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INTRODUCTION: DÉTENTE AND PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE REVISITED

There are several interpretations of détente but in mainstream scholarship the prevailing idea is that it was basically the period between 1969 and 1975 when the relaxation of tension in East-West relations produced spectacular results, including the settlement of the German question, U.S.-Soviet agreement on arms limitation, and bilateral cooperation, eventually culminating in the signing of the Helsinki Final Act.

For more than a decade, however, I myself have been arguing that détente in fact started in 1953 and never ended up until the collapse of the Soviet Union. The short period between 1953 and 1956 was a major landmark, after which the Cold War meant something else than before. During these formative years the most important trend in East-West relations was the mutual and gradual realization and understanding of the fact that the two opposing political-military blocs and ideologies had to live side by side and tolerate one another in order to avoid a third world war, now waged with thermonuclear weapons, which would certainly lead to total destruction. Therefore the main characteristic in the relationship of the conflicting superpowers and their political-military blocs after 1953 was—despite the ever increasing competition in the arms race—the con-
tuous interdependence and compelled cooperation of the United States and the Soviet Union while imminent antagonism obviously remained. Competition, conflict, and confrontation remained constant elements of the Cold War structure but they were always controlled by the détente elements: interdependence and compelled cooperation with the aim of avoiding a direct military confrontation of the superpowers.¹

The mechanism of compelled cooperation was not visible for the contemporaries, however, we now know that the tacit recognition of the European status quo and spheres of influence explain American inaction at the time of all the Soviet Bloc’s internal crises which, consequently can be regarded only pseudo crises in the East-West relationship. More importantly, the real crises of the time, especially the second Berlin crisis and the Cuban missile crisis, could be resolved peacefully via secret diplomacy— in the latter case including totally neglecting the allies on both sides—exactly by the mechanism of compelled cooperation, aimed at finding a compromise solution and even directly helping the opponent to save face, in order to avoid the escalation of the crisis.²

Similar cases of the omnipresent mechanism of compelled superpower cooperation could be mentioned in all stages of the East-West relationship from 1953 to 1991. This new interpretation of détente will also explain how it was possible that just a few years after the alleged “end of détente” at the end of the 1970s, an unprecedented rapprochement between the superpowers occurred with the coming of Gorbachev from 1985 on.

The new strategy of peaceful coexistence was introduced by the old-new Soviet collective leadership emerging after Stalin’s death, as early as right after the funeral of their former boss. This meant a much more flexible foreign policy aimed at radically easing tension in East-West relations and the continuous deepening of political and, especially, economic cooperation with the West, with the obvious aim of reducing the cost of the arms race and thus improving the Soviet Union’s chances of surviving the intensifying competition between the two opposing blocs.³

The principle of peaceful coexistence, based on the thesis that war between the socialist and capitalist camps was not inevitable, was declared right after Stalin’s death in 1953 and was elevated to the level of a doctrine at the 20th congress of the CPSU in February 1956 and it was in force right up until the dissolution of the Soviet Union.⁴ For the Soviet bloc leaders it meant a peaceful competition between the two blocs in which, of course, eventually, in the long run, the Communist bloc would win. This did not mean giving up the class struggle as such: it only meant that the focus of class struggle was redirected from Europe—the most important territory for advancing Communism so far—to the third world, where supporting mostly indigenous liberation movements created a chance for expanding Soviet influence.⁵ Penetration into the third world was particularly intense in 1962, leading to a...
clusive contact between Stalin and the top leaders of each Eastern European country—the local “little Stalins”—the Soviet leaders now collectively did their best to strengthen the local collective leadership in each country and to maintain contact with them. Another new feature was that the occasional, ad hoc consultations that formerly had occurred were now replaced by regular bilateral and multilateral meetings at the senior level.

As early as June 1953, during talks with the Hungarian leadership, the Soviets explicitly stated that they wanted to rejuvenate their relationship with their allies in Eastern Europe in a fundamental way. According to Lavrentii Beria, the relations had not been nurtured in a productive fashion. “In the future we will create a new kind of relationship, a more responsible and serious relationship,” he promised. Malenkov said that the paradigm would be entirely different from that of the past, and Beria added that Moscow would keep its allies informed about this, possibly hinting at the preparation of a special document containing directives on this topic.10 While no such statute emerged until 30 October 1956, the practice of cooperation with the allies did change remarkably between 1953 and 1955. However, this did not yet mean any radical adjustment of the subordinate status of the East European states; it was merely the regulation and rationalization of the established hierarchy. When the Soviet leaders believed that they could only achieve their goal by brutal political intervention, they sharply rebuked the leaders of Eastern European countries in an authoritative tone that often outdid even Stalin. In January 1955, when the Hungarian leaders were again summoned to Moscow for consultations, Khrushchev practically threatened Hungarian Prime Minister Imre Nagy with execution.11 Moreover, in a perceived emergency, when it was a question of protecting Soviet imperial interests, the men in the Kremlin did not shrink from using the most drastic means possible. In October 1956, they threatened the local leadership in Poland with military intervention, and at the beginning of November a Soviet military invasion put an end to the revolution in Hungary.

At the same time, hoping for general reconciliation, Moscow was determined to significantly improve relations. The Warsaw Pact, established in May 1955, was at that time seen by many as a means of tightening unity and strengthening Soviet dominance within the bloc. However, this political-military alliance itself gradually came to be the catalyst for a new era of Soviet-East-Central European relations. To show formal equality, the Warsaw Pact imitated the organizational framework of NATO,12 and so in theory the organization was a voluntary alliance of sovereign and equal states. The institutionalization of multilateral and regular military-political coordination in itself constituted a qualitative change with respect to former conditions. Previously, only bilateral consultations were held regularly, initiated by the Soviets; likewise, multilateral consultations were infrequent and took place irregularly. The Warsaw Pact marked a new chapter in the history of East-West relations.

ed by Moscow alone. Thus, in a peculiar way, the establishment of the Warsaw Pact significantly increased the international reputation of the allied states, which before had been called simply “Soviet satellite states” in the West. This new development marked the beginning of a process of limited emancipation both in their relationship with the Soviet Union and with the Western and Non-Aligned states. The doctrine of “active foreign policy” announced in the spring of 1954 was also meant to boost the fitness of the allies for international society, and by extension the diplomatic maneuverability of the entire Soviet bloc. From now on Moscow encouraged its allies to use their international reputation, with Soviet support, to the benefit of the eastern bloc in the international system. The allies had to promote the success of Soviet goals in Europe and even more so in the Third World, especially in Asia, the Arab states, and Latin America. While in Europe priority was given to the development of economic relations with the Western European states, in the Third World the main objective was to facilitate Soviet economic and political penetration, and thereby lasting influence.13

As a by-product of the bargain that the great powers made on the Austrian state treaty, Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania gained admittance to the UN in December 1955. With the exception of the GDR then, the European states of the Soviet bloc had achieved a minimal level of preparedness for international affairs.

At the beginning of January 1956, less than a month before the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, the leadership of the European Communist countries participated in Moscow’s most important summit since Stalin’s death. At the meeting, Khrushchev stressed emphatically the importance of the new “active foreign policy” doctrine, by which the socialist camp was to strengthen its international position. Said Khrushchev:

It is true that the Soviet Union is the great force of our camp, but if we organized our work in a more flexible way, the Soviet Union would not always have to be the first to take action. In certain situations one or another country of peoples’ democracy could take action and then the Soviet Union would support that country. There are issues in which the countries of peoples’ democracies could take action better.14

Although no such initiatives had been made up to that time, hereon this strategy became an effective model for cooperation among the states of the Soviet bloc in the field of foreign policy, especially from the mid-1960s up to the collapse of the Communist regimes in East-Central Europe. In this spirit, from 1954 on Moscow kept its allies actively and extensively informed, partly through bilateral channels, of the Soviet position on any given issue in international politics, often even concerning actions that the Soviets planned to take in the area of East-West relations. The demands of intensive coordination entailed radical change to the regularity of multilateral summit meetings: between the last session of
Cominform in November 1949 and Stalin’s death there was only one such meeting that we know of, in January 1951, while in contrast, seven summits took place during the span of just two years from November 1954 to January 1957.

Khrushchov wanted to remake the basic foundations of intra-bloc relations essentially by modifying the terms of those relations from those of colony to dominium. In formal terms, the position of the allies was even more promising: they could now participate in shaping bloc policies as equal partners in the Warsaw Pact and in Comecon. It was an important element of Khrushchov’s thinking that the Eastern bloc enjoy at least ostensibly equivalent capabilities and conditions in its peaceful competition with the West.

Ironically, this new Soviet strategy was in full harmony with the radical changes in U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe that emerged a few weeks after the Poznań uprising in Poland in June 1956. NSC 5608/1, the new policy paper on the “Soviet satellites” adopted on 18 July, a document that in rudimentary form contained all the elements of U.S. policy in the forthcoming decades (bridge building, differentiation, economic pressure, etc.), broke with the slogan of “the liberation of the captive nations” and clearly stated that the “United States is not prepared to resort to war to eliminate Soviet domination of the satellites, nor does attainment of this goal through internal revolutionary means appear likely or practicable.” Consequently, new U.S. policy was not any more aimed at trying to detach the satellites from the Soviet orbit but to “promote evolutionary changes in Soviet-satellite policies and relationships.”

SOVIET-EAST EUROPEAN RELATIONS DURING THE REVOLTS IN POLAND AND HUNGARY AND THE ORIGINS OF THE “MIKOYAN DOCTRINE”

The process of Soviet decision-making during the 1956 revolts in Eastern Europe is well presented by recent studies of new Cold War history. In this chapter I address only some important, controversial or understudied aspects of the topic, especially concerning the role of foreign policy coordination within the Soviet Bloc during these crises.

By the late hours of 23 October 1956 armed clashes had occurred in Budapest and the situation in Hungary was thought by the Soviet leaders to be far graver than the one in Warsaw when the matter was discussed by the CPSU Presidium late on the evening of the same day. At the meeting the idea was not even raised of postponing the discussion until the following day, when the Soviet Union’s allies could be consulted at the Moscow summit originally convened to discuss the situation in Poland and might have decided jointly whether Soviet troops stationed in Hungary should be deployed as the country’s leadership now requested. In the meantime, a compromise was reached on the Polish crisis, with Moscow dropping the idea of armed intervention and Gomulka assuring the Soviets that the envisaged reforms would not endanger Communist power or the unity of the socialist camp.

Yet in spite of the armed conflict—still rather limited at this point—that had broken out in Hungary, the Polish scenario might have been applied. This was put very plainly by Anastas Mikoyan, a respected member of the Soviet leadership and the one who knew the Hungarian situation best: “Without Nagy they can’t get control of the movement, and it’s also cheaper for us. Expresses doubt about the sending of troops. What are we loosing? The Hungarians themselves will restore order on their own. We should try political means, and only then send troops.” The strategy for crisis management in case of a serious revolt in one of the Soviet Bloc member states proposed by Mikoyan (e.g., restoring order by local forces and without the use of the Soviet army)—that can rightly be dubbed the Mikoyan Doctrine—was the only rational alternative in the given situation. However, the rest of the Presidium stood firm and voted for the Soviet intervention. Thus, the Soviet leadership, having tackled world political issues pragmatically since 1953 and even in its last-minute solution to the Polish crisis resisted its imperial reflexes to use armed intervention on ideological and emotional grounds, proved incapable of biding its time and exercising such self-restraint in Hungary’s case. Khrushchov and his associates thereby took the worst political decision from their own point of view, and gave rise to a process whose consequences would be just what armed intervention was supposed to spare them. In other words, they achieved the opposite of what they had wanted: not rapid pacification, but escalation of the sporadic armed actions into an extensive anti-Soviet war of liberation of a kind unparalleled in the history of the Soviet bloc.

While Mikoyan’s proposal was voted down on 23 October 1956, his doctrine survived the Hungarian crisis and during the forthcoming decades became a crucial element of the learning process determining the evolution of Soviet crisis management. It was actually the Mikoyan Doctrine that was applied during the eight months from January to August 1968 when the Soviet leaders did everything possible, from their perspective, to find a political solution and to avoid a military invasion of Czechoslovakia. Similarly, the same determination was behind the reluctance of Moscow to send Soviet troops to Afghanistan in the nine-month period from March to December 1979. While eventually both these attempts failed and a military solution could not be avoided in the end, in December 1981 the successful application of the Mikoyan doctrine occurred in Poland by the introduction of martial law after a sixteen-month long internal crisis, thus making a Soviet military intervention unnecessary.
As we have seen, after discussing the critical situation in Poland in 1956, the 20 October meeting of the CPSU Presidium decided it was urgent to hold a multilateral meeting in Moscow on 24 October, for which they would “invite to Moscow representatives from the Communist parties of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, the GDR and Bulgaria.” Since convening an emergency summit to deal with a crisis situation marked a departure from the previous internal decision-making mechanism of the Soviet Bloc, it is worth looking in detail at the communications between Moscow and its allies during the Hungarian Revolution. Arrangements were also made to brief the Chinese leadership personally by sending a Central Committee representative to Beijing. The fragmentary minutes of the Presidium meeting show that hardly a day after the Soviet crisis managing team had returned from its talks in Warsaw, the general view was that “there is only one way out - put an end to what is in Poland.” This is confirmed by the measures planned, which in similar crises had clearly presaged a violent solution or replacement of the leaders of the day by the seemingly legal technique of dismissing them by appointing new ones: “Maneuvers. Prepare a document. Form a committee.”

The Communist summit hastily convened in Moscow on 24 October had been intended originally to prepare and coordinate Soviet military intervention in Poland. It is clear that the political consultative role of the one-and-a-half-year-old Warsaw Pact was still not significant, as it was not even suggested that agreement should be reached by convening its Political Consultative Committee, though the Warsaw Pact would have provided a requisite legal framework. The crisis management still proceeded in the traditional way of summoning the party leaders to Moscow. Because of the short notice and the extraordinary situation only the Czechoslovaks, the East Germans, and the Bulgarians could send representatives on 24 October. Ernő Gerő was detained by the events in Budapest, while the Romanian leadership, headed by Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, was making visit of penance to Belgrade on 20-27 October. Meanwhile the situation was changing radically in any case. The original plan for intervention in Poland came off the agenda, as the new leader of the Polish Communist party, Władysław Gomułka, had given assurances to Khrushchev on the telephone that Communist dictatorship in Poland was in no danger and the security interests of the Soviet bloc could be guaranteed. This meant the country would remain a staunch member of the Warsaw Pact and not raise the issue of the withdrawal of Soviet troops. But in the meantime the situation in Hungary had become critical, where the peaceful 23 October demonstration calling for reforms had escalated by evening into an armed uprising. So Khrushchev presented the 24 October summit with the facts that had occurred.

On the same day, there arrived in Moscow a Chinese delegation...
and Široký, the Politburo of the Czechoslovak Communist Party passed a resolution stating that “if need be,” Czechoslovakia would, “make an active contribution” to the struggle against the Hungarian “counterrevolution” in defense of the people’s democratic system. It is perhaps more surprising still that Khrushchev and Malenkov flew on from Bucharest to Sofia to meet the Bulgarian leaders, who could not for some reason attend the Bucharest meeting. What has been discovered so far might support the assumption that the Soviets would have considered the Romanian and Czechoslovak offers had there been more time to prepare for the intervention. To be sure, just a few months later Khrushchev raised the idea to János Kádár that it could be considered that troops from the Warsaw Pact nations, including Hungary could send their troops “to the Soviet Union, perhaps to the Far East, to guard the socialist camp from the Japanese. Perhaps some units could be sent to Moscow. This would not weaken the unity between our countries. We raise our people in the spirit of such unity.”

This flurried briefing of allies is conspicuous not only because the Soviets had never done anything similar before, but also because no such move was envisaged in the Presidium resolution of 31 October, as has been seen. One possible explanation is that it was concluded after the Soviet-Polish meeting it would be useful to consult the other allies as well, especially as there could be no doubt that the Czechoslovaks, Romanians, and Bulgarians (unlike the Poles) would give the planned measures their decided support. It is also possible that parting advice was given by the Chinese delegation headed by Liu Shaoqi, which left Moscow on 3 October, arguing that consultation would enhance the legitimacy of the Soviet intervention. Finally, we cannot exclude the possibility that Khrushchev may have recalled the Soviet government statement of 30 October, for just a couple of days before new emphasis had been given to placing relations between the Soviet Union and its allies on a new basis of “partnership.” It would hardly have been consistent with that to have an intervention in a Warsaw Pact member-state without consulting the other members. Certainly the incident foreshadowed the slow but inevitable development of a process of multinational foreign policy coordination. The two crises in East-Central Europe indirectly helped the Warsaw Pact to “define itself,” as well as developing its political consultative function and to some extent its policing role.

After Khrushchev and Malenkov had visited Bucharest and Sofia, they arrived exhausted in the evening of 2 November on the island of Brioni, where they had talks with Tito, Aleksandar Ranković, Edvard Kardelj, and the Yugoslav ambassador in Moscow, Veljko Mićunović. The Soviets were prepared to implement the plan even if the Yugoslav view was negative, but they held the talks nonetheless as they knew the strong influence Yugoslav propaganda had had on the radical party operations in Hungary. Initially, CPSU Presidium decided to send Khrushchev and Malenkov to Budapest immediately. When Khrushchev called Kádár after the meeting to inform him of the visit Kádár argued that the Czechoslovak, Romanian, and Bulgarian preparations for the Hungarian Revolution. Furthermore, a letter from Tito to the Central Leadership of the Hungarian Workers’ Party on 29 October had pledged support for the Imre Nagy government and its new policy of reassessing events, although it had warned sternly of the danger of counterrevolution as well. But Tito had been hoping that Hungary would follow the Yugoslav path and been disappointed by events in Hungary in subsequent days. He had found instead that the new system had taken two steps at a time and begun to resemble the Austrian model, which Tito found unacceptable. So it was a great relief to Khrushchev and Malenkov to find that the Yugoslav leaders agreed on the need for intervention and even promised to assist in removing Imre Nagy’s group from the political scene.

While the process of Soviet Bloc multilateral decision-making during the crisis in Czechoslovakia in 1968 is well known today, it is less known that the first time that the members of the Warsaw Pact jointly and directly intervened into the internal politics of another member state occurred after the Hungarian revolution in 1956. On 1-4 January 1957, an extraordinary Soviet Bloc summit meeting was held in Budapest with the participation of the Soviet, Hungarian, Bulgarian, Czechoslovak, and Romanian party leadership. The meeting had been called on very short notice to deal mainly with Hungary’s internal situation. A Soviet Bloc meeting was originally proposed by the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party in mid-November to discuss the new type of relationship between Moscow and its allies proclaimed in the Soviet Government declaration of 30 October 1956. While this proposal was left unanswered in Moscow, in late December János Kádár, leader of the Hungarian party and government had another urgent motivation to initiate consultation with the Kremlin. He received information from the Romanian party to the effect that Zoltán Szántó, then interned together with the rest of the Imre Nagy group in Romania, would be sent back to Hungary soon. Kádár, alarmed about the possibility of a Soviet-Romanian plot to replace him with Szántó, a Muscovite and a former Comintern official, suggested that a meeting of the Soviet, Romanian, and Hungarian leaders be convened to discuss the issue of the Nagy group. The reason, however, for the actual convening of the meeting was not Kádár’s but Khrushchev’s fear of a very different nature: on 29 December the CPSU Presidium was informed of and discussed right away a forthcoming public declaration by the Kádár government, to be published on 5 or 6 January 1957, which alarmed Moscow because it contained a provision that would allow non-Communist parties, as parts of a Patriotic Bloc, a role, albeit a sharply limited one—akin to the Czechoslovak model—in Hungary. The Presidium decided to send Khrushchev and Malenkov to Budapest immediately. When Khrushchev called Kádár after the meeting to inform him of the visit Kádár argued that the Czechoslovak, Romanian, and Bulgarian
the scope of the discussion in part to include the practical implications of the 30 October Soviet government declaration. Although his request was eventually met, there could be not much satisfaction for him in the meeting of the five parties which predominantly dealt with the internal Hungarian political situation. The Soviets and their colleagues at the meeting were insistent that the provision on a multi-party system be struck before the declaration was due to be made public, and indeed, neither the final communiqué of the meeting nor the government program made mention of the multi-party issue. Another major topic discussed at the session was the fate of the Imre Nagy group. From the available sources it is clear that the meeting yielded crucial decisions, which opened the way for the trial and ultimately execution of the former prime minister and several of his associates.

THE BEGINNING OF THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF SOVIET-BLOC FOREIGN POLICY COORDINATION IN THE KHRUSHCHEV ERA

As is well known, no structure of any kind was set up for the military-political alliance of the Soviet bloc—except for formally establishing a Political Consultative Committee—when signing the Warsaw Treaty in May 1955. While the future function of the new organization was to be clarified for the Soviet leaders themselves during the years to come, in the course of the year of the “spirit of Geneva” it became obvious that a more effective model of foreign policy coordination had to be established in the bloc.

It was thus not by chance that at the first session of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee (PCC) held in Prague on 28 January 1956, just a few weeks following the Soviet Bloc summit in Moscow in early January, a decision was made that the Council of Foreign Ministers and a Permanent Secretariat should be established as a subsidiary organ of the PCC. As is well known, no such bodies were actually formed within the Warsaw Pact in 1956, or indeed, not up until exactly twenty years later, in 1976. While it is clear that from the mid-1960s the opposition of Romania blocked such plans, further research will be needed to show why the Soviet leadership did not implement these resolutions in the period between 1956 and 1961 when they were still “plenipotentiary” masters of the Soviet bloc. This is all the more interesting as we now know that in this same period an intensive process of policy coordination never before took place in the Soviet Bloc.

Following the year of crises in 1956, concerning foreign policy coordination in the Soviet Bloc there was a shift from the multilateral model of the years 1953-1956 to a mixed model of bilateral and multilateral consultations. After the failed coup d’etat of June 1957 Khrushchev solidified his power and from 1958 filled both the post of Prime Minister and CPCSU first secretary. Unlike Stalin, he loved to travel and until his fall in October 1964 he made numerous visits to the countries of the Eastern Bloc as well. Foreign policy coordination at the multilateral level became also increasingly intensive between 1957 and 1964; during these eight years five summit meetings, five WP PCC meetings, five Comecon summits (attended by the top leaders), one meeting of the foreign ministers, and three meetings of the defense ministers were held (altogether fifteen summits plus four high level consultations).

At these meetings no serious debates occurred yet—except for in the Comecon—mainly what happened was that Khrushchev gave detailed information on the international situation and the position of the Soviet Union. The practice of these years, however, set the model for Soviet Bloc policy coordination that became more intensive, now including serious internal debates starting right after the fall of Khrushchev. This period of very intensive policy coordination within the Soviet Bloc during the years 1956-1961, and especially during the second Berlin crisis from 1958-1961 created the illusion that the East Central European leaders were now important—even if not equal—partners of Moscow. Therefore, the Soviet policy of providing “zero information” to the allies concerning the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 caused a real shock in the Soviet Bloc.

The Warsaw Pact member countries learned a serious lesson in October 1962 as they suddenly realized the extent of their defenselessness. It was especially hard for them to understand, that if the Soviet leaders had considered the Berlin crisis, which had generated significantly lower international tension, important enough to hold regular consultations with the allies, then how it could have happened that a third world war had nearly broken out while the members of the eastern military bloc just had to stand by and wait for the denouement without any substantial information. Had they known that, contrary to the claims of Khrushchev’s propaganda, it was not the Soviet Union, but the United States that had a significant, approximately triple superiority with respect to intercontinental missiles at the time! It was the Romanian leadership that drew the most radical conclusion from the case: in October 1963, the Romanian foreign minister, requesting utmost secrecy, informed his American counterpart that Romania would remain neutral in the case of a nuclear world war. On the grounds of this standpoint, he requested the Americans not to set Romania as a target for a nuclear strike. Thus the Romanian trend of conducting a deviant policy, which had appeared in the economic area as early as 1958 and was officially admitted in 1964, can be attributed, at least to a significant extent, to the impact of the Cuban missile crisis.

The Polish leadership was equally indignant at the events, furthermore, they considered, that the Soviet leaders did not understand the significance of the affair, therefore they would continue to reward Poland...
inary consultations as unimportant. Among other things, the Polish leaders objected to Moscow's lack of consultation with Warsaw Pact member countries concerning the nuclear test ban treaty, especially since they had to sign it as well after the contract had been concluded. During his negotiations in Budapest in November 1963, Gomułka stated that Cuba intended to join the Warsaw Pact, which would pose a significant threat to the security of the Eastern bloc as well as world peace. Therefore he firmly declared that should the request be officially submitted, Poland would veto Cuba's admission. The Polish leaders saw the solution in intensifying preliminary consultation within the Warsaw Pact, and significantly boosting the political role of individual member states.51

The East German leaders were also critical of the Soviet behavior during the Cuban missile crisis. Years later Walter Ulbricht complained to the Romanian leaders saying that,

it goes without saying that we must make improvements since we do not want things to happen as in 1962, during the crisis in the Carribean Sea. If we are a pact intended for defense and fight in common, the steps that are to be taken must be the result of everybody's will.52

Although the Hungarian leadership was much more cautious in criticizing the Soviet behavior than the Poles, it basically agreed with the Polish views pertaining to the nature of the future cooperation within the Warsaw Pact. It was clearly indicated by the fact that Kádár, during his visit in Moscow in July 1963, proposed to establish a Committee of Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers, long before the plans to reform the Warsaw Pact were officially placed on the agenda in 1965-1966.53 The clear objective of the initiative was to place the Soviet leadership under the pressure of necessity for consultation and information provision as well as to enforce the multilateral nature of the decision-making process. Kádár clearly stated to Khrushchev that,

the question is that there must not be a case when the Soviet government publishes various statements and the other governments read them in the newspaper. . . . I thought of a preliminary consultation. I have also told [Khrushchev], that experience showed it is better to dispute sooner rather than later.54

It is interesting that the Soviet leaders, who actually suggested this idea already at the cradle of the Warsaw Pact in January 1956 and supported it later too, from 1965 on, at this point flatly rejected the proposal. Khrushchev's argument was based on the pretext that at a time when a "sovereignty disease" broke out in the camp (referring to Romania's position), the reaction of the member states would be wrong, and they would only misunderstand this intention. Romania, however, opposed only the institutionalization of foreign policy coordination and in fact was herself pressing for preliminary consultations as it was clearly presented at the meeting of deputy foreign ministers in Berlin in February 1966.55

The pressure for regular consultation by the allies, eventually turned out to be stronger than expected, so hardly half a year after Kádár's intervention, on 2 January 1964—referring to such demands for consultation from "individual sister parties," that is, those of the Hungarian and Polish parties—Khrushchev himself made a proposal for the organization of regular meetings of the Warsaw Pact foreign ministers or their deputies.56 This was the first reference to the possibility of establishing foreign policy coordination in the Warsaw Pact at a level lower than the originally designated Council of Foreign Ministers (e.g., at the level of deputy foreign ministers).

The first meeting of deputy foreign ministers took place in Warsaw in December 1964 and from that time on they held sessions more and more regularly. These meetings gradually became the most important working forum of foreign policy coordination within the Warsaw Pact until the dissolution of the alliance in 1991.

A SPECIAL CASE OF FOREIGN POLICY COORDINATION: EAST EUROPEAN MEDIATION DURING THE VIETNAM WAR

It is well known that U.S.-Soviet and Soviet-West German backchannel diplomacy played a crucial role in the settlement of the German question and the success of the CSCE process in the golden years of détente between 1969 and 1975, but the same willingness for cooperation was also perceivable already during the escalation of the Vietnam war in 1965-1966. In public the Soviets and their allies harshly condemned the American aggression, therefore official Soviet-American relations were rather strained. In reality, however, the Kremlin, interested in a rapprochement with the U.S. was aware of the sincerity of the Johnson administration's wish to find a peaceful solution to the crisis. Therefore Moscow urged some of the Soviet Bloc countries, notably Poland and Hungary with a mission to conduct secret negotiations with the leaders of North Vietnam and to urge them to enter into negotiations with Washingont and eventually accept the division of Vietnam.57 These mediation attempts failed because of the Chinese leaders, who by that time had a predominant influence over Hanoi and who urged the North Vietnamese to fight until a final victory over the Americans.58 At a meeting with Hungarian leader Kádár in May 1965, Brezhnev himself expressed his belief that the Chinese wanted to use the conflict in Indochina to cause a direct military conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States and he added that Moscow would do everything possible to thwart that evil plan.59
It seems to be that using the war in Vietnam the Chinese want to force the Soviet Union and the United States into a direct conflict. This provocation will be rejected by the Soviets. ... The Soviet Union will give all support to Vietnam but it will prevent the conflict from developing into a World War.\footnote{60}

Brezhnev also confessed that,

since the existence of the Soviet Union they have never been engaged in a fight where they did not know the tactics, the strategy and the goal. For the first time, they have no idea about the plans of the Vietnamese and indeed the Chinese, and this has a very bad effect. It must be added that they do not blame the Vietnamese for this. In spite of this, they will help wherever they can. ... They have the impression that the bombing pause was not just a tactical move on the side of the Americans, but it shows that they themselves do not know how they would get out of this situation. Their intention to negotiate should be taken as serious.\footnote{61}

Ironically, the Chinese position voiced at a meeting with Ceausescu by Deng Xiaoping in the same period, in July 1965, basically confirms the above described Soviet view:

We have recently received precise information from which it results that the USA is still wondering whether they should bomb Hanoi and Haiphong, because this would mean bombing the guided-missile bases of the Soviet Union. However, through diplomatic contacts between the Soviet Union and the United States of America, the latter were officially informed about the locations of the Soviet guided-missile bases. That is what these common actions mean! To act jointly with them?! The Soviets wanted us to act jointly with them under the aegis of solving the Vietnamese issue on the basis of the collaboration between the United States of America and the Soviet Union. This is their real purpose.\footnote{62}

Deng Xiaoping was right: by 1965 the Soviet leadership was determined to start a campaign for legalizing the post-World War II European status quo and they were fully aware that it would be impossible without a rapprochement with the other superpower, the United States.

EUROPEAN SECURITY, THE HELSINKI PROCESS, AND THE SOVIET BLOC

By the middle of the 1960s it became obvious that the operational efficiency of the Warsaw Pact was satisfactory neither for the Soviet leaders nor for the member states, therefore—especially after the Cuban missile crisis—the efforts to reform the organization appeared more and more resolutely.\footnote{63} Thus those member states of the Warsaw Pact that were ready for the modernization of the organization and strengthening cooperation—especially Hungary and Poland—were interested in the development of a more effective and democratic structure in which the member states may obtain a significantly more serious role. These countries were thinking along the lines of such semi-democratic reforms for the implementation of which the Soviets showed at least some willingness. The idea of forming a Council of Foreign Ministers in the Warsaw Pact now offered Moscow's loyal allies a chance for regular preliminary consultation on foreign policy issues—exactly the practice they had been lobbying for.

The issue of the organizational transformation of the Warsaw Pact\footnote{64} was placed on the agenda in official form at the PCC session of January 1965 in Warsaw.\footnote{65} As a result of the resistance of the Romanian leaders opposing the transformation without any prior consideration, no real decision was made at this time besides the discussion of the issue, although the Soviet proposal to form the Council of Foreign Ministers was supported by all parties but the Romanians. The transformation of the political organization of the Warsaw Pact was discussed again in the session of the deputy foreign ministers in February 1966 in Berlin.\footnote{66} At a subsequent summit meeting of the party first secretaries held on 7 April, at the time of the 23rd Congress of the CPSU in Moscow, it was decided that the issue should be submitted to the next session of the Warsaw Pact PCC. A two-week long meeting of foreign ministers, held in Moscow in June, was charged with reaching an agreement on the definitive proposals. The closely cooperating parties (all WP members but Romania) proposed holding the sessions of the PCC at regular intervals and establishing the Council of Foreign Ministers as well as a Permanent Secretariat with headquarters in Moscow. These proposals were all rejected by the Romanians who were trying to preserve the Warsaw Pact as loose an organization as possible.\footnote{67}

Thus at the 1966 June Bucharest PCC—in order to be able to work out a unified position concerning a call for the convention of a pan-European conference on European security—the issue of the organizational transformation of the WP was sacrificed by Moscow and was taken off of the agenda as a result of a last minute secret deal between the Soviet and Romanian leaders.\footnote{68} The reform of the Warsaw Pact as well as the plan for the establishment of the Council of Foreign Ministers was buried for several years.

Ironically, however, the Soviet bloc's project on working for an European security conference unfolding after the PCC session in Bucharest, eventually, in the long run, contributed to the establishment of much more intensive foreign policy coordination within the Warsaw Pact than ever before. After the WP's Bucharest declaration, Moscow began very firmly urging the member states of the alliance to engage in bilateral negotiations with the Western European countries to convince them how significant this initiative was with respect to the development of Euro-
relations. The main goal of this campaign was to promote the Soviets' most important strategic goal, that is, convening the European security conference in order to confirm the European status quo that had been established after the Second World War. This development resulted in active participation of some of the East-Central European countries on an unprecedented level—especially Poland, Hungary, and Romania—in international politics, which promoted their further emancipation both within their own alliance and in the East-West relationship overall. These bilateral negotiations that were going on uninterruptedly up until the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, contributed to easing international tensions, gradually building confidence between the representatives of the two sides and promoting the development of a common European conscience in the long run. As a result, the European allies of the Soviet Union participated in the preparatory negotiations for the Helsinki Conference not simply as the mere executors of Soviet policy but in several cases they acted as independent entities, often playing an important role in shaping the overall CSCE process.

While the Bucharest declaration of the WP served as a catalyst, the declaration of the Warsaw Pact member states that finally did initiate the multilateral preparatory process for the European security conference was issued at the WP PCC meeting in Budapest on 17 March 1969. The main achievement of the meeting was the acceptance by all parties of the Soviet-Hungarian proposal that there should be no preconditions for the convening of an ESC. The inclusion of this thesis in the Budapest Call would prove to be a crucial factor in bringing about the CSCE process. While for outsiders the unanimous Warsaw Pact position looked only too logical, in reality this decision was made after unprecedented harsh debates among the WP members. We now know that by the mid-1960s the Soviet bloc was clearly divided into a security-concerned and an economy-oriented sub-bloc as far as the German question was concerned. Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania had no serious unsettled issues with the FRG, therefore they were definitely seriously interested in the economic cooperation, increasing trade and taking over cutting-edge technologies. The members of the security-concerned sub-bloc (the GDR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia), on the other hand, while also interested in economic cooperation with the West, were primarily interested in guaranteeing their security by acquiring assurances from the FRG to recognize their post-1945 borders. The Budapest Call then clearly meant the victory of the economy-oriented sub-bloc over their opponents, however, the continuous struggle between the two groups characterized the Warsaw Pact decision making process up until the settlement of the German question at the end of 1973. This also means that during the formative years from 1969 to 1973 Romania, while publicly playing up their "independent foreign policy line," during the Soviet Bloc foreign policy coordination concerning the WP, in fact, was in the middle of 1967, having gained a nantly constructive role, mostly acting in a veritable coalition with the Soviet Union and Hungary. Although the Romanian leaders further objected to the institutionalization of foreign policy coordination, in the bloc they were the most serious advocates of opening to the West since the mid-1960s, so they were truly interested in the success of this project. Thus Bucharest became willing to take part in the coordination process at all levels.

The Hungarian leadership was not less interested in opening to the West, especially to the FRG, than was Romania, but they pursued a different policy. They assumed correctly that the Soviet Bloc's objectives concerning the German question and convening a pan-European security conference must be achieved within the framework of a very divided Warsaw Pact. Hence, they deduced that for the sake of success, much more than before, a more effective and more systematic coordination of foreign policy was necessary within the Soviet bloc. Perhaps effected by the fact that Romania gave up its long time opposition to the creation of the Committee of Defense Ministers at the Budapest PCC meeting, the Hungarian leaders decided to raise the issue of the establishment of a permanent organ for foreign policy coordination (e.g., the Council of Foreign Ministers again, that had been proposed by the Hungarian leadership on several occasions since 1958). Clearly there was an awareness that Romania opposed the establishment of the council, nevertheless they hoped that Leninist gradualism would still prevail in this respect too. One of the two proposed versions would be a "coordination light" model: not the creation of an official body, namely the Council of Foreign Ministers, but a regular platform of foreign ministers. During a visit to Moscow in December 1969, Foreign Minister János Péter mentioned the above proposal to Andrei Gromyko, which the Soviets promptly adopted and authorized the Hungarians to start preparations for the required bilateral consultative negotiations. In January 1970, Deputy Foreign Minister Frigyes Puja paid a visit to Bucharest to discuss the plan, but the mission eventually failed (the Romanians consented to the creation of the Committee of Foreign Ministers only in 1974 and under different conditions, and the body was finally established in 1976).

In the process of establishing a unified and thus powerful Warsaw Pact position concerning the planned European security conference the next important step was the meeting of the WP foreign ministers in Budapest in June 1970. There the participants, after another round of harsh internal debates, reiterated that the convening of a European security conference had no preconditions. This was highly significant since the Polish, East German, and Czechoslovak sides unsparingly insisted during the post-Budapest Call period that the Soviet bloc indeed would stress that the settlement of the German question should be a specific precondition. In other words, the WP theoretically could have back-tracked tactically as a result of internal pressures, which would have en
ously hindered and delayed the process. However, the specific close cooperation between Soviet and Hungarian diplomacy, coupled with the virtual support of the Romanian side, succeeded in circumventing this eventuality.79

Thus the basic Soviet Bloc policy vis-à-vis the European security conference was settled in this early stage, so from now on the WP states’ internal debates were once again concentrated on the solution of the German question. An important decision was made already at the WP PCC session held at the beginning of December 1970, convened just before the signing of the Polish-FRG Treaty, which was regarded another significant success on the road to settling the German issue. This was the time that representatives of the WP were informed of the Polish-German deal on the basis of which the Poles were given permission to enter into diplomatic relations with the FRG as the new socialist country after the ratification of the Polish-FRG Treaty.80

It was worthy of note that this solution, which was hardly based on principles but which undoubtedly gave evidence of much flexibility, was accepted by the leaders of the GDR too, while the GDR leadership had been vehemently against even the planned commencement of negotiations between Poland and the FRG a year before. However, the time-table for the other member states was reconfirmed: the other three countries—Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Hungary—cannot normalize their relations with the FRG only if a) the Soviet-FRG and the Polish-FRG Treaties are ratified; b) the GDR-FRG relations are normalized, including the recognition of the GDR in accordance with international law; and c) the FRG acknowledges that the Munich Agreement was invalid from the very beginning.

The next important stage in the process of political coordination that was getting quite intensive within the Warsaw Pact these days was the WP PCC session held in Prague in January 1972. The conference adopted a new statement in which the participants urged for convening the European conference on security and cooperation as soon as possible. They accepted the Finnish proposal to begin preparatory talks at the level of ambassadors and announced that they would nominate their representatives and called upon the other European countries to do the same. They called upon the governments of the United States and Canada to begin practical preparations so that the multilateral preparatory talks could begin in 1972.

Of course the announcement failed to mention that the major issue at the conference was the shaping of relations with the FRG in the future.

Although the time-table that had been in existence since the Warsaw diktat of February 196781 and was later made more precise in December 1969,82 became quite soft at the Moscow PCC session held in August 1970, the participants at that time still unanimously adopted it with the two treaties was clearly within reach, fighting flared up again among the Soviet Bloc leaders in order to enforce their own interests, and practically there were almost as many positions as there were participants at the meeting. In fact five different positions can be distinguished on the basis of accessible sources.83

1. East German position: diplomatic relations can only be established if the GDR is admitted to the UN.
2. Czechoslovakian and Soviet position: diplomatic relations can only be established after the FRG recognized the invalidity of the Munich Agreement from the very beginning.
3. Polish position: sometime after the ratification Poland alone will enter into diplomatic relations with the FRG but will coordinate this step with the others.
4. Hungarian position: after the ratification of the treaties new negotiations should be conducted and then Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria should settle their relations with Bonn.
5. Romanian position: they repeated their earlier proposal that the four countries should now enter into diplomatic relations with the FRG.

At the Crimean meeting of the WP countries on 31 July 1972, Brezhnev took great pains to prevent the development of chaotic conditions that had characterized the January PCC session in Prague in the German issue. After the ratification of the two treaties he judged that the FRG could be forced to make additional concessions only by means of concerted and uniform action. Therefore, with a view to prevent any serious dispute, he made it clear: “If all the socialist countries were to enter into diplomatic relations with the FRG in the near future, that would practically mean weakening or even losing one of the most important tools of influencing Bonn’s policy. This step would further complicate the position of our German comrades at the talks being conducted with the FRG at present.”

Practically, it could be interpreted as he withdrew the special permission fought out by the Poles before.84 On the other hand this wording did not actually preclude the option of another Soviet-Polish special deal, and indeed, Poland did enter into diplomatic relations with the FRG in the fall of 1972.

As we have seen, the key to successfully initiate the CSCE process by the Soviet Bloc was to declare in the Budapest Call in March 1969 that there were no preconditions to convening a pan-European security conference, seemingly a serious concession as compared to the content of the Bucharest declaration. In reality, this was only a tactical concession, aimed at inviting a positive Western response and all the preconditions originally made public in Bucharest had to be met by the West and especially the FRG before such a conference could be convened. This became possible because all these claims were basically dropped for the
character, and in fact they were far from irrational. Thus the German question was settled according the wishes of the Soviet Bloc by the end of 1972, except for settling the FRG-Czechoslovakian dispute over the Munich Agreement but even that issue was resolved by the middle of 1973.

All this opened the way to starting East-West multilateral talks on the agenda and procedures of a pan-European security conference and the first preliminary talks were held in Helsinki, in November 1972. During the CSCE talks up to the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in August 1975, the structure of intra-bloc conflicts changed dramatically. From now on the states of the security oriented sub-bloc, having achieved all they had wanted, became interested in formulating and representing a united and thus powerful Soviet Bloc position vis-à-vis a group of rather divided NATO and neutral states. Romania, on the other hand, took it seriously, that officially the talks were conducted by individual European states and was not willing to subordinate the country’s specific interests to a joint bloc position. This development created new challenges for the Soviet leaders, and this was one of the reasons why no WP PCC meeting was held in the crucial period between January 1972 and April 1974, although Brezhnev was urged by several Soviet Bloc leaders to consult on the international situation at the highest level. So now one of the most important tasks was to exclude or at least neutralize the Romanian factor. This became possible by introducing a special foreign policy coordination mechanism that characterized the CSCE process all along: a combination of regular bilateral and multilateral consultations. According to this model during this period, beginning in 1969, before a forthcoming high level, or summit meeting several Soviet deputy foreign ministers visited the WP states—except Romania—concurrently to harmonize Soviet Bloc policy. Then at the multilateral level a more or less unified position was represented vis-à-vis Bucharest which was adopted by majority vote, which often forced the Romanians to give up their opposition or resulted in a compromise.

A new model was introduced at the multilateral foreign policy coordination level as well. While the establishment of the Committee of Foreign Ministers was blocked yet another time in 1970 by Romania, they were not against having consultations at a lower level. Thus the regular meetings of the deputy foreign ministers gained great importance as the most efficient WP multilateral forum during the CSCE process. The idea that foreign policy coordination might be more successful in the Warsaw Pact at the level of deputy foreign ministers originally appeared in Khrushchev’s letter to the Soviet Bloc leaders of January 1964 cited above. The Hungarian proposal of 1970 raised the same issue again and finally it met with success, for from 1970 the meetings of deputy foreign ministers took place on a regular basis every year and from 1975 even more frequently (in 1986 alone eight such sessions were held), so this forum was undoubtedly the most powerful all-aggregation forum of the period 1970 and 1975 the meetings of deputy foreign ministers assumed an even more important role. In this period several sessions were held to coordinate a joint Warsaw Pact policy in the various preparatory phases of the CSCE process. While between 1969 and 1975 there were four conferences of the ministers of foreign affairs, the deputy foreign ministers met nine times.

Since the end of the 1960s the meetings of deputy foreign ministers had become a regular forum for consultation within the Warsaw Pact, though they were never formalized and they worked in an ad hoc manner all along. The Romanian leadership did not object either because it also believed that regular consultation—without any obligation—was in fact useful. For them the meeting of deputy foreign ministers was an adequately flexible form of consultation and the level of representation was also low enough for them not to be too much concerned if a problematic issue was raised, since they could easily say that a higher forum was needed to make a decision on that particular issue. The relative efficiency of the meetings of deputy foreign ministers was essentially due to the fact that they did not have a decision-making role and served all along as a forum for the exchange of information, coordination and preparation of decisions. It could not make any decisions, only recommendations at best, whose implementation fell within the competence of the highest leadership of each member state. Perhaps it is not too far-fetched to say that this institution was the most useful for the “closely cooperating” allies of the Soviet Union—among them especially for Poland, Hungary and the GDR—since they, unlike Romania, did not take the risk of open confrontation with the Soviet Union, so they had to bear the possible negative consequences of Soviet steps anyhow. However, in return to their cooperation at the meetings of deputy foreign ministers they rightly expected the Soviet leadership to provide up-to-date information for them on issues of foreign policy that affected the Warsaw Pact even at times when there was no PCC session or a conference of ministers of foreign affairs held for years. The meetings of deputy foreign ministers played a key role in the Warsaw Pact foreign policy coordination mechanism all along, and the documentary value of the reports on the meetings is greatly enhanced by the fact that real disputes emerged much more openly at this level than at higher forums. Several proposals and initiatives launched by the Soviets as well as other member states were first tested at this level too.

Maintaining the appearance of unity in the Warsaw Pact was of utmost importance for the Soviet leadership all along, even when Romania openly started to follow a separate political line in the middle of the 1960s. This ambition was not without some success, for while the differences of opinion within NATO surfaced more or less at the time they emerged, it is only in the last decade that scholarly publications start to reveal how serious internal disputes took place behind the scenes despite the public declarations and agreements which were explicitly stated.
the Romanian attitude at all. Therefore, it was especially important for the Soviet leadership that the highest forums, the conferences of the ministers of foreign affairs and especially the PCC sessions, should, if possible, only discuss issues on which the members had already arrived at some sort of a consensus. This was the point at which the meetings of deputy foreign ministers assumed a key role in that, on the one hand, the desired consensus was reached at this forum, and, on the other, issues on which there was no hope for a consensus, often did not make it to higher forums at all. Thus, the meetings of deputy foreign ministers gradually became a routine-like organ of foreign policy coordination within the Warsaw Pact that could be used in a more flexible and efficient way than any other forum, including, for that matter, the conference of the ministers of foreign affairs. Efficiency did not mean that an agreement was made on every issue raised at the sessions; rather, it meant that through the testing function mentioned above in most cases it became clear what should not be pressed at all and what could eventually be adopted by all the member states, perhaps after “working on” some of them (e.g., by means of direct Soviet-Romanian coordination).

The German question was finally settled according to the wishes of the Soviet Bloc by the end of 197388 what was clearly regarded a great victory in the East. Similarly, the Helsinki Final Act was seen as a long awaited legal guarantee for the legalization of the European status quo.

The price for the historical compromise was accepting Basket III with a promise that the free movement of people, information and ideas would be made possible in the Soviet Bloc states as well. However, in Yalta, Stalin too, signed the Declaration on Liberated Europe, explicitly promising holding free elections in Soviet-occupied East Central Europe in February 1945 and we know the result of that promise only too well. Indeed, the Soviet Bloc leaders, while aware of the problem, were confident that their authoritarian regimes and closed societies will effectively block attempts both by the West and the internal opposition in their countries at using the 3rd Basket for undermining their regimes.89 The principle of the non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, also included in the Helsinki Final Act, gave them a convenient legal basis for rejecting any unwanted intervention. While it is widely believed that Basket III and the U.S.-led human rights campaign crucially contributed to the eventual collapse of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, this role, in reality, was marginal. On the other hand, the role of Basket II is generally underestimated although the ever broadening economic cooperation between the Eastern and Western parts of Europe eventually led to a serious economic and financial dependency on and indebtedness to the West. We can argue that economic cooperation that was originally seen in the East as a vehicle for consolidating the Soviet Bloc economies especially by the transfer of developed technologies, by the end of the 1980s, became a stable element of the collapse of the Communist systems.90 The collapse itself, however, was neither due to the economic nor the human rights factor, but it occurred as a consequence of the collapse of the Soviet Union itself, which was underway since the middle of 1988. To be sure, between the two factors the role of the economic factor was much more significant.

NOTES

2. The continuous presence of the elements of cooperation and confrontation during the Cold War was pointed out already in Raymond Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation. American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1985).
4. Ibid.
6. The following paragraphs on Soviet-East European relations are based on Csaba Békés, “East Central Europe, 1953-1956.”
7. For a recent collection of essays on international politics after Stalin’s death see Larres and Osgood, eds., The Cold War after Stalin’s Death.
11. “You are not without merits. But then again, Zinovyev and Rykov were not without merits either, perhaps they were more meritorious than you are, and yet we did not hesitate to take firm steps against them when they became a threat to the party.” Békés, Byrne, Rainer, eds., The 1956 Hungarian Revolution, p. 63.
13. For the text of a complex policy paper on the future role of the Soviet bloc in world policy prepared by the Soviet Foreign Ministry for the summit meeting of European Communist leaders in Moscow in early January 1956, see Békés, Byrne and Westad, The Global Cold War, Third World Interventions, pp. 216-221.

15. Békés, Byrne, and Rainer, eds., The 1956 Hungarian Revolution, p. 154. This volume prints the document in full, while in FRUS it was previously published in a heavily sanitized version.

16. Ibid., p. 155.


18. On 20 October 1956, the CPSU Presidium decided to urgently convene a multilateral meeting on 24 October in Moscow with the participation of the representatives of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and the CDR.


21. This excepts the Afghan partisan war precipitated by the Soviet intervention in 1979, where the circumstances were rather different.


26. Ibid.


31. Ibid., p. 394.

32. Ibid., p. 393.


35. Békés, Byrne, and Rainer, eds., The 1956 Hungarian Revolution, p. 347.

36. Mičunović, Moskota Diary. Interestingly, several recent works on 1956 still state wrongly that the Bulgarian leaders were also briefed in Bucharest.

37. Speech of N. S. Khrushchev at the first session of the Soviet-Hungarian inter-governmental talks in Moscow on 21 March 1957. Csaba Békés, "Magyar-szovjet csústalalkozók, 1957-1965" [Hungarian-Soviet Summit Meetings. Documents], in György Litván, ed., Észköny, Vol. 6 (Budapest: 1956-os Intézet, 1998), pp. 150-151. This impromptu statement that exhibits Khrushchev's noble intentions was not kept in consideration in the future, but a similar topic was seriously brought up at the Moscow meeting of the Hungarian delegation: that to demonstrate the socialist camp's unity, the socialist countries' military corps should take place in the ceremonies in Moscow honoring the 40th anniversary of the 1917 October Revolution. The idea was definitely Khrushchev's, although it was noted that the HSWP will "initiate" it with the other sister-parties and this did happen in July 1957. In his letter to the CPSU CC, Kádár officially brought up the suggestion, and interestingly, he got a positive response to it. However, the evolution of world politics did not allow for the plan to be realized. In favor of détente this moment may be considered a demonstration of strength, which would impede the normalization of the East-West relationship.

38. Also odd is the absence of any reference to the Bucharest or Sofia visits in the next Presidium minutes after 31 October 1956.

39. Another question might be why the East German leaders were left out. Even the Soviet Union in the mid-1950s hardly saw the German Democratic Republic as a sovereign state, treating it in many ways as an occupied country, and this appeared in its status as an ally. The leaders of the German Socialist Unity Party had been invited to the 24 October consultation in Moscow, perhaps because the Polish crisis was on the overall agenda if they were directly affected as a neighboring country, all the more in view of the controversy over the Oder-Neisse line. In Albania's case, the country was seen as of little importance and the idea of briefing its leadership was not mentioned. On the other hand, it cannot be excluded that this omission may have also contributed to the steady worsening of Soviet-Albanian relations from the end of the 1950s.


41. Magyar Nemzet, 30 October 1956.

Cold War, Détente, and the Soviet Bloc, 1953-1975

Chapter 12


3. Ibid.

4. The Hungarian government declaration was published on 6 January 1957. For an English text of the communiqué see Békés, Byrne, and Rainer, eds., The 1956 Hungarian Revolution, pp. 493-495.


13. Ibid.


19. Memorandum on the visit of HSWP FC members János Kádár, Antal Ápró and Béla Biszkat in Moscow on 23-29 May 1965, MOL, M-KS 288. f. 5. cs. 367. 6.e.

20. Ibid.


22. On a multiarchival collection of the records of the Warsaw Pact FCC sessions, with introductions by Vojtech Mastny, see Warsaw Pact records/Party leaders (PHP web site www.isn.ethz.ch/php).


35. On Czechoslovakia, see Oldřich Tůma, “Negotiations Toward Establishing Diplomatic Relations between Czechoslovakia and the Federal Republic of Germany.”

79. For a recent study on Soviet Bloc policy concerning the CSCE process, see Csaba Békés, "The Warsaw Pact and the Helsinki Process, 1965-1970."

80. MOL, HSWF PC Minutes of the HSWF Political Committee on 8 December 1969, MOL KS 288, f. 5, s. 538, s. 6.


84. Report by János Kádár at the HSWF Political Committee meeting on 2 August 1972, MOL M KS 288, f. 5, s. 687, s. 6.


86. Békés, Locher, and Nuenlist, eds., The Records of the Warsaw Pact Deputy Foreign Ministers.

87. It is worth noting that from 1970 to 1985, that is, during the sixteen years before the Gorbachev era, there were nine PCC sessions and fourteen CMFA meetings, or meetings of ministers of foreign affairs, and during the same period of time twenty-three deputy foreign minister meetings were held.

88. The process ended when Bulgaria and Hungary established diplomatic relations with the FRG in December 1973.


90. I fully support the argument recently put forward by Juhana Aunesluoma to this effect: Juhana Aunesluoma, "Finlandization in Reverse: The CSCE and the Rise and Fall of Economic Détenente, 1968-1975," in Niedhart and Bange, eds., The CSCE 1975 and the Transformation of Europe, pp. 98-112.