones, and this is just a simple tool of discrimination.

Moreover, developed ones do not want to limit their economies by any means. As well, recently the world price of oil dropped significantly, possibly weakening the *cost-effectiveness of renewables*, providing less incentive to invest in them. However, a fluctuating world price makes for a bad investment, whereas the cost of renewables is constantly decreasing. On the international level the deciding factor of cooperation on reduction is the participation of the biggest emitters, the United States and China, who make up of almost half of all emissions. So far they were reluctant to approve the terms of international agreements (e.g. the USA did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol).

Blind spots in international cooperation

There is, however, another obstacle to effective solutions besides the reluctance of international actors. The treaties and measures regarding the environment (particularly Greenhouse Gas Emissions) either focus only on the marine environment, or on land. Therefore, they do not recognize the interconnectedness of the two spheres, namely the effect of CO₂ emissions on the marine environment. Because of this narrowly focused scientific and environmental-diplomatic viewpoint there are grand discrepancies and *blind spots* between the fields of science, methods of implementation and information sharing. This results in ineffective and incomplete solutions, and the consequences of this will be presumably serious. Without firm action on all aspects of climate change, a global catastrophe is imminent.

Case study

All these can be strikingly presented through connection with *ocean acidification*, the prime example of the aforementioned problems. Ocean acidification is the decrease of

pH in the oceans, due to the rise of CO₂ concentration. An estimated 30-40% of atmospheric CO₂ is dissolved in the water.¹⁴⁴⁴ Since the beginning of the industrial age pH of the oceans have already decreased by 0.11 units, accounting to a 28.8% increase in hydrogen ion concentration (indicator of acidification).¹⁴⁴⁵ Furthermore, this process is accelerating, and by the end of the century, the pH may decrease by up to another 0.3 units.¹⁴⁴⁶ Even more troubling is the fact that the chemistry of the ocean is changing more rapidly than at any period in the past 20 million years.¹⁴⁴⁷

Fortunately, there is total scientific consensus and ample data available on the reality of the issue. Projections vary for the future, but a rapid and dramatic increase in acidification is probable if we do not limit greenhouse gas emissions. Overall, ocean acidification is a well-defined problem that will negatively affect global warming, the marine ecosystem, and thus livelihoods and food supplies. This would worsen the already severe problems of starvation around the globe, and create instability in international relations as well. There is still no clear financial estimate how much loss will occur due to this phenomenon, the data mentioned below are just approximations and not necessarily the total cost of ocean acidification, and even these numbers are alarming.

The change in pH has devastating effects on many marine lifeforms, especially those with calcification processes, since the carbonic acid dissolves their shells. However, many more species are susceptible to changes in pH, and this will lead to a catastrophic collapse of the oceans' biosphere. Several animals' immune systems are weakened,¹⁴⁴⁸

¹⁴⁴⁴ F. J. Millero. Thermodynamics of the carbon dioxide system in the oceans *Geochimica et Cosmochimica Acta. Geochimica et Cosmochimica Acta*, 1995, pp. 661–677.

¹⁴⁴⁵ SCOR Biological Observatories Workshop. Report of the Ocean Acidification and Oxygen Working Group, 2009.

¹⁴⁴⁶ Orr et al., J. F. (.). “Anthropogenic ocean acidification over the twenty-first century and its impact on calcifying organisms”. *Science* , 2005, 437, 681-686.

¹⁴⁴⁷ R. S. Feely. Impact of anthropogenic CO₂ on the CaCO₃ system in the oceans. *Science*, 305, 2004. pp. 362-366.

¹⁴⁴⁸ R. Rosa & B. Seibel. Synergistic effects of climate-related variables suggest future physiological impairment in a top oceanic predator. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 105 (52), 2008, pp. 20776–20780.

multiple elements of the food chain are affected, from top to bottom.¹⁴⁴⁹ Moreover, corals may be vulnerable as well, which provide many species with a safe habitat, so animals are indirectly affected as well. Dwindling populations of sea animals combined with serious overfishing, many species would go extinct. These events would affect fisheries severely. For example, 73% of fish caught in US commercial fisheries in 2007 were calcifiers and their direct predators.¹⁴⁵⁰ Several ocean goods and services are likely to be undermined by future ocean acidification potentially affecting the livelihoods of some 400 to 800 million people depending upon the emission scenario.

Besides direct biological effects, ocean acidification will lead to a decrease in the deposition of carbonate sediments, and the dissolution of existing ones.¹⁴⁵¹ This will cause a rise in ocean alkalinity (the quantitative capacity of an aqueous solution to neutralize an acid), meaning that the CO₂ absorption factor of the oceans will decrease dramatically, which in turn will increase global warming even more.

Another problem concerns the effect the disappearing coral reefs will have on land. Environmental economist Luke Brander stated that coral reef tourism was valued at US\$ 11.5 billion. The shoreline protection value of reefs was estimated at US \$9 billion a year, and reef-supported fisheries at 30 billion. To gain a better understanding, scientists try to grasp the socioeconomic consequences of ocean acidification, and for ease of understanding try to form an economic value representing the loss from ocean acidification.¹⁴⁵² More alarming is that mostly developing countries, which are already vulnerable, sometimes monocultural in production of food and largely reliant on fisheries, or on tourism as a form of income, will suffer the most, and the added problems of global warming such as sea level rise. This creates a great deal of political inequality and conflict in internal and international relations.

¹⁴⁴⁹ C. Mora, Wei C-L, Rollo A, Amaro T, Baco AR, Billett D, et al. Biotic and Human Vulnerability to Projected Changes in Ocean Biogeochemistry over the 21st Century. PLoS Biol 11(10), e1001682, 2013, <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pbio.1001682>.

¹⁴⁵⁰ V. J. Fabry, et al., C. L. Present and Future Impacts of Ocean Acidification on Marine Ecosystems and Biogeochemical Cycle. Ocean Carbon and Biogeochemistry Scoping Workshop on Ocean Acidification Research, 2007.

¹⁴⁵¹ A. Ridgwell, I. Zondervan, J. C. Hargreaves, J. Bijma & Lenton, T. M. Assessing the potential long-term increase of oceanic fossil fuel CO₂ uptake due to CO₂-calcification feedback. Biogeosciences, 2007, pp. 481–492.

¹⁴⁵² C. Winner. The Socioeconomic Costs of Ocean Acidification. *Oceanus Magazine*, January 8, 2010.

The ocean-based factors are predominantly the following. 71% percent of the globe is covered in water, yet generally oceans are a neglected environment. Some scientists go as far as to state that oceanography was not even recognized and a serious discipline until the last few years.¹⁴⁵³ Also, it is stated that the ocean environment was separate from human sciences, and no multidisciplinary approach was applied, its history was not studied with the same scrutiny as other spheres. With this crucial element lacking, it is no surprise that human activities' effects on oceans are not studied thoroughly.

Why is it so? Historically the emphasis was almost always on land, and later, during the Cold War, in space. Everybody heard of the Space Race, but the closest thing to an Ocean Race was in the 17th century. It is no surprise that so far *more than five hundred people have been to space versus less than 10 in the deep ocean*. The oceans still hold many secrets and potential, from natural resources to biological discoveries. When environmental historians organized a session on the history of ocean science in 2010, the audience consisted of one person. Oceanographers only have a professional entity, the Oceanography Society, and only since 1988.¹⁴⁵⁴ Even more troubling is that among oceanographers there are clearly divided fields of chemistry, biology, geology, etc. Overall we can see that the relative freshness of oceanography, the division between its branches and the lack of interest in the oceans make it difficult to cooperate.

Fortunately, awareness has been raised through scientists, policy makers and NGOs in recent years. Scientific advances offer new possibilities for (deep) ocean exploration. With dwindling natural resources on the ground, there is a growing incentive to extract from the deep oceans, which besides posing new challenges to the environment, also raises the importance of all ocean-related issues. The next step however, is less certain. Universally the world's waters are regulated by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. It regulates matters of business, environment, and the management of marine natural resources.¹⁴⁵⁵

¹⁴⁵³ N. Oreskes. Scaling Up Our Vision. *Isis*, 105 (2), 2014, pp. 379-391.

¹⁴⁵⁴ The Oceanography Society. (2014). www.tos.com. Retrieved 2015, from www.tos.com
S. Weart, *The Discovery of Global Warming - Ocean Currents and Climate*. Harvard University Press, 2008.

¹⁴⁵⁵ United Nations. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Montego Bay. 1982

It is widely accepted and regarded as customary international law (even by the United States, which has not ratified it). The main problem with it is that it only vaguely covers environmental problems, in very broad terms, and only territorially. Drafted in 1982, 33 years ago, its contents have not been changed much; the world, however, did change. Although the wide acceptance of the convention in itself is a positive aspect of international relations, it is its drawback as well, since amending it would change the fragile status of customary international law, and it seems almost impossible to come to an agreement. The original convention mentions pollution, however there are multiple aspects that render its statements ineffective.


First of all, the text mentions in part XII Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment, Section 5., Article 222 that countries have the obligation to prevent pollution to territories under their sovereignty. This shows that this is clearly a regulation for traditional sources of pollution, such as chemicals, radiation or oil. Even in those times this was illogical, since due to ocean currents much of the pollution can cause spillover effects, and this is not covered. This is no surprise however, if we connect this to the fact that oceanography was in a pioneering phase, and scientific models of the relations between ocean currents and the atmosphere were only starting to take shape in the 1970s (partly due to advances in computer modelling).¹⁴⁵⁶ At the time there was simply no recognized, established relation of interconnection between the systems. Even more, CO₂ was not regarded as a pollutant.

The problem is that this type of pollution is not bound to territories, and this renders the UNCLOS regulation ineffective. Of course one can argue that the *Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas* (translated as “use your property so that the property of others is not damaged.”) principle may apply here as part of international customary law, since the famous Trail Smelter Case. The crucial point however, is that for something to become custom, both objective and subjective elements must be present. It is clear that subjective element of state practice does not corroborate this theory.

¹⁴⁵⁶ The Oceanography Society. (2014). www.tos.com. Retrieved 2015, from www.tos.com
S. Weart, *The Discovery of Global Warming- Ocean Currents and Climate*. Harvard University Press. 2008.

Another problem with UNCLOS is its emphasis. It is clearly visible that its main purpose is to regulate international claims on waters, to allow for exploitation of natural resources governed by law and to create a framework for interstate relations on the seas and oceans. Much of its contents are focused on this, defining zones such as the Exclusive Economic Zone, and environmental issues are phrased in a loose tone such as “states shall adopt States shall adopt laws and regulations to prevent, reduce and control pollution”¹⁴⁵⁷. Also most of the debates on revising it are based on territorial and natural resource issues. There is much disputed territory in the Arctic for example, where multiple countries have competing claims over land. Another example is the South China Sea, where China, Japan and even South Korea have various conflicting claims. So far it seems that the focus of the international community on oceans or of the UNCLOS is on exploitation, however recent developments of global warming and the worsening developments both on land and sea may raise the importance of other issues than territorial disputes. The main question is if this problem exists with certainty, and if it is so serious, why is there relatively small recognition of it? The source of the problem has its similarities with other environmental problems (e.g. global warming), but it has unique characteristics as well.

The main problem is what I call the *blind spot* of international relations in this matter. Since the source of the problem (CO₂ emissions) is land-based, and the effects are ocean-based, there is a gap between the regulations, mindset and vision regarding the problem, because the connection



is not made by many. This makes problem solving difficult even with incentive. The first step to solving/managing it is to see clearly the connections and the circumstances. It is all a matter of perspective, a point of view. That is why I address the problem as a blind spot. One culture or group may not see things the way the other one does, even if

¹⁴⁵⁷ United Nations. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Montego Bay, 1982.

the facts are straightforward enough. One good example for this is the following story from anthropologist John Wilson, who was screening a film in Africa in a little village. The film was about sanitation and health related issues, how to dispose of waste, etc. At the end, the tribesmen were asked what they saw.

They all said they saw a chicken, but could not recall anything else. John Wilson was surprised, since he did not remember seeing a chicken in the film at all; however, after a careful examination frame-by-frame, he found that for a brief moment in of the corners of the picture there was indeed a chicken.¹⁴⁵⁸ This shows that people's understanding of things is very different from ours. Because of this, information needs to be passed on in a manner that is clear and straightforward. We all know some people still deny or marginalize global warming and its effects, which is the same kind of blindness then the aforementioned anecdote.

So what does it take to address the complex problems regarding ocean acidification? To summarize the main points, we can now piece the puzzle together. First of all, awareness needs to be raised inside and outside of the scientific community. Then land-based actors need to adopt to the emerging problem by incorporating it into action and finally legislation on all possible levels. As it was mentioned, the main regulations are the UNCLOS and the UNFCCC. These need to be altered or interpreted in a way that it includes ocean acidification in a direct way. In the case of UNCLOS, Part XII Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment should be amended to directly address the problem of GHG emissions. Since the UNCLOS has an enforcement/dispute mechanism, it could be effective in reaching a positive outcome. To limit ocean acidification, an acidity threshold should be introduced, similar to a temperature one. This would ensure an objective criterion for protecting the marine environment.¹⁴⁵⁹ Furthermore, the UNCLOS should shift focus from territorial disputes to environmental issues, even if currently GHG pollution is only implied by its clauses.

¹⁴⁵⁸ J. A. Tillmann, A vakfolt hosszú árnya. Retrieved from [filozofia.wordpress.com: https://filozofia.wordpress.com/2013/04/24/tillmann-j-a-a-vakfolt-hosszu-arnya/](https://filozofia.wordpress.com/2013/04/24/tillmann-j-a-a-vakfolt-hosszu-arnya/), 2011.

¹⁴⁵⁹ R. Baird, M. Simons & T. Stephens, "Ocean Acidification: A Litmus Test for International Law". *Carbon and Climate Law Review*, 3, 2009, pp. 459-471.

In the case of the UNFCCC, the text of the document should be changed as well to reflect the complexity of the carbon cycle rather than a focus on solely the atmosphere. Currently it does not acknowledge that the oceans act as a carbon sink, saving the world from further warming. This is especially dangerous, since targets for GHG emissions often do not take this into account, and if the oceans' uptake decreases due to high levels of CO₂, the atmospheric concentration will increase. Article I of the UNFCCC defines a 'sink' to be "Any process, activity or mechanism which removes a greenhouse gas, an aerosol or a precursor of a greenhouse gas from the atmosphere".¹⁴⁶⁰

In addition, the Kyoto Protocol was also ineffective by principle in solving the problem. It allows for a reduction of GHG emissions in general, and theoretically allows CO₂ emissions to increase as long as other gases are decreasing. Therefore, the UNFCCC should incorporate an acidity threshold. This would ensure that the carbon cycle remains in check and that the atmospheric reduction is in parallel with oceanic reduction. Otherwise carbon leakage may occur, offsetting atmospheric gains at the expense of the marine environment. Unfortunately, the text of the COP21 final document only mentions oceans once, and makes no remark about ocean acidification or the marine environment as an equally important biosphere. This is somewhat a paradox, since a whole day of the COP21 was dedicated to the oceans, and the final document of the day by the International Working Group on Oceans and Climate expressed great concern. The lack of focus on the marine environment is also supported by big data analysis. The research examined the roundtable discussions of the UNFCCC between 1995 and 2013. It shows that discussions are centered around five main macro-themes none of which include the oceans. Although the oceans are carbon sinks, they are not taken into account by the UNFCCC discussions. As for the frequency of keywords, oceans' is 17, water's 20, amongst the least frequent terms. In comparison, emission has the highest frequency with 990.¹⁴⁶¹

¹⁴⁶⁰ United Nations. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Montego Bay, pp. 1982.

¹⁴⁶¹ T.Venturini. Baya-laffite, N., C. J., Gray, I., Zabban, et al. Three Maps and Three Misunderstandings: A Digital Mapping of Climate Diplomacy. Big Data & Society, July-December (1), 2014, pág. 1-19.

Ocean acidification, albeit a relatively new field of concern, is among the top dangers to the marine environment, and it should be treated as such, meaning that its priority is above for example territorial disputes. Principles that are connected to the subject, such as common but differentiated responsibility, polluters pay principle and loss and damage schemes should be adjusted to include the marine environment as well. Furthermore, affected regions should be connected with monitoring agencies, to get an accurate picture of the situation, and economic, social and environmental impacts should all be summarized and then shared with policymakers and countries that may not be directly or as much affected by the changes.

The economic incentive should be highlighted as well, since it is less costly to stop events now than later. Moreover, long-term consequences and opportunities must be examined. This means for example that investing in renewable energy is beneficial because it reduces CO₂ emissions and it is getting cheaper every year. Not even the dreaded oil price drop hurts the sector. On the contrary, as Christiana Figueres, the executive secretary of the UNFCCC put it, “the instability of oil prices is exactly one of the main reasons why we must move to renewable energy, which has a completely predictable cost of zero for fuel”.¹⁴⁶²

The main reason to invest in renewables can be summarized in the following quote from a market report from Bernstein Research: “Renewable energy is a technology. In the technology sector, costs always go down. Fossil fuels are extracted. In extractive industries, costs (almost) always go up”. Until global warming is reduced, a contingency plan must be outlined. Since some species are more affected by ocean acidification than others, regional and specific protections must be created. This of course demands research on marine animals and then cooperation between based on the research. Currently only 1% of oceans are under protection.¹⁴⁶³ This needs to change in order to combat the effects of global warming. Unfortunately, there is simply no other way to fight ocean acidification than to reduce CO₂ emissions and battle the already

¹⁴⁶² EDF Energy Exchange. Why Falling Oil Prices Don't Hurt Demand For Renewable Energy. *Forbes*, January 5, 2015.

¹⁴⁶³ Ocean Conservancy. 2015. [oceanconservancy.org](http://www.oceanconservancy.org). Retrieved from <http://www.oceanconservancy.org/our-work/marine-protected-areas/>

present effects of global warming. Plans to use geoengineering tools have all failed.¹⁴⁶⁴ Geoengineering altogether has been abandoned by US scientists claiming that it was “not ready for deployment”,¹⁴⁶⁵ leaving us with little doubt on what the course of action should be.

Conclusion

Overall we can see that factors that hinder the solution of ocean acidification come from multiple sources. The history of environmental protection, the development of oceanography, the technical advancements in science, the global stabilization of international relations, the awareness raised on ocean acidification, the economic incentives to act all contribute towards the goal of dealing with this issue. The relative rapid buildup of forces in environmental protection, renewable energy and sustainable development all give us hope that a solution may be possible. Even the blind spot seems to disappear slowly as more and more stakeholders connect the dots, which is crucial for success.

Still, there are many obstacles ahead. Awareness of the problem is still not satisfactory, and there is no real sign that any of the future resolutions on climate change will specifically incorporate ocean acidification as one the most important issues (e.g. UNCLOS). Even more, there is no real sign that the US or China will actually reduce emissions (US reductions have fierce opposition in the legislation, claiming national interests, economic factors and sovereignty, while China’s rapidly growing economy and huge population may be the reason for withdrawal). Besides these two countries, the developing states’ pollution may also present a great challenge, if they cannot industrialize with more sustainable technologies (NIC, BRICS countries mostly). This problem is worsened by the rapidly growing population of the Earth, who will demand more and more resources, and they cannot all be provided with sustainable energy yet (not even sustainable food production).

¹⁴⁶⁴ C. Lepisto. Iron Fertilization Experiment Proves Geo-engineering Unpredictable. Treehugger, 2009, March 29.

¹⁴⁶⁵ National Academy of Sciences. (2015). [nationalacademies.org](http://www8.nationalacademies.org/onpinews/newsitem.aspx?RecordID=02102015). Retrieved February 10, 2015, from <http://www8.nationalacademies.org/onpinews/newsitem.aspx?RecordID=02102015>

There are also signs of a deteriorating international system, with a re-emerging Russia, an ever-growing China, and conflict in the Middle East. Not to mention that time is against us, since global warming may already be irreversible.¹⁴⁶⁶ Steps to combat and reduce its effects can be taken however, and it is a duty of every government and citizen to do everything in its power to support this effort, even against all odds.

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¹⁴⁶⁶ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 2014. Climate change threatens irreversible and dangerous impacts, but options exist to limit its effects. Retrieved from <http://www.un.org/climatechange/blog/2014/11/climate-change-threatens-irreversible-dangerous-impacts-options-exist-limit-effects/>

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Appendix

Programs of the Annual International Student Conferences of the Cold War History Research Center at Corvinus University of Budapest, 2010 – 2016

I. Annual Cold War History Research Center International Student Conference at Corvinus University of Budapest

Dates: 15-16 July, 2010

Place: Budapest, Közraktár utca 4-6. Room C102

Day 1: The Cold War in Europe

9:00-9:30 Opening remarks:

Zsolt ROSTOVÁNYI, Dean, Faculty of Social Sciences

Csaba BÉKÉS Director, Cold War History Research Center

9:30-12:30 Panel 1. – Hungary in the Cold War

Chair: Géza JESZENSZKY (Corvinus)

Dávid LIGETI (ELTE):

Hungarian Military Preparations for the Third World War in the Rákosi Era

Ádám VÁRHEGYI (Corvinus):

The 1956 Hungarian Revolution and the United Nations

Bálint BAK (ELTE):

The Issue of Hungarian Neutrality during the Revolution of 1956

Gábor FARAGÓ (ELTE):

The Press under the Hungarian Revolution

Máté Gergely BALOGH (Debrecen University):

The Road to the Hungarian-American Claims Settlement of 1973

Ágnes REMETE (Corvinus):

Possibility or Necessity? Hungary's Road to IMF Membership

Béla MICZI (Corvinus):

Trapped in 'Mutual Friendship': Hungary's Last Decade in the Warsaw Pact, 1979-1991

3:30-16:20 Panel 2. – East-Central Europe in the Cold War and its Aftermath

Chair: Erzsébet KAPONYI (Corvinus)

Zsombor DIVINYI (ELTE):

The Show Trials in Eastern European Countries after 1945

Katarína GABÍKOVÁ (Masaryk University, Brno):
Comparison of Polish and Czechoslovak Communism

Martyna BOJARSKA (University of Lodz):
The Rapacki Plan and its Consequences

Melinda VITTAY (Corvinus):
The Yugoslav Political System under Tito

Tamás SRANCSIK (Corvinus):
The Dissolution of Yugoslavia

Manó Gábor TÓTH (Corvinus):
Reckoning with the Past in Eastern Europe

Stephen Patrick WAGER (University of St. Andrews):
How Do We Address the Prevalent Nationalism of Central and Eastern Europe?

16:40-18:10 Panel 3. – Western Europe and the Cold War
Chair: Zoltán MARUZSA (ELTE)

Diego BENEDETTI (University of Bologna):
The Second Berlin Crisis

David CATALAN (University of Michigan):
Understanding Citizenship in Modern Greece

Dóra HORVÁTH (ELTE):
Austria – Balance at the Time of the Cold War

Day 2 The Cold War in the Rest of the World and Current Affairs

9:00-11:00 Panel 1. – Soviet Union
Chair: László KISS J. (Corvinus)

Zsófia GÖDE (Corvinus):
Arab Nationalism and the Soviet Union

Doris DOMOSZLAI (Columbia University):
Soviet Decision-Making during the 1956 Hungarian Revolution

Alexandra BALI (Corvinus):
Evolution of Soviet Decision Making during the Soviet Bloc's Internal Crises in 1956,
1968 and 1980-81

Jennifer OTTERSON (Columbia University):
Limiting the Legacy of Soviet Biological Weapons

11:20-13:10 Panel 2. – Asia and Africa in the Cold War and its Aftermath

Chair: Jennifer OTTERSON (Columbia University)

Torben GÜLSTORFF (Humboldt University, Berlin):
With VEBs and Liberal Market Economy into the “Second Scramble for Africa”
German Activities in Central Africa 1945-75/76.

Viktor MARSÁI (ELTE):
Somalia - The Failure of the Integration Experiment 1960-2010.

János KEMÉNY (Corvinus):
The Changing Face of War in the 21st Century: The Fallujah Case Study

Jonathon Mark WOODRUFF (University of St. Andrews):
Darwinian Superpower: “Can The Chinese Communist Party Adapt to the Pressures of
China’s Domestic Reforms?”

15:00-16:30 Panel 3. – International Relations during and after the Cold War

Chair: Csaba BÉKÉŠ (Corvinus)

Péter András TÓTH (ELTE):
Spanish-American Relations 1948-53

Karina LÉGRÁDI (Emory University):
Comparative Review of Civil Society in China and Hungary at the End of the Cold War

Virág ZSÁR (Corvinus):
Hungarian Neighbouring Policy towards Romania from 1989

16:30-17:00 Closing Remarks

II. Annual Cold War History Research Center International Student Conference at Corvinus University of Budapest

Dates: 11-12 July, 2011

Place: Budapest, Közraktár utca 4-6. Room C102

Day 1

10:00-10:10 Opening remarks:

Erzsébet KAPONYI , Deputy Director, Institute for International Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Corvinus

10:10-11:30 Panel 1 - International Relations During the Cold War Chair:

Erzsébet KAPONYI (Corvinus)

Tamás BARANYI (ELTE):

Problems of American Decision-Making in the Outset of the Cold War

Zardas Shuk-man LEE (University of Hong Kong):

Neither “Left” nor “Right” : Film Censorship Policy against the Soviet Union’s Films in Cold War Hong Kong

Anna PÉCZELI (BCE):

The Two Faces of Ronald Reagan

13:00-14:40 Panel 2 - Central Eastern Europe in the Cold War and its Aftermath

Chair: Csaba BÉKÉS (Corvinus)

Connie IP (Mount Holyoke College):

The Division of Eastern and Western Europe

Béla MICZI (BCE):

The Evolution of the Warsaw Pact, 1955-1976

Krisztina SLACHTA (PTE):

The East-German state Security Service - the Stasi - in Hungary 1961-1989

Balázs DOBROSI (BCE):

East Central Europe and the End of the Cold War, 1985-1991

15:00-16:20 Panel 3 - Conflicts During the Cold War

Chair: János KEMÉNY (Corvinus)

Sonya COWELL (Clemson University):
Why Did the United Nations Pass the Resolution to Go to War over South Korea?
Csaba HORVÁTH (BCE)
Decades of Incidents between the Two Koreas

Ferenc DÁVID (PTE):
Political Transformation and Military Secret Services

Day 2

10:00-11:20 Panel 1 - Hungary in the Cold War
Chair: Zoltán MARUZSA (ELTE)

Zsombor DIVINYI (ELTE)
An unfinished case - The Jacobson trial

Bálint BAK (ELTE):
The Hungarian Uprising of 1956 and the Non-aligned Movement

Peter GALAMBOS (ELTE):
Hungarian-Czechoslovak Relations During the Prague Spring in 1968

Dora HORVÁTH (ELTE):
Szonyi or Rajk : Change in Prisoner's Box as Change in Conception of a Show Trial

11:40-14:10 Panel 2 - International Relations in the Post Cold War Era
Chair: Csaba BÉKÉS (BCE)

Janos KEMÉNY (BCE):
Measuring Success in Iraq and Afghanistan

Viktor MARSÁI (ELTE):
Piracy in the Post Cold War Somalia - A Global Threat or a Local Symptom?

Virag ZSÁR (BCE):
Is Central Europe Restorable under the Framework of the EU Danube Regional Strategy?

Lilla FÖRDÖS (Clemson University):
The Misinterpretation of History and the Road to Educational Reform Serbia

14:10-14:20 Closing Remarks

III. Annual Cold War History Research Center International Student Conference at Corvinus University of Budapest

Dates: July 9-10, 2012

Place: Budapest, Közraktár utca 4-6. Room C102

Day 1

10:00-10:10 Opening remarks

Zoltán SZÁNTÓ Vice-rector (Corvinus University of Budapest)

10:10-11:50 Panel 1 – East-Central-European affairs during the Cold War

Chair: László BÉKÉSI (Corvinus)

Ferenc DÁVID (PTE):

The Hungarian Intelligence and Counter Intelligence Structure in the Cold War era

Roman KOZIEL (University College, London):

The Rise of National Communism in Poland and Czechoslovakia 1945–1956.

Tamás Péter BARANYI (ELTE):

“Measured by the Millimeter” - Hungary and the Non-Proliferation Treaty

Dóra Ilona VERESS (Corvinus):

Opening the Austrian-Hungarian border on September 11, 1989

13:00-14:40 Panel 2 - Resisting Communism

Chair: Dániel VÉKONY (Corvinus)

Anikó FÜREDI (Corvinus):

RFE in Hungary After 1956 and in the Sixties

Oskar MULEJ (CEU):

Armed Anti-Communist Resistance in Slovenia 1945-50

Iji O. SOLOMON (McDaniel College):

The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 and the Whims of Soviet Power

Nello VERDE (CEU):

The decision-making of the Italian Communist Party in the context of the 1956 Hungarian crisis

15:00-16:40 Panel 3 - Transition in the former Soviet bloc

Chair: Erzsébet KAPONYI (Corvinus)

Susan COOPER (University College London):

The rejection of Socialism in the Hungarian national narrative

Laura CSEKE (Corvinus):

The Possibilities of Kazakh foreign policy at the end of the Cold War

Marja LAHTINEN (University of Tampere):

The regime transition in Czechoslovakia: Will the past experiences have an impact on the democratization process?

Roland PAPP (Corvinus):

The independence of Estonia and the Russian speaking minority

Day 2, Tuesday, July 10

10:00-11:40 Panel 4 - International Relations during the Cold War

Chair: Zoltán MARUZSA (ELTE)

Babak ARZANI (Azad University of Najaf Abad, Esfahan):

The Iran-Iraq War: A Cold War Proxy War

Thomas KOLLMANN (University of Bristol):

Nuclear Madness Revisited: What was special about the Brazil–West German Nuclear Accord of 1975?

Melinda KRAJCÁR (ELTE):

The National Security Council and the Korean Decision

Sabine TOPOLANSKY (Corvinus), Anett SZŰCS (Corvinus):

Anglo–American relations during the beginning of the Cold war – the 1958 bilateral Mutual Defense Agreement

12:00-13:20 - Panel 5 - International Relations in the post-Cold War era

Chair: Csaba BÉKÉS (Corvinus)

Victoria JONES (Clemson University):

The Responsibility to Protect

János KEMÉNY (Corvinus):

Counterinsurgency in Contemporary Political Thought

Dániel VÉKONY (Corvinus):

The American role in the Soviet–Afghan war and its implications on global terrorism

13:20-13:30 Closing remarks

IV. Annual Cold War History Research Center International Student Conference at Corvinus University of Budapest

Dates: 9 – 10 July, 2013

Place: Budapest, Közraktár utca 4-6., room N° C 316.

Day 1:

9:00 – 9:15 Opening speech

László CSICSMANN, Dean, Faculty of Social Sciences, Corvinus University of Budapest

9:15 – 11:05 Panel 1: The Soviet Union and the United States in the Cold War and its aftermath

Chair: Brianna GREENWALD, Intern, Cold War History Research Center at CUB

Sara RODA (Catholic University of Lublin)

The Logic of Force. Henry Kissinger's PhD Dissertation about the Sense of Insecurity and the Origins of the Cold War

Jula DANYLOW (Free University of Berlin)

Cold War Representations in U.S. Museums

Orsolya PÓSFAL (Eötvös Loránd University)

The Moscow Youth Festival: Opening to the West or Simply Propaganda?

Laura GOUSHA (Central European University)

The Funding of Hungarian Refugee Students by the Rockefeller Foundation, 1956-1958

11:15 – 12:45 Panel 2: The third world in the Cold War and its aftermath

Chair: Daniel VÉKONY, Ph.D. Candidate, Corvinus University of Budapest

Gábor WESZPRÉMY (Pázmány Péter Catholic University)

Sub-Saharan Africa in the Cold War

Bela MICZI (Corvinus University of Budapest)

Cuban and Soviet Intervention in the Ogaden War (1977 – 1978)

David VOGEL (National University of Public Service)

The Brazilian Miracles: Twelve Years Before and After the End of the Cold War

15:00 – 16:10 Panel 3: Hungary in the Cold War

Chair: Barnabás VAJDA, Selye János University, Komárno

Rita PARODA (Pázmány Péter Catholic University)

Top Secret Soviet and Hungarian Plans for Pre-empting NATO – USA Unexpected Nuclear Strikes

Daniel VÉKONY (Corvinus University of Budapest)

Bittersweet Friendships: Relationship Between Hungary and Countries of the Middle East During the Cold War

Day 2

9:00 – 11:10 – Panel 4 Europe in the Cold War and its aftermath

Chair: Zoltán KELEMEN, Ph.D. Candidate, Corvinus University of Budapest

Vanessa ROBERTSON (American University, Washington)

The German Question that Stumped the West: Errors in Czechoslovakia 1945-1948

Annemarie EICHENAUER (University of Applied Sciences, Fulda)

Social Life in Germany During the Cold War Period

Roland PAPP (Corvinus University of Budapest)

Soviet Policy towards Eastern Europe, 1944 – 1949

Béla MICZI (Corvinus University of Budapest)

The Management of the Polish Crisis in the Eastern Bloc (1980-1981)

Eszteella CSISZÁR (Corvinus University of Budapest)

“Why Should I Be a Minority in Your Country when You Can Be a Minority in Mine?”
Exploring the Roots of the Bosnian War in the Historical Context of the Disintegration of Yugoslavia

11:20 – 13:10 – Panel 5: International Relations during the Cold War

Chair: Csaba BÉKÉS, Corvinus University of Budapest

Jesse HIRVELÄ (University College London)

A Shift towards the Cold War: Interventionism and the Greek Civil War

Juho HÄKKINEN (University of Eastern Finland)

Finnish–Soviet Relations during the Kekkonen Administrations (1956–1982)

Éva MERENICS (Corvinus University of Budapest)
The Armenian Genocide and the Soviet–Armenian Public
Kate LEVCHUK (Central European University)
The Caribbean Crises in View of the Newly Released Documents

15:00 – 17:40 – Panel 6: International Relations in the Post Cold War era
Chair: Péter MARTON, Corvinus University of Budapest

János KEMÉNY (Corvinus University of Budapest)
The Problem of Unsatisfying Wars

Péter Pál KRÁNITZ (Pázmány Péter Catholic University)
The Balkanization of the South-Caucasus in the post-Cold War era

Thomas GILLIS (Central European University)
Tug-Of-War in Orange: How Ukraine's Revolution Reveals Continuing Cold War Tensions

Brianna DZMURA (Indiana University)
Happy Divorces & New Relationships: The Russian Exclusivity Factor

Vusal HUSEYNOV (University of Wrocław)
The Energy Dependence of the East-Central European Countries on Russia

Matteo DE SIMONE (Central European University)
Hybrid Regimes: Stuck in Transition or Fully-Fledged Regimes? A comparative study with special reference to Russia and Iran

17:40 – 17:50 – Closing remarks

Csaba BÉKÉS, Director, Cold War History Research Center at Corvinus University of Budapest

V. Annual Cold War History Research Center International Student Conference at Corvinus University of Budapest

Dates: July 8-9, 2014

Budapest, Közraktár utca 4-6. Room C102

Day 1

10.00 – 10:10 Opening speech

Csaba BÉKÉS, Professor, Director, Cold War History Research Center at Corvinus University of Budapest

10.10 – 12.00 Panel 1: International conflicts during the early Cold War

Chair: Barnabás VAJDA, Professor, University Selye János, Komárno

Márton KOVÁCS (Corvinus University of Budapest, intern)

Ukrainian collaboration with the Axis powers during WWII

Zsolt MÁTÉ (University of Pécs)

Khrushchev in the UN General Assembly in 1960

Irem Melis ÖZYURT (Gazi University of Ankara)

The Berlin Wall and its consequences

Talha TOL (Gazi University of Ankara)

Benefits of diplomatic maneuvers and long-term strategies in the Cold War era

13:30 – 15.30 Panel 2: International Relations during the Cold War

Chair: Erzsébet KAPONYI, Professor, Corvinus University of Budapest

Máté SZALAI (Corvinus University of Budapest)

Small state strategies during the Cold War

László GULYÁS (University of Szeged):

Relations between Saudi Arabia and the superpowers from the beginning of the Cold War to the mid-1950s

Anikó MÉSZÁROS (Corvinus University of Budapest)

Finding a loophole? Finland in the Nordic Cooperation during the Cold War

Derya ERTEMİZ (Gazi University of Ankara)

Terrorism during the Cold War and its aftermath
15:50 – 17:40 Panel 3 Hungary in the Cold War
Chair: Anikó MAGASHÁZI, Research Coordinator, CWHRC

Róbert BARACS (University of Szeged)
Hungary's role in the Congo crisis

Tamás NGUYEN (Corvinus University of Budapest)
A comparison of the economic reforms in the Hungarian People's Republic and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam

Olivia BESZEDA (Corvinus University of Budapest):
The 1956 Revolution of Hungary and the great powers

Bernadett KISS: (Corvinus University of Budapest)
Hungary's foreign policy vis-a-vis the West between 1975-1980

Day 2

10:00 – 12.00 – Panel 4: International Relations in the Post-Cold War era
Chair: Péter MARTON, Assistant Professor, Corvinus University of Budapest

Péter DARÁK (Corvinus University of Budapest)
The end of the Soviet Union: Socialism as a religion

Joseph LARSEN (Central European University)
From Conflict to Cautious Embrace: Sino-Russian Relations after the Cold War

Anna ÖLVECHKY: (Central European University, Budapest):
Two decades of Latvian ethnic political practice, 1989–2010

Kia REPO: (University of Tampere)
Chechen Political shift from separatism to religious radicalism and pro-Moscow governance between the first and second Chechen wars, 1994–2009

11.50 – 12.00 – Closing remarks
Csaba BÉKÉS, Professor, Director, Cold War History Research Center at Corvinus University of Budapest

VI. Annual Cold War History Research Center International Student Conference at Corvinus University of Budapest

Dates: July 7-8, 2015

Place: Közraktár utca 4-6. Room C102

Day 1

10:50 - 11:00 Opening speech

Csaba BÉKÉS, Professor, Director, Cold War History Research Center at Corvinus University of Budapest

11:00 - 13:00 Panel 1: East Central Europe in the Cold War and its aftermath

Chair: Zoltán KELEMEN (Corvinus University of Budapest, Ph.D. candidate)

Eszterella CSISZÁR (Corvinus University of Budapest, PhD candidate) The Role of the Islamic Religious Community (IVZ) in Tito's Non- Aligned Movement

Solveig HANSEN (Corvinus University of Budapest, MA student)
1970 Polish protests in Tricity

Daniel Janisz INDRI (Corvinus University of Budapest, MA student) Stretching the boundaries: Foreign relations of Hungary with the West between 1985 and 1991

14:00 - 16:00 Panel 2: The Soviet Union and the United States in the Cold War

Chair: Csaba BÉKÉS (Professor, Director, Cold War History Research Center at Corvinus University of Budapest)

Szonja SZABÓ (Corvinus University of Budapest, BA student)
The founding conference of the Cominform in 1947

Zsolt MÁTÉ (University of Pecs, MA student)
Khrushchev and the Pepsi. The American National Exhibition in Moscow in 1959.

Anna NÉMET (Corvinus University of Budapest, MA student)
US Cultural Propaganda in Western Europe during the Cold War: A Battle for Men's Minds

Daniil KABOTYANSKI (Central European University, MA student)
Broadcasting Freedom while Demanding Justice: International Solidarity in Labor Disputes of Radio Free Europe Employees

Day 2

11:00 - 13:00 Panel 3: Asia and Africa in the Cold War and its aftermath

Chair: Barnabás VAJDA, Professor, University Selye Janos, Komarno

Bálint KÁSA (Corvinus University of Budapest, English MA student)
The Korean War

Andra-Daria SZASZ (Corvinus University of Budapest, MA student)
Xiangqi - a Chinese strategy for survival during the Cold War

Száva Adél TAR (Corvinus University of Budapest, English BA student)
The Prelude to the Split: Two Meetings between Khrushchev and Mao in 1958 and 1959

Tamas NGUYEN (Corvinus University of Budapest, MA student)
The Doi Moi Reforms in the Cold War framework

András KOVÁCS (Corvinus University of Budapest, MA student)
The revolution of Burkina Faso - An attempt to leave the bipolar system

14:00 - 16:00 Panel 4: International Relations in the Post Cold War Era

Chair: János KEMÉNY (Ph.D., Research Coordinator, Cold War History Research Center)

Max COHEN (St Andrews University, MA student)
Political Considerations for the future of Britain's Nuclear Weapons

Mirtill Krisztina NAGY (Eotvos Lorand University of Budapest BA student)
The Role of Jihadi Symbols in the Transformation of Terrorism

Gáspár BÉKÉS (Corvinus University of Budapest, English BA student) Global Cooperation on the Acidification of the Oceans

16:00 - 16:10 Closing remarks

Csaba BÉKÉS, Professor, Director, Cold War History Research Center at Corvinus University of Budapest

VII. Annual Cold War History Research Center International Student Conference at Corvinus University of Budapest

This conference was organized in collaboration with the European Institute at Columbia University, New York

Dates: May 30-31, 2016

Place: Budapest, Közraktár utca 4-6 Room C 316

Day 1

10:00-10:45 Opening of the Conference

10:00-10:05 Opening Remarks

Csaba BÉKÉES, Professor, Director, Cold War History Research Center at Corvinus University of Budapest

10:05-10:15 Opening Speech

László CSICSMANN, Dean, Faculty of Social Sciences and International Relations, Corvinus University of Budapest

10:15-10:45 Keynote Speech

Victoria PHILLIPS, Lecturer in History, Columbia University Soft and Hard Power during the Cold War

10:45-12:00 Panel 1: Soft power in the Cold War era part 1

Chair: Anita SZŰCS (Associate Professor, Corvinus University of Budapest)

Fatima DAR (Columbia University, BA student, RFE fellow, European Institute)
Psychological Warfare and Soft Power: A State of Total War

Natalija DIMIC (University of Belgrade, PhD candidate)

Yugoslav Soft Power in the Third World. A Case Study of the Yugoslav Involvement in the Angolan War for Independence 1961-1975.

Monique KIL (Columbia University, MA student, RFE fellow, European Institute)

A Penny for Every Word: Radio Free Europe's Call for 'Truth Dollars'.

13:00-14:30 Panel 2: Soft power in the Cold War era part 2

Chair: Victoria PHILLIPS (Lecturer in History, Columbia University)

Thalia ERTMAN (Columbia University, MA student, RFE fellow, European Institute)
Spies, Stars, and Stripes: The Portrayal of Russians in Star Trek and The Man from U.N.C.L.E.

Adriana POPA (Columbia University, MA student, RFE fellow, European Institute)
Radio Free Europe: Intellectual Backlash

Tinatin JAPARIDZE (Columbia University, BA student, RFE fellow, European Institute)
Rebuilding the U.S.-Russian Space Bridge in the Post-Cold War Era

14:45-16:35 Panel 3: the Soviet Union and the United States in the Cold War
Chair: Zoltan GALIK (Associate Professor, Corvinus University of Budapest)

Ádám CSILLAG (Corvinus University of Budapest, MA student)
The analysis of Russian-American relations in the mirror of the actual world-political events: a comprehensive approach

Márton TÖKE (University of Szeged, MA student)
The Soviet Union in Henry Kissinger's Anti-Revolutionary Criticism

Gábor VÖRÖS (Corvinus University of Budapest, MA student)
Ingredients to the Soviet war scare of 1983

Bryan PANACCIONE (United States Military Academy at West Point, BSc student)
Central Asian Human rights after the Soviet Collapse

16:50-18:20 Panel 4 Europe in the Cold War
Chair: Barnabás VAJDA (Professor, University Selye Janos, Komarno)

Manolo MANCO (University of Siena, MSc student)
Italy in the Cold War

Vincent GARNIER-SALVI (Corvinus University of Budapest, MA student)
The 1956 Hungarian revolution and its repression according to the French communist press

Veronika SZAKÁL (University of Szeged, PhD candidate)
Details from the history of Intervision

Day 2

10:00-11:50 Panel 5: Hungary in the Cold War
Chair: Maya NADKARNI (Assistant Professor, Swarthmore College)

Eszter SZABÓ (Corvinus University of Budapest, MA student)
Hungary's relations with the West, 1956-1965

Zsolt MÁTE (University of Pecs, MA student)
The first steps in America. Hungarian refugees in Camp Kilmer in 1956-57.

Eszter HERNER-KOVÁCS (Pazmany Peter Catholic University, PhD candidate)
Hungarian American Advocacy for Hungarian Minorities during the 1970-1980s

Andrea BORELLI (University of Florence, PhD candidate)
Against the Cold War: the role of Eugene Varga and the Institute of World Economy and Politics in Soviet foreign policy (1945-1948)

12:10-14:00 Panel 6 Asia in the Cold War

Chair: Tamás MATURA (Assistant Professor, Corvinus University of Budapest)

Levente SZABÓ (University of Szeged, MA student)
Pacifism and Reality. Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution

Jennifer PIERSON (Columbia University, MA student, RFE fellow, European Institute)
Veiled Student Activists: A Gender Analysis of the Iranian Hostage Crisis of 1979

Andrew GRELLA (United States Military Academy at West Point, BSc student)
The Effects of US Participation in the Iran-Iraq War

Éva SZALAI (Corvinus University of Budapest, PhD candidate)
India and the Non-aligned Movement during and after the Cold War.

15:00-16:30 Panel 7: Latin America in the Cold War

Chair: Bernadett LEHOCZKI (Associate Professor, Corvinus University of Budapest)

Sarita Ruiz MORATO (Corvinus University of Budapest, MA student)
The Guatemalan Civil War: Under Cold War influence?

Dániel LAYKO (Corvinus University of Budapest, MA student)
Causes of the Bay of Pigs Invasion's Failure

Rafael MORENO (Corvinus University of Budapest, BA student)
The Role of Mexico during the Cold War

16:30-16:40 Closing remarks

Csaba BÉKÉS, Professor, Director, Cold War History Research Center at Corvinus University of Budapest